From 32f76a2f20d602a845cafe2904a4fab80aeffb9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: thePR0M3TH3AN <adambrettmalin@protonmail.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 23:59:16 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Cover every owner-op client method's denial, completing the
 agent sweep

Extends the denied-request test to a table over all nine owner-op methods
rather than the three that happened to have surviving mutants, so a method
added later is covered the day it appears. Each one's dropped check produces
a different false success:

  shutdown()   -> void, reading as "the daemon stopped" while it is still
                  running and still holding seeds. The test now pings the
                  socket afterwards to prove it did not.
  status()     -> [], reading as "no profiles are held"
  tokenIssue() -> the STRING "undefined" handed back as a token
  tokenRevoke()-> void, "token revoked", while the token stays live
  tokenList()  -> undefined
  put()        -> NaN

agent.ts now sweeps to zero survivors across all 86 mutants, up from 39 under
the old vocabulary rule. Every mutation target is clean: 234 mutants, none
surviving.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN
---
 js/packages/cli/test/agentSecurity.test.ts | 29 +++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/js/packages/cli/test/agentSecurity.test.ts b/js/packages/cli/test/agentSecurity.test.ts
index 82c7e88a..e538bbc8 100644
--- a/js/packages/cli/test/agentSecurity.test.ts
+++ b/js/packages/cli/test/agentSecurity.test.ts
@@ -732,9 +732,32 @@ describe("a denied request is not a quiet zero", () => {
     process.env["SEEDPASS_AGENT_CAP"] = "not-the-capability";
     try {
       const client = new AgentClient(sock);
-      await expect(client.lock()).rejects.toThrow(/owner capability/);
-      await expect(client.highRiskLock(FINGERPRINT)).rejects.toThrow(/owner capability/);
-      await expect(client.highRiskStatus(FINGERPRINT)).rejects.toThrow(/owner capability/);
+      // Every owner-op method, so a new one added later is covered too.
+      const calls: [string, () => Promise<unknown>][] = [
+        ["lock", () => client.lock()],
+        ["highRiskLock", () => client.highRiskLock(FINGERPRINT)],
+        ["highRiskStatus", () => client.highRiskStatus(FINGERPRINT)],
+        // shutdown() returns void, so a dropped check reads as "the daemon
+        // stopped" while it is still running and still holding seeds.
+        ["shutdown", () => client.shutdown()],
+        // status() falls back to [], which reads as "no profiles are held".
+        ["status", () => client.status()],
+        // tokenIssue() would hand back the STRING "undefined" as a token.
+        ["tokenIssue", () => client.tokenIssue({ fingerprint: FINGERPRINT, scopes: ["read"] })],
+        ["tokenList", () => client.tokenList(FINGERPRINT)],
+        // tokenRevoke() returns void: "token revoked", while it stays live.
+        ["tokenRevoke", () => client.tokenRevoke("some-token-id")],
+        ["put", () => client.put(FINGERPRINT, MNEMONIC, 900)],
+      ];
+      for (const [name, call] of calls) {
+        await expect(call(), `${name} must throw when denied`).rejects.toThrow(
+          /owner capability/,
+        );
+      }
+
+      // The daemon is genuinely still up — proof that `shutdown` above did
+      // not quietly succeed while reporting nothing.
+      expect(await AgentClient.ping(sock)).toBe(true);
     } finally {
       if (previous === undefined) delete process.env["SEEDPASS_AGENT_CAP"];
       else process.env["SEEDPASS_AGENT_CAP"] = previous;