thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
98b2967116
Neither remaining Math.random call was a secret. The backup-quiz picker chooses which three recovery words to re-type -- an attacker who cannot see the phrase gains nothing from predicting them -- and the relay subscription id is a public wire identifier scoped to one socket, where collision is the only failure mode. They are changed anyway, because the point is the rule rather than these two call sites. A Math.random ban that carries a standing exception is worth much less than one that does not: the exception is what a future misuse hides behind, and reviewers stop reading a warning they have already agreed to ignore twice. Both now use the CSPRNG (randomUniformInt, and bytesToHex(randomBytes(8)) for the subscription id, same 16-hex-character shape as before), which costs nothing here. With no exception left, the rule can be absolute. .semgrep.yml adds three rules over packages/*/src/**, run in CI as a separate step after --config auto: - bitlogin-no-math-random: no Math.random anywhere, secret or not - bitlogin-no-crypto-fallback: no `?? fallback`, `|| fallback`, or catch-and-substitute around getRandomValues -- the COLDCARD defect class - bitlogin-no-time-or-id-seeded-secrets: no hashing Date.now() or performance.now() into a key Verified the rules fire rather than merely passing, which is the failure mode of a lint rule nobody tests: reintroducing the old Math.floor(Math.random() * pool.length) produces 1 blocking finding and exit 1, and the tree is clean at 0 findings with it restored. Path patterns are anchored (/packages/...) so semgrep's upcoming Semgrepignore v2 change does not silently alter their scope. Typecheck and the full suite pass (185 tests). This closes the entropy audit for this repo. The only gate remaining is an independent review of the RNG path by someone other than the author. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtNMsKzzFTPURemX7tT19u
BitLogin Documentation
BitLogin is a static, relay-backed portable account protocol that gives users a familiar login name and password while preserving a user-controlled Nostr identity and independent phrase recovery.
This directory contains the core protocol specification, implementation notes, and experimental designs for expanding BitLogin into a portable account layer for compatible applications.
Core protocol
spec.md— canonical BitLogin protocol specificationsecond-factor.md— second-factor design notes
Portable account layer
These documents describe proposed capabilities that build on BitLogin's core identity and recovery model.
account-switching.md— multiple independent accounts on one device, fast switching, locking, logout, and account-aware signer behaviorportable-app-state.md— encrypted, user-owned application settings and lightweight state that follow the account across devicesportable-entitlements.md— discovery, verification, recovery, and presentation of purchases, licenses, memberships, and access rightsrelay-and-messaging-portability.md— relay-role management, DM inbox and outbox synchronization, sent-message recovery, and conversation reconstruction
Connection Vault
The Connection Vault stores portable application credentials outside the core
identity capsules as independently encrypted records. Its protocol layer
(records, key hierarchy, relay sync, migration, tiers) is implemented in
@bitlogin/core's src/vault/; the widget authorization layer shipped 2026-07-30 in REVEAL mode
(requestNwcConnection, offerNwcConnection, and a Wallet-connections
screen). Durable per-origin grants and a Connected-apps page are still to
come; see connection-vault.md §19 for the open limitations.
connection-vault.md— overall vault architecture, key hierarchy, relay storage, authorization, recovery, and deletion; §18 records the implementation-time decisions (tier model, sudo key)vault-ux.md— the agreed user-experience walkthroughs, serving as the authorization layer's acceptance criterianwc-connections.md— Nostr Wallet Connect credential profile (parser/exporter implemented insrc/vault/nwc.ts)s3c-format.md— portables3c1:format for S3-compatible storage connections
How the pieces fit together
BitLogin account
├── Identity and recovery
│ ├── Credential capsule
│ ├── Recovery capsule
│ └── Everyday Nostr identity
│
├── Accounts and sessions
│ └── Multiple-account switching
│
├── Communication
│ ├── Relay preferences
│ ├── DM inbox synchronization
│ ├── DM outbox and sent-message recovery
│ └── Conversation reconstruction
│
├── Portable application experience
│ ├── App settings
│ ├── Saved state
│ └── Per-app authorization
│
├── Ownership
│ ├── Purchases
│ ├── Licenses
│ ├── Memberships
│ └── Access entitlements
│
└── Connection Vault
├── NWC wallet connections
├── S3-compatible storage connections
└── Future service credentials
Status terminology
Documents use these labels:
- Implemented — available in the current codebase
- Partially implemented — some required primitives or flows exist, but the complete user-facing feature does not
- Experimental design — documented for review and future implementation; wire formats and APIs may change
Experimental documents are not part of the stable BitLogin protocol until their schemas, security properties, migrations, and test vectors are finalized.
Recommended product sequence
A practical development sequence is:
- Complete the core account and messaging foundations.
- Add independent multi-account sessions and switching.
- Add relay management, inbox synchronization, and sent-message recovery.
- Add portable application state and per-app permissions.
- Add entitlement discovery and a portable ownership library.
- Implement the Connection Vault and its NWC and S3 profiles.
- Move high-value authorization into stronger extension, native, or cross-origin execution boundaries.
Design principle
BitLogin should coordinate portable identity, state, ownership, and service access without becoming the centralized custodian of the user's identity, money, files, messages, or purchases.