mirror of
https://github.com/PR0M3TH3AN/bitlogin.git
synced 2026-10-27 08:31:21 +00:00
thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
30b4f34300
Owner decision: keep the architecture (static, independently hostable, no BitLogin-operated OAuth service, shared signer, or central login domain) and strengthen recovery instead. Passkey registration now runs the phrase ceremony BEFORE granting a session -- phrase shown, three words verified, then dashboard -- exactly as password signup does. The deferred 'Secure your account' card is gone, along with the securePhrasePending state behind it: that design was inherited from the OAuth on-ramps, where a service still held a copy of the credential. Nothing holds a copy for a passkey account, so deferring the only recovery path was strictly worse than the design it came from. Note the recovery EXPORT is not an alternative here: by design it carries no phrase-derived key and cannot recover an account alone (§19.5), so the phrase ceremony is the only thing that closes the trap. Also documents the loss mode that surprises people: a passkey is bound to the site's WebAuthn RP id, so a deployment changing domain leaves its users' passkeys unable to unlock anything there -- account untouched on relays, phrase still works. The e2e now drives the real ceremony (reads the 12 words from the DOM, answers the three-word quiz) and asserts activeMethod() is null until it completes, so 'no session before recovery' is enforced against a real browser. New policy pin: runPasskeyRegistration must hand off to the phrase screens and must not dispatch a session itself. 269 tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>