diff --git a/src/lock-publisher.mjs b/src/lock-publisher.mjs
index d01c68d..004bcd7 100644
--- a/src/lock-publisher.mjs
+++ b/src/lock-publisher.mjs
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
+import { randomUUID, randomInt } from 'node:crypto';
 import { SimplePool } from 'nostr-tools/pool';
 import {
   getPublishTimeoutMs,
diff --git a/src/services/governance/index.js b/src/services/governance/index.js
index 4d498da..9aa6778 100644
--- a/src/services/governance/index.js
+++ b/src/services/governance/index.js
@@ -220,8 +220,9 @@ export async function applyProposal(id) {
 
   // Git Commit (optional)
   try {
-    // We use execFileSync for git operations to avoid command injection
-    // Ensure we are in repo root? cwd is repo root.
+    // We use execFileSync for git operations to avoid command injection.
+    // Explicitly using the array form ensures arguments are passed directly to the spawned process
+    // without shell interpretation, preventing command injection attacks via 'meta.target' or 'commitMsg'.
     execFileSync('git', ['add', meta.target]);
     const commitMsg = `feat(prompts): apply proposal ${id} by ${meta.author}`;
     execFileSync('git', ['commit', '-m', commitMsg]);
diff --git a/test/governance-security-impl.mjs b/test/governance-security-impl.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..acdc109
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/governance-security-impl.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
+import os from 'node:os';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+
+// Calculate paths relative to this file
+const __dirname = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
+const repoRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, '..');
+const governanceServicePath = path.resolve(repoRoot, 'src/services/governance/index.js');
+
+async function runTest() {
+  // Create temp dir
+  const tempDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'torch-gov-test-'));
+  console.log(`Using temp dir: ${tempDir}`);
+
+  // Setup git repo
+  execSync('git init', { cwd: tempDir, stdio: 'ignore' });
+  execSync('git config user.name "Test User"', { cwd: tempDir, stdio: 'ignore' });
+  execSync('git config user.email "test@example.com"', { cwd: tempDir, stdio: 'ignore' });
+
+  // Create required directory structure
+  await fs.mkdir(path.join(tempDir, 'src/prompts/daily'), { recursive: true });
+  await fs.mkdir(path.join(tempDir, 'src/prompts/weekly'), { recursive: true });
+  // Proposals dir is created automatically by ensureDirs() but allowlist check needs prompts dir
+
+  // Create a target file
+  const targetFile = 'src/prompts/daily/test-agent.md';
+  const absoluteTarget = path.join(tempDir, targetFile);
+  await fs.writeFile(absoluteTarget, 'Original Content');
+
+  // Commit initial state so we have a HEAD
+  execSync(`git add ${targetFile}`, { cwd: tempDir });
+  execSync('git commit -m "Initial commit"', { cwd: tempDir });
+
+  // Switch cwd to tempDir
+  const originalCwd = process.cwd();
+  try {
+    process.chdir(tempDir);
+    console.log(`Changed cwd to: ${process.cwd()}`);
+
+    // Import governance service dynamically so it picks up the new cwd
+    const governance = await import(governanceServicePath);
+
+    // Malicious payload
+    const maliciousPayload = 'attacker"; touch /tmp/pwned_check; echo "';
+    // const proposalId = `test-proposal-${Date.now()}`; // unused
+
+    // Manually create proposal metadata and files because createProposal also uses git diff
+    // We can use createProposal from the service, but we need to pass the malicious agent name there.
+    // Let's try using createProposal first.
+
+    const proposalContent = `Shared contract (required):\nRequired startup + artifacts + memory + issue capture\n\nNew Content`;
+
+    console.log('Creating proposal...');
+    const { id } = await governance.createProposal({
+      agent: maliciousPayload,
+      target: targetFile,
+      newContent: proposalContent,
+      reason: 'Testing security'
+    });
+
+    console.log(`Proposal created with ID: ${id}`);
+
+    // Verify metadata has the malicious author
+    const metaPath = path.join(tempDir, 'src/proposals', id, 'meta.json');
+    const meta = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(metaPath, 'utf8'));
+    if (meta.author !== maliciousPayload) {
+      throw new Error('Meta author does not match malicious payload');
+    }
+
+    // Apply proposal
+    console.log('Applying proposal...');
+    await governance.applyProposal(id);
+    console.log('Proposal applied.');
+
+    // Verification 1: Check if /tmp/pwned_check exists
+    try {
+      await fs.access('/tmp/pwned_check');
+      console.error('VULNERABILITY DETECTED: /tmp/pwned_check exists!');
+      process.exit(1);
+    } catch {
+      console.log('Security check passed: /tmp/pwned_check does not exist.');
+    }
+
+    // Verification 2: Check git log for commit message
+    const log = execSync('git log -1 --pretty=%B', { cwd: tempDir }).toString();
+    console.log(`Commit message: ${log}`);
+
+    if (!log.includes(maliciousPayload)) {
+      console.error('Verification failed: Commit message does not contain the payload literally.');
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+
+    // Check if the commit message looks "broken" (e.g. if newlines were injected)
+    // Here we just want to ensure the whole thing is in the message.
+    console.log('Verification passed: Commit message contains payload.');
+
+  } finally {
+    // Cleanup
+    process.chdir(originalCwd);
+    await fs.rm(tempDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    // Also remove /tmp/pwned_check if it exists (it shouldn't)
+    try { await fs.unlink('/tmp/pwned_check'); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+  }
+}
+
+runTest().catch(err => {
+  console.error('Test failed:', err);
+  process.exit(1);
+});
diff --git a/test/governance-security.test.mjs b/test/governance-security.test.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cefa3c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/governance-security.test.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+import { test } from 'node:test';
+import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+import assert from 'node:assert';
+
+const __dirname = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
+const implPath = path.join(__dirname, 'governance-security-impl.mjs');
+
+test('Governance Service Security: Command Injection Prevention', (_t) => {
+  // We run the implementation in a separate process to ensure process.cwd() isolation
+  // and to verify that the dynamic import picks up the correct paths.
+  try {
+    const output = execFileSync(process.execPath, [implPath], { encoding: 'utf8' });
+    // If we reach here, the process exited with code 0 (success)
+    // We can optionally check the output for specific messages if needed,
+    // but the implementation script asserts internally.
+    assert.ok(output.includes('Verification passed: Commit message contains payload.'), 'Output should confirm verification passed');
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error('Test implementation failed.');
+    if (err.stdout) console.error('STDOUT:', err.stdout);
+    if (err.stderr) console.error('STDERR:', err.stderr);
+    assert.fail(`Security test failed with exit code ${err.status}: ${err.message}`);
+  }
+});