Files
bitgate/packages/nostr/test/canonical.test.js
thePR0M3TH3AN 94ef6a72f5 fix(security): close every finding from the audit
Critical
- Any pubkey could publish a kind:30078 roles document and become root of a
  deployment, granting itself every capability and denying anyone. Roles are now
  accepted only from the configured root, compared against the constructor
  value rather than current authority state so a bad ingest cannot move the
  goalposts. Reproduced end to end before the fix; regression test added.
- Administrative state now fails closed without signature verification. Without
  it, event.pubkey is an unauthenticated claim, so an authorship check alone
  proves nothing — a relay can put the root's key on an event the root never
  wrote. trustUnsignedEvents opts in for local and test use.

High
- Report categories could evade moderation entirely: resolveThresholds used
  bracket truthiness, so "constructor" resolved to the Object constructor (all
  gates undefined) and "__proto__" to Object.prototype, both bypassing the
  default threshold. Own-property lookups and null-prototype tables throughout
  core — policy, evaluator, evidence, authority, presets.
- Live subscriptions bypassed signature verification entirely; an attacker only
  had to wait for the subscription rather than the load.
- The default administrative query asked relays for every kind:30078 and
  kind:30000 event in existence, with no author, identifier, or limit. Now
  filtered to governance identifiers with a bounded limit.

Medium
- Cached state was trusted as authority: a cache naming a different root is now
  rejected, so same-origin tampering cannot persist a takeover.
- Provider attribute changes silently stopped working after the first one, and
  concurrent starts leaked a transport. Generation-guarded.
- Unbounded growth in the report store, mute store, decision cache, and the
  transport's per-subscription dedupe set — all now capped.

Also restores the on-wire `d` identifier to <namespace>:governance:<scope>:v1.
The BitGate rename replaced "governance:" too broadly and silently changed the
event format; both encoder and parser changed together, so round-trip tests
never noticed. The identifier names the kind of document, not the library.

Adds docs/security.md and 21 regression tests reproducing each finding.

