Files
SeedPass/scripts/mutation_test.py
T
thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5 c2a6a11472 fix: revert an inverted security check I committed by accident, and make it impossible
Commit cf18ab8 included a one-line change to agent.ts that was never intended:

    -if (generateFingerprint(mnemonic) !== fingerprint) {
    +if (generateFingerprint(mnemonic) === fingerprint) {

That inverts the daemon's `put` check, so it would refuse every CORRECT
fingerprint and accept every wrong one — the exact L-7 hole this branch closed
two days ago, reopened backwards.

Cause: scripts/mutation_test.py deliberately writes broken security code into
the working tree one mutant at a time, and I ran it in the background and then
committed with `git add -A` from another shell while a mutant was live. The
script restored the file correctly when it finished; the mistake was entirely
mine, in committing during the window.

Reverted. The check is back, typecheck is clean, and all 630 tests pass.

The real fix is structural, because "remember not to commit during a mutation
run" is not a control. The script now:

  - takes a lock file at start and refuses to run if one exists, so a
    previous run that died with a mutant applied is loud rather than silent;
  - releases it on success, on failure, and on Ctrl-C;
  - VERIFIES after each target that the file it restored actually matches the
    original, and aborts loudly if not — a mutant left behind is a broken
    security check sitting in the tree waiting to be committed;
  - prints a warning at start that the tree contains deliberately broken code.

The lock file is gitignored, so its presence never itself becomes a commit.

Worth stating plainly: this was found by reading `git diff` after a test
failure looked wrong, not by any check. A CI run on that commit would have
caught it — agentSecurity.test.ts fails on that mutation — which is an
argument for the CI wiring done earlier today, not against it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN
2026-08-19 13:46:11 -04:00

