Files
SeedPass/scripts/mutation_test.py
T
thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5 c12f5de213 fix(api): password-gate live TOTP codes; add mutation testing for the un-oracled surfaces
Differential fuzzing can only reach code both implementations have. The
session agent, the API's HTTP layer, high-risk session handling and the sinks
exist only in TypeScript — and that is where the security properties live. For
those the question "would the suite notice if this broke?" has no oracle, so
it has to be answered by breaking things deliberately.

scripts/mutation_test.py does that: it flips comparison and boolean operators
and forces guards to always-allow, but only on lines that decide whether
something is permitted, expired, within a limit, or authentic. Mutating a log
line would produce a survivor that means nothing. Every mutant is typechecked
first, so a mutant that does not compile is reported as invalid rather than
counted as caught, and the original file is restored even on interrupt.

The first run on the API server found two survivors, and they were different
in kind:

**A real gap.** Disabling the rate-limit check entirely left every test
passing — nothing exercised it. Now tested: the limit refuses the request past
its budget, and unauthenticated requests consume budget too, since otherwise
the limit is bypassed by simply not sending a token.

**An equivalent mutant, which pointed at a real hole anyway.** The route-level
`requiresPassword` flag turned out to be fully redundant with the
`requirePassword` call in each handler, so disabling it changed nothing. The
redundancy is worth keeping, but nothing ENFORCED the pairing — so a future
route could set one and forget the other with the suite silent either way.
Two structural tests now pin it.

Writing the second of those tests immediately found a security regression I
had introduced: **`GET /api/v1/totp` returned live TOTP codes on a bearer
token alone.** Python gates that endpoint on the master password
(`_require_password` in api.py) and this port did not, so a leaked token
yielded working second factors for every TOTP entry in the vault. Now gated,
and tested for.

Server mutation score: 88% of viable mutants caught, the single survivor being
the equivalent one above.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN
2026-08-19 13:01:22 -04:00

