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thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
98b2967116
Neither remaining Math.random call was a secret. The backup-quiz picker chooses which three recovery words to re-type -- an attacker who cannot see the phrase gains nothing from predicting them -- and the relay subscription id is a public wire identifier scoped to one socket, where collision is the only failure mode. They are changed anyway, because the point is the rule rather than these two call sites. A Math.random ban that carries a standing exception is worth much less than one that does not: the exception is what a future misuse hides behind, and reviewers stop reading a warning they have already agreed to ignore twice. Both now use the CSPRNG (randomUniformInt, and bytesToHex(randomBytes(8)) for the subscription id, same 16-hex-character shape as before), which costs nothing here. With no exception left, the rule can be absolute. .semgrep.yml adds three rules over packages/*/src/**, run in CI as a separate step after --config auto: - bitlogin-no-math-random: no Math.random anywhere, secret or not - bitlogin-no-crypto-fallback: no `?? fallback`, `|| fallback`, or catch-and-substitute around getRandomValues -- the COLDCARD defect class - bitlogin-no-time-or-id-seeded-secrets: no hashing Date.now() or performance.now() into a key Verified the rules fire rather than merely passing, which is the failure mode of a lint rule nobody tests: reintroducing the old Math.floor(Math.random() * pool.length) produces 1 blocking finding and exit 1, and the tree is clean at 0 findings with it restored. Path patterns are anchored (/packages/...) so semgrep's upcoming Semgrepignore v2 change does not silently alter their scope. Typecheck and the full suite pass (185 tests). This closes the entropy audit for this repo. The only gate remaining is an independent review of the RNG path by someone other than the author. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtNMsKzzFTPURemX7tT19u
57 lines
2.1 KiB
YAML
57 lines
2.1 KiB
YAML
# Local semgrep rules, run alongside `--config auto` in
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# .github/workflows/security.yml.
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#
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# Checklist §13 of docs/entropy-audit-2026-07-31.md: make the randomness rules
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# machine-enforced rather than review-enforced. Every rule here is currently
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# clean across packages/ — they exist to keep it that way, not to flag a
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# backlog.
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rules:
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- id: bitlogin-no-math-random
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languages: [typescript, javascript]
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severity: ERROR
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message: >-
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Math.random() is not a CSPRNG and must not be used anywhere in this
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package, including for values that are not secrets. Use randomBytes or
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randomUniformInt from @bitlogin/core/crypto. A ban with a standing
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exception is where the next real misuse hides -- if you believe this
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specific call is safe, the correct move is still to use the CSPRNG, which
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costs nothing here.
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paths:
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include:
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- /packages/*/src/**
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pattern: Math.random(...)
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- id: bitlogin-no-crypto-fallback
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languages: [typescript, javascript]
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severity: ERROR
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message: >-
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Do not fall back to another source when getRandomValues is unavailable.
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Key generation must fail closed -- "continue with reduced security" is the
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COLDCARD defect class. crypto/random.ts throws by design; keep it that way.
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paths:
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include:
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- /packages/*/src/**
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patterns:
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- pattern-either:
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- pattern: $C.getRandomValues(...) ?? $FALLBACK
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- pattern: $C.getRandomValues(...) || $FALLBACK
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- pattern: |
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try { ... $C.getRandomValues(...) ... } catch(...) { ... return $FALLBACK; ... }
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- id: bitlogin-no-time-or-id-seeded-secrets
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languages: [typescript, javascript]
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severity: ERROR
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message: >-
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Timestamps, counters and identifiers are not entropy. A secret derived
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from Date.now() or performance.now() is predictable to anyone who knows
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roughly when it was created.
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paths:
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include:
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- /packages/*/src/**
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patterns:
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- pattern-either:
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- pattern: |
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$KEY = $HASH(Date.now(), ...)
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- pattern: |
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$KEY = $HASH(performance.now(), ...)
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