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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
62e577a6e1
Mutation testing carried agent.ts to zero survivors (37 mutants, all killed or non-compiling). Four gaps, in descending order of how much they mattered: The high-risk session's expiry was decided in two places -- the sweep in expire() and a second comparison inside highRiskTag(). Breaking EITHER left the whole suite green, because each covered for the other. Worse, the copy in highRiskTag() was unreachable: handle() sweeps before it dispatches, so no request could ever arrive with an expired session still in the map. It read like a check and enforced nothing. highRiskTag() now sweeps instead of re-testing expiresAt, so the rule has one home and a test can hold it to account. The remaining three were missing assertions, not missing checks: - `put`'s `!fingerprint || !mnemonic` guard could become `&&` unnoticed. Both fields are re-validated downstream, so nothing is permitted that was not before -- but a blank mnemonic then reports "fingerprint does not match the supplied seed", sending whoever reads it after the wrong field. Tests now pin the message. - Same shape on high-risk-unlock's fingerprint format guard: disabling it entirely still refused, via "profile not unlocked" -- a lie about a string that could never be a profile. It is also the guard between a caller-supplied string and the audit-log path join, so it should be the one that answers. - highRiskStatus's client-side `expires_at === null` decode was never asserted; inverted, it reports 0 for a locked profile and null for a live one. That number is how a caller knows what is left of the second factor. Also hoists FROZEN/TAG/daemonAt to module scope so the new tests share the injectable clock. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN