thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
51855ddea6
The first real finding from the new lint gate, and the one that justified
turning it on.
`decryptPartition` proves a partition file is AUTHENTIC — it decrypts under
the partition key and Fernet carries an HMAC, so nobody without the factor
wrote it. It proves nothing about a record's SHAPE: it checks only that each
value is an object. Both hydration paths then asserted the result straight
into `Entry` and handed it to materializeSecret.
That was the one place in the vault where a record reached secret derivation
without passing the schema. Every entry arriving through the index goes
through parseVaultIndex; the partition path did not — and the partition is
where the ssh keys, pgp keys and seeds live. Python writes these files and
validates nothing, so a shape divergence between the implementations, a
renamed field or a kind added on one side, would not have raised anything
here. It would have derived from whatever fields it found and returned a
confidently wrong secret, which is worse than an error by a wide margin.
`parsePartitionRecord` validates per RECORD rather than per file, so one odd
record fails one entry instead of locking the user out of every secret in the
partition. The error names the entry and nothing else, because the record IS
the secret — asserted, along with the fact that a record of an unknown kind
is still carried through untouched per spec §8.2, which validation must not
quietly have turned into a refusal.
Typing the API's hydration path properly removed the round trip it used to
make — Entry to Record and back — so the fix subtracts assertions rather than
trading one for another.
Also clears the twelve dead imports the gate found. One of them was not dead:
the `cause` binding in decryptPartition is discarded on purpose, because the
reason a Fernet decrypt failed distinguishes "wrong key" from "corrupt blob"
and surfacing that hands a caller an oracle for probing the factor. It is now
`catch {}` with that written down, which says it better than an ignored name.
Chained assertions: 44 -> 42. Tests: 689 passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN
seedpass-js
The SeedPass command-line interface, TypeScript port.
It reads and writes the same ~/.seedpass profiles as the Python
implementation — same derivations, same vault format, same Nostr sync — and
adds a session agent plus a scoped-token surface designed for AI agents and
automation.
Install
Requires Node.js 22 or newer.
# from a checkout
cd js && pnpm install && pnpm --filter @seedpass/cli build
node packages/cli/dist/seedpass-js.mjs --version
The build produces one self-contained file (dist/seedpass-js.mjs) plus a
.sha256 next to it. Copy it anywhere on your PATH; it has no runtime
dependencies beyond Node itself.
Quick start
export SEEDPASS_APP_DIR=~/.seedpass # omit to use the default
# Create a profile (mnemonic and password come from the environment,
# never from the command line)
export SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC="your twelve or twenty-four words"
export SEEDPASS_PASSWORD="your master password"
seedpass-js fingerprint add --name main
unset SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC # not needed again
# Unlock once per session through the agent
seedpass-js agent start &
seedpass-js vault unlock --ttl 900
seedpass-js entry add password github.com --length 20 --username you
seedpass-js entry reveal github.com
seedpass-js entry totp-codes
seedpass-js use github.com --clipboard
seedpass-js vault lock
Design: reference-first output
Default output never contains secret values. Entries are addressed by
reference (sp://entry/<id>), and secret-bearing fields are reported as
has_* flags:
$ seedpass-js entry get api-token
{ "id": "5", "ref": "sp://entry/5", "label": "api-token",
"kind": "key_value", "has_value": true, ... }
Plaintext leaves the vault only through commands that say so
(entry reveal, entry totp-codes, entry export-document,
util generate-password), or through a sink, which delivers a secret to its
destination without routing it through this process's output:
seedpass-js use api-token --exec ./deploy.sh # SEEDPASS_SECRET in the child env
seedpass-js use api-token --stdin-to "wc -c" # quote specs that contain flags
seedpass-js use api-token --clipboard
Scoped tokens for agents
An agent can be given a token that grants exactly what it needs and nothing else. Secrets are materialized inside the session agent, so the token holder never receives the seed and can never escalate to owner operations.
# As the owner:
seedpass-js agent token-issue --scope read use \
--kind key_value --label-regex '^api-' --uses 2 --ttl 600
# In the agent's process — no mnemonic, no password:
export SEEDPASS_TOKEN=<token>
seedpass-js entry list # metadata only
seedpass-js use api-token --exec ./deploy.sh # permitted
seedpass-js entry reveal api-token # denied: scope 'reveal' not granted
# Back as the owner — every grant, delivery and denial is recorded:
seedpass-js agent audit-verify
seedpass-js agent audit-tail -n 20
Environment
| Variable | Purpose |
|---|---|
SEEDPASS_APP_DIR |
Profile directory (default ~/.seedpass) |
SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC |
Parent seed; needed for profile creation, otherwise use the agent |
SEEDPASS_PASSWORD |
Master password, for fingerprint add and vault unlock |
SEEDPASS_TOKEN |
Scoped token; puts the CLI in token mode |
SEEDPASS_AGENT_SOCK |
Override the agent socket path |
SEEDPASS_SECRET |
Set by use --exec in the child process only |
Compatibility
Interoperability with the Python implementation is verified on every change
by scripts/cross_impl_check.py: each side opens the other's profiles,
backups round-trip, edits are mutually visible, conflict merges agree, and a
snapshot published by Python restores here with secrets intact. See
docs/typescript_port_compatibility_matrix.md.
Not yet ported: PGP RSA keys (not byte-reproducible; ed25519 is at parity),
and the semantic and api command groups.