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Closes the four spec gaps from the audit, verified against the NIPs repo. NIP-65 (kind 10002) — the one that was actually breaking things. Mute lists are published by each contact to their own write relays, so querying a fixed relay set finds only the subset who happen to write where this deployment reads. The trust graph was silently under-fed and counts came out low, which looks like "nobody muted them" rather than like a bug. Adds a relay-list codec, per-author grouping with a fallback for accounts that have published no list, and on-demand relay connections in the transport so an outbox query can reach relays that were never configured. NIP-51 private entries — the viewer's own private mutes are now decrypted through their signer (NIP-44) and applied as viewer mutes. Someone who mutes privately previously got no effect at all. The privacy boundary is asymmetric and enforced at the codec: another account's private list is never decoded, and the check lives there rather than in the caller's discipline. NIP-02 (kind 3) — the runtime can build the trust graph itself, so <bitgate-provider> no longer needs a host to supply a follow list. Set trust="manual" to opt out. NIP-56 vocabulary — SOCIAL_POLICY declared thresholds for "harassment", which is not a NIP-56 type, so no standard client could ever trigger it. Replaced with the defined vocabulary and asserted in tests. Commerce keeps its marketplace-specific categories, now documented as deliberate, with defaults so unclassified reports are never silently dropped. Two bugs found by the new tests: - checkout had no default threshold, so a flood of "other" reports did nothing at the one place money changes hands. Now earns review, never auto-denial. - describe() spread diagnostics after a derived field, so a stale zero shadowed the live relay-list count. Adds docs/nips.md recording coverage, deliberate choices, and remaining gaps — NIP-32 labelling being the largest. 811 tests.
249 lines
8.9 KiB
JavaScript
249 lines
8.9 KiB
JavaScript
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { createAuthorityState } from "../src/authority.js";
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import { reduceAdminState } from "../src/adminState.js";
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import { createSnapshot, evaluateTarget } from "../src/evaluator.js";
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import {
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ADMIN_ONLY_POLICY,
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COMMERCE_POLICY,
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POLICY_PRESETS,
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SOCIAL_POLICY,
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getPolicyPreset,
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} from "../src/presets.js";
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const ROOT = "a1".repeat(32);
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const MODERATOR = "b2".repeat(32);
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const CREATOR = "d4".repeat(32);
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const NOW = 1_750_000_000;
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const trusted = (index) => index.toString(16).padStart(2, "0").repeat(32);
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const TRUSTED = Array.from({ length: 16 }, (_, index) => trusted(index + 1));
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const authority = () =>
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createAuthorityState({
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root: ROOT,
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actors: { [ROOT]: ["super_admin"], [MODERATOR]: ["moderator"] },
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});
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/** Evaluate a user target with `count` trusted reports in `category`. */
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function evaluateWithReports(policy, profile, category, count, contributions = []) {
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const auth = authority();
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const snapshot = createSnapshot({
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authority: auth,
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admin: reduceAdminState(contributions, auth),
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trust: { contacts: new Set(TRUSTED) },
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reports: new Map([
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[
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`user:${CREATOR}`,
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TRUSTED.slice(0, count).map((reporter) => ({ reporter, category, createdAt: NOW - 100 })),
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],
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]),
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});
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return evaluateTarget({ type: "user", pubkey: CREATOR }, snapshot, {
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surface: profile,
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policyProfile: profile,
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policy,
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now: NOW,
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});
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}
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describe("preset registry", () => {
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it("resolves each preset by name", () => {
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expect(getPolicyPreset("social")).toBe(SOCIAL_POLICY);
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expect(getPolicyPreset("commerce")).toBe(COMMERCE_POLICY);
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expect(getPolicyPreset("admin-only")).toBe(ADMIN_ONLY_POLICY);
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});
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it("is case- and whitespace-insensitive", () => {
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expect(getPolicyPreset(" SOCIAL ")).toBe(SOCIAL_POLICY);
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});
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it("returns null for anything else", () => {
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expect(getPolicyPreset("nonsense")).toBeNull();
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expect(getPolicyPreset(/** @type {any} */ (null))).toBeNull();
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});
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it("exposes every preset in the registry", () => {
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expect(Object.keys(POLICY_PRESETS).sort()).toEqual(["admin-only", "commerce", "social"]);
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});
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});
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describe("social preset", () => {
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it("escalates malware fastest", () => {
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const decision = evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "playback", "malware", 1);
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expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("restrict");
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expect(decision.interaction.effect).toBe("deny");
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});
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it("requires more agreement before acting on spam", () => {
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// One report of spam must not restrict anything: it is the category most
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// easily weaponized against an unpopular account.