832 tests.
2026-08-09 21:52:44 -04:00

298 lines
8.5 KiB
JavaScript

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import {
CANONICAL_KIND,
MAX_POLICY_BYTES,
canonicalIdentifier,
decodeAddressCoordinate,
decodeContribution,
decodePolicy,
decodeRoles,
encodeAddressCoordinate,
encodeContribution,
encodeRoles,
isCanonicalGovernanceEvent,
parseIdentifier,
} from "../src/canonical.js";
const ROOT = "a1".repeat(32);
const MODERATOR = "b2".repeat(32);
const CREATOR = "d4".repeat(32);
const EVENT_ID = "1b".repeat(32);
/**
* @param {Partial<import('../src/replaceable.js').NostrEvent>} parts
* @returns {import('../src/replaceable.js').NostrEvent}
*/
const event = (parts) => ({
id: "00".repeat(32),
pubkey: MODERATOR,
kind: CANONICAL_KIND,
created_at: 1000,
tags: [],
content: "",
...parts,
});
describe("canonical identifiers", () => {
it("builds a namespaced identifier", () => {
expect(canonicalIdentifier("bitroad", "address-deny")).toBe(
"bitroad:governance:address-deny:v1",
);
});
it("round-trips through the parser", () => {
expect(parseIdentifier(canonicalIdentifier("app", "user-deny"))).toEqual({
namespace: "app",
scope: "user-deny",
version: "1",
});
});
it("rejects a non-governance identifier", () => {
expect(parseIdentifier("bitvid:admin:blacklist")).toBeNull();
expect(parseIdentifier("")).toBeNull();
});
});
describe("isCanonicalGovernanceEvent", () => {
it("accepts a well-formed document", () => {
expect(
isCanonicalGovernanceEvent(event({ tags: [["d", canonicalIdentifier("app", "user-deny")]] })),
).toBe(true);
});
it("rejects the wrong kind", () => {
expect(
isCanonicalGovernanceEvent(
event({ kind: 30000, tags: [["d", canonicalIdentifier("app", "user-deny")]] }),
),
).toBe(false);
});
it("can be restricted to one namespace", () => {
const candidate = event({ tags: [["d", canonicalIdentifier("app", "user-deny")]] });
expect(isCanonicalGovernanceEvent(candidate, "app")).toBe(true);
expect(isCanonicalGovernanceEvent(candidate, "other")).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("decodeContribution", () => {
it("decodes a user denial list", () => {
const contribution = decodeContribution(
event({
tags: [
["d", canonicalIdentifier("app", "user-deny")],
["p", CREATOR],
],
}),
);
expect(contribution).toMatchObject({
actor: MODERATOR,
kind: "user-deny",
targets: [{ type: "user", pubkey: CREATOR }],
});
});
it("decodes an event denial list", () => {
const contribution = decodeContribution(
event({
tags: [
["d", canonicalIdentifier("app", "event-deny")],
["e", EVENT_ID],
],
}),
);
expect(contribution?.targets).toEqual([{ type: "event", id: EVENT_ID }]);
});
it("decodes an address denial list", () => {
const contribution = decodeContribution(
event({
tags: [
["d", canonicalIdentifier("app", "address-deny")],
["a", `30078:${CREATOR}:sku-001`],
],
}),
);
expect(contribution?.targets).toEqual([
{ type: "address", kind: "30078", pubkey: CREATOR, identifier: "sku-001" },
]);
});
it("carries a community source marker", () => {
const contribution = decodeContribution(
event({
tags: [
["d", canonicalIdentifier("app", "user-deny")],
["source", "list-a"],
["p", CREATOR],
],
}),
);
expect(contribution?.source).toBe("list-a");
});
it("skips malformed entries but keeps the rest", () => {
const contribution = decodeContribution(
event({
tags: [
["d", canonicalIdentifier("app", "user-deny")],
["p", "not-a-pubkey"],
["p", CREATOR],
],
}),
);
expect(contribution?.targets).toHaveLength(1);
});
it("returns null for an unknown scope", () => {
expect(
decodeContribution(event({ tags: [["d", canonicalIdentifier("app", "nonsense")]] })),
).toBeNull();
});
it("prefers an explicit scope tag over the identifier", () => {
const contribution = decodeContribution(
event({
tags: [
["d", canonicalIdentifier("app", "user-deny")],
["scope", "user-allow"],
["p", CREATOR],
],
}),
);
expect(contribution?.kind).toBe("user-allow");
});
});
describe("address coordinates", () => {
it("decodes a coordinate", () => {
expect(decodeAddressCoordinate(`30078:${CREATOR}:sku-001`)).toEqual({
type: "address",
kind: "30078",
pubkey: CREATOR,
identifier: "sku-001",
});
});
it("keeps colons inside the d-tag", () => {
expect(decodeAddressCoordinate(`30078:${CREATOR}:bitroad:product:sku-001`)?.identifier).toBe(
"bitroad:product:sku-001",
);
});
it("rejects a non-numeric kind", () => {
expect(decodeAddressCoordinate(`abc:${CREATOR}:sku`)).toBeNull();
});
it("rejects a missing identifier", () => {
expect(decodeAddressCoordinate(`30078:${CREATOR}:`)).toBeNull();
});
it("round-trips", () => {
const coordinate = `30078:${CREATOR}:sku-001`;
const target = decodeAddressCoordinate(coordinate);
expect(encodeAddressCoordinate(/** @type {any} */ (target))).toBe(coordinate);
});
});
describe("decodeRoles", () => {
const rolesEvent = event({
pubkey: ROOT,
tags: [
["d", canonicalIdentifier("app", "roles")],
["p", MODERATOR, "moderator"],
["cap", MODERATOR, "contribute-address-deny"],
["protected", CREATOR],
],
});
it("treats the publisher as root", () => {
expect(decodeRoles(rolesEvent)?.root).toBe(ROOT);
});
it("reads role assignments", () => {
expect(decodeRoles(rolesEvent)?.actors[MODERATOR]).toEqual(["moderator"]);
});
it("reads explicit capabilities", () => {
expect(decodeRoles(rolesEvent)?.capabilities[MODERATOR]).toEqual(["contribute-address-deny"]);
});
it("always protects the root and reads extra protected actors", () => {
const roles = decodeRoles(rolesEvent);
expect(roles?.protectedActors).toContain(ROOT);
expect(roles?.protectedActors).toContain(CREATOR);
});
it("returns null for a non-roles document", () => {
expect(decodeRoles(event({ tags: [["d", canonicalIdentifier("app", "user-deny")]] }))).toBeNull();
});
});
describe("decodePolicy", () => {
const policyEvent = (content) =>
event({ tags: [["d", canonicalIdentifier("app", "policy")]], content });
it("parses valid JSON content", () => {
expect(decodePolicy(policyEvent('{"version":"1"}'))).toEqual({ version: "1" });
});
it("returns null for malformed JSON rather than throwing", () => {
expect(decodePolicy(policyEvent("{not json"))).toBeNull();
});
it("rejects non-object content", () => {
expect(decodePolicy(policyEvent("[1,2]"))).toBeNull();
expect(decodePolicy(policyEvent('"a string"'))).toBeNull();
});
it("rejects oversized content before parsing", () => {
expect(decodePolicy(policyEvent("x".repeat(MAX_POLICY_BYTES + 1)))).toBeNull();
});
it("rejects empty content", () => {
expect(decodePolicy(policyEvent(""))).toBeNull();
});
});
describe("encoders", () => {
it("encodes a contribution round-trip", () => {
const template = encodeContribution(
{ actor: MODERATOR, kind: "user-deny", targets: [{ type: "user", pubkey: CREATOR }] },
"app",
);
const decoded = decodeContribution(event({ ...template, pubkey: MODERATOR }));
expect(decoded?.kind).toBe("user-deny");
expect(decoded?.targets).toEqual([{ type: "user", pubkey: CREATOR }]);
});
it("encodes an address contribution", () => {
const template = encodeContribution(
{
actor: MODERATOR,
kind: "address-deny",
targets: [{ type: "address", kind: "30078", pubkey: CREATOR, identifier: "sku" }],
},
"app",
);
expect(template.tags).toContainEqual(["a", `30078:${CREATOR}:sku`]);
});
it("encodes roles round-trip", () => {
const template = encodeRoles(
{ actors: { [MODERATOR]: ["moderator"] }, capabilities: {}, protectedActors: [] },
"app",
);
const decoded = decodeRoles(event({ ...template, pubkey: ROOT }));
expect(decoded?.actors[MODERATOR]).toEqual(["moderator"]);
});
it("stamps the client and version tags", () => {
const template = encodeContribution({ actor: MODERATOR, kind: "user-deny", targets: [] }, "app");
expect(template.tags).toContainEqual(["v", "1"]);
expect(template.tags).toContainEqual(["client", "bitgate"]);
});
});