thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5
b85e1572ea
crypto/random.ts is the single chokepoint for every secret this codebase mints -- recovery entropy, everyday keys, vault roots, AEAD nonces, account ids, generated passphrases. It is correct today: it throws when no secure source exists rather than falling back, and rejection-samples to avoid modulo bias. Nothing in CI would have reported it if either stopped being true. That is the gap this closes. The existing suite is strong on known-answer vectors -- HKDF, ScalarExpand, Argon2id, BIP-39, Schnorr, GCM tamper detection, NIP-44 official vectors -- but every one of them is satisfied by a deterministic stream. Same input, same output. That is exactly how a predictable RNG survives a health check that only asks whether the output looks random. Adds two blocks, nine tests: - Fail-closed: no crypto object, crypto without getRandomValues, and getRandomValues present but not callable must each throw, and randomEntropy128 / generatePrivateKey / randomUniformInt must abort rather than substitute a value. Plus a check that normal operation resumes once a source is available again, so the guard cannot be satisfied by breaking everything permanently. - Uniformity: chi-square over 200k draws at modulus 94, full-range coverage at the EFF wordlist modulus of 7776, rejection of invalid bounds, and the degenerate modulus of 1. Both mutation-verified rather than assumed. Replacing the throw with a zero-filling stub turns five fail-closed tests red. Replacing rejection sampling with a bare `value % maxExclusive` gives chi-square 5614 against a threshold of 147 -- while leaving every other test in the suite green, which is the whole reason the distribution test has to exist. Tests only; no source or behaviour change. Suite 172 -> 181. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HtNMsKzzFTPURemX7tT19u
BitLogin Documentation
BitLogin is a static, relay-backed portable account protocol that gives users a familiar login name and password while preserving a user-controlled Nostr identity and independent phrase recovery.
This directory contains the core protocol specification, implementation notes, and experimental designs for expanding BitLogin into a portable account layer for compatible applications.
Core protocol
spec.md— canonical BitLogin protocol specificationsecond-factor.md— second-factor design notes
Portable account layer
These documents describe proposed capabilities that build on BitLogin's core identity and recovery model.
account-switching.md— multiple independent accounts on one device, fast switching, locking, logout, and account-aware signer behaviorportable-app-state.md— encrypted, user-owned application settings and lightweight state that follow the account across devicesportable-entitlements.md— discovery, verification, recovery, and presentation of purchases, licenses, memberships, and access rightsrelay-and-messaging-portability.md— relay-role management, DM inbox and outbox synchronization, sent-message recovery, and conversation reconstruction
Connection Vault
The Connection Vault stores portable application credentials outside the core
identity capsules as independently encrypted records. Its protocol layer
(records, key hierarchy, relay sync, migration, tiers) is implemented in
@bitlogin/core's src/vault/; the widget authorization layer shipped 2026-07-30 in REVEAL mode
(requestNwcConnection, offerNwcConnection, and a Wallet-connections
screen). Durable per-origin grants and a Connected-apps page are still to
come; see connection-vault.md §19 for the open limitations.
connection-vault.md— overall vault architecture, key hierarchy, relay storage, authorization, recovery, and deletion; §18 records the implementation-time decisions (tier model, sudo key)vault-ux.md— the agreed user-experience walkthroughs, serving as the authorization layer's acceptance criterianwc-connections.md— Nostr Wallet Connect credential profile (parser/exporter implemented insrc/vault/nwc.ts)s3c-format.md— portables3c1:format for S3-compatible storage connections
How the pieces fit together
BitLogin account
├── Identity and recovery
│ ├── Credential capsule
│ ├── Recovery capsule
│ └── Everyday Nostr identity
│
├── Accounts and sessions
│ └── Multiple-account switching
│
├── Communication
│ ├── Relay preferences
│ ├── DM inbox synchronization
│ ├── DM outbox and sent-message recovery
│ └── Conversation reconstruction
│
├── Portable application experience
│ ├── App settings
│ ├── Saved state
│ └── Per-app authorization
│
├── Ownership
│ ├── Purchases
│ ├── Licenses
│ ├── Memberships
│ └── Access entitlements
│
└── Connection Vault
├── NWC wallet connections
├── S3-compatible storage connections
└── Future service credentials
Status terminology
Documents use these labels:
- Implemented — available in the current codebase
- Partially implemented — some required primitives or flows exist, but the complete user-facing feature does not
- Experimental design — documented for review and future implementation; wire formats and APIs may change
Experimental documents are not part of the stable BitLogin protocol until their schemas, security properties, migrations, and test vectors are finalized.
Recommended product sequence
A practical development sequence is:
- Complete the core account and messaging foundations.
- Add independent multi-account sessions and switching.
- Add relay management, inbox synchronization, and sent-message recovery.
- Add portable application state and per-app permissions.
- Add entitlement discovery and a portable ownership library.
- Implement the Connection Vault and its NWC and S3 profiles.
- Move high-value authorization into stronger extension, native, or cross-origin execution boundaries.
Design principle
BitLogin should coordinate portable identity, state, ownership, and service access without becoming the centralized custodian of the user's identity, money, files, messages, or purchases.