inactivity_timeout was stored, displayed as Settings item 12, and enforced nowhere: an unattended terminal stayed unlocked indefinitely. Python's legacy TUI checks it at the top of its main loop and locks; this ports that. The main menu now measures how long the user took to answer. If that exceeds the configured timeout, the vault is locked -- the seed is dropped and re-derived through the normal relock path (password, or the session agent) -- and the keystroke that arrived after the timeout is discarded rather than acted on against a stale unlocked screen. 0 disables it, matching Python. Scope, stated plainly: like Python's, this fires when the user returns to the main menu, not via a background timer, so idling mid-submenu does not lock until they surface. A true idle-anywhere auto-lock would mean interrupting a readline mid-line and is a larger change; this matches the reference. The millisecond clock is injected through the Session (defaults to Date.now), so two tests drive it deterministically: idling past the timeout locks and demands the password a second time, and answering within it does not. Verified as a negative control -- forcing the timeout to 0 turns the locking test red. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tkj4rzKBA3uhfgk7kqjsb8
seedpass-js
The SeedPass command-line interface, TypeScript port.
It reads and writes the same ~/.seedpass profiles as the Python
implementation — same derivations, same vault format, same Nostr sync — and
adds a session agent plus a scoped-token surface designed for AI agents and
automation.
Install
Requires Node.js 22 or newer.
# from a checkout
cd js && pnpm install && pnpm --filter @seedpass/cli build
node packages/cli/dist/seedpass-js.mjs --version
The build produces one self-contained file (dist/seedpass-js.mjs) plus a
.sha256 next to it. Copy it anywhere on your PATH; it has no runtime
dependencies beyond Node itself.
Quick start
export SEEDPASS_APP_DIR=~/.seedpass # omit to use the default
# Create a profile (mnemonic and password come from the environment,
# never from the command line)
export SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC="your twelve or twenty-four words"
export SEEDPASS_PASSWORD="your master password"
seedpass-js fingerprint add --name main
unset SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC # not needed again
# Unlock once per session through the agent
seedpass-js agent start &
seedpass-js vault unlock --ttl 900
seedpass-js entry add password github.com --length 20 --username you
seedpass-js entry reveal github.com
seedpass-js entry totp-codes
seedpass-js use github.com --clipboard
seedpass-js vault lock
Design: reference-first output
Default output never contains secret values. Entries are addressed by
reference (sp://entry/<id>), and secret-bearing fields are reported as
has_* flags:
$ seedpass-js entry get api-token
{ "id": "5", "ref": "sp://entry/5", "label": "api-token",
"kind": "key_value", "has_value": true, ... }
Plaintext leaves the vault only through commands that say so
(entry reveal, entry totp-codes, entry export-document,
util generate-password), or through a sink, which delivers a secret to its
destination without routing it through this process's output:
seedpass-js use api-token --exec ./deploy.sh # SEEDPASS_SECRET in the child env
seedpass-js use api-token --stdin-to "wc -c" # quote specs that contain flags
seedpass-js use api-token --clipboard
Scoped tokens for agents
An agent can be given a token that grants exactly what it needs and nothing else. Secrets are materialized inside the session agent, so the token holder never receives the seed and can never escalate to owner operations.
# As the owner:
seedpass-js agent token-issue --scope read use \
--kind key_value --label-regex '^api-' --uses 2 --ttl 600
# In the agent's process — no mnemonic, no password:
export SEEDPASS_TOKEN=<token>
seedpass-js entry list # metadata only
seedpass-js use api-token --exec ./deploy.sh # permitted
seedpass-js entry reveal api-token # denied: scope 'reveal' not granted
# Back as the owner — every grant, delivery and denial is recorded:
seedpass-js agent audit-verify
seedpass-js agent audit-tail -n 20
Environment
| Variable | Purpose |
|---|---|
SEEDPASS_APP_DIR |
Profile directory (default ~/.seedpass) |
SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC |
Parent seed; needed for profile creation, otherwise use the agent |
SEEDPASS_PASSWORD |
Master password, for fingerprint add and vault unlock |
SEEDPASS_TOKEN |
Scoped token; puts the CLI in token mode |
SEEDPASS_AGENT_SOCK |
Override the agent socket path |
SEEDPASS_SECRET |
Set by use --exec in the child process only |
Compatibility
Interoperability with the Python implementation is verified on every change
by scripts/cross_impl_check.py: each side opens the other's profiles,
backups round-trip, edits are mutually visible, conflict merges agree, and a
snapshot published by Python restores here with secrets intact. See
docs/typescript_port_compatibility_matrix.md.
Not yet ported: PGP RSA keys (not byte-reproducible; ed25519 is at parity),
and the semantic and api command groups.