thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
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Spec section 8.2: a record whose kind this build does not understand -- one written by a newer build, or by another application sharing the vault, such as a future BitLogin namespaced kind -- must be carried through untouched, never dropped, and must not brick the whole index. TS previously failed the entire parse on the first unrecognized kind, stranding any shared vault on older SeedPass builds. The entry schema is now a union: known kinds validate strictly against the discriminated union exactly as before, and anything else parses as an opaque loose record. The refine on the opaque branch is the load-bearing detail -- a malformed record of a KNOWN kind must still fail its own schema, never fall through and escape validation. Records with no kind or type at all remain rejected as garbage. Statically the entries map stays typed to the known kinds (exhaustive switches keep their meaning); the module comment states the runtime widening plainly. At the CLI surface, foreign records list with unrecognized fields redacted to has_* flags -- another application's data is not ours to hand out -- and reveal refuses with "unsupported entry kind" instead of guessing. Allocation counts foreign ids, so neighbours never collide with them. Python's natural tolerance is now pinned by test, which surfaced a real nuance: Python backfills base-field defaults (tags, links, date_modified) onto foreign records on load, where TS carries them verbatim. No data is lost, so both conform to the preservation rule as now worded (no loss, no reinterpretation; base-field normalization permitted) -- but the two produce different canonical bytes for the same foreign record, which matters once foreign kinds sync. Recorded in the spec's gap ledger to align before any application ships them. Verified: 4 of the 6 new TS tests fail against the previous schema; 230 core + 152 CLI tests and the cross-impl suite pass with the change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tkj4rzKBA3uhfgk7kqjsb8
seedpass-js
The SeedPass command-line interface, TypeScript port.
It reads and writes the same ~/.seedpass profiles as the Python
implementation — same derivations, same vault format, same Nostr sync — and
adds a session agent plus a scoped-token surface designed for AI agents and
automation.
Install
Requires Node.js 22 or newer.
# from a checkout
cd js && pnpm install && pnpm --filter @seedpass/cli build
node packages/cli/dist/seedpass-js.mjs --version
The build produces one self-contained file (dist/seedpass-js.mjs) plus a
.sha256 next to it. Copy it anywhere on your PATH; it has no runtime
dependencies beyond Node itself.
Quick start
export SEEDPASS_APP_DIR=~/.seedpass # omit to use the default
# Create a profile (mnemonic and password come from the environment,
# never from the command line)
export SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC="your twelve or twenty-four words"
export SEEDPASS_PASSWORD="your master password"
seedpass-js fingerprint add --name main
unset SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC # not needed again
# Unlock once per session through the agent
seedpass-js agent start &
seedpass-js vault unlock --ttl 900
seedpass-js entry add password github.com --length 20 --username you
seedpass-js entry reveal github.com
seedpass-js entry totp-codes
seedpass-js use github.com --clipboard
seedpass-js vault lock
Design: reference-first output
Default output never contains secret values. Entries are addressed by
reference (sp://entry/<id>), and secret-bearing fields are reported as
has_* flags:
$ seedpass-js entry get api-token
{ "id": "5", "ref": "sp://entry/5", "label": "api-token",
"kind": "key_value", "has_value": true, ... }
Plaintext leaves the vault only through commands that say so
(entry reveal, entry totp-codes, entry export-document,
util generate-password), or through a sink, which delivers a secret to its
destination without routing it through this process's output:
seedpass-js use api-token --exec ./deploy.sh # SEEDPASS_SECRET in the child env
seedpass-js use api-token --stdin-to "wc -c" # quote specs that contain flags
seedpass-js use api-token --clipboard
Scoped tokens for agents
An agent can be given a token that grants exactly what it needs and nothing else. Secrets are materialized inside the session agent, so the token holder never receives the seed and can never escalate to owner operations.
# As the owner:
seedpass-js agent token-issue --scope read use \
--kind key_value --label-regex '^api-' --uses 2 --ttl 600
# In the agent's process — no mnemonic, no password:
export SEEDPASS_TOKEN=<token>
seedpass-js entry list # metadata only
seedpass-js use api-token --exec ./deploy.sh # permitted
seedpass-js entry reveal api-token # denied: scope 'reveal' not granted
# Back as the owner — every grant, delivery and denial is recorded:
seedpass-js agent audit-verify
seedpass-js agent audit-tail -n 20
Environment
| Variable | Purpose |
|---|---|
SEEDPASS_APP_DIR |
Profile directory (default ~/.seedpass) |
SEEDPASS_MNEMONIC |
Parent seed; needed for profile creation, otherwise use the agent |
SEEDPASS_PASSWORD |
Master password, for fingerprint add and vault unlock |
SEEDPASS_TOKEN |
Scoped token; puts the CLI in token mode |
SEEDPASS_AGENT_SOCK |
Override the agent socket path |
SEEDPASS_SECRET |
Set by use --exec in the child process only |
Compatibility
Interoperability with the Python implementation is verified on every change
by scripts/cross_impl_check.py: each side opens the other's profiles,
backups round-trip, edits are mutually visible, conflict merges agree, and a
snapshot published by Python restores here with secrets intact. See
docs/typescript_port_compatibility_matrix.md.
Not yet ported: PGP RSA keys (not byte-reproducible; ed25519 is at parity),
and the semantic and api command groups.