mirror of
https://github.com/PR0M3TH3AN/SeedPass.git
synced 2026-10-28 08:22:03 +00:00
Ran the full CLI surface against a freshly generated throwaway seed (profile -> agent unlock -> all 8 entry kinds -> reveal/sinks -> tokens -> audit -> backup -> relay sync -> seed-only recovery). Four defects that no unit test had caught: - clipboard sink hung the CLI forever. xclip/wl-copy fork a resident process to own the X/Wayland selection; it inherited our stdio, so any reader of the CLI's stdout blocked indefinitely, and waiting for process exit never returned. Now detached with ignored stdio, success declared once stdin is flushed. - 'vault import' read the mnemonic straight from the env, so it failed whenever the vault was unlocked through the agent -- the normal path. - 'vault import' never wrote anything; it only printed a summary. It now restores into the active vault, refuses to overwrite a non-empty vault without --yes, and keeps the old behavior behind --inspect. - A corrupt/foreign vault file surfaced the raw codec error "invalid token encoding". It now names the actual likely causes. Also documented the variadic-option limitation that a trailing flag is lost (commander stops collecting at the next dash-prefixed token): a quoted command spec now splits on whitespace, no shell involved. Regression tests for all four. 151 core + 44 CLI tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
401 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
401 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
/**
|
|
* CLI behavior tests against a fixture vault.
|
|
*
|
|
* The load-bearing assertions are the agent-blind properties from plan
|
|
* section 9.3: default output never contains secret values; `reveal` is the
|
|
* only command that prints one; sinks deliver without printing.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
import { beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
|
|
import { mkdtemp, writeFile, readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
|
|
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
|
|
import { join } from "node:path";
|
|
import process from "node:process";
|
|
import {
|
|
entriesIndex,
|
|
entrySecrets,
|
|
passwordV1Cases,
|
|
passwordV2Cases,
|
|
totpCases,
|
|
mnemonics,
|
|
} from "@seedpass/test-vectors";
|
|
import { deriveIndexKeyBytes, encryptV3, utf8 } from "@seedpass/core";
|
|
import { buildProgram, type ProgramIo } from "../src/index.js";
|
|
|
|
const MNEMONIC = mnemonics["abandon12"]!;
|
|
let vaultPath: string;
|
|
|
|
interface RunResult {
|
|
stdout: string;
|
|
stderr: string;
|
|
error?: unknown;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function run(...argv: string[]): Promise<RunResult> {
|
|
const out: string[] = [];
|
|
const err: string[] = [];
|
|
const io: ProgramIo = {
|
|
out: (l: string) => out.push(l),
|
|
err: (l: string) => err.push(l),
|
|
};
|
|
const program = buildProgram(io);
|
|
let error: unknown;
|
|
try {
|
|
await program.parseAsync(["node", "seedpass-js", ...argv]);
|
|
} catch (e) {
|
|
error = e;
|
|
}
|
|
return { stdout: out.join("\n"), stderr: err.join("\n"), error };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
beforeAll(async () => {
|
|
process.env["SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC"] = MNEMONIC;
|
|
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "seedpass-cli-"));
|
|
vaultPath = join(dir, "vault.enc");
|
|
const key = deriveIndexKeyBytes(MNEMONIC);
|
|
const payload = await encryptV3(key, utf8(JSON.stringify(entriesIndex.entries)));
|
|
await writeFile(vaultPath, payload);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("capabilities", () => {
|
|
it("reports the agent surface", async () => {
|
|
const r = await run("capabilities");
|
|
const caps = JSON.parse(r.stdout);
|
|
expect(caps.agent_surface.reference_first_output).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(caps.protocol.entry_schema_version).toBe(4);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("reference-first output (agent-blind default)", () => {
|
|
it("entry list returns refs and metadata for all entries, no secret values", async () => {
|
|
const r = await run("--vault", vaultPath, "entry", "list");
|
|
const rows = JSON.parse(r.stdout) as Record<string, unknown>[];
|
|
expect(rows).toHaveLength(10);
|
|
for (const row of rows) {
|
|
expect(String(row["ref"])).toMatch(/^sp:\/\/entry\/\d+$/);
