Ran the full CLI surface against a freshly generated throwaway seed
(profile -> agent unlock -> all 8 entry kinds -> reveal/sinks -> tokens ->
audit -> backup -> relay sync -> seed-only recovery). Four defects that no
unit test had caught:
- clipboard sink hung the CLI forever. xclip/wl-copy fork a resident
process to own the X/Wayland selection; it inherited our stdio, so any
reader of the CLI's stdout blocked indefinitely, and waiting for process
exit never returned. Now detached with ignored stdio, success declared
once stdin is flushed.
- 'vault import' read the mnemonic straight from the env, so it failed
whenever the vault was unlocked through the agent -- the normal path.
- 'vault import' never wrote anything; it only printed a summary. It now
restores into the active vault, refuses to overwrite a non-empty vault
without --yes, and keeps the old behavior behind --inspect.
- A corrupt/foreign vault file surfaced the raw codec error "invalid token
encoding". It now names the actual likely causes.
Also documented the variadic-option limitation that a trailing flag is
lost (commander stops collecting at the next dash-prefixed token): a
quoted command spec now splits on whitespace, no shell involved.
Regression tests for all four. 151 core + 44 CLI tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
The section-9.3 permission model is now working code, enforced where the
keys live:
- Token model (aligned with the Python agent surface): bearer tokens with
read/use/reveal scopes, entry-kind and label-regex constraints, TTL and
use counts. Issued and held by the session agent — hash-stored, plaintext
shown exactly once at issuance; list/revoke commands.
- Token mode: with SEEDPASS_TOKEN set (and no mnemonic), the CLI reads the
decrypted index and materializes secrets AGENT-SIDE. The constrained
process never receives the mnemonic, and resolveMnemonic refuses owner
fallback in token mode — a token can never silently escalate (the test
suite caught exactly this hole and it is now closed).
- Denials are precise and audited: wrong scope, wrong kind, unmatched
label, expired, exhausted, revoked. Reads don't consume uses; secret
deliveries do.
- Audit chain in Python AuditLogger's scheme: sig = HMAC-SHA256(key_index,
prev_sig + canonical_payload), genesis 64 zeros, per-profile audit.log;
agent records unlocks, token lifecycle, index reads, deliveries and
denials (never secret values). audit-verify/audit-tail commands; a forged
record breaks the chain in tests.
- 151 core + 41 CLI tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
- core entryMod: modify_entry port with the per-kind allowed-field matrix,
policy merging, blacklisted-field cleanup and timestamp touching;
archive/restore; typed links (add/remove/get with Python's normalization,
dedupe on target/relation/note, self-link and missing-target refusal).
- Parity fixture entry_mods.json: the real Python EntryManager applies a
10-op modification sequence at a later pinned clock; TS replays the same
ops from the creation state and matches byte-for-byte.
- CLI: entry modify/archive/unarchive/links/link-add/link-remove,
entry totp-codes (explicit egress, honors --at and archived state),
util generate-password (Python parity: index 0 + gen v1 defaults, full
policy flags — v1/v2 outputs verified against password fixtures).
- capabilities: egress command list updated.
- 148 core parity tests (Node + jsdom) + 22 CLI tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
- core entryOps: add* functions for all creatable kinds rebuild the Python
EntryManager fixture index byte-for-byte under a pinned clock — field
shapes, id allocation, independent TOTP derivation-index allocation, and
Python's ISO timestamp format all verified.
- CLI 'entry add password/totp/key-value/document/seed/managed-account/
nostr': provision-blind — returns the reference and metadata, never the
secret the entry represents; tests assert the derived password / imported
secret / child mnemonic appear nowhere in provisioning output.
- Parity bug found and fixed by the new entry_secrets fixtures: nostr ENTRY
keys derive via the default BIP-85 app 39 path (EntryManager), not app
1237 (sync client identity); the CLI had used 1237. Reveal values for
password/TOTP/nostr/seed/managed-account now match Python retrieval.
- 129 core parity tests (Node + jsdom) + 16 CLI tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
- Portable backup (format_version 1): TS imports Python exports, re-exports
byte-identically under pinned nonce/timestamp, verifies the canonical
checksum, rejects tampering and unknown versions.
- .github/workflows/ts-parity.yml: typecheck + Node/jsdom parity suite on
js/ changes, plus a fixture-drift job that regenerates fixtures from
Python and fails if the committed ones don't match (manifest commit field
excluded by construction).
- packages/cli — seedpass-js MVP implementing plan section 9.3:
* reference-first output: entry list/get/search emit sp://entry/<id> refs
and metadata; secret-bearing fields become has_* flags
* 'entry reveal' is the only plaintext egress command
* 'use --clipboard|--exec|--stdin-to' delivers secrets to sinks; --exec
injects SEEDPASS_SECRET into the child env, never argv or stdout
* vault export/import over portable backups; capabilities --format json
* mnemonic comes from SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC env, never the command line
- CLI tests prove the blindness properties: derived password matches the v2
fixture, TOTP at pinned time, secrets absent from all default output and
from sink-delivery confirmations.
- 125 core parity tests (Node + jsdom) + 11 CLI tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
