diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 098822f..cb18d89 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ The previous Tor/OnionShare CLI version is preserved on the `legacy-tor` branch.
## Features
- **Author and publish.** Fill in the flyer fields and publish them as a Nostr `30078` parameterized replaceable event. Republishing with the same flyer name replaces the previous version.
-- **Anonymous by default, your identity if you want it.** The editor signs flyers under one of four identities: an **anonymous** per-device key (default, no setup), a **NIP-07 browser extension** (your secret never touches the page), an **imported `nsec`**, or a **NIP-46 remote signer** (paste a `bunker://` link — your secret stays in your signer app, the browser holds only an ephemeral key; session-only). An imported key signs in-memory for the session; tick "Remember on this device" to keep it, encrypted with a PIN (PBKDF2 → AES-GCM) — the plaintext secret is never stored. A short PIN is a convenience lock, not protection against a targeted attacker (see the [spec](docs/nostr-static-client-spec.md#publishing-identity)); the extension and remote-signer paths are stronger.
+- **Anonymous by default, your identity if you want it.** The editor signs flyers under one of four identities: an **anonymous** per-device key (default, no setup), a **NIP-07 browser extension** (your secret never touches the page), an **imported `nsec`**, or a **NIP-46 remote signer** (paste a `bunker://` link or scan a `nostrconnect://` QR with your signer app — your secret stays in the app, the browser holds only an ephemeral key; session-only). An imported key signs in-memory for the session; tick "Remember on this device" to keep it, encrypted with a PIN (PBKDF2 → AES-GCM) — the plaintext secret is never stored. A short PIN is a convenience lock, not protection against a targeted attacker (see the [spec](docs/nostr-static-client-spec.md#publishing-identity)); the extension and remote-signer paths are stronger.
- **Publish confirmation.** After signing and publishing, a modal shows the new flyer's URL to copy, so authors know they're done and where to find it (localized, like everything else).
- **Edit, re-publish, and delete your flyers.** Because flyers are replaceable events, the author can edit one in place (same key + Flyer Name keeps the same URL), re-publish it as a keep-alive so relays don't age it out, or delete it. Delete publishes a replaceable **tombstone** (so VoxVera hides it even where relays ignore deletions) **and** a NIP-09 deletion request — best-effort, author-only.
- **Import / export a flyer design.** Save the current flyer as a portable `.json` file and load it back later — or hand it to someone else. The design file holds the content and relay list but **nothing identity-bound** (no npub, address, or signature; those are generated at publish), so a recipient can import it and publish under their own key. Importing asks for confirmation before replacing what's in the editor.
diff --git a/docs/nostr-static-client-spec.md b/docs/nostr-static-client-spec.md
index 6df0d83..139e994 100644
--- a/docs/nostr-static-client-spec.md
+++ b/docs/nostr-static-client-spec.md
@@ -143,15 +143,22 @@ identity controls (`activeIdentity` / `signActiveEvent` in `nostr-client.js`):
memory** for the session. If the user ticks "Remember on this device", the
secret is encrypted with a PIN and stored as `voxvera_identity_nsec_enc`; the
plaintext secret is never written to storage.
-- **Remote signer (NIP-46 / bunker).** The user pastes a `bunker://` link from a
- signer app (nsec.app, Amber, …). The client mints an **ephemeral** local key,
- connects to the bunker relay over a raw WebSocket, and exchanges encrypted
- kind-`24133` JSON-RPC requests (`connect` → `get_public_key` → `sign_event`).
- The user's real secret never reaches the browser. Requests are encrypted with
- **NIP-44** (with a NIP-04 decrypt fallback for older signers); the vendored
- nostr-tools bundle has no nip46 module, so this client is hand-rolled. The
- connection is **session-only** — the bunker token is never persisted, so a
- reload returns to anonymous.
+- **Remote signer (NIP-46).** The user's real secret never reaches the browser;
+ the client mints an **ephemeral** local key and exchanges encrypted
+ kind-`24133` JSON-RPC requests (`connect` → `get_public_key` → `sign_event`)
+ over a raw WebSocket. Two connect paths are offered:
+ - **`bunker://` (paste).** The user pastes a link the signer app generated;
+ the client connects out to that bunker relay.
+ - **`nostrconnect://` (QR).** The client generates the link itself, renders it
+ as a QR (`makeQrSvg`) plus a copyable link, and listens on a rendezvous relay
+ (`relay.nsec.app`); the signer app scans it and connects back, proving the
+ connection by echoing the client's random `secret`. The discovered signer
+ pubkey is then used for the durable connection.
