Phase F starts the in-process NIP-01 relay, has the real Python NostrClient
publish a chunked snapshot to it, then restores that snapshot with the TS
CLI on a clean profile and checks the secrets survive.
It immediately caught a genuine restore bug: Python's index files wrap the
ciphertext in a kdf/ct JSON envelope, and a published snapshot carries
whatever the local file held. TS decrypted the fetched bytes directly, so
it failed on anything Python published -- invisible to the TS-only tests
because TS writes bare ciphertext. Restore (and delta replay) now parse the
wrapper first, exactly as decrypt_and_save_index_from_nostr does.
Regression test in relay.test.ts publishes a wrapper-format payload through
a live relay and restores it.
Cutover plan updated: gate 4 (sync protocol) now cites this end-to-end
evidence, and gate 5's remaining list drops SSH and migrations.
171 core + 46 CLI tests green; 19/19 cross-implementation checks green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
- core/derive/ssh.ts: BIP-85 app 32 entropy used directly as the Ed25519
private key, serialized as PKCS#8 and SubjectPublicKeyInfo PEM. Both DER
shapes are fixed for Ed25519, so they are emitted from literal prefixes
rather than adding an ASN.1 dependency to the crypto path.
- Output matches Python's `cryptography` byte-for-byte across two seeds and
three indices, including PEM line wrapping.
- CLI: `entry add ssh`, reveal (private key PEM), and `entry ssh-public`
which prints the public key without touching secret material. The
OpenSSH authorized_keys line is a TS-only convenience -- Python emits
only PEM, which ssh(1) cannot consume directly -- and is marked as such
in the compatibility matrix.
- Cross-impl phases A and B now include an ssh entry in both directions.
One harness fix: PEM values carry a trailing newline that the CLI capture
strips, so the cross-impl comparison normalizes trailing whitespace. The
unit tests still compare exactly.
170 core + 46 CLI tests green; 16/16 cross-implementation checks green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
This was the one remaining gap that could strand a real user: TS refused
any index below schema_version 4, which is every profile written before
tags were added.
- core/schema/migrations.ts ports seedpass.core.migrations exactly,
including the quirks: v1->v2 copies `website` to `label` and drops it
only for password entries; `kind` is NOT backfilled (Python leaves
pre-v2 entries `type`-only and falls back on read). Migration works on a
copy, so a failure can never leave a half-converted vault.
- parseVaultIndex now migrates on open and still refuses future versions;
pass {migrate:false} where silent upgrades are unwanted.
- Two bugs this surfaced: the version probe could not read a v0 index (no
schema_version field at all), and migrated legacy entries failed schema
validation because the discriminator `kind` was missing. The parser now
fills `kind` from `type` at validation time -- the same shape Python
writes for new entries, documented in the matrix.
Evidence: fixtures generated by running Python's own apply_migrations over
v0/v1/v2/v3 payloads, plus cross-impl phase E, which writes a real legacy
v2 index into a Python profile, opens it with the TS CLI, reveals a
migrated secret, and confirms Python still reads the profile afterwards.
162 core + 46 CLI tests green; 16/16 cross-implementation checks green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Fixtures show both implementations compute the same values. This adds the
missing half: proof they can read each other's on-disk profiles and
backups, using each side's real code paths.
scripts/cross_impl_check.py (12 checks, wired into CI):
A. Python creates a profile -> TS opens the index, derives every secret
identically, and unlocks it with the master password alone
B. TS creates a profile -> Python decrypts parent_seed.enc and the index,
recovers the same seed, derives the same secrets
C. Portable backups round-trip both directions (Python verifies the
checksum of a TS-written export)
D. Both implementations reject a bad-checksum mnemonic
Two real compatibility bugs it caught, both fixed:
- TS-created profiles were unopenable by Python. Python only honors the
recorded parent-seed KDF parameters when kdf.name is exactly "pbkdf2";
TS wrote "pbkdf2-sha256" with an empty salt and 100k iterations, so
Python fell back to its config defaults (200k, fingerprint salt) and
derived a different key. TS now writes exactly what
PasswordManager._build_seed_kdf_config does, and its own unlock path
honors the recorded salt and iteration count.
- TS accepted invalid BIP-39 mnemonics. Seed derivation takes any string,
so a typo'd phrase silently produced a *different* vault -- unopenable
by Python and unrecoverable by the user. Mnemonics are now validated
wherever they enter (profile creation and SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC), with an
error that says why it matters.
Also: docs/typescript_cutover_plan.md records the gate list for promoting
TS to main and retiring Python to legacy/reference -- P0 gates 1-4 are
green, 5-7 (feature parity tail, packaging, migration/rollback) are not.
The Python tree stays in CI after cutover as the compatibility oracle.
Regression tests for both bugs. 151 core + 46 CLI tests green,
12/12 cross-implementation checks green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
