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https://github.com/PR0M3TH3AN/SeedPass.git
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
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5315d8fae9 |
Fix: migrating a seed entry produced an index that would not parse
Found while writing a test for a mutation survivor on the API's partition gate. A high-risk STUB — what the index keeps after `agent high-risk migrate` moves an entry's substance into the encrypted partition file — was being validated against the full schema of the kind it stands in for. It is a different shape on purpose: kind, index, label, archived and the partition pointers, so an index read without the factor discloses that a high-risk entry exists and nothing about it. `seedEntrySchema` requires `word_count`, which a stub does not carry. So: - `agent high-risk migrate` on any vault holding a seed entry built an index saveVault refused to write — correctly, that check exists so a malformed index never reaches disk — but only AFTER writePartition had copied the secret into the partition file. The migration failed while leaving a copy of the secrets behind. - Worse, Python builds the byte-identical stub (high_risk_partition_store.py, migrate_high_risk_entries) and validates nothing on save, so it writes one happily. A vault Python had migrated could not be OPENED by this implementation at all. That is a cross-implementation data-compatibility break, not a TypeScript-only bug. Fixed by modelling the stub as its own shape in the entry union rather than by adding `word_count` to the stub, which would have made the two implementations write different bytes and diverged sync's canonical hashing. It is not a validation bypass: a stub holds no secret material, the `partition: "high_risk"` literal is the discriminator, and an entry claiming a known kind without it still faces that kind's own schema — asserted. Only `ssh` was ever exercised, which is exactly why this survived: ssh's schema has no required field a stub omits, and pgp's extras carry defaults. The new tests cover all five high-risk kinds, so a future kind with a required field breaks a test rather than a vault. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
|
991c71189e |
test: differential fuzzing against Python, as the substitute for outside review
The cutover plan's last open gate is an independent security review, and there
is no third party to hand the branch to. Self-review has a known failure mode:
you cannot see what you did not think of, which is why two earlier rounds each
found criticals that reading had missed. Me reviewing this session's code has
exactly that defect.
The substitute for another pair of eyes is not more reading. It is an oracle
that is not the author's judgement — and this project has the best one
available: two implementations required to agree. Feed both the same randomly
generated input and any disagreement is a bug in one of them, established
without anyone knowing in advance which answer is right or what to look for.
scripts/differential_fuzz.py covers the surfaces where a disagreement would be
silent and expensive: canonical JSON and hashing (underpins everything else),
password derivation with random policies, the sync CRDT (a mismatch means two
clients converge to DIFFERENT vaults), index0, recovery shares, the semantic
index, and entry hashing. Results are compared as canonical JSON so the
comparison cannot itself paper over an ordering difference. ~10,000 cases
across four seeds currently agree.
IT FOUND A REAL DEFECT, and then found a defect in itself.
canonical.ts asserted that the int/float ambiguity "does not arise" because
SeedPass data never carries float-typed whole numbers. That is true of data
SeedPass writes and false of data it carries: unknown-kind records, hand-edited
vaults, third-party tools. Python distinguishes int from float; JavaScript does
not, so `JSON.parse("0.0")` and `JSON.parse("0")` are the same value and TS
emits "0" where CPython emits "0.0". Entry hashes break same-timestamp merge
ties, so two clients could converge to different vaults — silently. No amount
of formatting fixes it: the information is destroyed at parse time.
The comment is now accurate rather than reassuring, and `findAmbiguousNumbers`
detects the condition on raw JSON text, which is the only moment the
distinction still exists. A second, separate limitation is documented in the
same place: values outside the safe-integer range are refused where Python
encodes them, which is the SAFE direction, because JSON.parse has already
rounded such a value and any hash of it would be a hash of the wrong number.
Then mutation testing was turned on the fuzzer itself, and it failed: two
deliberate off-by-ones in the tombstone-retention and checkpoint-subject caps
went undetected, because random small payloads never reach a bound of 2048 or
64. Two generator bugs behind it — tombstone keys drawn from 31 distinct
values, so 2050 writes landed in 31 slots; and event subjects that peaked at
63 distinct against a cap of 64, one short. Both fixed by generating well past
each bound with margin, and both mutations are now caught. Bounded code is
only tested at its bound.
A fuzzer that cannot fail is worthless, so that is verified too: inverting the
merge tie-break is caught in 20 of 120 cases.
Known number-representation divergences are classified separately rather than
filtered, and the classifier is deliberately narrow — "known limitation" is
exactly the category that quietly grows to hide real bugs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
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c6cb85e840 |
feat(vault): port index0/atlas, and keep it current on every mutation
index0 is the per-vault activity ledger under `_system.index0`: an append-only event stream per writer, daily checkpoints rolling those events up, and derived canonical views (children_of, counts_by_kind, recent_activity). It was the last piece carried through verbatim rather than computed — which was safe for round-tripping but meant a TypeScript client never UPDATED it. A vault written by this port went stale the moment it was touched, and a Python client reading it afterwards saw an activity log missing everything the TS client had done. Worse, `nostr restore` kept the local block verbatim, so a restore silently discarded the remote's history. Hash parity is the entire contract here: event ids, integrity hashes, checkpoint summaries and view hashes are SHA-256 over Python's canonical JSON, and the merge picks winners by comparing those hashes — one byte of encoding disagreement means the two implementations permanently disagree about which record wins. Everything routes through the existing canonicalJson (Python's ensure_ascii escaping, code-point key ordering, CPython number formatting) rather than JSON.stringify, and the tests compare whole structures via canonical JSON rather than toEqual, so they pass only if the bytes that get hashed are identical. Verified against Python fixtures covering the append chain, compaction, manifest metadata, views and a two-replica merge — including non-ASCII labels and tags, a non-numeric entry id, two writers across two days, and a managed-account scope path. Two Python quirks are replicated deliberately rather than "fixed", because diverging would change which events exist rather than merely how they hash: `str(None)` is "None" (so a JSON null in a required field is a non-empty string there), and a stored integrity_hash is preserved even when it disagrees — this normalizes, it does not verify, and silently rewriting a mismatched hash would hide the tampering the hash exists to reveal. Events are emitted by DIFFING the index at the single mutation funnel each surface goes through, rather than from each call site as Python does. That is deliberate: a call-site emitter is something a new code path can forget, and a silently incomplete ledger is worse than an absent one because it reads as "nothing happened". The event vocabulary matches Python's, so a stream from either implementation reads the same. Emission is best-effort — the atlas is derived state, and it must never fail a committed vault write. mergeIndexPayloads now defaults to merging index0 with the same deterministic rules; "preserve-current" and "reject" remain for callers that want them, and `nostr restore` no longer discards the remote's history. Also made gen_high_risk deterministic. Fernet embeds a random IV and the current time, so that fixture regenerated differently every run and would have failed the fixture-drift CI job each time — it now pins both, with a note that production must never do this. Verified end to end: the TS binary performed four mutations, and Python read the resulting atlas, normalized it without dropping a record, and compacted it into checkpoints and views. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
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7f095cba86 |
feat(agent): port job profiles and recovery split; fix Shamir's sub-threshold secrecy
Recovery split is Shamir over GF(257), one polynomial per secret byte, shares
encoded as sprec1:<label>:<threshold>:<total>:<index>:<digest>:<payload>.