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expect(evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "playback", "spam", 1).visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
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expect(evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "playback", "spam", 4).visibility.effect).toBe("restrict");
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});
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it("declines to hard-hide on the feed", () => {
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const decision = evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "feed", "spam", 8);
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expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("restrict");
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expect(decision.reasons.map((reason) => reason.id)).toContain("surface-policy-bypass");
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});
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it("does hide on playback, where the viewer chose the item", () => {
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expect(evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "playback", "spam", 8).visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
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});
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it("exposes evidence only on playback", () => {
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const playback = evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "playback", "spam", 4);
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const feed = evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "feed", "spam", 4);
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expect(playback.evidence?.trustedReporterPubkeys.length).toBe(4);
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expect(feed.evidence?.trustedReporterPubkeys).toEqual([]);
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});
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it("leaves a clean target entirely alone", () => {
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const decision = evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "feed", "spam", 0);
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expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
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expect(decision.ranking.effect).toBe("normal");
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});
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});
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describe("commerce preset", () => {
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it("blocks checkout on a single malware report", () => {
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expect(evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "checkout", "malware", 1).transaction?.effect).toBe(
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"deny",
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);
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});
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it("escalates scam through review before denial", () => {
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expect(evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "checkout", "scam", 2).transaction?.effect).toBe(
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"require-review",
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);
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expect(evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "checkout", "scam", 3).transaction?.effect).toBe(
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"deny",
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);
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});
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it("keeps a denied listing visible to its own seller", () => {
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const denial = [
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{ actor: MODERATOR, kind: "user-deny", targets: [{ type: "user", pubkey: CREATOR }] },
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];
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const dashboard = evaluateWithReports(
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COMMERCE_POLICY,
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"seller-dashboard",
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"scam",
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0,
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/** @type {any} */ (denial),
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);
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const browse = evaluateWithReports(
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COMMERCE_POLICY,
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"browse",
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"scam",
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0,
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/** @type {any} */ (denial),
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);
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expect(dashboard.visibility.effect).toBe("warn");
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expect(browse.visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
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expect(dashboard.transaction?.effect).toBe("deny");
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});
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it("keeps visibility more generous than transaction", () => {
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const decision = evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "checkout", "scam", 3);
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expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
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expect(decision.transaction?.effect).toBe("deny");
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});
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it("never hides a listing from its own seller", () => {
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// Strong evidence hides it everywhere else, but the seller still needs to
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// see it to appeal.
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expect(evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "browse", "scam", 5).visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
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expect(
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evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "seller-dashboard", "scam", 5).visibility.effect,
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).toBe("warn");
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});
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it("gives one product different answers per surface from one snapshot", () => {
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const byProfile = Object.fromEntries(
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["browse", "detail", "checkout", "seller-dashboard"].map((profile) => [
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profile,
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evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, profile, "scam", 5),
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]),
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);
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expect(byProfile.browse.visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
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expect(byProfile["seller-dashboard"].visibility.effect).toBe("warn");
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expect(byProfile.checkout.visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
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expect(byProfile.checkout.transaction?.effect).toBe("deny");
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});
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});
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describe("admin-only preset", () => {
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it("enforces administrative denial", () => {
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const decision = evaluateWithReports(ADMIN_ONLY_POLICY, "default", "spam", 0, [
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/** @type {any} */ ({
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actor: MODERATOR,
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kind: "user-deny",
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targets: [{ type: "user", pubkey: CREATOR }],
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}),
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]);
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expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
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});
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it("ignores trust signals entirely", () => {
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// Even sixteen trusted reports do nothing: this preset is for operators who
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// do not want crowd signals affecting what anyone sees.
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const decision = evaluateWithReports(ADMIN_ONLY_POLICY, "default", "malware", 16);
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expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
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expect(decision.ranking.effect).toBe("normal");
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});
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});
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describe("category vocabulary", () => {
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// NIP-56 defines exactly these. A threshold for anything else can only fire
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// if a bespoke client emits it.
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const NIP56 = ["nudity", "malware", "profanity", "illegal", "spam", "impersonation", "other"];
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it("uses only NIP-56 categories in the social preset", () => {
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for (const category of Object.keys(SOCIAL_POLICY.profiles.feed.reports ?? {})) {
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if (category === "default") continue;
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expect(NIP56, `social preset declares "${category}"`).toContain(category);
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}
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});
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it("keeps commerce extensions alongside the standard ones", () => {
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const categories = Object.keys(COMMERCE_POLICY.profiles.browse.reports ?? {});
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expect(categories).toContain("malware");
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expect(categories).toContain("illegal");
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// Marketplace-specific vocabulary is deliberate; it is documented as such.
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expect(categories).toContain("scam");
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});
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it("gives every preset a default so unknown categories still land somewhere", () => {
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for (const [name, policy] of Object.entries(POLICY_PRESETS)) {
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for (const [profileName, profile] of Object.entries(policy.profiles)) {
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const reports = profile.reports ?? {};
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if (Object.keys(reports).length === 0) continue;
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expect(reports.default, `${name}/${profileName}`).toBeDefined();
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}
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}
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});
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});
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describe("preset hygiene", () => {
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it("gives every preset a version and a named default profile", () => {
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for (const [name, policy] of Object.entries(POLICY_PRESETS)) {
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expect(policy.version, name).toMatch(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/);
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expect(policy.defaultProfile, name).toBeTruthy();
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expect(policy.profiles[/** @type {string} */ (policy.defaultProfile)], name).toBeTruthy();
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}
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});
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it("names every profile consistently with its key", () => {
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for (const policy of Object.values(POLICY_PRESETS)) {
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for (const [key, profile] of Object.entries(policy.profiles)) {
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expect(profile.name).toBe(key);
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}
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}
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});
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});
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