mirror of
https://github.com/PR0M3TH3AN/SeedPass.git
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Expanded the cross-implementation suite from 19 to 30 checks so every feature is exercised against the other implementation, not just the ones that were convenient: G edits (modify / archive / links) made by either side are seen by the other H deterministic conflict merge produces byte-identical output on both sides I an Argon2id-protected Python profile unlocks in TS J the encrypted config file interoperates both directions Entry coverage in phases A/B now spans every creatable kind, including a policy-constrained password and an imported (non-deterministic) TOTP. Two real bugs this surfaced, both fixed: - Password entries carrying a `policy` block derived the WRONG password in TS. Python's _generate_password_for_entry merges the entry's overrides onto the base policy before deriving; TS ignored the block entirely, so any entry created with policy flags produced a different password. core now exposes passwordPolicyFromRecord and the CLI applies it. - TS could not read a Python-written config file: Python wraps it in the kdf/ct JSON envelope (same class as the snapshot bug fixed last commit). loadConfig now parses the envelope; regression test included. One behavioral divergence found and deliberately NOT papered over: Python generates TOTP codes with pyotp defaults (6 digits / 30s) even when the entry records different values, so an imported 8-digit/45s secret yields different codes in each implementation -- and Python's would be rejected by the issuing service. The suite now reports it as a [DIVERGE] line rather than a pass or a failure, and the matrix records it as awaiting a product decision. TS behavior is believed correct. 173 core + 47 CLI tests green; 30/30 cross-implementation checks green with 2 documented divergences. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
209 lines
8.0 KiB
TypeScript
209 lines
8.0 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Profile, config, and session-agent tests: the full unlock lifecycle with
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* no SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC in the environment — the agent is the only seed
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* source, exactly how an agent-driven workflow would run.
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*/
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import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { mkdtemp, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
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import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
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import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
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import { join } from "node:path";
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import process from "node:process";
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import { mnemonics } from "@seedpass/test-vectors";
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import {
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generateFingerprint,
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sha256Hex,
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hexToBytes,
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utf8,
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encryptV3,
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deriveIndexKeyBytes,
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} from "@seedpass/core";
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import { buildProgram, AgentDaemon, agentSocketPath, type ProgramIo } from "../src/index.js";
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const MNEMONIC = mnemonics["abandon12"]!;
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const FINGERPRINT = generateFingerprint(MNEMONIC);
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const PASSWORD = "profile-test-password";
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let appDir: string;
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let daemon: AgentDaemon;
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interface RunResult {
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stdout: string;
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error?: unknown;
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}
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async function run(env: Record<string, string | undefined>, ...argv: string[]): Promise<RunResult> {
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const saved: Record<string, string | undefined> = {};
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for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(env)) {
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saved[k] = process.env[k];
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if (v === undefined) delete process.env[k];
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else process.env[k] = v;
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}
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const out: string[] = [];
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const io: ProgramIo = { out: (l: string) => out.push(l), err: () => {} };
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let error: unknown;
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try {
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await buildProgram(io).parseAsync(["node", "seedpass-js", "--app-dir", appDir, ...argv]);
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} catch (e) {
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error = e;
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} finally {
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for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(saved)) {
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if (v === undefined) delete process.env[k];
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else process.env[k] = v;
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}
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}
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return { stdout: out.join("\n"), error };
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}
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beforeAll(async () => {
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appDir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "seedpass-appdir-"));
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process.env["SEEDPASS_AGENT_SOCK"] = join(appDir, "agent.sock");
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daemon = new AgentDaemon(agentSocketPath(appDir), 900);
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await daemon.start();
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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await daemon.stop();
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delete process.env["SEEDPASS_AGENT_SOCK"];
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});
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describe("profile lifecycle", () => {
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it("creates a Python-layout profile from env secrets", async () => {
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const r = await run(
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{ SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC: MNEMONIC, SEEDPASS_PASSWORD: PASSWORD },
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"fingerprint", "add", "--name", "main",
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);
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expect(JSON.parse(r.stdout).fingerprint).toBe(FINGERPRINT);
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expect(existsSync(join(appDir, FINGERPRINT, "parent_seed.enc"))).toBe(true);
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expect(existsSync(join(appDir, FINGERPRINT, "seedpass_entries_db.json.enc"))).toBe(true);
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const meta = JSON.parse(await readFile(join(appDir, "fingerprints.json"), "utf8"));
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expect(meta).toEqual({
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fingerprints: [FINGERPRINT],
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last_used: FINGERPRINT,
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names: { [FINGERPRINT]: "main" },
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});
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});
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it("writes Python-compatible parent-seed KDF metadata", async () => {
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// Python's PasswordManager._derive_seed_key only takes the recorded
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// parameters when kdf.name is exactly "pbkdf2"; anything else makes it
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// fall back to its config defaults and derive a different key, leaving
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// TS-created profiles unopenable there.