Verified interoperable in both directions on real shares, including multi-byte
UTF-8 and payloads containing colons: Python recovers TS-produced shares and
TS recovers Python-produced ones. Confirmed end to end by splitting a live
parent seed 3-of-5 with the TS binary and recovering it in Python.
**Python's coefficients were derived from the secret, and that is now fixed.**
`_coef` HMAC'd the secret to produce every polynomial coefficient, which made
the entire share set a deterministic function of it. Shamir's defining
property is that any sub-threshold set of shares is information-theoretically
independent of the secret; deriving coefficients from the secret destroys it,
because one share becomes an offline verifier — guess a secret, re-run the
split, compare. Demonstrated recovering "hunter2" from one share of five at
threshold three, before changing anything. It also meant re-splitting produced
byte-identical shares, so a leaked share could never be rotated out without
changing the secret.
The determinism was load-bearing in the wrong way: coefficients were
recomputed inside the per-share loop, so they HAD to be reproducible or the
points would not lie on one polynomial. Fixed by hoisting them out and drawing
from `secrets`. The share token format is unchanged and `recover_secret` is
untouched — recovery is Lagrange interpolation over (x, y) pairs and never
recomputes coefficients — so old shares keep recovering and both versions
interoperate. Zero interop cost for a real security property.
TypeScript never had the defect and its test suite pins it: reintroducing
secret-derived coefficients turns three tests red, including the guessing
attack. Coefficients use rejection sampling because 257 does not divide 2^16,
and a modulo draw would bias them.
Job profiles port straight across, with policy_stamp as the security-relevant
field: sha256 of the canonical agent_policy.json at creation, so a policy
tightened afterwards shows as a mismatch instead of leaving the job running
under rules nobody reviewed it against. The canonical form matches Python's
`sort_keys=True, separators=(",",":"), ensure_ascii=True` — including the
ensure_ascii escaping, which is easy to miss and would otherwise make a
non-ASCII policy hash differently in the two implementations. Verified
byte-identical stamps for both an empty policy and one with non-ASCII values.
An unreadable policy hashes to its own distinct value rather than to the empty
policy, so jobs read as stale rather than silently current.
Recovery drills use the same HMAC-chained log design as the audit log, with
tests that an edited record, a removed record and an unsigned appended record
are all detected.
Every Python API endpoint now has a TypeScript equivalent: UNPORTED_PREFIXES
is empty. The 501 mechanism stays, because the honest answer for a dropped
subsystem is 501 naming the feature rather than 404.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
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0c48c1f9dc |
feat(agent): port high-risk partitions and approval gates
High-risk partitions move ssh/pgp/seed/nostr/managed_account records out of
the vault index into a separately encrypted file, so those kinds need a SECOND
factor beyond the master password. The index keeps a stub carrying kind, label
and archived — enough to list, nothing more.
Both file formats are byte-compatible with Python and verified bidirectionally:
TS unwraps a Python-written key envelope and reads a Python-written partition,
and Python unwraps a TS-written envelope and reads a TS-written partition. That
matters more than usual here — the entries are SSH keys, PGP keys and seeds, so
a partition only one implementation can open is lost secrets, not an
inconvenience. This required a Fernet encryptor in core, which had been
decrypt-only by design; the header now says why that exception exists and that
no other Fernet payload should ever be written.
**One deliberate divergence, and it is the reason this is not a straight port.**
Python records an unlock session in agent_high_risk_unlock.json, and that record
contains the partition_key_tag — the value the partition file's encryption key
is derived from. So for the life of any Python unlock session the partition is
decryptable from disk alone, with no factor, by anything that can read the app
directory; both files live in the same directory, so "can read one" implies "can
read the other". That voids the guarantee the partition exists to provide.
Verified empirically before writing any of this.
Here the tag lives only in the session agent's memory, beside the parent seeds
it already holds, with the same TTL discipline — and in the API process's memory
for the API. Nothing derived from the factor reaches disk, asserted by a test
that scans every file in the app directory for the tag, and confirmed on a live
install. No file format or interop changes; only where the live session lives.
Other properties the tests pin:
- a locked partition refuses reveal rather than deriving from the stub, which
would return a plausible wrong secret
- locking the vault drops the high-risk grant, which is scoped to it
- the grant expires on its own clock, typically much shorter than the seed's
- unlock is owner-gated: a scoped token cannot reach it
- the tag is absent from the audit log, which records only that an unlock
happened
- the factor comes from the environment, never argv
- factor-set refuses to replace an existing factor, since a new partition key
would make an existing partition permanently unreadable
- migrate writes the partition BEFORE the index, so a crash between them
cannot leave stubs pointing at records that were never stored
Approval gates port straight across: one-shot (or N-use) authorizations for
export / reveal_parent_seed / private_key_retrieval, consumed under the store
lock so two callers cannot both spend the last use, with every failure mode
getting its own reason string matching Python's. A corrupt store reads as empty,
which fails closed.
API: /api/v1/high-risk/{status,unlock,lock} are real rather than 501. Unlock
needs the bearer token, the master password header AND the factor header; a
wrong factor gets one indistinguishable reason so probing cannot tell failures
apart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
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885cbe5665 |
fix(semantic): delete indexes written before secrets stopped being indexed
Fixing the writer does not rewrite files already on disk, so a profile that built an index before today still has one holding stored secrets in plaintext. Reporting a version string in a status field and expecting the user to notice is not a remedy for that. Both implementations now check the manifest's model_id on every read — status, search, and the API equivalents — and delete records + manifest when it predates the fix. Reading a stale index would also mean serving results derived from the secrets it should never have held, so search purges before it reads rather than after. Deleting is safe: the index is a derived cache, rebuilt from the vault in milliseconds, and the user is told to rebuild. A manifest that cannot be parsed is deliberately NOT treated as stale. "Cannot tell" must not mean "delete it", or every corrupt-manifest read would throw away a working index; that case is tested on both sides. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
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39c4e45376 |
feat(semantic): port the retrieval index — and stop it writing secrets to disk
The "semantic (vector search)" entry in not_yet_ported was a misnomer. It is
not vector search and needs no model: MODEL_ID is "seedpass-token-overlap-v1",
and it scores by Jaccard overlap over tokenized metadata. That is why it could
be ported at all — there is nothing to embed.
Porting it surfaced two defects in the Python implementation.
**Stored secrets were written to a plaintext, 0664 file.** `_extract_text`
appended a key_value entry's `value` — the stored secret itself — and
`build()` wrote it to semantic_index/records.json in the clear, along with a
tokenized copy that leaked it just as thoroughly. The file was created at the
process umask, so on a default install it was group- and world-readable, next
to a vault that is encrypted and 0600. Anything that could read the directory
— a backup, a sync client, another user on a shared machine — got the secret
without the master password.
