mirror of
https://github.com/PR0M3TH3AN/bitgate.git
synced 2026-10-27 08:31:00 +00:00
Closes the gap the audit left open: administrative state fails closed without a verifier, and BitGate shipped none. @bitgate/verify is a separate package so core, nostr, and runtime keep no crypto dependency and can be audited without one. The widget bundles it, so the drop-in path is verified with no extra step; verify="off" disables it, sets data-unverified on the element, and emits bitgate:unverified — meant for local development, and meant to be visible. Verification recomputes the event id before checking the signature. Checking only the signature would let a forged event pass by reusing a genuine signature over an unrelated id, which is the failure mode that matters here. createVerifier also rejects events dated far in the future. A far-future created_at wins replaceable-event selection indefinitely and pins stale state in place; the signature is perfectly valid, so only a clock check catches it. Found while testing: #adminIngestAllowed checked that a verifier *exists*, not that this event was verified — so the public ingestEvent path, which "bring your own relays" integrations use, bypassed verification entirely. Verification now runs inside ingestEvent, with an already-verified flag for the loaders. An async verifier cannot be awaited there and is treated as unverified; ingestVerified() awaits properly. Conformance validated against 120 live events from a public relay across kinds 0, 1, 3 and 10002 — 59 with non-ASCII content and 71 containing quotes, newlines or tabs, which is where a serialization mismatch would surface. All 120 verified, zero id mismatches. Bundle grows 72K -> 120K. 855 tests; audit clean.
13 lines
253 B
JSON
13 lines
253 B
JSON
{
|
|
"extends": "../../tsconfig.json",
|
|
"compilerOptions": {
|
|
"noEmit": false,
|
|
"emitDeclarationOnly": true,
|
|
"declaration": true,
|
|
"declarationMap": true,
|
|
"outDir": "dist/types",
|
|
"rootDir": "src"
|
|
},
|
|
"include": ["src/**/*.js"]
|
|
}
|