Files
bitgate/packages/core/test/presets.test.js
thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 4.8 af2818fbce core: add the allowlist policy preset
The engine already honored requireAllowlist + allowlistMiss, and the
commerce example configured a seller allowlist by hand -- but there was no
reusable, named "only show allowlisted publishers" preset, the symmetric
twin of the denylist. Integrators (Tessera) punted on allowlist mode for
lack of one.

Add ALLOWLIST_POLICY (registry name "allowlist"): a publisher is shown only
when an authorized actor has contributed a user-allow for them, and every
unlisted publisher misses and is hidden across all four dimensions.
Administrative denials still apply on top, and protected actors (root,
moderators) are never gated -- the people who curate the list can always
see. Populate userAllow exactly as the denylist: signed contributions
resolved from relays (e.g. NIP-32 allow labels).

Exported from @bitgate/core, registered in POLICY_PRESETS, documented in the
README, and covered by presets.test.js (unlisted hidden, allowlisted shown,
protected bypasses).

Addresses the "allowlist / whitelist mode" item of the Tessera integration
feedback (docs/TODO.md).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BXQCvJPA6sVSQ5j8uBd9bB
2026-08-11 20:30:52 -04:00

296 lines
11 KiB
JavaScript

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { createAuthorityState } from "../src/authority.js";
import { reduceAdminState } from "../src/adminState.js";
import { createSnapshot, evaluateTarget } from "../src/evaluator.js";
import {
ADMIN_ONLY_POLICY,
ALLOWLIST_POLICY,
COMMERCE_POLICY,
POLICY_PRESETS,
SOCIAL_POLICY,
getPolicyPreset,
} from "../src/presets.js";
const ROOT = "a1".repeat(32);
const MODERATOR = "b2".repeat(32);
const CREATOR = "d4".repeat(32);
const NOW = 1_750_000_000;
const trusted = (index) => index.toString(16).padStart(2, "0").repeat(32);
const TRUSTED = Array.from({ length: 16 }, (_, index) => trusted(index + 1));
const authority = () =>
createAuthorityState({
root: ROOT,
actors: { [ROOT]: ["super_admin"], [MODERATOR]: ["moderator"] },
});
/** Evaluate a user target with `count` trusted reports in `category`. */
function evaluateWithReports(policy, profile, category, count, contributions = []) {
const auth = authority();
const snapshot = createSnapshot({
authority: auth,
admin: reduceAdminState(contributions, auth),
trust: { contacts: new Set(TRUSTED) },
reports: new Map([
[
`user:${CREATOR}`,
TRUSTED.slice(0, count).map((reporter) => ({ reporter, category, createdAt: NOW - 100 })),
],
]),
});
return evaluateTarget({ type: "user", pubkey: CREATOR }, snapshot, {
surface: profile,
policyProfile: profile,
policy,
now: NOW,
});
}
describe("preset registry", () => {
it("resolves each preset by name", () => {
expect(getPolicyPreset("social")).toBe(SOCIAL_POLICY);
expect(getPolicyPreset("commerce")).toBe(COMMERCE_POLICY);
expect(getPolicyPreset("admin-only")).toBe(ADMIN_ONLY_POLICY);
});
it("is case- and whitespace-insensitive", () => {
expect(getPolicyPreset(" SOCIAL ")).toBe(SOCIAL_POLICY);
});
it("returns null for anything else", () => {
expect(getPolicyPreset("nonsense")).toBeNull();
expect(getPolicyPreset(/** @type {any} */ (null))).toBeNull();
});
it("exposes every preset in the registry", () => {
expect(Object.keys(POLICY_PRESETS).sort()).toEqual([
"admin-only",
"allowlist",
"commerce",
"social",
]);
});
it("resolves the allowlist preset by name", () => {
expect(getPolicyPreset("allowlist")).toBe(ALLOWLIST_POLICY);
});
});
describe("social preset", () => {
it("escalates malware fastest", () => {
const decision = evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "playback", "malware", 1);
expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("restrict");
expect(decision.interaction.effect).toBe("deny");
});
it("requires more agreement before acting on spam", () => {
// One report of spam must not restrict anything: it is the category most
// easily weaponized against an unpopular account.
expect(evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "playback", "spam", 1).visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
expect(evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "playback", "spam", 4).visibility.effect).toBe("restrict");
});
it("declines to hard-hide on the feed", () => {
const decision = evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "feed", "spam", 8);
expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("restrict");
expect(decision.reasons.map((reason) => reason.id)).toContain("surface-policy-bypass");
});
it("does hide on playback, where the viewer chose the item", () => {
expect(evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "playback", "spam", 8).visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
});
it("exposes evidence only on playback", () => {
const playback = evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "playback", "spam", 4);
const feed = evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "feed", "spam", 4);
expect(playback.evidence?.trustedReporterPubkeys.length).toBe(4);
expect(feed.evidence?.trustedReporterPubkeys).toEqual([]);
});
it("leaves a clean target entirely alone", () => {
const decision = evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "feed", "spam", 0);
expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
expect(decision.ranking.effect).toBe("normal");
});
});
describe("commerce preset", () => {
it("blocks checkout on a single malware report", () => {
expect(evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "checkout", "malware", 1).transaction?.effect).toBe(
"deny",
);
});
it("escalates scam through review before denial", () => {
expect(evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "checkout", "scam", 2).transaction?.effect).toBe(
"require-review",
);
expect(evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "checkout", "scam", 3).transaction?.effect).toBe(