Fixed in Python (index the key NAME, never the value; chmod 0600 on both
files) and never done in TypeScript. The rule is worth keeping simple: nobody
searches for a secret they do not already know, so indexing one is pure
downside. MODEL_ID is bumped to v2 so an index built by the old code is
distinguishable — a v1 index on disk still contains the secrets and should be
rebuilt.
**Entry 0 was silently unsearchable.** The check was
`int(entry.get("id", 0) or 0) <= 0`, conflating "no id" with "id 0" — and
entry ids start at 0, so the first entry any user ever created was absent from
every search result with nothing to indicate why. Found by writing a test that
queried for it. Fixed in both implementations: skip an id that is absent,
unparseable or negative, which is what the check was reaching for.
The TypeScript port is wired into the CLI (`semantic build/status/search`),
the API (the /api/v1/semantic routes are now real rather than 501), and
writes through atomicWrite for a genuine 0600 inode. Fixtures come from
scripts/generate_ts_port_fixtures.py, which asserts the leaked value is absent
from its own output, so the fixture-drift job proves provenance the way it
does for every other fixture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
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51f1358da4 |
feat(tui): render real QR codes; verified module-for-module against the reference encoder
The TUI had a QR action that answered "QR rendering is not available in this
build". The stated reason was that a QR library is not worth a dependency in a
process holding unlocked seeds — which is true, and is why this implements the
encoder instead: byte mode, versions 1-40, all four error-correction levels,
zero dependencies.
A wrong QR code is worse than no QR code. It scans cleanly, yields the wrong
secret, and the user finds out when their 2FA stops working — so this is
verified rather than eyeballed:
- The block-structure table was extracted programmatically from qrcode's
RS_BLOCK_TABLE rather than transcribed. 160 rows of three-number triples
are exactly the kind of data a human copies wrong once and never notices.
- qr.json holds reference matrices from that library, and the tests compare
EVERY module — 10 cases spanning all four EC levels and versions 1 to 17,
including past version 7 where version-information blocks start being
written.
- Generation moved into scripts/generate_ts_port_fixtures.py, so the
fixture-drift CI job proves the committed fixture came from the committed
generator, like every other fixture. Regenerating produced byte-identical
output for all pre-existing fixtures.
Two things are pinned so the comparison is between implementations rather than
between configurations. Byte mode is forced, because the reference
auto-selects alphanumeric for an all-uppercase string — a different encoding
of the same text, not a different answer. And the mask is pinned, because the
two disagree about mask SELECTION: the spec scores the finished symbol, while
the reference scores one with its format modules blanked and its dark module
light (makeImpl(test=True, ...)), which is not a legal symbol. All eight masks
produce valid scannable codes, so the selection rule is checked as a property
instead of reproducing a known quirk to make an equality assertion pass. At a
pinned mask the matrices are identical, which is what establishes that the
data encoding, Reed-Solomon, interleaving, placement, format and version
information are all correct.
In the TUI, TOTP entries encode their otpauth:// URI so an authenticator can
consume them; everything else encodes its own value. Secret Mode suppresses
the code entirely — a QR code is the secret in a form a camera reads from
across a room, so the setting that exists to keep secrets off the screen
applies here more than anywhere — and an entry too large to encode says so
rather than looking unavailable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
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276aca65b6 |
feat(sync): report what a merge resolves silently; stop it editing its inputs (L-2, L-3)
The deterministic merge is frozen for parity -- both implementations must
reach the same vault from the same inputs -- so how it resolves is not up for
negotiation. What was missing is that nobody is told a resolution happened.
L-2: the allocation watermark is per-replica, so two devices working offline
can both allocate id N. The merge then resolves that id by timestamp then
hash, and the loser is replaced with no trace. An entry the user created is
simply absent afterwards. Worse than a plain overwrite, because an id is a
permanent BIP-85 derivation coordinate: the survivor derives from the same
coordinate the discarded entry did (see the L-1 detector).
L-3: past TOMBSTONE_RETENTION_CAP the oldest deletions are forgotten, and
merging a stale replica or old snapshot then resurrects those entries. A
documented protocol limit -- but a user cannot know the cap has actually begun
trimming their history unless something says so.
Both implementations gain an optional MergeReport collector: same-id conflicts
(with the kept and discarded entries named) and a count of evicted tombstones.
`nostr restore` reports both in its summary and on stderr, covering delta
replay as well as the final local merge.
Only genuine divergences are reported. Two replicas holding the same entry
with different timestamps is an ordinary edit and is ignored; flagging it
would bury the case that matters in noise and train the user past the warning.
The collector is write-only and cannot change the merged result -- asserted in
both implementations, because if observing could alter the outcome it would be
a parity divergence rather than an observation.
Two defects found while writing the tests:
- Python's merge MUTATED its `current` argument. `dict(current)` shares the
nested entries dict, so the merge wrote its result straight into the
caller's payload: after merging, "current" had already become the merged
value. Anything comparing before-and-after, or merging one payload twice,
silently saw the wrong input. Now deep-copied, matching TypeScript's
structuredClone. Found because the "reported whichever side wins" test
failed -- the forward merge had corrupted the input for the backward one.
- test_merge_replay_same_payload_is_idempotent was passing only because of
that aliasing: `once` and `twice` were one object. With inputs no longer
mutated, replaying the same payload is shown to normalize entry SHAPE --
the equal-timestamp path unions field sets and writes explicit nulls for
absent optional fields. TypeScript produces byte-identical output for the
same input, so this is shared designed behaviour rather than a Python
regression, and it converges on the second pass. The test now asserts what
is actually true (content unchanged, shape normalized, settles at two) and
records why the old assertion held.
Mutation-verified: removing the recording turns the reporting tests red.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
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75e370d098 |
feat(vault): detect shared BIP-85 derivation coordinates; bind Python imports too (L-1, L-8)
L-1 — three entry kinds derive from BIP-85 app 32 at the entry's index:
ssh@N -> 32 bytes of m/83696968'/32'/N'
pgp@N -> 32 bytes of m/83696968'/32'/N' (the SAME 32 bytes)
password@N -> 64 bytes of the same, then PBKDF2
So ssh@N and pgp@N are byte-for-byte the same Ed25519 private key, and
password@N takes that key as its entropy prefix. The password stays safe (256
unknown bits remain, PBKDF2 is one-way) but this is not key separation, and
SSH keys are exactly what gets exported to a server or uploaded to a forge.
Deliberately NOT fixing the derivation itself yet. Domain-separating the three
uses is a versioned protocol change in both implementations, i.e. a new
derivation path -- and the project's own note is that "a derivation bug does
not throw, it quietly produces a secret that cannot be recovered". Adding one
immediately before the first outside review inverts the point of the review.
The v2 design is written up in TODO.md instead, ready to implement after it.
What ships is the audit's short-term recommendation, which needs no derivation
change: notice the state and say so. findDerivationCollisions /
find_derivation_collisions report cross-kind clashes at one app-32 index,
worst first, in both implementations with identical message text -- a user
moving between the two must not be told different things about one vault.
Wired into every path the state can arrive by: vault import (CLI and TUI, both
implementations), nostr restore's merge, `vault import --inspect` before
anything is written, and a new `util check-derivation` for auditing an
existing vault (exit 1 when it finds something, for scripts).
