thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
39c4e45376
The "semantic (vector search)" entry in not_yet_ported was a misnomer. It is
not vector search and needs no model: MODEL_ID is "seedpass-token-overlap-v1",
and it scores by Jaccard overlap over tokenized metadata. That is why it could
be ported at all — there is nothing to embed.
Porting it surfaced two defects in the Python implementation.
**Stored secrets were written to a plaintext, 0664 file.** `_extract_text`
appended a key_value entry's `value` — the stored secret itself — and
`build()` wrote it to semantic_index/records.json in the clear, along with a
tokenized copy that leaked it just as thoroughly. The file was created at the
process umask, so on a default install it was group- and world-readable, next
to a vault that is encrypted and 0600. Anything that could read the directory
— a backup, a sync client, another user on a shared machine — got the secret
without the master password.
Fixed in Python (index the key NAME, never the value; chmod 0600 on both
files) and never done in TypeScript. The rule is worth keeping simple: nobody
searches for a secret they do not already know, so indexing one is pure
downside. MODEL_ID is bumped to v2 so an index built by the old code is
distinguishable — a v1 index on disk still contains the secrets and should be
rebuilt.
**Entry 0 was silently unsearchable.** The check was
`int(entry.get("id", 0) or 0) <= 0`, conflating "no id" with "id 0" — and
entry ids start at 0, so the first entry any user ever created was absent from
every search result with nothing to indicate why. Found by writing a test that
queried for it. Fixed in both implementations: skip an id that is absent,
unparseable or negative, which is what the check was reaching for.
The TypeScript port is wired into the CLI (`semantic build/status/search`),
the API (the /api/v1/semantic routes are now real rather than 501), and
writes through atomicWrite for a genuine 0600 inode. Fixtures come from
scripts/generate_ts_port_fixtures.py, which asserts the leaked value is absent
from its own output, so the fixture-drift job proves provenance the way it
does for every other fixture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN
seedpass-js
The SeedPass command-line interface, TypeScript port.
It reads and writes the same ~/.seedpass profiles as the Python
implementation — same derivations, same vault format, same Nostr sync — and
adds a session agent plus a scoped-token surface designed for AI agents and
automation.
Install
Requires Node.js 22 or newer.
# from a checkout
cd js && pnpm install && pnpm --filter @seedpass/cli build
node packages/cli/dist/seedpass-js.mjs --version
The build produces one self-contained file (dist/seedpass-js.mjs) plus a
.sha256 next to it. Copy it anywhere on your PATH; it has no runtime
dependencies beyond Node itself.
Quick start
export SEEDPASS_APP_DIR=~/.seedpass # omit to use the default
# Create a profile (mnemonic and password come from the environment,
# never from the command line)
export SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC="your twelve or twenty-four words"
export SEEDPASS_PASSWORD="your master password"
seedpass-js fingerprint add --name main
unset SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC # not needed again
# Unlock once per session through the agent
seedpass-js agent start &
seedpass-js vault unlock --ttl 900
seedpass-js entry add password github.com --length 20 --username you
seedpass-js entry reveal github.com
seedpass-js entry totp-codes
seedpass-js use github.com --clipboard
seedpass-js vault lock
Design: reference-first output
Default output never contains secret values. Entries are addressed by
reference (sp://entry/<id>), and secret-bearing fields are reported as
has_* flags:
$ seedpass-js entry get api-token
{ "id": "5", "ref": "sp://entry/5", "label": "api-token",
"kind": "key_value", "has_value": true, ... }
Plaintext leaves the vault only through commands that say so
(entry reveal, entry totp-codes, entry export-document,
util generate-password), or through a sink, which delivers a secret to its
destination without routing it through this process's output:
seedpass-js use api-token --exec ./deploy.sh # SEEDPASS_SECRET in the child env
seedpass-js use api-token --stdin-to "wc -c" # quote specs that contain flags
seedpass-js use api-token --clipboard
Scoped tokens for agents
An agent can be given a token that grants exactly what it needs and nothing else. Secrets are materialized inside the session agent, so the token holder never receives the seed and can never escalate to owner operations.
# As the owner:
seedpass-js agent token-issue --scope read use \
--kind key_value --label-regex '^api-' --uses 2 --ttl 600
# In the agent's process — no mnemonic, no password:
export SEEDPASS_TOKEN=<token>
seedpass-js entry list # metadata only
seedpass-js use api-token --exec ./deploy.sh # permitted
seedpass-js entry reveal api-token # denied: scope 'reveal' not granted
# Back as the owner — every grant, delivery and denial is recorded:
seedpass-js agent audit-verify
seedpass-js agent audit-tail -n 20
Environment
| Variable | Purpose |
|---|---|
SEEDPASS_APP_DIR |
Profile directory (default ~/.seedpass) |
SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC |
Parent seed; needed for profile creation, otherwise use the agent |
SEEDPASS_PASSWORD |
Master password, for fingerprint add and vault unlock |
SEEDPASS_TOKEN |
Scoped token; puts the CLI in token mode |
SEEDPASS_AGENT_SOCK |
Override the agent socket path |
SEEDPASS_SECRET |
Set by use --exec in the child process only |
Compatibility
Interoperability with the Python implementation is verified on every change
by scripts/cross_impl_check.py: each side opens the other's profiles,
backups round-trip, edits are mutually visible, conflict merges agree, and a
snapshot published by Python restores here with secrets intact. See
docs/typescript_port_compatibility_matrix.md.
Not yet ported: PGP RSA keys (not byte-reproducible; ed25519 is at parity),
and the semantic and api command groups.