|
|
expect(row).not.toHaveProperty("secret");
|
|
expect(row).not.toHaveProperty("value");
|
|
expect(row).not.toHaveProperty("content");
|
|
}
|
|
// The imported TOTP secret must not appear anywhere in the output
|
|
expect(r.stdout).not.toContain("JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP");
|
|
// ...but its presence is flagged
|
|
const importedTotp = rows.find((row) => row["label"] === "imported-totp")!;
|
|
expect(importedTotp["has_secret"]).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("entry get resolves by label, id, and ref identically", async () => {
|
|
const byLabel = await run("--vault", vaultPath, "entry", "get", "example.com");
|
|
const byId = await run("--vault", vaultPath, "entry", "get", "0");
|
|
const byRef = await run("--vault", vaultPath, "entry", "get", "sp://entry/0");
|
|
expect(byLabel.stdout).toBe(byId.stdout);
|
|
expect(byId.stdout).toBe(byRef.stdout);
|
|
const row = JSON.parse(byRef.stdout);
|
|
expect(row.label).toBe("example.com");
|
|
expect(row.kind).toBe("password");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("entry search matches tags and never leaks values", async () => {
|
|
const r = await run("--vault", vaultPath, "entry", "search", "api");
|
|
const rows = JSON.parse(r.stdout) as Record<string, unknown>[];
|
|
expect(rows.map((x) => x["label"])).toEqual(["api-token"]);
|
|
expect(r.stdout).not.toContain("abc123");
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("plaintext egress is explicit and correct", () => {
|
|
it("reveal derives the same password as the Python fixture", async () => {
|
|
// Vault entry 0: example.com, length 16, gen_version 2, derivation index 0
|
|
const expected = passwordV2Cases.find(
|
|
(c) => c.policy === "default" && c.length === 16 && c.index === 0,
|
|
)!.password;
|
|
const r = await run("--vault", vaultPath, "entry", "reveal", "example.com");
|
|
expect(r.stdout).toBe(expected);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("reveal computes deterministic TOTP codes at a pinned time", async () => {
|
|
const fixture = totpCases.find((c) => c.mnemonic_id === "abandon12" && c.index === 0)!;
|
|
const r = await run(
|
|
"--vault", vaultPath, "entry", "reveal", "example-totp", "--at", "1700000000",
|
|
);
|
|
expect(r.stdout).toBe(fixture.codes_at["1700000000"]);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("reveal prints an imported key_value secret", async () => {
|
|
const r = await run("--vault", vaultPath, "entry", "reveal", "api-token");
|
|
expect(r.stdout).toBe("abc123");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("reveal matches every Python-computed entry secret", async () => {
|
|
expect((await run("--vault", vaultPath, "entry", "reveal", "example.com")).stdout).toBe(
|
|
entrySecrets.password_entry_0,
|
|
);
|
|
expect(
|
|
(await run("--vault", vaultPath, "entry", "reveal", "example-totp", "--at", "1700000000"))
|
|
.stdout,
|
|
).toBe(entrySecrets.totp_entry_1_code_at["1700000000"]);
|
|
// Nostr entries use BIP-85 app 39 (not the sync client's app 1237)
|
|
expect((await run("--vault", vaultPath, "entry", "reveal", "example-nostr")).stdout).toBe(
|
|
entrySecrets.nostr_entry_4.nsec,
|
|
);
|
|
expect((await run("--vault", vaultPath, "entry", "reveal", "example-seed")).stdout).toBe(
|
|
entrySecrets.seed_entry_7_mnemonic,
|
|
);
|
|
expect((await run("--vault", vaultPath, "entry", "reveal", "example-managed")).stdout).toBe(
|
|
entrySecrets.managed_entry_8_mnemonic,
|
|
);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("provisioning is agent-blind", () => {
|
|
let writablePath: string;
|
|
|
|
beforeAll(async () => {
|
|
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "seedpass-provision-"));
|
|
writablePath = join(dir, "vault.enc");
|
|
await writeFile(writablePath, await readFile(vaultPath));
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("entry add password returns a reference, never the derived password", async () => {
|
|
const r = await run(
|
|
"--vault", writablePath, "entry", "add", "password", "new-site.example",
|
|
"--length", "16", "--username", "bob",
|
|
);
|
|
const row = JSON.parse(r.stdout);
|
|
expect(row.ref).toBe("sp://entry/10");
|
|
expect(row.kind).toBe("password");
|
|
expect(row.gen_version).toBe(2);
|
|
|
|
// The derived password exists and reveals correctly, but appeared
|
|
// nowhere in the provisioning output.