Neither implementation can create the state -- index == vault id, ids unique,
watermark prevents reuse -- so this is about imported, foreign, and merged
data, which is also why it must never be the thing that fails an import: it
reports, never refuses, and tolerates malformed input.
The lead test in each implementation does not exercise the detector at all.
It derives the keys and compares the bytes, proving the property the detector
reports. Without that, the rest only checks that a written-down rule is
applied consistently, and a derivation change could falsify the rule with
everything still green.
L-8 (Python) — while wiring the above it turned out Python's import_backup had
the same unbound-plaintext-import gap the audit found in TypeScript: the
wrapper carries a `fingerprint` and nothing compared it. Now fixed there too,
with a new ProfileMismatchError so the TUI can offer the override instead of
reporting a generic failure.
The comparison is against the fingerprint DERIVED FROM THE SEED, not the
profile directory's name. In production they are the same string, but the
question worth asking is "was this backup made from my seed?", and only the
seed answers it -- comparing directory names refused a legitimate restore of
the same seed into a freshly named profile, which test_account_roundtrip_
restore caught immediately. It is enforced only when the wrapper records
something that is actually a fingerprint: a backup carrying some other label
offers no evidence about its source seed, and refusing on no evidence blocks
restores without making anyone safer.
All guards mutation-verified on both sides.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
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8414deff20 |
fix(sync): order snapshots by signed publication time, in both implementations (M-1)
Restoring the wrong manifest is not an ordering detail -- the manifest that
wins the comparison IS the vault the user gets back. Two defects compounded:
TypeScript ordered manifests by created_at with the event id as tie-break.
created_at is whole seconds, so two snapshots published in the same second
tied, and the id tie-break -- stable and relay-independent, but arbitrary with
respect to time -- returned the OLDER vault about half the time. Entries
created between the two syncs disappeared silently; skippedNewerManifests
stayed empty because nothing was skipped, the wrong manifest simply sorted
first. It surfaced only as an intermittent test failure.
Python never ordered at all: it asked the relay for limit(1) and restored
whatever came back, handing the relay the choice of which snapshot wins.
Both now stamp published_ms -- publication time in milliseconds -- inside the
manifest JSON, so it is covered by the event signature and no relay can steer
it, and both order by it. The value is monotonic per process (max(now,
last+1)), because two back-to-back publishes can share a millisecond and would
otherwise fall back to the same arbitrary id tie-break in a narrower window.
Across machines the clock remains the only shared reference; that case is
unchanged and documented.
Backwards compatible: the field is optional, and a manifest without it orders
at the start of its created_at second. That biases a new-format manifest to
win a same-second tie against an old-format one, which is the right direction
-- old-format manifests are by definition from before the upgrade. Ordering
the unknown one last would let a pre-upgrade snapshot outrank every
post-upgrade one for that second: the same bug from the other side.
Two things found while doing it:
- Python's publish_delta republishes the manifest with an updated
delta_since. It needed the new field too: without it the manifest carrying
the newest delta_since sorted BELOW the snapshot it supersedes, so readers
fetched deltas from a stale watermark and the update never arrived. Caught
by the existing roundtrip tests, which is why they are worth having.
- Raising Python's fetch limit turned its vestigial fallback loop into a
live downgrade path: a relay withholding one chunk of the newest snapshot
could walk a client silently backwards through its history. The loop now
skips unparseable events (relay noise must not deny service) but refuses
to reach past the newest manifest that genuinely parses, and says why.
A restore that quietly returns last week's vault is indistinguishable from
one that worked.
Tests: js relay.test.ts gains a 12-round same-second case -- one pair
reproduces the bug only half the time, which is how it stayed a "flake" --
plus a legacy-manifest case built by hand in the true old format. Python gains
test_manifest_ordering.py (6 cases: order key, both fallbacks, arrival order
irrelevant, id tie-break, unparseable content). Mutation-verified on both
sides: restoring the old comparison turns the matching tests red.
The nostr CLI test now passes 6/6 consecutive runs, having failed roughly 1
in 4 before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
|
4b01ac62e0 |
fix(cli): real rolling backups, and imports bound to their profile (L-4, L-8)
Two findings from the 2026-08-18 audit, entangled in the same files.
L-4 — the additional backup location was inert. The TUI accepted a path and
answered "Additional backups will be written to X"; nothing ever wrote one.
That is worse than an absent setting: it is false assurance in the feature a
user leans on precisely when everything else has gone wrong. The cause was
larger than the setting — Python's BackupManager is not ported at all, so
`backup_interval` was dead for the same reason.
New backups.ts ports the write side: after every committed mutation, the
encrypted index is copied to <profile>/backups/entries_db_backup_<ts>.json.enc
at 0600, and mirrored to `additional_backup_path` as <fingerprint>_<name>.
Filenames match Python's byte for byte so the two implementations share one
backup directory. Hooked after the save in both mutation funnels, matching
Python's create_backup()-after-_save_index() order, so a snapshot is the
post-mutation state.
Two deliberate deviations, both documented in the source:
- Throttling reads the newest snapshot on disk rather than Python's
in-memory _last_backup_time. Every CLI command is its own process, so an
in-memory counter would make backup_interval inert for CLI use — the same
bug in a new place.
- A failed mirror is reported rather than swallowed. Best-effort must not
fail a committed vault write, but silence would restore the false
assurance this change exists to remove.
Quick Unlock stays in the menu for item-order parity but now says it is not
implemented instead of storing a preference nothing reads. In Python the flag
never changed unlocking either — it writes an audit entry and raises a
security finding.
L-8 — plaintext backup import was not bound to a profile. A seed-only backup
is implicitly seed-bound: the wrong seed cannot decrypt it. A plaintext one
imports into any profile and is then re-derived from the TARGET seed, so every
password, SSH key, PGP key and seed silently comes out different from the one
the backup was taken to preserve. Nothing errors anywhere along the way.
Both the CLI and the TUI now compare the wrapper's fingerprint to the target
profile and require an explicit override (--allow-fingerprint-mismatch, or a
confirmation in the TUI). `vault import --inspect` reports the backup's
fingerprint and encryption mode so the mismatch is visible before committing.
The CLI also stops deciding encryption mode by regex over the whole file: new
parseBackupWrapper reads the envelope, which is the structural question being
asked.