+
+ Requests are encrypted with **NIP-44** (with a NIP-04 decrypt fallback for
+ older signers); the vendored nostr-tools bundle has no nip46 module, so this
+ client is hand-rolled. The connection is **session-only** — nothing is
+ persisted, so a reload returns to anonymous.
The chosen mode is remembered in `voxvera_identity_mode` (and the npub in
`voxvera_identity_npub` for display). On reload: NIP-07 re-fetches the pubkey;
@@ -278,10 +285,11 @@ de-duplicated per author+`d` identifier, keeping the latest.
- **The board is gated behind a connected Nostr identity.** On load it shows a
login gate (`#board-gate`) instead of the table, with four ways to connect:
a **NIP-07** extension (`window.nostr.getPublicKey()`), a **NIP-46 remote
- signer** (paste a `bunker://` link; same hand-rolled client as the editor —
- it establishes the viewer pubkey via `get_public_key` and keeps the connection
- so `getBoardSigner` can sign reports/deletes remotely this session, then falls
- back to read-only after a reload), **pasting an `nsec`** (decoded in-page to
+ signer** (either paste a `bunker://` link or scan a `nostrconnect://` QR; same
+ hand-rolled client as the editor — it establishes the viewer pubkey via
+ `get_public_key` and keeps the connection so `getBoardSigner` can sign
+ reports/deletes remotely this session, then falls back to read-only after a
+ reload), **pasting an `nsec`** (decoded in-page to
derive the pubkey, then discarded — the secret is never stored or transmitted),
or **creating a new key** (reuses this device's anon key in
`voxvera_nostr_anon_secret_hex` if present, else generates one, and reveals the
diff --git a/docs/roadmap.md b/docs/roadmap.md
index 70978d5..2050dde 100644
--- a/docs/roadmap.md
+++ b/docs/roadmap.md
@@ -198,19 +198,22 @@ board can show them flyers from people they trust.
riskier than a NIP-07 extension that keeps the key isolated; the input is a
password field, the value is cleared after use, and nothing is transmitted. The
**NIP-46 remote signer** (below) is now the safer mobile path.
-- **NIP-46 remote signer (shipped — editor *and* board).** Both the editor's
- publishing identity and the board's login gate can connect a remote signer
- (bunker) by pasting a `bunker://` link: the user's secret stays in their signer
- app (nsec.app, Amber, …) and the browser only holds an ephemeral local key. The
- client is hand-rolled over a raw WebSocket using the vendored NIP-44 (with a
- NIP-04 decrypt fallback) — the bundle ships no nip46 module. On the board it
- establishes the viewer pubkey and keeps the connection so reports/deletes are
- signed remotely (read-only after a reload). Connections are **session-only**
- (the bunker token is never written to disk, so a reload returns to anonymous /
- read-only). Covered by the cross-engine e2e suite (editor: connect →
- get_public_key → sign_event → publish; board: connect → reveal → report
- signed through the remote signer — both against a fake signer doing real
- NIP-44 crypto).
+- **NIP-46 remote signer (shipped — editor *and* board, both connect paths).**
+ Both the editor's publishing identity and the board's login gate can connect a
+ remote signer two ways: **(a) `bunker://`** — paste a link the signer app
+ generated; and **(b) `nostrconnect://` (QR)** — *we* generate the link, show it
+ as a QR (and a copyable link for one-device use), and the signer app scans it
+ and connects back (verified by echoing our secret). Either way the user's
+ secret stays in their signer app (nsec.app, Amber, …) and the browser holds
+ only an ephemeral local key. The client is hand-rolled over a raw WebSocket
+ using the vendored NIP-44 (with a NIP-04 decrypt fallback) — the bundle ships
+ no nip46 module; the QR flow uses `relay.nsec.app` as the rendezvous relay. On
+ the board it establishes the viewer pubkey and keeps the connection so
+ reports/deletes are signed remotely (read-only after a reload). Connections are
+ **session-only** (nothing is written to disk, so a reload returns to anonymous
+ / read-only). Covered by the cross-engine e2e suite for both paths on both
+ pages (bunker and nostrconnect), against a fake signer doing real NIP-44
+ crypto.