|
|
const reveal = await run("--vault", writablePath, "entry", "reveal", "sp://entry/10");
|
|
expect(reveal.stdout).toHaveLength(16);
|
|
expect(r.stdout).not.toContain(reveal.stdout);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("entry add totp --secret stores but never echoes the imported secret", async () => {
|
|
const secret = "GEZDGNBVGY3TQOJQ";
|
|
const r = await run(
|
|
"--vault", writablePath, "entry", "add", "totp", "imported-2", "--secret", secret,
|
|
);
|
|
const row = JSON.parse(r.stdout);
|
|
expect(row.has_secret).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(r.stdout).not.toContain(secret);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("entry add key-value persists across reopen", async () => {
|
|
await run(
|
|
"--vault", writablePath, "entry", "add", "key-value", "deploy-token", "token", "s3cr3t-value",
|
|
);
|
|
const list = await run("--vault", writablePath, "entry", "list");
|
|
const rows = JSON.parse(list.stdout) as { label: string }[];
|
|
expect(rows.map((x) => x.label)).toContain("deploy-token");
|
|
expect(list.stdout).not.toContain("s3cr3t-value");
|
|
const reveal = await run("--vault", writablePath, "entry", "reveal", "deploy-token");
|
|
expect(reveal.stdout).toBe("s3cr3t-value");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("entry add managed-account records the child fingerprint only", async () => {
|
|
const r = await run("--vault", writablePath, "entry", "add", "managed-account", "child-acct");
|
|
const row = JSON.parse(r.stdout);
|
|
expect(row.fingerprint).toMatch(/^[0-9A-F]{16}$/);
|
|
expect(row.word_count).toBe(12);
|
|
// The child mnemonic is derivable but was never printed
|
|
const reveal = await run("--vault", writablePath, "entry", "reveal", "child-acct");
|
|
expect(reveal.stdout.split(" ")).toHaveLength(12);
|
|
expect(r.stdout).not.toContain(reveal.stdout);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("sink delivery keeps secrets out of CLI output", () => {
|
|
it("use --exec injects SEEDPASS_SECRET into the child env only", async () => {
|
|
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "seedpass-sink-"));
|
|
const capture = join(dir, "captured.txt");
|
|
const script = join(dir, "cap.sh");
|
|
await writeFile(script, `#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s' "$SEEDPASS_SECRET" > "${capture}"\n`, {
|
|
mode: 0o755,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const r = await run("--vault", vaultPath, "use", "api-token", "--exec", script);
|
|
const delivered = JSON.parse(r.stdout);
|
|
expect(delivered.sink).toBe("exec");
|
|
expect(delivered.exitCode).toBe(0);
|
|
expect(delivered.ref).toBe("sp://entry/5");
|
|
// The secret reached the child...
