TotpManager built pyotp.TOTP(secret) with library defaults (6 digits, 30s)
and ignored what the entry recorded, so any imported or derived entry using
other values produced codes the issuing service rejects. The service was
configured from the entry's values -- those govern the code.
- current_code_from_secret and current_code take period/digits
- EntryManager.get_totp_code passes the entry's values for both the
derived and imported paths
- display_service, menu_handler (totp_list now carries digits) and the GUI
updated at every call site
- regression tests for imported and deterministic entries with custom
parameters, asserting against pyotp with the matching interval/digits,
and confirming default entries are byte-identical to before
Found by scripts/cross_impl_check.py, which flagged it as a divergence
against the TypeScript port. That allowance is now removed: the suite
asserts TOTP equality and reports 30/30 with zero divergences.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Expanded the cross-implementation suite from 19 to 30 checks so every
feature is exercised against the other implementation, not just the ones
that were convenient:
G edits (modify / archive / links) made by either side are seen by the other
H deterministic conflict merge produces byte-identical output on both sides
I an Argon2id-protected Python profile unlocks in TS
J the encrypted config file interoperates both directions
Entry coverage in phases A/B now spans every creatable kind, including a
policy-constrained password and an imported (non-deterministic) TOTP.
Two real bugs this surfaced, both fixed:
- Password entries carrying a `policy` block derived the WRONG password in
TS. Python's _generate_password_for_entry merges the entry's overrides
onto the base policy before deriving; TS ignored the block entirely, so
any entry created with policy flags produced a different password.
core now exposes passwordPolicyFromRecord and the CLI applies it.
- TS could not read a Python-written config file: Python wraps it in the
kdf/ct JSON envelope (same class as the snapshot bug fixed last commit).
loadConfig now parses the envelope; regression test included.
One behavioral divergence found and deliberately NOT papered over:
Python generates TOTP codes with pyotp defaults (6 digits / 30s) even when
the entry records different values, so an imported 8-digit/45s secret
yields different codes in each implementation -- and Python's would be
rejected by the issuing service. The suite now reports it as a [DIVERGE]
line rather than a pass or a failure, and the matrix records it as awaiting
a product decision. TS behavior is believed correct.
173 core + 47 CLI tests green; 30/30 cross-implementation checks green
with 2 documented divergences.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Phase F starts the in-process NIP-01 relay, has the real Python NostrClient
publish a chunked snapshot to it, then restores that snapshot with the TS
CLI on a clean profile and checks the secrets survive.
It immediately caught a genuine restore bug: Python's index files wrap the
ciphertext in a kdf/ct JSON envelope, and a published snapshot carries
whatever the local file held. TS decrypted the fetched bytes directly, so
it failed on anything Python published -- invisible to the TS-only tests
because TS writes bare ciphertext. Restore (and delta replay) now parse the
wrapper first, exactly as decrypt_and_save_index_from_nostr does.
Regression test in relay.test.ts publishes a wrapper-format payload through
a live relay and restores it.
Cutover plan updated: gate 4 (sync protocol) now cites this end-to-end
evidence, and gate 5's remaining list drops SSH and migrations.
171 core + 46 CLI tests green; 19/19 cross-implementation checks green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
- core/derive/ssh.ts: BIP-85 app 32 entropy used directly as the Ed25519
private key, serialized as PKCS#8 and SubjectPublicKeyInfo PEM. Both DER
shapes are fixed for Ed25519, so they are emitted from literal prefixes
rather than adding an ASN.1 dependency to the crypto path.
- Output matches Python's `cryptography` byte-for-byte across two seeds and
three indices, including PEM line wrapping.
- CLI: `entry add ssh`, reveal (private key PEM), and `entry ssh-public`
which prints the public key without touching secret material. The
OpenSSH authorized_keys line is a TS-only convenience -- Python emits
only PEM, which ssh(1) cannot consume directly -- and is marked as such
in the compatibility matrix.
- Cross-impl phases A and B now include an ssh entry in both directions.
One harness fix: PEM values carry a trailing newline that the CLI capture
strips, so the cross-impl comparison normalizes trailing whitespace. The
unit tests still compare exactly.
170 core + 46 CLI tests green; 16/16 cross-implementation checks green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
This was the one remaining gap that could strand a real user: TS refused
any index below schema_version 4, which is every profile written before
tags were added.
- core/schema/migrations.ts ports seedpass.core.migrations exactly,
including the quirks: v1->v2 copies `website` to `label` and drops it
only for password entries; `kind` is NOT backfilled (Python leaves
pre-v2 entries `type`-only and falls back on read). Migration works on a
copy, so a failure can never leave a half-converted vault.
- parseVaultIndex now migrates on open and still refuses future versions;
pass {migrate:false} where silent upgrades are unwanted.
- Two bugs this surfaced: the version probe could not read a v0 index (no
schema_version field at all), and migrated legacy entries failed schema
validation because the discriminator `kind` was missing. The parser now
fills `kind` from `type` at validation time -- the same shape Python
writes for new entries, documented in the matrix.
Evidence: fixtures generated by running Python's own apply_migrations over
v0/v1/v2/v3 payloads, plus cross-impl phase E, which writes a real legacy
v2 index into a Python profile, opens it with the TS CLI, reveals a
migrated secret, and confirms Python still reads the profile afterwards.
162 core + 46 CLI tests green; 16/16 cross-implementation checks green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Fixtures show both implementations compute the same values. This adds the
missing half: proof they can read each other's on-disk profiles and
backups, using each side's real code paths.
scripts/cross_impl_check.py (12 checks, wired into CI):
A. Python creates a profile -> TS opens the index, derives every secret
identically, and unlocks it with the master password alone
B. TS creates a profile -> Python decrypts parent_seed.enc and the index,
recovers the same seed, derives the same secrets
C. Portable backups round-trip both directions (Python verifies the
checksum of a TS-written export)
D. Both implementations reject a bad-checksum mnemonic
Two real compatibility bugs it caught, both fixed:
- TS-created profiles were unopenable by Python. Python only honors the
recorded parent-seed KDF parameters when kdf.name is exactly "pbkdf2";
TS wrote "pbkdf2-sha256" with an empty salt and 100k iterations, so
Python fell back to its config defaults (200k, fingerprint salt) and
derived a different key. TS now writes exactly what
PasswordManager._build_seed_kdf_config does, and its own unlock path
honors the recorded salt and iteration count.
- TS accepted invalid BIP-39 mnemonics. Seed derivation takes any string,
so a typo'd phrase silently produced a *different* vault -- unopenable
by Python and unrecoverable by the user. Mnemonics are now validated
wherever they enter (profile creation and SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC), with an
error that says why it matters.
Also: docs/typescript_cutover_plan.md records the gate list for promoting
TS to main and retiring Python to legacy/reference -- P0 gates 1-4 are
green, 5-7 (feature parity tail, packaging, migration/rollback) are not.
The Python tree stays in CI after cutover as the compatibility oracle.
Regression tests for both bugs. 151 core + 46 CLI tests green,
12/12 cross-implementation checks green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