271 lines
10 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Mutation testing for the TypeScript surfaces that have no second implementation.
WHY THIS EXISTS
---------------
Differential fuzzing (scripts/differential_fuzz.py) uses Python as an oracle,
so it can only reach code both implementations have. The session agent, the
API's HTTP layer, high-risk session handling and the secret sinks exist only
in TypeScript — and they are where the security properties live. For those,
the question "would the suite notice if this broke?" has no oracle at all, so
it has to be answered by breaking things on purpose.
A passing suite proves the code works on the cases someone wrote down. It says
nothing about whether a REGRESSION would be caught. This deliberately breaks
one security predicate at a time and checks that some test goes red. A mutant
that survives is a place where the code could silently stop enforcing
something and every test would still pass.
WHAT IT MUTATES
---------------
Security predicates specifically, not arbitrary syntax: comparison and
equality operators, boolean connectives, and guard conditions forced to always
allow. Mutating a log message would produce a survivor that means nothing;
mutating `if (!tokenValid)` means something exact.
Three outcomes per mutant:
killed the suite failed. Good: a regression here would be caught.
SURVIVED the suite passed. A gap, or an equivalent mutant. Needs triage.
invalid the mutant does not typecheck. Not a real mutant; skipped.
Usage:
.venv/bin/python scripts/mutation_test.py --target agent
.venv/bin/python scripts/mutation_test.py --target all --limit 40
Survivors are reported with file, line, and the exact edit, so each can be
judged by hand. The script never leaves a mutation behind: the original file
is restored after every run, including on interrupt.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import re
import signal
import subprocess
import sys
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
CLI = REPO / "js" / "packages" / "cli"
# This script deliberately writes broken security code into the working tree,
# one file at a time, and restores it after each mutant. That is safe on its
# own and NOT safe alongside anything else touching the repository: a `git
# add -A` while a mutant is live commits a deliberately inverted security
# check. That happened once during development -- an inverted fingerprint
# check reached a commit -- so the guard below exists to make it structurally
# impossible rather than a thing to remember.
LOCK = REPO / ".mutation-test-running"
def acquire_lock() -> None:
if LOCK.exists():
raise SystemExit(
f"{LOCK.name} exists: another mutation run is in progress, or a "
f"previous one died with a mutant still applied. Check "
f"`git diff` before deleting it."
)
LOCK.write_text(
"A mutation test is running. The working tree contains deliberately\n"
"broken code. Do not commit. Do not run `git add -A`.\n"
)
def release_lock() -> None:
LOCK.unlink(missing_ok=True)
# Each target names the source file and the tests that should defend it.
# Running only the relevant suites keeps a full pass tractable; a mutant that
# survives its own suite but would be caught by another is still a finding,
# because the defending test is not where anyone would look for it.
TARGETS: dict[str, tuple[str, list[str]]] = {
# agent.ts also holds the high-risk session, whose tests live in
# highRisk.test.ts. Leaving it out scored the agent at 38% and blamed the
# code for gaps that were really a gap in this mapping.
"agent": (
"src/agent.ts",
["test/agentSecurity.test.ts", "test/tokens.test.ts", "test/highRisk.test.ts"],
),
"server": ("src/api/server.ts", ["test/api.test.ts"]),
"routes": ("src/api/routes.ts", ["test/api.test.ts"]),
"highrisk": ("src/highRisk.ts", ["test/highRisk.test.ts"]),
"sinks": ("src/sinks.ts", ["test/sinks.test.ts", "test/tokens.test.ts"]),
"approvals": ("src/approvals.ts", ["test/highRisk.test.ts"]),
}
# Operator swaps that change a decision rather than a value's shape.
OPERATORS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [
("!==", "==="),
("===", "!=="),
(" >= ", " > "),
(" <= ", " < "),
(" > ", " >= "),
(" < ", " <= "),
(" && ", " || "),
(" || ", " && "),
]
# Lines worth mutating: they decide whether something is permitted, expired,
# within a limit, or authentic. A mutation anywhere else mostly produces noise.
SECURITY_HINTS = re.compile(
r"\b("
r"auth|token|cap|capab|scope|permit|allow|deny|refus|valid|verif|"
r"expire|expires|ttl|limit|rate|uses|remaining|owner|secret|password|"
r"factor|unlock|lock|held|fingerprint|hash|equal|match|forbidden"
r")",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
SKIP_LINE = re.compile(r"^\s*(//|\*|/\*)")
@dataclass
class Mutant:
line_no: int
original: str
mutated: str
description: str
def generate(source: str) -> list[Mutant]:
mutants: list[Mutant] = []
for i, line in enumerate(source.splitlines(), start=1):
if SKIP_LINE.match(line) or not SECURITY_HINTS.search(line):
continue
for old, new in OPERATORS:
if old not in line:
continue
mutated = line.replace(old, new, 1)
if mutated == line:
continue
mutants.append(
Mutant(i, line, mutated, f"{old.strip()} -> {new.strip()}")
)
# Force a guard to always allow. This is the single most informative
# mutation for security code: if no test notices a check being removed
# entirely, that check is unverified.
guard = re.match(r"^(\s*)if \((.+)\) \{\s*$", line)
if guard and SECURITY_HINTS.search(guard.group(2)):
mutants.append(
Mutant(
i,
line,
f"{guard.group(1)}if (false) {{",
"guard disabled (always allow)",
)
)
return mutants
def run(cmd: list[str], cwd: Path, timeout: int) -> tuple[int, str]:
try:
proc = subprocess.run(
cmd, cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout
)
return proc.returncode, proc.stdout + proc.stderr
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
# A hang counts as killed: the suite noticed, however unhappily.
return 1, "TIMEOUT"
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument(
"--target", default="all", choices=[*sorted(TARGETS), "all"]
)
parser.add_argument(
"--limit", type=int, default=0, help="cap mutants per target (0 = all)"
)
parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=420)
args = parser.parse_args()
targets = sorted(TARGETS) if args.target == "all" else [args.target]
overall_survivors: list[tuple[str, Mutant]] = []
overall_counts = {"killed": 0, "survived": 0, "invalid": 0}
acquire_lock()
print(
"NOTE: the working tree will contain deliberately broken code until "
"this finishes.\n Do not commit from another shell while it runs.\n"
)
for name in targets:
rel, tests = TARGETS[name]
path = CLI / rel
original = path.read_text()
mutants = generate(original)
if args.limit:
mutants = mutants[: args.limit]
print(f"\n=== {name} ({rel}): {len(mutants)} mutants ===")
# Restore the file whatever happens, including Ctrl-C. Leaving a
# deliberate security hole in the tree would be a spectacular own goal.
def restore(*_: object) -> None:
path.write_text(original)
signal.signal(
signal.SIGINT, lambda *a: (restore(), release_lock(), sys.exit(130))
)
try:
for idx, mutant in enumerate(mutants, start=1):
lines = original.splitlines(keepends=True)
ending = "\n" if lines[mutant.line_no - 1].endswith("\n") else ""
lines[mutant.line_no - 1] = mutant.mutated + ending
path.write_text("".join(lines))
code, _ = run(
["npx", "tsc", "--noEmit"], CLI, timeout=args.timeout
)
if code != 0:
overall_counts["invalid"] += 1
print(f" [{idx}/{len(mutants)}] line {mutant.line_no}: invalid (does not typecheck)")
continue
code, _ = run(
["npx", "vitest", "run", *tests], CLI, timeout=args.timeout
)
if code != 0:
overall_counts["killed"] += 1
print(f" [{idx}/{len(mutants)}] line {mutant.line_no}: killed ({mutant.description})")
else:
overall_counts["survived"] += 1
overall_survivors.append((f"{rel}:{mutant.line_no}", mutant))
print(f" [{idx}/{len(mutants)}] line {mutant.line_no}: SURVIVED ({mutant.description})")
finally:
restore()
# Prove the restore worked rather than assuming it: a mutant left
# behind is a deliberately broken security check sitting in the
# tree waiting to be committed.
if path.read_text() != original:
release_lock()
raise SystemExit(f"FAILED TO RESTORE {rel} -- fix this before committing")
release_lock()
total = sum(overall_counts.values())
viable = overall_counts["killed"] + overall_counts["survived"]
print(f"\n{'=' * 70}")
print(
f"{overall_counts['killed']} killed, {overall_counts['survived']} survived, "
f"{overall_counts['invalid']} invalid (of {total})"
)
if viable:
print(f"mutation score: {overall_counts['killed'] / viable:.0%} of viable mutants caught")
if overall_survivors:
print(f"\nSURVIVORS — each is either a gap or an equivalent mutant, and needs judging:\n")
for where, mutant in overall_survivors:
print(f" {where} [{mutant.description}]")
print(f" was: {mutant.original.strip()[:110]}")
print(f" now: {mutant.mutated.strip()[:110]}")
print()
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())