|
|
expect(await readFile(capture, "utf8")).toBe("abc123");
|
|
// ...and never appeared in the CLI's own output
|
|
expect(r.stdout).not.toContain("abc123");
|
|
expect(r.stderr).not.toContain("abc123");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("use --stdin-to pipes the secret to the command's stdin", async () => {
|
|
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "seedpass-sink-"));
|
|
const capture = join(dir, "captured.txt");
|
|
const script = join(dir, "cap.sh");
|
|
await writeFile(script, `#!/bin/sh\ncat > "${capture}"\n`, { mode: 0o755 });
|
|
|
|
const r = await run("--vault", vaultPath, "use", "api-token", "--stdin-to", script);
|
|
expect(JSON.parse(r.stdout).sink).toBe("stdin");
|
|
expect(await readFile(capture, "utf8")).toBe("abc123");
|
|
expect(r.stdout).not.toContain("abc123");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("accepts a quoted command spec so flags survive option parsing", async () => {
|
|
// Regression: commander's variadic options stop at the next "-token",
|
|
// so `--stdin-to wc -c` lost the flag. A quoted spec is the documented
|
|
// way to include flags.
|
|
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "seedpass-spec-"));
|
|
const capture = join(dir, "captured.txt");
|
|
const script = join(dir, "cap.sh");
|
|
await writeFile(script, `#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s %s' "$1" "$(cat)" > "${capture}"\n`, {
|
|
mode: 0o755,
|
|
});
|
|
const r = await run(
|
|
"--vault", vaultPath, "use", "api-token", "--stdin-to", `${script} -flagged`,
|
|
);
|
|
expect(JSON.parse(r.stdout).sink).toBe("stdin");
|
|
expect(await readFile(capture, "utf8")).toBe("-flagged abc123");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("use refuses ambiguous sink selection", async () => {
|
|
const r = await run(
|
|
"--vault", vaultPath, "use", "api-token", "--clipboard", "--stdin-to", "cat",
|
|
);
|
|
expect(String((r.error as Error).message)).toContain("exactly one sink");
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("modification commands", () => {
|
|
let modPath: string;
|
|
|
|
beforeAll(async () => {
|
|
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "seedpass-mod-"));
|
|
modPath = join(dir, "vault.enc");
|
|
await writeFile(modPath, await readFile(vaultPath));
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("entry modify updates fields and bumps timestamps", async () => {
|
|
const before = JSON.parse(
|
|
(await run("--vault", modPath, "entry", "get", "example.com")).stdout,
|
|
);
|
|
const r = await run(
|
|
"--vault", modPath, "entry", "modify", "example.com",
|
|
"--username", "carol", "--tags", "web", "staging",
|
|
);
|
|
const row = JSON.parse(r.stdout);
|
|
expect(row.username).toBe("carol");
|
|
expect(row.tags).toEqual(["web", "staging"]);
|
|
expect(row.modified_ts).toBeGreaterThan(before.modified_ts);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("entry modify rejects fields the kind does not allow", async () => {
|
|
const r = await run(
|
|
"--vault", modPath, "entry", "modify", "example-totp", "--username", "x",
|
|
);
|
|
expect(String((r.error as Error).message)).toContain("does not support fields");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("archive hides from totp-codes; unarchive restores", async () => {
|
|
await run("--vault", modPath, "entry", "archive", "example-totp");
|
|
const archived = JSON.parse(
|
|
(await run("--vault", modPath, "entry", "totp-codes", "--at", "1700000000")).stdout,
|
|
) as { label: string }[];
|
|
expect(archived.map((x) => x.label)).not.toContain("example-totp");
|
|
|
|
await run("--vault", modPath, "entry", "unarchive", "example-totp");
|
|
const restored = JSON.parse(
|
|
(await run("--vault", modPath, "entry", "totp-codes", "--at", "1700000000")).stdout,
|
|
) as { label: string; code: string }[];
|
|
const det = restored.find((x) => x.label === "example-totp")!;
|
|
