thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5
25df5140b3
BL-25 (medium): live subscriptions get the same adversarial-relay posture buffered queries got in round 2 -- a bounded already-seen id cache (2048 ids, FIFO eviction) so replaying one retained valid event costs one verification and ONE delivery ever, plus a fixed-window verification budget (100 per 10s) that quarantines distinct-event spray for the rest of the window. The audit's 2,000-replay probe now produces one callback, bounded by test. BL-26 (medium): teardown order inverted. retireNip46Client pre-signs the courtesy logout event while the key exists, then close() runs IMMEDIATELY -- rejecting every in-flight request and wiping keys -- and only then is the pre-signed event delivered, asynchronously and bounded (publishCourtesy, safe after close). The audit's probe -- a pending get_public_key resolving after logout began -- is now impossible and regression-tested: in-flight requests reject within the same tick of close(). BL-27 (low): a nostrconnect listen that fails naturally (timeout, unreachable relays) discards the pending ephemeral key in a guarded catch -- ownership-transfer on success unchanged. BL-28 (low): the hosted verify job installs the pinned Semgrep 1.171.0 before security:ci, which round 2 taught to require it; the job was red at the previous HEAD and skipping its SBOM/checksum artifacts. Informational: bunker URI input bounds -- 4096 chars total, 256-char secret (rejected beyond), 512-char relay URLs (filtered beyond). 8 new/updated adversarial tests; 266 total, all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
BitLogin Documentation
BitLogin is a static, relay-backed portable account protocol that gives users a familiar login name and password while preserving a user-controlled Nostr identity and independent phrase recovery.
This directory contains the core protocol specification, implementation notes, and experimental designs for expanding BitLogin into a portable account layer for compatible applications.
Core protocol
spec.md— canonical BitLogin protocol specificationsecond-factor.md— second-factor design noteslogin-methods.md— the widget as the single login surface: NIP-07 and NIP-46 sign-in behind the existing provider facade (implemented; nsec-paste login rejected on the record)passkey-login.md— passkey sign-in via the WebAuthn PRF extension (implemented): zero registration, zero servers, a frozen derivation contract, and the graduation ladder to self-custodycentralized-onramps.md— superseded, kept on the record: the OAuth on-ramp designs (external service, serverless Google Drive) and the analysis of why OAuth cannot be static without per-site provider registration — the requirement that led to the passkey rail
Portable account layer
These documents describe proposed capabilities that build on BitLogin's core identity and recovery model.
account-switching.md— multiple independent accounts on one device, fast switching, locking, logout, and account-aware signer behaviorportable-app-state.md— encrypted, user-owned application settings and lightweight state that follow the account across devicesportable-entitlements.md— discovery, verification, recovery, and presentation of purchases, licenses, memberships, and access rightsrelay-and-messaging-portability.md— relay-role management, DM inbox and outbox synchronization, sent-message recovery, and conversation reconstruction
Connection Vault
The Connection Vault stores portable application credentials outside the core
identity capsules as independently encrypted records. Its protocol layer
(records, key hierarchy, relay sync, migration, tiers) is implemented in
@bitlogin/core's src/vault/; the widget authorization layer shipped 2026-07-30 in REVEAL mode
(requestNwcConnection, offerNwcConnection, and a Wallet-connections
screen). Durable per-origin grants and a Connected-apps page are still to
come; see connection-vault.md §19 for the open limitations.
connection-vault.md— overall vault architecture, key hierarchy, relay storage, authorization, recovery, and deletion; §18 records the implementation-time decisions (tier model, sudo key)vault-ux.md— the agreed user-experience walkthroughs, serving as the authorization layer's acceptance criterianwc-connections.md— Nostr Wallet Connect credential profile (parser/exporter implemented insrc/vault/nwc.ts)s3c-format.md— portables3c1:format for S3-compatible storage connections
How the pieces fit together
BitLogin account
├── Identity and recovery
│ ├── Credential capsule
│ ├── Recovery capsule
│ └── Everyday Nostr identity
│
├── Accounts and sessions
│ └── Multiple-account switching
│
├── Communication
│ ├── Relay preferences
│ ├── DM inbox synchronization
│ ├── DM outbox and sent-message recovery
│ └── Conversation reconstruction
│
├── Portable application experience
│ ├── App settings
│ ├── Saved state
│ └── Per-app authorization
│
├── Ownership
│ ├── Purchases
│ ├── Licenses
│ ├── Memberships
│ └── Access entitlements
│
└── Connection Vault
├── NWC wallet connections
├── S3-compatible storage connections
└── Future service credentials
Status terminology
Documents use these labels:
- Implemented — available in the current codebase
- Partially implemented — some required primitives or flows exist, but the complete user-facing feature does not
- Experimental design — documented for review and future implementation; wire formats and APIs may change
Experimental documents are not part of the stable BitLogin protocol until their schemas, security properties, migrations, and test vectors are finalized.
Recommended product sequence
A practical development sequence is:
- Complete the core account and messaging foundations.
- Add independent multi-account sessions and switching.
- Add relay management, inbox synchronization, and sent-message recovery.
- Add portable application state and per-app permissions.
- Add entitlement discovery and a portable ownership library.
- Implement the Connection Vault and its NWC and S3 profiles.
- Move high-value authorization into stronger extension, native, or cross-origin execution boundaries.
Design principle
BitLogin should coordinate portable identity, state, ownership, and service access without becoming the centralized custodian of the user's identity, money, files, messages, or purchases.