223 lines
8.4 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Mutation testing for the TypeScript surfaces that have no second implementation.
WHY THIS EXISTS
---------------
Differential fuzzing (scripts/differential_fuzz.py) uses Python as an oracle,
so it can only reach code both implementations have. The session agent, the
API's HTTP layer, high-risk session handling and the secret sinks exist only
in TypeScript — and they are where the security properties live. For those,
the question "would the suite notice if this broke?" has no oracle at all, so
it has to be answered by breaking things on purpose.
A passing suite proves the code works on the cases someone wrote down. It says
nothing about whether a REGRESSION would be caught. This deliberately breaks
one security predicate at a time and checks that some test goes red. A mutant
that survives is a place where the code could silently stop enforcing
something and every test would still pass.
WHAT IT MUTATES
---------------
Security predicates specifically, not arbitrary syntax: comparison and
equality operators, boolean connectives, and guard conditions forced to always
allow. Mutating a log message would produce a survivor that means nothing;
mutating `if (!tokenValid)` means something exact.
Three outcomes per mutant:
killed the suite failed. Good: a regression here would be caught.
SURVIVED the suite passed. A gap, or an equivalent mutant. Needs triage.
invalid the mutant does not typecheck. Not a real mutant; skipped.
Usage:
.venv/bin/python scripts/mutation_test.py --target agent
.venv/bin/python scripts/mutation_test.py --target all --limit 40
Survivors are reported with file, line, and the exact edit, so each can be
judged by hand. The script never leaves a mutation behind: the original file
is restored after every run, including on interrupt.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import re
import signal
import subprocess
import sys
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
CLI = REPO / "js" / "packages" / "cli"
# Each target names the source file and the tests that should defend it.
# Running only the relevant suites keeps a full pass tractable; a mutant that
# survives its own suite but would be caught by another is still a finding,
# because the defending test is not where anyone would look for it.
TARGETS: dict[str, tuple[str, list[str]]] = {
"agent": ("src/agent.ts", ["test/agentSecurity.test.ts", "test/tokens.test.ts"]),
"server": ("src/api/server.ts", ["test/api.test.ts"]),
"routes": ("src/api/routes.ts", ["test/api.test.ts"]),
"highrisk": ("src/highRisk.ts", ["test/highRisk.test.ts"]),
"sinks": ("src/sinks.ts", ["test/sinks.test.ts", "test/tokens.test.ts"]),
"approvals": ("src/approvals.ts", ["test/highRisk.test.ts"]),
}
# Operator swaps that change a decision rather than a value's shape.
OPERATORS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [
("!==", "==="),
("===", "!=="),
(" >= ", " > "),
(" <= ", " < "),
(" > ", " >= "),
(" < ", " <= "),
(" && ", " || "),
(" || ", " && "),
]
# Lines worth mutating: they decide whether something is permitted, expired,
# within a limit, or authentic. A mutation anywhere else mostly produces noise.
SECURITY_HINTS = re.compile(
r"\b("
r"auth|token|cap|capab|scope|permit|allow|deny|refus|valid|verif|"
r"expire|expires|ttl|limit|rate|uses|remaining|owner|secret|password|"
r"factor|unlock|lock|held|fingerprint|hash|equal|match|forbidden"
r")",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
SKIP_LINE = re.compile(r"^\s*(//|\*|/\*)")
@dataclass
class Mutant:
line_no: int
original: str
mutated: str
description: str
def generate(source: str) -> list[Mutant]:
mutants: list[Mutant] = []
for i, line in enumerate(source.splitlines(), start=1):
if SKIP_LINE.match(line) or not SECURITY_HINTS.search(line):
continue
for old, new in OPERATORS:
if old not in line:
continue
mutated = line.replace(old, new, 1)
if mutated == line:
continue
mutants.append(
Mutant(i, line, mutated, f"{old.strip()} -> {new.strip()}")
)
# Force a guard to always allow. This is the single most informative
# mutation for security code: if no test notices a check being removed
# entirely, that check is unverified.
guard = re.match(r"^(\s*)if \((.+)\) \{\s*$", line)
if guard and SECURITY_HINTS.search(guard.group(2)):
mutants.append(
Mutant(
i,
line,
f"{guard.group(1)}if (false) {{",
"guard disabled (always allow)",
)
)
return mutants
def run(cmd: list[str], cwd: Path, timeout: int) -> tuple[int, str]:
try:
proc = subprocess.run(
cmd, cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout
)
return proc.returncode, proc.stdout + proc.stderr
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
# A hang counts as killed: the suite noticed, however unhappily.
return 1, "TIMEOUT"
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument(
"--target", default="all", choices=[*sorted(TARGETS), "all"]
)
parser.add_argument(
"--limit", type=int, default=0, help="cap mutants per target (0 = all)"
)
parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=420)
args = parser.parse_args()
targets = sorted(TARGETS) if args.target == "all" else [args.target]
overall_survivors: list[tuple[str, Mutant]] = []
overall_counts = {"killed": 0, "survived": 0, "invalid": 0}
for name in targets:
rel, tests = TARGETS[name]
path = CLI / rel
original = path.read_text()
mutants = generate(original)
if args.limit:
mutants = mutants[: args.limit]
print(f"\n=== {name} ({rel}): {len(mutants)} mutants ===")
# Restore the file whatever happens, including Ctrl-C. Leaving a
# deliberate security hole in the tree would be a spectacular own goal.
def restore(*_: object) -> None:
path.write_text(original)
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, lambda *a: (restore(), sys.exit(130)))
try:
for idx, mutant in enumerate(mutants, start=1):
lines = original.splitlines(keepends=True)
ending = "\n" if lines[mutant.line_no - 1].endswith("\n") else ""
lines[mutant.line_no - 1] = mutant.mutated + ending
path.write_text("".join(lines))
code, _ = run(
["npx", "tsc", "--noEmit"], CLI, timeout=args.timeout
)
if code != 0:
overall_counts["invalid"] += 1
print(f" [{idx}/{len(mutants)}] line {mutant.line_no}: invalid (does not typecheck)")
continue
code, _ = run(
["npx", "vitest", "run", *tests], CLI, timeout=args.timeout
)
if code != 0:
overall_counts["killed"] += 1
print(f" [{idx}/{len(mutants)}] line {mutant.line_no}: killed ({mutant.description})")
else:
overall_counts["survived"] += 1
overall_survivors.append((f"{rel}:{mutant.line_no}", mutant))
print(f" [{idx}/{len(mutants)}] line {mutant.line_no}: SURVIVED ({mutant.description})")
finally:
restore()
total = sum(overall_counts.values())
viable = overall_counts["killed"] + overall_counts["survived"]
print(f"\n{'=' * 70}")
print(
f"{overall_counts['killed']} killed, {overall_counts['survived']} survived, "
f"{overall_counts['invalid']} invalid (of {total})"
)
if viable:
print(f"mutation score: {overall_counts['killed'] / viable:.0%} of viable mutants caught")
if overall_survivors:
print(f"\nSURVIVORS — each is either a gap or an equivalent mutant, and needs judging:\n")
for where, mutant in overall_survivors:
print(f" {where} [{mutant.description}]")
print(f" was: {mutant.original.strip()[:110]}")
print(f" now: {mutant.mutated.strip()[:110]}")
print()
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())