expect(det.code).toBe(entrySecrets.totp_entry_1_code_at["1700000000"]);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("link-add/links/link-remove round-trip with resolved targets", async () => {
|
|
await run(
|
|
"--vault", modPath, "entry", "link-add", "example.com", "example-totp",
|
|
"--relation", "totp", "--note", "2fa",
|
|
);
|
|
const links = JSON.parse(
|
|
(await run("--vault", modPath, "entry", "links", "example.com")).stdout,
|
|
);
|
|
expect(links).toEqual([
|
|
{ target_id: 1, relation: "totp", note: "2fa", target_label: "example-totp", target_kind: "totp" },
|
|
]);
|
|
const after = await run(
|
|
"--vault", modPath, "entry", "link-remove", "example.com", "example-totp",
|
|
);
|
|
expect(JSON.parse(after.stdout).links).toEqual([]);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("util generate-password", () => {
|
|
it("matches the v1 fixture at default index/version", async () => {
|
|
const expected = passwordV1Cases.find(
|
|
(c) => c.policy === "default" && c.length === 16 && c.index === 0,
|
|
)!.password;
|
|
const r = await run("util", "generate-password", "--length", "16");
|
|
expect(r.stdout).toBe(expected);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("matches v2 and policy fixtures", async () => {
|
|
const v2 = passwordV2Cases.find(
|
|
(c) => c.policy === "safe_special" && c.length === 40 && c.index === 2,
|
|
)!.password;
|
|
const r = await run(
|
|
"util", "generate-password", "--length", "40", "--index", "2",
|
|
"--gen-version", "2", "--special-mode", "safe",
|
|
);
|
|
expect(r.stdout).toBe(v2);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("vault export/import", () => {
|
|
it("exports an encrypted portable backup and inspects it without writing", async () => {
|
|
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "seedpass-export-"));
|
|
const dest = join(dir, "backup.json");
|
|
const exportResult = await run("--vault", vaultPath, "vault", "export", dest);
|
|
expect(JSON.parse(exportResult.stdout).encrypted).toBe(true);
|
|
|
|
const importResult = await run("vault", "import", dest, "--inspect");
|
|
const summary = JSON.parse(importResult.stdout);
|
|
expect(summary.schema_version).toBe(4);
|
|
expect(summary.entry_count).toBe(10);
|
|
expect(summary.written).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("import actually restores into a vault and guards non-empty targets", async () => {
|
|
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "seedpass-import-"));
|
|
const backup = join(dir, "backup.json");
|
|
await run("--vault", vaultPath, "vault", "export", backup);
|
|
|
|
// Fresh empty vault: import writes without --yes
|
|
const target = join(dir, "target.enc");
|
|
await writeFile(
|
|
target,
|
|
await encryptV3(deriveIndexKeyBytes(MNEMONIC), utf8(JSON.stringify({ schema_version: 4, entries: {} }))),
|
|
);
|
|
const first = await run("--vault", target, "vault", "import", backup);
|
|
expect(JSON.parse(first.stdout).entry_count).toBe(10);
|
|
const listed = JSON.parse((await run("--vault", target, "entry", "list")).stdout);
|
|
expect(listed).toHaveLength(10);
|
|
|
|
// Now non-empty: refuses without --yes, proceeds with it
|
|
const guarded = await run("--vault", target, "vault", "import", backup);
|
|
expect(String((guarded.error as Error).message)).toContain("--yes");
|
|
const forced = await run("--vault", target, "vault", "import", backup, "--yes");
|
|
expect(JSON.parse(forced.stdout).entry_count).toBe(10);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("error messages", () => {
|
|
it("explains a corrupt or foreign vault file instead of leaking a codec error", async () => {
|
|
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "seedpass-corrupt-"));
|
|
const broken = join(dir, "broken.enc");
|
|
await writeFile(broken, "not a seedpass vault");
|
|
const r = await run("--vault", broken, "entry", "list");
|
|
const msg = String((r.error as Error).message);
|
|
expect(msg).toContain("could not decrypt vault");
|
|
expect(msg).toContain("different seed");
|
|
});
|
|
});
|