- **Editor identity (shipped).** The editor signs under anon / NIP-07 / imported
nsec / remote signer. A remembered nsec is PIN-encrypted at rest (PBKDF2 600k →
AES-GCM); plaintext is never stored. **Known weakness:** a short numeric PIN is
diff --git a/e2e/flyer.spec.js b/e2e/flyer.spec.js
index e64bef7..0aa6740 100644
--- a/e2e/flyer.spec.js
+++ b/e2e/flyer.spec.js
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ test.describe("VoxVera static client", () => {
const link = page.locator('.preview-band > .board-link a[href="board.html"]');
await expect(link).toHaveText("Bulletin board");
// The safety link sits alongside it, below the preview.
- await expect(page.locator('.preview-band > .board-link a[href="/safety"]')).toHaveText("Safety & privacy");
+ await expect(page.locator('.preview-band > .board-link a[href="/safety.html"]')).toHaveText("Safety & privacy");
// It is app chrome below the preview, not part of the printable sheet.
await expect(page.locator(".container .board-link")).toHaveCount(0);
// Screen-only — it must not appear in print output.
@@ -741,7 +741,93 @@ test.describe("VoxVera static client", () => {
expect(errors, errors.join("\n")).toHaveLength(0);
});
+ // A fake relay that also plays a signer "scanning" the nostrconnect QR: when it
+ // sees the client's listener subscription it reads the on-screen nostrconnect
+ // URI, echoes the secret back (the connect proof), then answers requests.
+ function nostrConnectSignerInit() {
+ function hexToBytes(hex) {
+ const b = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);
+ for (let i = 0; i < b.length; i += 1) b[i] = parseInt(hex.substr(i * 2, 2), 16);
+ return b;
+ }
+ class FakeWS {
+ constructor() { this.readyState = 1; setTimeout(() => this.onopen && this.onopen(), 1); }
+ send(data) {
+ let m; try { m = JSON.parse(data); } catch (_) { return; }
+ const NT = window.NostrTools;
+ if (m[0] === "REQ") {
+ this.sub = m[1];
+ const f = m[2] || {};
+ if (f["#p"] && f.kinds && f.kinds.indexOf(24133) !== -1 && window.__nip46SkHex) {
+ const clientPubkey = f["#p"][0];
+ const uriEl = document.getElementById("nip46-uri") || document.getElementById("board-nip46-uri");
+ const uri = uriEl ? uriEl.value : "";
+ const mm = uri.match(/secret=([0-9a-f]+)/i);
+ if (mm) {
+ const sk = hexToBytes(window.__nip46SkHex);
+ const ck = NT.nip44.getConversationKey(sk, clientPubkey);
+ const content = NT.nip44.encrypt(JSON.stringify({ id: "echo", result: mm[1] }), ck);
+ const echo = NT.finalizeEvent({ kind: 24133, created_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000), tags: [["p", clientPubkey]], content }, sk);
+ setTimeout(() => this.onmessage && this.onmessage({ data: JSON.stringify(["EVENT", this.sub, echo]) }), 5);
+ }
+ }
+ setTimeout(() => this.onmessage && this.onmessage({ data: JSON.stringify(["EOSE", this.sub]) }), 1);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (m[0] !== "EVENT") return;
+ const ev = m[1];
+ if (ev.kind === 24133) {
+ const sk = hexToBytes(window.__nip46SkHex);
+ const ck = NT.nip44.getConversationKey(sk, ev.pubkey);
+ let req; try { req = JSON.parse(NT.nip44.decrypt(ev.content, ck)); } catch (_) { return; }
+ let result = "";
+ if (req.method === "get_public_key") result = window.__nip46Pubkey;
+ else if (req.method === "sign_event") result = JSON.stringify(NT.finalizeEvent(JSON.parse(req.params[0]), sk));
+ else if (req.method === "connect") result = "ack";
+ const content = NT.nip44.encrypt(JSON.stringify({ id: req.id, result }), ck);
+ const resp = NT.finalizeEvent({ kind: 24133, created_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000), tags: [["p", ev.pubkey]], content }, sk);
+ const sub = this.sub;
+ setTimeout(() => this.onmessage && this.onmessage({ data: JSON.stringify(["EVENT", sub, resp]) }), 5);
+ return;
+ }
+ window.__published = window.__published || [];
+ window.__published.push(ev);
+ setTimeout(() => this.onmessage && this.onmessage({ data: JSON.stringify(["OK", ev.id, true, ""]) }), 1);
+ }
+ close() {}
+ }
+ window.WebSocket = FakeWS;
+ }
+
+ async function mintSignerKey(page) {
+ return page.evaluate(() => {
+ const sk = window.NostrTools.generateSecretKey();
+ window.__nip46SkHex = Array.from(sk).map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
+ window.__nip46Pubkey = window.NostrTools.getPublicKey(sk);
+ return window.__nip46Pubkey;
+ });
+ }
+
+ test("editor connects via the NIP-46 nostrconnect (QR) flow", async ({ page }) => {
+ const errors = trackErrors(page);
+ await page.addInitScript(nostrConnectSignerInit);
+ await page.goto("/#editor");
+ const signerPubkey = await mintSignerKey(page);
+ const expectedNpub = await page.evaluate((pk) => window.NostrTools.nip19.npubEncode(pk), signerPubkey);
+ await page.locator("#use-nip46-toggle").click();
+ await page.locator("#nip46-scan").click();
+ // A nostrconnect:// link + QR are produced for the signer to scan.