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const wrapper = JSON.parse(
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await readFile(join(appDir, FINGERPRINT, "parent_seed.enc"), "utf8"),
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) as { kdf: { name: string; params: { iterations: number }; salt_b64: string } };
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expect(wrapper.kdf.name).toBe("pbkdf2");
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expect(wrapper.kdf.params.iterations).toBe(200000);
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// salt = sha256(fingerprint)[:16], as Python computes it
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const expectedSalt = Buffer.from(
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hexToBytes(sha256Hex(utf8(FINGERPRINT))).slice(0, 16),
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).toString("base64");
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expect(wrapper.kdf.salt_b64).toBe(expectedSalt);
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});
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it("refuses an invalid mnemonic instead of creating an unrecoverable vault", async () => {
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// Valid words, wrong checksum. BIP-39 seed derivation would happily
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// accept it and produce a different vault that nothing can recover.
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const bogus = "gaze stereo trend brown chunk hero pole width once tent lift bird";
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const r = await run(
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{ SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC: bogus, SEEDPASS_PASSWORD: "x" },
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"fingerprint", "add", "--name", "should-not-exist",
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);
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expect(String((r.error as Error).message)).toContain("valid BIP-39");
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const meta = JSON.parse(await readFile(join(appDir, "fingerprints.json"), "utf8"));
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expect(meta.fingerprints).toHaveLength(1);
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});
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it("lists and switches profiles", async () => {
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const r = await run({}, "fingerprint", "list");
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expect(JSON.parse(r.stdout)).toEqual([
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{ fingerprint: FINGERPRINT, name: "main", current: true },
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]);
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});
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});
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describe("agent unlock lifecycle (no mnemonic in env)", () => {
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it("locked vault refuses access with a helpful error", async () => {
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const r = await run({ SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC: undefined }, "entry", "list");
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expect(String((r.error as Error).message)).toContain("vault is locked");
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});
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it("vault unlock hands the seed to the agent using only the password", async () => {
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const r = await run(
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{ SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC: undefined, SEEDPASS_PASSWORD: PASSWORD },
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"vault", "unlock", "--ttl", "60",
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);
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const row = JSON.parse(r.stdout);
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expect(row.unlocked).toBe(FINGERPRINT);
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expect(row.expires_at).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now() / 1000);
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});
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it("profile vault opens via the agent, no env mnemonic, no --vault", async () => {
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const list = await run({ SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC: undefined }, "entry", "list");
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expect(JSON.parse(list.stdout)).toEqual([]);
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const add = await run(
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{ SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC: undefined },
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"entry", "add", "key-value", "agent-made", "k", "agent-value",
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);
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expect(JSON.parse(add.stdout).ref).toBe("sp://entry/0");
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expect(add.stdout).not.toContain("agent-value");
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const reveal = await run(
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{ SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC: undefined },
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"entry", "reveal", "agent-made",
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);
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expect(reveal.stdout).toBe("agent-value");
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});
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it("agent status shows the unlocked profile; lock drops it", async () => {
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const status = await run({}, "agent", "status");
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expect(JSON.parse(status.stdout).map((p: { fingerprint: string }) => p.fingerprint)).toEqual([
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FINGERPRINT,
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]);
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const lock = await run({ SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC: undefined }, "vault", "lock");
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expect(JSON.parse(lock.stdout).locked).toBe(1);
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const denied = await run({ SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC: undefined }, "entry", "list");
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expect(String((denied.error as Error).message)).toContain("vault is locked");
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});
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});
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describe("config file compatibility", () => {
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it("reads a config written in Python's kdf/ct wrapper format", async () => {
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// Python's EncryptionManager.save_json_data wraps ciphertext in a JSON
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// envelope; TS writes it bare. Reading must handle both.
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const key = deriveIndexKeyBytes(MNEMONIC);
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const inner = await encryptV3(key, utf8(JSON.stringify({ clipboard_clear_delay: 99 })));
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const wrapped = JSON.stringify({
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kdf: { name: "argon2id", version: 1, params: {}, salt_b64: "" },
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ct: Buffer.from(inner).toString("base64"),
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});
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await writeFile(join(appDir, FINGERPRINT, "seedpass_config.json.enc"), wrapped);
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const r = await run({ SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC: MNEMONIC }, "config", "get");
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expect(JSON.parse(r.stdout).clipboard_clear_delay).toBe(99);
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});
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});
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describe("config", () => {
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it("returns defaults, persists sets, and redacts hashes", async () => {
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const env = { SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC: MNEMONIC };
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const defaults = JSON.parse((await run(env, "config", "get")).stdout);
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expect(defaults.relays).toHaveLength(3);
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expect(defaults.kdf_iterations).toBe(200000);
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await run(env, "config", "set", "clipboard_clear_delay", "10");
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await run(env, "config", "set", "relays", '["wss://relay.example"]');
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const after = JSON.parse((await run(env, "config", "get")).stdout);
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expect(after.clipboard_clear_delay).toBe(10);
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expect(after.relays).toEqual(["wss://relay.example"]);
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await run(env, "config", "set", "pin_hash", "supersecret");
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const redacted = JSON.parse((await run(env, "config", "get", "pin_hash")).stdout);
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expect(redacted.pin_hash).toBe("<redacted>");
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});
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});
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