"deny",
);
});
it("keeps a denied listing visible to its own seller", () => {
const denial = [
{ actor: MODERATOR, kind: "user-deny", targets: [{ type: "user", pubkey: CREATOR }] },
];
const dashboard = evaluateWithReports(
COMMERCE_POLICY,
"seller-dashboard",
"scam",
0,
/** @type {any} */ (denial),
);
const browse = evaluateWithReports(
COMMERCE_POLICY,
"browse",
"scam",
0,
/** @type {any} */ (denial),
);
expect(dashboard.visibility.effect).toBe("warn");
expect(browse.visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
expect(dashboard.transaction?.effect).toBe("deny");
});
it("keeps visibility more generous than transaction", () => {
const decision = evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "checkout", "scam", 3);
expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
expect(decision.transaction?.effect).toBe("deny");
});
it("never hides a listing from its own seller", () => {
// Strong evidence hides it everywhere else, but the seller still needs to
// see it to appeal.
expect(evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "browse", "scam", 5).visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
expect(
evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "seller-dashboard", "scam", 5).visibility.effect,
).toBe("warn");
});
it("gives one product different answers per surface from one snapshot", () => {
const byProfile = Object.fromEntries(
["browse", "detail", "checkout", "seller-dashboard"].map((profile) => [
profile,
evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, profile, "scam", 5),
]),
);
expect(byProfile.browse.visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
expect(byProfile["seller-dashboard"].visibility.effect).toBe("warn");
expect(byProfile.checkout.visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
expect(byProfile.checkout.transaction?.effect).toBe("deny");
});
});
describe("admin-only preset", () => {
it("enforces administrative denial", () => {
const decision = evaluateWithReports(ADMIN_ONLY_POLICY, "default", "spam", 0, [
/** @type {any} */ ({
actor: MODERATOR,
kind: "user-deny",
targets: [{ type: "user", pubkey: CREATOR }],
}),
]);
expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
});
it("ignores trust signals entirely", () => {
// Even sixteen trusted reports do nothing: this preset is for operators who
// do not want crowd signals affecting what anyone sees.
const decision = evaluateWithReports(ADMIN_ONLY_POLICY, "default", "malware", 16);
expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
expect(decision.ranking.effect).toBe("normal");
});
});
describe("allowlist preset", () => {
const evaluateUser = (pubkey, contributions = []) => {
const auth = authority();
const snapshot = createSnapshot({ authority: auth, admin: reduceAdminState(contributions, auth) });
return evaluateTarget({ type: "user", pubkey }, snapshot, {
surface: "default",
policyProfile: "default",
policy: ALLOWLIST_POLICY,
now: NOW,
});
};
it("hides an unlisted publisher across every dimension", () => {
const decision = evaluateUser(CREATOR);
expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
expect(decision.interaction.effect).toBe("deny");
expect(decision.transaction?.effect).toBe("deny");
expect(decision.reasons.map((reason) => reason.id)).toContain("allowlist-miss");
});
it("shows a publisher once an authorized actor allowlists them", () => {
const allow = [
{ actor: ROOT, kind: "user-allow", targets: [{ type: "user", pubkey: CREATOR }] },
];
const decision = evaluateUser(CREATOR, /** @type {any} */ (allow));
expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
expect(decision.transaction?.effect ?? "allow").toBe("allow");
expect(decision.evidence?.userAllowed).toBe(true);
});
it("never gates a protected actor by the allowlist", () => {
// ROOT is protected, so it shows even though nobody allowlisted it — the
// people who curate the list can always see.
expect(evaluateUser(ROOT).visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
});
});
describe("category vocabulary", () => {
// NIP-56 defines exactly these. A threshold for anything else can only fire
// if a bespoke client emits it.
const NIP56 = ["nudity", "malware", "profanity", "illegal", "spam", "impersonation", "other"];
it("uses only NIP-56 categories in the social preset", () => {
for (const category of Object.keys(SOCIAL_POLICY.profiles.feed.reports ?? {})) {
if (category === "default") continue;
expect(NIP56, `social preset declares "${category}"`).toContain(category);
}
});
it("keeps commerce extensions alongside the standard ones", () => {
const categories = Object.keys(COMMERCE_POLICY.profiles.browse.reports ?? {});
expect(categories).toContain("malware");
expect(categories).toContain("illegal");
// Marketplace-specific vocabulary is deliberate; it is documented as such.
expect(categories).toContain("scam");
});
it("gives every preset a default so unknown categories still land somewhere", () => {
for (const [name, policy] of Object.entries(POLICY_PRESETS)) {
for (const [profileName, profile] of Object.entries(policy.profiles)) {
const reports = profile.reports ?? {};
if (Object.keys(reports).length === 0) continue;
expect(reports.default, `${name}/${profileName}`).toBeDefined();
}
}
});
});
describe("preset hygiene", () => {
it("gives every preset a version and a named default profile", () => {
for (const [name, policy] of Object.entries(POLICY_PRESETS)) {
expect(policy.version, name).toMatch(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/);
expect(policy.defaultProfile, name).toBeTruthy();
expect(policy.profiles[/** @type {string} */ (policy.defaultProfile)], name).toBeTruthy();
}
});
it("names every profile consistently with its key", () => {
for (const policy of Object.values(POLICY_PRESETS)) {
for (const [key, profile] of Object.entries(policy.profiles)) {
expect(profile.name).toBe(key);
}
}
});
});