Tests: backups.test.ts (9 cases: filename parity, 0600, verbatim ciphertext,
mirror naming, mirror-failure reporting, interval throttling, CLI end-to-end)
plus foreign-import cases in cli.test.ts and tuiMenus.test.ts using a genuine
second profile rather than a doctored file. All mutation-verified: removing
each hook or guard turns the matching tests red.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
|
ecff57e8c6 |
test(core): run the official BIP-85 spec vectors directly against the TS core
Every other derivation check compares this implementation against Python -- cross-verification, not ground truth. The BIP-85 specification's own test vectors (spec master xprv, 12- and 24-word BIP-39 children at index 0) are immune to the failure mode where both of our implementations share a misconception and agree with each other: Python has pinned them since early on (test_bip85_vectors.py), and now the TypeScript core runs them natively via a new Bip85.fromExtendedKey factory (the spec vectors start from an xprv, not a mnemonic). Python's pinned app-32 entropy and TOTP derivations from the same master ride along as cross-family anchors. All four pass on first contact -- an independent confirmation of the root derivation ahead of the external review, and recorded as such in the #34 review-strategy notes in TODO.md, along with the ultrareview size blocker (PR #989 spans 720k lines including beta's history) and its fallback options. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tkj4rzKBA3uhfgk7kqjsb8 |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
|
e434b0abc1 |
feat(schema): carry unknown entry kinds through instead of refusing the vault
Spec section 8.2: a record whose kind this build does not understand -- one written by a newer build, or by another application sharing the vault, such as a future BitLogin namespaced kind -- must be carried through untouched, never dropped, and must not brick the whole index. TS previously failed the entire parse on the first unrecognized kind, stranding any shared vault on older SeedPass builds. The entry schema is now a union: known kinds validate strictly against the discriminated union exactly as before, and anything else parses as an opaque loose record. The refine on the opaque branch is the load-bearing detail -- a malformed record of a KNOWN kind must still fail its own schema, never fall through and escape validation. Records with no kind or type at all remain rejected as garbage. Statically the entries map stays typed to the known kinds (exhaustive switches keep their meaning); the module comment states the runtime widening plainly. At the CLI surface, foreign records list with unrecognized fields redacted to has_* flags -- another application's data is not ours to hand out -- and reveal refuses with "unsupported entry kind" instead of guessing. Allocation counts foreign ids, so neighbours never collide with them. Python's natural tolerance is now pinned by test, which surfaced a real nuance: Python backfills base-field defaults (tags, links, date_modified) onto foreign records on load, where TS carries them verbatim. No data is lost, so both conform to the preservation rule as now worded (no loss, no reinterpretation; base-field normalization permitted) -- but the two produce different canonical bytes for the same foreign record, which matters once foreign kinds sync. Recorded in the spec's gap ledger to align before any application ships them. Verified: 4 of the 6 new TS tests fail against the previous schema; 230 core + 152 CLI tests and the cross-impl suite pass with the change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tkj4rzKBA3uhfgk7kqjsb8 |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
|
e3b1325a2b |
fix(vault): entry ids are never reused -- allocate from a persisted watermark
An entry id doubles as the BIP-85 derivation index for managed_account and seed entries, which makes it a permanent cryptographic coordinate: "Alice is account #184" is a recovery claim, and #184 must mean Alice forever. But both implementations allocated ids as max(live ids)+1, and sync deletion removes entries via tombstones -- so deleting #184 on one device let the next creation reissue #184 to a NEW entry, which then re-derived the departed identity's exact child seed and npub. Tombstone retention (capped at 2048) made even the evidence expire. Allocation now comes from a high-watermark persisted in _sync_meta.next_index: never-decreasing, bumped on every insert/save (explicit-id inserts included), merged as max(both sides' watermarks, one past any merged entry or tombstone id), and identical in both implementations -- the merge computation must stay byte-for-byte the same in sync_conflict.py and sync/merge.ts. _sync_meta was chosen because both sides already round-trip it (it carries the tombstones), so old builds preserve the field and no schema version bump is needed. Legacy vaults heal on their next allocation: the floor folds in tombstone ids still within retention, and the first save persists the watermark. Python-side key parsing mirrors the TS regex exactly (ASCII digits, no leading zeros, JS safe-integer range): str.isdigit() alone accepts Unicode digits that Number() rejects, which would have made the two implementations compute different watermarks from the same payload. Fixtures regenerated from Python; the byte-for-byte entry-creation parity test now passes with the watermark present, proving TS's insert-time bump and Python's save-time bump converge on identical indexes. Verified: the recycle regression tests fail on both pre-fix implementations; 1180 Python, 224 core, 149 CLI tests and all 36 cross-impl checks pass with the fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tkj4rzKBA3uhfgk7kqjsb8 |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
|
b0e2a309a4 |
feat: generate a master seed, and fix three bugs found by using the CLI
Driving the CLI from an empty app directory turned up a gap that no test
covered: there was no way to create a vault. Every path assumed you already
had a seed and told you to export SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC, so a new user could not
get started at all. Python has generate_bip85_seed; the port did not.
fingerprint create fills that in with the same construction Python uses --
32 bytes of OS entropy through BIP-85 app 39 index 0. The entropy call sits
outside any try/catch on purpose, carried over from Python's entropy audit:
nothing may catch a CSPRNG failure and substitute a value.
Where the phrase goes is a deliberate choice rather than a default. This is
the one secret in SeedPass with no other copy, so:
- the destination is validated BEFORE generating, and delivery happens
BEFORE the profile is created -- a failure at either point leaves
nothing behind rather than a vault whose seed nobody has;
- --out writes 0600 with O_EXCL, so an existing file is never clobbered;
- with no destination and a non-TTY stdout it refuses outright, instead of
writing the only copy of a seed into a pipe -- a log, a transcript, an
agent's context.
Also fixed, all found the same way:
- use --exec always exited 0, so chaining a deploy command after it with
&& reported success even when the deploy failed. The sink child's exit
status is now the CLI's own.
- the sink command spec split on whitespace and ignored quotes, so
--exec 'sh -c "..."' -- the most common form there is -- handed sh the
fragments of the script and died on an unterminated string.
- --tags work,dev silently stored a single tag named "work,dev" that no
search would ever match. Commas and spaces both separate now.
Two normal states reported raw errno: a stopped agent said
'connect ENOENT /.../agent.sock', and an occupied --out path said EEXIST.
The capability map claimed ssh/pgp were unported. Both work and are at
parity with Python; automation branches on that list, so it now describes
this build.
Verified against Python on a TS-generated seed: same fingerprint, same
password, same TOTP code. 320 JS tests and 36/36 cross-impl checks pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
|
ee330c52f7 |
security: fix critical findings from the second audit
Four independent reviewers went over the branch. The worst findings were in
code I had just written and reviewed myself, which is the argument for
having done this.
CRITICAL
- A mnemonic was validated in one form and derived from in another. @scure's
normalize only counts words, so a phrase with a trailing newline passed
validation and then derived a completely different seed, while Python
canonicalizes and derives the correct one. The result was a vault encrypted
under a key that neither implementation -- nor the user's written-down
phrase -- could ever reproduce. Mnemonics are now canonicalized (NFKD,
lowercase, single-space) once, and every derivation site uses that form:
Bip85.fromMnemonic, deriveIndexKeyBytes, deriveTotpSecret, deriveKeyIndex
and generateFingerprint.
- atomicWrite ignored short writes. `handle.write()` may write fewer bytes
than asked (ENOSPC, RLIMIT_FSIZE, EINTR); the truncated temp file was then
fsynced and renamed over the only copy of the vault, with exit code 0 and
no stderr -- inside the function whose comment promised crash safety. It
now loops until every byte lands, fails loudly otherwise, and removes the
temp file on any failure.
