mirror of
https://github.com/PR0M3TH3AN/SeedPass.git
synced 2026-10-28 00:12:04 +00:00
Continues the security-review fixes. Durability and concurrency: - Vault, config, fingerprint-registry and parent-seed writes are now atomic: temp file in the same directory, fsync, rename, then an fsync of the directory. Previously the target was truncated and rewritten in place, so a crash could destroy the vault. - The lock now spans the whole read-modify-write cycle, not just the write. Serializing writes alone still lost changes -- two commands each read the same index, mutated their copy, and wrote in turn. Every mutating command goes through mutateVault(), which holds the lock from open to save. A test runs five concurrent writers and asserts all five entries survive. - 0600 is now enforced on existing files too: writeFile's mode argument only applies on creation, so a loosened vault stayed loosened. - The index is schema-validated before it can reach disk. Path handling: - Profile fingerprints are validated (16 uppercase hex) before being used in any path, and removeProfile additionally checks the resolved directory still sits directly under the app directory. A tampered registry could otherwise have steered a recursive delete elsewhere. - Malformed entries in fingerprints.json are dropped on read. Restore semantics: - `nostr restore` merges remote state into the local vault instead of replacing it. Replacing silently discarded entries created since the last sync; that now requires --replace --yes, and any overwritten vault is copied aside first. - Deltas are bound to the manifest they extend (filtered on the e tag, and re-checked locally), so a relay cannot replay a validly-signed delta from another snapshot lineage into a restore. - Manifest selection breaks created_at ties by relay order, so a same-second republish cannot leave a restore on a stale snapshot. - mergeIndexPayloads gained an index0 option. The default still refuses to merge populated Python atlas state rather than drop it; restore uses preserve-current, keeping the local block verbatim, because Python recomputes canonical views on load and the default would block every restore into a Python-created profile. 193 core + 69 CLI tests green; 36/36 cross-implementation checks green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
148 lines
4.9 KiB
TypeScript
148 lines
4.9 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Vault file access for the CLI: an encrypted index file (V3 payload, with
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* or without the JSON kdf/ct wrapper) unlocked by the parent seed mnemonic.
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*/
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import { readFile, open, rename, rm, stat, chmod } from "node:fs/promises";
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import { basename, dirname, join } from "node:path";
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import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
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import process from "node:process";
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import {
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decryptPayload,
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parseEncryptedFile,
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deriveIndexKeyBytes,
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encryptV3,
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parseVaultIndex,
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utf8,
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type VaultIndex,
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} from "@seedpass/core";
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export interface OpenedVault {
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index: VaultIndex;
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mnemonic: string;
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path: string;
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}
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export async function openVault(path: string, mnemonic: string): Promise<OpenedVault> {
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const blob = new Uint8Array(await readFile(path));
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const { ciphertext } = parseEncryptedFile(blob);
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const key = deriveIndexKeyBytes(mnemonic);
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let plaintext: Uint8Array;
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try {
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plaintext = await decryptPayload(key, ciphertext);
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} catch (cause) {
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// Raw decrypt errors ("invalid token encoding") tell the user nothing
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// about which of the two likely causes they are looking at.
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throw new Error(
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`could not decrypt vault at ${path}: the file is corrupt, is not a ` +
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`SeedPass vault, or belongs to a different seed ` +
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`(restore with 'nostr restore' or 'vault import')`,
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{ cause },
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);
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}
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const index = parseVaultIndex(JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)));
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return { index, mnemonic, path };
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}
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/**
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* Persist the vault.
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*
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* Writes must survive a crash and must not let two concurrent commands
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* silently discard each other's changes, so this:
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* 1. validates the index before anything touches disk,
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* 2. takes an exclusive lock for the read-modify-write window,
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* 3. writes a temp file in the same directory, fsyncs it, and renames
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* over the target (atomic within a filesystem),
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* 4. fsyncs the directory so the rename itself is durable.
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*/
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export async function saveVault(vault: OpenedVault): Promise<void> {
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await withVaultLock(vault.path, () => saveVaultHoldingLock(vault));
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}
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/**
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* Save without taking the lock — for callers already inside `withVaultLock`.
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*
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* Serializing only the write is not enough: two commands that each read,
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* mutate and write will still lose one set of changes. The lock has to span
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* the whole read-modify-write cycle, which is what `mutateVault` does.
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*/
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export async function saveVaultHoldingLock(vault: OpenedVault): Promise<void> {
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// A malformed index must never reach disk: a bad write here is what makes
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// a vault unopenable afterwards.
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parseVaultIndex(JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(vault.index)), { migrate: false });
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const key = deriveIndexKeyBytes(vault.mnemonic);
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const payload = await encryptV3(key, utf8(JSON.stringify(vault.index)));
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await atomicWrite(vault.path, payload);
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}
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/** Write `data` to `path` atomically, with 0600 and durability. */
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export async function atomicWrite(path: string, data: Uint8Array): Promise<void> {
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const dir = dirname(path);
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const tmp = join(dir, `.${basename(path)}.${process.pid}.${randomBytes(6).toString("hex")}.tmp`);
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const handle = await open(tmp, "wx", 0o600);
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try {
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await handle.write(data);
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await handle.sync();
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} finally {
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await handle.close();
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}
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await rename(tmp, path);
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// Repair permissions if the target already existed with looser modes:
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// writeFile's mode argument applies only on creation.
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await chmod(path, 0o600);
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const dirHandle = await open(dir, "r");
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try {
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await dirHandle.sync();
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} catch {
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// Directory fsync is not supported everywhere; the rename still lands.
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} finally {
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await dirHandle.close();
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}
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}
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/**
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* Hold an exclusive lock for the duration of `fn`.
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*
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* `wx` on a sidecar file is the portable primitive here: creation is atomic,
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* so exactly one holder wins. A stale lock (crashed holder) is broken after
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* LOCK_STALE_MS rather than wedging the CLI forever.
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*/
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const LOCK_STALE_MS = 30_000;
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export async function withVaultLock<T>(path: string, fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
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const lockPath = `${path}.lock`;
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const deadline = Date.now() + LOCK_STALE_MS;
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for (;;) {
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try {
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const handle = await open(lockPath, "wx", 0o600);
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await handle.write(String(process.pid));
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await handle.close();
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break;
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} catch (e) {
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if ((e as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code !== "EEXIST") throw e;
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let age = 0;
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try {
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age = Date.now() - (await stat(lockPath)).mtimeMs;
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} catch {
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continue; // holder released it between our attempts
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}
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if (age > LOCK_STALE_MS) {
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await rm(lockPath, { force: true });
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continue;
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}
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if (Date.now() > deadline) {
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throw new Error(
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`another SeedPass process is holding ${lockPath}; retry, or remove it if no process is running`,
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);
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}
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await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 25));
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}
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}
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try {
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return await fn();
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} finally {
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await rm(lockPath, { force: true });
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}
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}
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