+ await expect(page.locator("#nip46-uri")).toHaveValue(/^nostrconnect:\/\//);
+ await expect(page.locator("#nip46-qr svg")).toHaveCount(1);
+ // The fake signer "scans" it and connects back → identity adopts the signer.
+ await expect(page.locator("#signer-state")).toHaveText("Publishing via remote signer");
+ await expect(page.locator("#author-npub-output")).toHaveText(expectedNpub);
+ expect(errors, errors.join("\n")).toHaveLength(0);
+ });
+
test("exports the current flyer design as a portable, identity-free JSON file", async ({ page }) => {
+ await page.goto("/#editor");
+ // Wait for the editor to finish populating defaults before overwriting them
await page.goto("/#editor");
// Wait for the editor to finish populating defaults before overwriting them
// (otherwise setDefaultText can race ahead of fill() on some engines).
@@ -1256,6 +1342,22 @@ test.describe("VoxVera static client", () => {
expect(reports[0].tags.some((tg) => tg[0] === "p" && tg[1] === AUTHOR)).toBe(true);
});
+ test("board connects via the NIP-46 nostrconnect (QR) flow", async ({ page }) => {
+ const errors = trackErrors(page);
+ await page.addInitScript(nostrConnectSignerInit);
+ await page.goto("/board.html");
+ const signerPubkey = await mintSignerKey(page);
+ await page.locator("#board-connect-nip46-toggle").click();
+ await page.locator("#board-nip46-scan").click();
+ // A nostrconnect:// link + QR are produced for the signer to scan.
+ await expect(page.locator("#board-nip46-uri")).toHaveValue(/^nostrconnect:\/\//);
+ await expect(page.locator("#board-nip46-qr svg")).toHaveCount(1);
+ // The fake signer "scans" and connects back → the board reveals as that key.
+ await expect(page.locator("#board-content")).toBeVisible();
+ expect(await page.evaluate(() => localStorage.getItem("voxvera_connected_pubkey"))).toBe(signerPubkey);
+ expect(errors, errors.join("\n")).toHaveLength(0);
+ });
+
test("safety page renders all sections, localizes, and is linked from editor + board", async ({ page }) => {
const errors = trackErrors(page);
await page.goto("/safety.html");
@@ -1270,11 +1372,12 @@ test.describe("VoxVera static client", () => {
await expect(page.locator("html")).toHaveAttribute("dir", "rtl");
await expect(page.locator("#safety-title")).toHaveText("الأمان والخصوصية");
await expect(page.locator("#safety-exposes li")).toHaveCount(7);
- // Reachable from both the editor and the board (served at /safety on Vercel).
+ // Reachable from the editor and the board via a footer link.
await page.goto("/");
- await expect(page.locator('.board-link a[href="/safety"]')).toHaveCount(1);
+ await expect(page.locator('.board-link a[href="/safety.html"]')).toHaveCount(1);
await page.goto("/board.html");
- await expect(page.locator("#board-safety")).toHaveAttribute("href", "/safety");
+ await expect(page.locator("#board-safety")).toHaveAttribute("href", "/safety.html");
+ await expect(page.locator(".board-link #board-safety")).toBeVisible();
expect(errors, errors.join("\n")).toHaveLength(0);
});
diff --git a/site/board.html b/site/board.html
index 764a9d8..0f928af 100644
--- a/site/board.html
+++ b/site/board.html
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@