- `fingerprint add` overwrote an existing profile. It consulted only
fingerprints.json, which readFingerprints returns empty for whenever the
file is corrupt or unreadable, then rewrote parent_seed.enc and the index.
Restoring a profile directory from backup and re-registering it -- the
canonical recovery gesture -- destroyed the vault. It now refuses if the
seed or index file already exists.
- Entry-id allocation could collide. A non-numeric or above-2^53 key (which
can arrive through import or a merge) made nextIndex return NaN or stop
incrementing, and insert overwrote blindly, so each new entry destroyed the
previous one. Both are now rejected, and insert refuses to overwrite.
HIGH
- RelayPool accepted any event a relay chose to send: verifyEvent only proves
an event is internally consistent, never that it came from the pubkey,
kind, or id we asked for. Events are now structurally validated (including
created_at being a finite safe integer -- "1e999" parsed to Infinity and
sorted ahead of everything forever) and matched against the filter.
- Snapshot handling had no resource budget: a decompression bomb turned 20 KB
of relay data into 20 MB, unbounded. Chunk count, chunk size, total
compressed and total decompressed bytes are now capped, the gunzip is
aborted mid-stream when it exceeds the budget, and each chunk must match
the size its signed manifest declares.
- Manifest tie-breaking used relay arrival order, letting a relay pick which
of two same-second snapshots won; it now breaks ties on event id, which no
party can steer. Falling back to an older manifest is recorded so callers
can surface a downgrade.
- Argon2/PBKDF2 parameters were read unbounded from the kdf block, which sits
outside the AEAD and is writable by anyone with directory access: 1e9 time
cost hung indefinitely, and this core targets browsers too. Now clamped.
- Config and fingerprint-registry writes held no lock at all, losing 4 of 6
concurrent updates in testing. Both now use a read-modify-write lock, and
the vault lock itself only breaks a lock whose owner pid is gone, steals it
atomically by rename, and releases only if it still owns it.
- Plaintext egress (document export, vault export) used writeFile's mode,
which applies only on creation, and followed symlinks -- an existing
world-readable file or a planted symlink received the secret. Both now go
through atomicWrite, which creates a fresh 0600 inode.
MEDIUM
- canonicalJson did not match Python. Exponent padding (1e-7 vs 1e-07), the
1e16 threshold, -0, and key ordering (UTF-16 code units vs code points) all
differed, and the code comment claiming they agreed was false. Since entry
hashes decide merge winners, two clients could keep different versions of
an entry forever. Now matched, with 24 differential fixtures generated from
CPython, and values above 2^53 refused rather than guessed at.
- "__proto__" as an entry or tombstone key silently vanished and polluted the
prototype; containers are now null-prototype. Python truthiness differs
from JS on empty containers, so `"_deleted": []` tombstoned an entry in JS
and kept it in Python; now matched.
- Policy blocks with JSON null produced the literal string "null" as the
special-character alphabet. TOTP secrets that pyotp accepts (lowercase,
unpadded) were rejected. Both fixed.
- hexToBytes accepted malformed input ("1z" -> 0x01, "-1" -> 0xff) where
Python raises; relay-supplied ids and signatures reach it.
- Password/fingerprint normalization used JS trim(), which strips a different
set than Python's strip(), changing derived keys; now uses Python's set.
Also removes a scratch file a reviewer's session left committed.
220 core + 71 CLI tests green; 36/36 cross-implementation checks green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
|
55879eaa1b |
security: durable vault writes, path validation, and safe restore semantics
Continues the security-review fixes. Durability and concurrency: - Vault, config, fingerprint-registry and parent-seed writes are now atomic: temp file in the same directory, fsync, rename, then an fsync of the directory. Previously the target was truncated and rewritten in place, so a crash could destroy the vault. - The lock now spans the whole read-modify-write cycle, not just the write. Serializing writes alone still lost changes -- two commands each read the same index, mutated their copy, and wrote in turn. Every mutating command goes through mutateVault(), which holds the lock from open to save. A test runs five concurrent writers and asserts all five entries survive. - 0600 is now enforced on existing files too: writeFile's mode argument only applies on creation, so a loosened vault stayed loosened. - The index is schema-validated before it can reach disk. Path handling: - Profile fingerprints are validated (16 uppercase hex) before being used in any path, and removeProfile additionally checks the resolved directory still sits directly under the app directory. A tampered registry could otherwise have steered a recursive delete elsewhere. - Malformed entries in fingerprints.json are dropped on read. Restore semantics: - `nostr restore` merges remote state into the local vault instead of replacing it. Replacing silently discarded entries created since the last sync; that now requires --replace --yes, and any overwritten vault is copied aside first. - Deltas are bound to the manifest they extend (filtered on the e tag, and re-checked locally), so a relay cannot replay a validly-signed delta from another snapshot lineage into a restore. - Manifest selection breaks created_at ties by relay order, so a same-second republish cannot leave a restore on a stale snapshot. - mergeIndexPayloads gained an index0 option. The default still refuses to merge populated Python atlas state rather than drop it; restore uses preserve-current, keeping the local block verbatim, because Python recomputes canonical views on load and the default would block every restore into a Python-created profile. 193 core + 69 CLI tests green; 36/36 cross-implementation checks green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
|
c2d7306bb7 |
parity: PGP key derivation, byte-for-byte with PGPy
The last unported derivation, and the one the plan flagged as highest risk. It turned out to be fully reproducible: the key material is deterministic, EdDSA signatures are deterministic (RFC 8032), and the packet layout is fixed -- so the armored blocks match exactly, with no OpenPGP dependency. core/derive/pgp.ts emits the packets directly: new-format headers, the secret-key packet (unencrypted MPI plus 16-bit checksum), the user-id packet, and the self-certification signature with PGPy's exact subpacket set and order, wrapped in ASCII armor with a CRC-24 footer. Verified against PGPy across two seeds, three indices and three user-id shapes -- armored private key, armored public key, and fingerprint. RSA is deliberately unsupported: PyCryptodome's seeded prime search is not reproducible, so the TS port refuses the key type rather than silently deriving a different key. Two things worth recording from the build: the v4 fingerprint reproduces from first principles (SHA-1 over the public-key packet), which is what made byte-parity look feasible before committing to it; and the only mismatch in the first run was packet framing -- PGPy uses new-format headers where I had emitted old-format. CLI: `entry add pgp`, reveal (armored private key), `entry pgp-public`. Cross-impl phases A/B now cover a pgp entry in both directions, completing coverage of every creatable entry kind. 193 core + 47 CLI tests green; 30/30 cross-implementation checks green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
|
b4f20d417a |
cross-impl: full feature coverage (30 checks) and two more compatibility fixes
Expanded the cross-implementation suite from 19 to 30 checks so every feature is exercised against the other implementation, not just the ones that were convenient: G edits (modify / archive / links) made by either side are seen by the other H deterministic conflict merge produces byte-identical output on both sides I an Argon2id-protected Python profile unlocks in TS J the encrypted config file interoperates both directions Entry coverage in phases A/B now spans every creatable kind, including a policy-constrained password and an imported (non-deterministic) TOTP. Two real bugs this surfaced, both fixed: - Password entries carrying a `policy` block derived the WRONG password in TS. Python's _generate_password_for_entry merges the entry's overrides onto the base policy before deriving; TS ignored the block entirely, so any entry created with policy flags produced a different password. core now exposes passwordPolicyFromRecord and the CLI applies it. - TS could not read a Python-written config file: Python wraps it in the kdf/ct JSON envelope (same class as the snapshot bug fixed last commit). loadConfig now parses the envelope; regression test included. One behavioral divergence found and deliberately NOT papered over: Python generates TOTP codes with pyotp defaults (6 digits / 30s) even when the entry records different values, so an imported 8-digit/45s secret yields different codes in each implementation -- and Python's would be rejected by the issuing service. The suite now reports it as a [DIVERGE] line rather than a pass or a failure, and the matrix records it as awaiting a product decision. TS behavior is believed correct. 173 core + 47 CLI tests green; 30/30 cross-implementation checks green with 2 documented divergences. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
|
1eee053ff0 |
parity: SSH key derivation (Ed25519, PEM byte-for-byte)
- core/derive/ssh.ts: BIP-85 app 32 entropy used directly as the Ed25519 private key, serialized as PKCS#8 and SubjectPublicKeyInfo PEM. Both DER shapes are fixed for Ed25519, so they are emitted from literal prefixes rather than adding an ASN.1 dependency to the crypto path. - Output matches Python's `cryptography` byte-for-byte across two seeds and three indices, including PEM line wrapping. - CLI: `entry add ssh`, reveal (private key PEM), and `entry ssh-public` which prints the public key without touching secret material. The OpenSSH authorized_keys line is a TS-only convenience -- Python emits only PEM, which ssh(1) cannot consume directly -- and is marked as such in the compatibility matrix. - Cross-impl phases A and B now include an ssh entry in both directions. One harness fix: PEM values carry a trailing newline that the CLI capture strips, so the cross-impl comparison normalizes trailing whitespace. The unit tests still compare exactly. 170 core + 46 CLI tests green; 16/16 cross-implementation checks green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
|
7407d65294 |
parity: schema migrations 0->4, so legacy Python vaults open in TypeScript
This was the one remaining gap that could strand a real user: TS refused
any index below schema_version 4, which is every profile written before
tags were added.
- core/schema/migrations.ts ports seedpass.core.migrations exactly,
including the quirks: v1->v2 copies `website` to `label` and drops it
only for password entries; `kind` is NOT backfilled (Python leaves
pre-v2 entries `type`-only and falls back on read). Migration works on a
copy, so a failure can never leave a half-converted vault.
- parseVaultIndex now migrates on open and still refuses future versions;
pass {migrate:false} where silent upgrades are unwanted.
- Two bugs this surfaced: the version probe could not read a v0 index (no
schema_version field at all), and migrated legacy entries failed schema
validation because the discriminator `kind` was missing. The parser now
fills `kind` from `type` at validation time -- the same shape Python
writes for new entries, documented in the matrix.
Evidence: fixtures generated by running Python's own apply_migrations over
v0/v1/v2/v3 payloads, plus cross-impl phase E, which writes a real legacy
v2 index into a Python profile, opens it with the TS CLI, reveals a
migrated secret, and confirms Python still reads the profile afterwards.
162 core + 46 CLI tests green; 16/16 cross-implementation checks green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
|
0f8ce35c47 |
cross-impl: prove Python/TS profile interop, fix two compatibility bugs
Fixtures show both implementations compute the same values. This adds the
missing half: proof they can read each other's on-disk profiles and
backups, using each side's real code paths.
scripts/cross_impl_check.py (12 checks, wired into CI):
A. Python creates a profile -> TS opens the index, derives every secret
identically, and unlocks it with the master password alone
B. TS creates a profile -> Python decrypts parent_seed.enc and the index,
recovers the same seed, derives the same secrets
C. Portable backups round-trip both directions (Python verifies the
checksum of a TS-written export)
D. Both implementations reject a bad-checksum mnemonic
Two real compatibility bugs it caught, both fixed:
- TS-created profiles were unopenable by Python. Python only honors the
recorded parent-seed KDF parameters when kdf.name is exactly "pbkdf2";
TS wrote "pbkdf2-sha256" with an empty salt and 100k iterations, so
Python fell back to its config defaults (200k, fingerprint salt) and
derived a different key. TS now writes exactly what
PasswordManager._build_seed_kdf_config does, and its own unlock path
honors the recorded salt and iteration count.
- TS accepted invalid BIP-39 mnemonics. Seed derivation takes any string,
so a typo'd phrase silently produced a *different* vault -- unopenable
by Python and unrecoverable by the user. Mnemonics are now validated
wherever they enter (profile creation and SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC), with an
error that says why it matters.
Also: docs/typescript_cutover_plan.md records the gate list for promoting
TS to main and retiring Python to legacy/reference -- P0 gates 1-4 are
green, 5-7 (feature parity tail, packaging, migration/rollback) are not.
The Python tree stays in CI after cutover as the compatibility oracle.
Regression tests for both bugs. 151 core + 46 CLI tests green,
12/12 cross-implementation checks green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
|
274bc0e1b8 |
TS port slice 10: scoped tokens, agent-side enforcement, audit chain
The section-9.3 permission model is now working code, enforced where the keys live: - Token model (aligned with the Python agent surface): bearer tokens with read/use/reveal scopes, entry-kind and label-regex constraints, TTL and use counts. Issued and held by the session agent — hash-stored, plaintext shown exactly once at issuance; list/revoke commands. - Token mode: with SEEDPASS_TOKEN set (and no mnemonic), the CLI reads the decrypted index and materializes secrets AGENT-SIDE. The constrained process never receives the mnemonic, and resolveMnemonic refuses owner fallback in token mode — a token can never silently escalate (the test suite caught exactly this hole and it is now closed). - Denials are precise and audited: wrong scope, wrong kind, unmatched label, expired, exhausted, revoked. Reads don't consume uses; secret deliveries do. - Audit chain in Python AuditLogger's scheme: sig = HMAC-SHA256(key_index, prev_sig + canonical_payload), genesis 64 zeros, per-profile audit.log; agent records unlocks, token lifecycle, index reads, deliveries and denials (never secret values). audit-verify/audit-tail commands; a forged record breaks the chain in tests. - 151 core + 41 CLI tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
|
e84a7e1c0e |
TS port slice 9: relay transport + nostr sync/restore — Milestone 5 complete
- core RelayPool over the platform WebSocket (global in Node 22+/browsers, no dependency): multi-relay publish with per-relay OK collection, fetch aggregation until EOSE with dedupe and signature verification on ingest, connect timeouts, dead-relay tolerance. - Sync flows mirroring nostr/snapshot.py: publishSnapshot (chunk events -> manifest with HMAC identity + nonce), fetchLatestSnapshot (newest-first, per-chunk hash verify, falls through incomplete manifests), publishDelta, fetchDeltasSince (created_at replay order). - CLI nostr group: get-pubkey (matches app-1237 fixture npub), list/add/ remove-relay (config-backed, ws:// validation, last-relay guard), sync (publish local vault), restore (snapshot + delta merge -> local vault). - Tested against an in-process NIP-01 mock relay: core round trip incl. corrupted-chunk rejection, and CLI end-to-end sync -> destroy local vault -> restore with secrets intact. Transport tests are Node-only (jsdom WebSocket can't connect; real browsers come with Milestone 6). - 151 core + 32 CLI tests green. Milestone 5 CLI surface is complete. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
|
4f2b8a79bf |
TS port slice 7: entry modify/archive/links + util generate-password
- core entryMod: modify_entry port with the per-kind allowed-field matrix, policy merging, blacklisted-field cleanup and timestamp touching; archive/restore; typed links (add/remove/get with Python's normalization, dedupe on target/relation/note, self-link and missing-target refusal). - Parity fixture entry_mods.json: the real Python EntryManager applies a 10-op modification sequence at a later pinned clock; TS replays the same ops from the creation state and matches byte-for-byte. - CLI: entry modify/archive/unarchive/links/link-add/link-remove, entry totp-codes (explicit egress, honors --at and archived state), util generate-password (Python parity: index 0 + gen v1 defaults, full policy flags — v1/v2 outputs verified against password fixtures). - capabilities: egress command list updated. - 148 core parity tests (Node + jsdom) + 22 CLI tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
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774c992153 |
TS port slice 6: Nostr event protocol layer with rust-nostr cross-fixtures
- NIP-01 event serialization/id computation, BIP-340 signing and verification via @noble/curves, SeedPass event builders (manifest 30070, chunk 30071, delta 30072 with d/e tags), and REQ/EVENT/EOSE/OK/NOTICE/ CLOSED client-relay framing. Transport-agnostic; the WebSocket adapter lands with the interface milestones. - Cross-implementation fixtures generated through the Python side's nostr_sdk (rust-nostr) with pinned created_at: TS ids match theirs byte-for-byte, their signatures verify in TS, and TS-signed events reproduce identical ids. The generator caches signatures across runs (BIP-340 aux randomness) so fixture output stays byte-deterministic and the CI drift job holds. - 143 core parity tests (Node + jsdom) + 16 CLI tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
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e91d5d0be2 |
TS port slice 5: agent-blind provisioning, entry-secret parity, nostr app fix
- core entryOps: add* functions for all creatable kinds rebuild the Python EntryManager fixture index byte-for-byte under a pinned clock — field shapes, id allocation, independent TOTP derivation-index allocation, and Python's ISO timestamp format all verified. - CLI 'entry add password/totp/key-value/document/seed/managed-account/ nostr': provision-blind — returns the reference and metadata, never the secret the entry represents; tests assert the derived password / imported secret / child mnemonic appear nowhere in provisioning output. - Parity bug found and fixed by the new entry_secrets fixtures: nostr ENTRY keys derive via the default BIP-85 app 39 path (EntryManager), not app 1237 (sync client identity); the CLI had used 1237. Reveal values for password/TOTP/nostr/seed/managed-account now match Python retrieval. - 129 core parity tests (Node + jsdom) + 16 CLI tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
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ab569fe900 |
TS port slice 4: portable backup, CI, and the agent-blind CLI MVP
- Portable backup (format_version 1): TS imports Python exports, re-exports
byte-identically under pinned nonce/timestamp, verifies the canonical
checksum, rejects tampering and unknown versions.
- .github/workflows/ts-parity.yml: typecheck + Node/jsdom parity suite on
js/ changes, plus a fixture-drift job that regenerates fixtures from
Python and fails if the committed ones don't match (manifest commit field
excluded by construction).
- packages/cli — seedpass-js MVP implementing plan section 9.3:
* reference-first output: entry list/get/search emit sp://entry/<id> refs
and metadata; secret-bearing fields become has_* flags
* 'entry reveal' is the only plaintext egress command
* 'use --clipboard|--exec|--stdin-to' delivers secrets to sinks; --exec
injects SEEDPASS_SECRET into the child env, never argv or stdout
* vault export/import over portable backups; capabilities --format json
* mnemonic comes from SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC env, never the command line
- CLI tests prove the blindness properties: derived password matches the v2
fixture, TOTP at pinned time, secrets absent from all default output and
from sink-delivery confirmations.
- 125 core parity tests (Node + jsdom) + 11 CLI tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
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2345f61431 |
TS port slice 3: Nostr sync model — snapshots, manifests, conflict merge
- Snapshot model parity (kinds 30070/30071/30072): gzip chunking via platform CompressionStream, chunk-hash verification, reassembly of Python-produced chunks, manifest JSON schema, manifest id HMAC-SHA256(key_index, 'manifest|'+nonce) with the key_index HKDF chain. - Full merge_index_payloads port (modified_ts_hash_tombstone_v2): Python-compatible canonical JSON (sort_keys + ensure_ascii) for hash parity, equal-ts field-level union, tombstone create/prefer/apply/cap, _sync_meta bookkeeping. Populated _system.index0 content refuses to merge loudly (atlas-milestone work) instead of silently dropping data. - Delta replay: encrypted V3 deltas decrypt and merge in order with source_tag = sha256(payload)[:16]; final state matches Python. - New fixtures: nostr_snapshot.json, sync_merge.json (8 scenarios), delta_replay.json; generator remains byte-deterministic. - 117 parity tests green in Node and jsdom. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
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6d6ad5e2c5 |
TS port slice 2: entry schemas, password KDF, legacy vault formats
- Zod schemas for all 9 entry kinds (schema_version 4): validate and roundtrip the Python EntryManager-generated fixture unchanged; refuse future schema versions. - Password KDF parity: PBKDF2-SHA256 (NFKD+strip, fingerprint salt, 50k/100k iters) and Argon2id via @noble/hashes, both fixture-verified. - Legacy vault decrypt chain matching EncryptionManager.decrypt_data: V3 GCM -> V2 GCM -> V2-header-over-Fernet -> raw Fernet (decrypt-only), plus the JSON kdf/ct file wrapper with bare-ciphertext fallback; the parent-seed file decrypts end-to-end from password. - Fixture generator grows password_kdf.json and legacy_payloads.json (pinned IVs/nonces, fixture-only). - 100 parity tests green in Node and jsdom. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> |
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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
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f720d16208 |
TS port first slice: fixture generator, js/ workspace, P0 derivation parity
- scripts/generate_ts_port_fixtures.py: deterministic fixtures from public test mnemonics (passwords v1+v2, BIP-39/85, TOTP, Nostr keys, managed seeds, fingerprints, index keys, entry schemas, V3 vault payload). Byte-identical across runs; v1 values match the frozen entropy-integrity vectors. - js/: pnpm workspace with @seedpass/core and @seedpass/test-vectors. Core implements BIP-85, password gen v1 (frozen) + v2, TOTP, Nostr keys, fingerprints, vault index key, and V3 AES-GCM decrypt using only noble/scure crypto + WebCrypto. Strict TS, no Node/DOM deps in core. - 82 parity tests pass in Node and a jsdom browser-like environment. - docs/typescript_port_compatibility_matrix.md tracks per-area status. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> |