Files
bitlogin/packages/core/src/vault/sync.ts
T
thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5 d040c2f5af Tier 1 hardening: no more silent hangs, no writes before consent
Reliability, which is where most of these reach users:
- The worker RPC had no message validation, no error/messageerror
  listener, no timeout, and terminate() left every pending promise
  unsettled. A malformed frame threw inside the listener (posting no
  response at all) and a dead worker stranded its callers -- the
  documented innerHTML-remount hazard manifested as a permanent freeze
  rather than an error. Both sides now validate the envelope, calls
  time out at 60s, and worker death rejects everything outstanding.
- requestNwcConnection fired no pending event, so a host using the
  RECOMMENDED hidden-mount pattern navigated a hidden element to a
  consent screen nobody could see and waited forever. Now symmetric
  with bitlogin-offer-pending.

Consent integrity:
- vaultOfferCheck published an origin rebinding to relays -- a durable
  mutation of the user's account -- from a plain host API call before
  any consent screen existed. It is read-only now, and a wallet stored
  under a DIFFERENT origin no longer reports as already-saved, so the
  binding can only change through the consented path.
- offerNwcConnection's guard sat above three awaits; two concurrent
  calls both passed it and the second dropped the first's promise. The
  slot is claimed synchronously.

Vault reads fail closed:
- listConnections threw rather than returning a relay-shaped subset
  when quorum is not met -- a short listing is indistinguishable from
  "you have no connections", and one relay should not get to say that.
- The 500-record page limit is reported (truncated) instead of silently
  deciding which connections exist.

Supply chain:
- All eight crypto dependencies pinned to exact versions (they held
  users' keys behind caret ranges), and Bitcoin Connect with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CMr9Yt8SYmZcfgrg3CV2G1
2026-07-31 09:40:49 -04:00

171 lines
6.7 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Vault relay synchronization (connection-vault.md §9, §10, Phase C).
*
* Publishing reuses the capsule publish-and-verify quorum bar. Fetching
* queries the derived vault identity's kind-30078 events and filters the
* `bitlogin:connection:` prefix locally — relay filters match exact tag
* values, and a per-id filter list would leak the vault's size and ids to
* anyone watching query traffic (§CV10).
*
* Rollback detection is per record (§CV9): a KeyValueStore high-water mark
* remembers the newest created_at ever accepted per connection, and a relay
* serving something older is reported, never silently accepted — a stale
* replica resurrecting a revoked credential is this design's nastiest
* failure mode.
*/
import { RelayPool } from "../nostr/pool.js";
import { KIND_APP_DATA } from "../nostr/kinds.js";
import { verifyNostrEvent, findTagValue, type NostrEvent } from "../nostr/event.js";
import { publishAndVerify, type PublishVerificationResult } from "../account/publish.js";
import type { KeyValueStore } from "../storage/interface.js";
import { deriveVaultSigningKey, connectionDTag, connectionIdFromDTag } from "./derivation.js";
import { getPublicKeyHex } from "../crypto/secp256k1.js";
function hwmKey(vaultPubkey: string, connectionId: string): string {
return `bitlogin:vault-hwm:${vaultPubkey}:${connectionId}`;
}
export interface RecordHighWaterMark {
createdAt: number;
eventId: string;
}
export async function getRecordHighWaterMark(
store: KeyValueStore,
vaultPubkey: string,
connectionId: string
): Promise<RecordHighWaterMark | null> {
const raw = await store.get(hwmKey(vaultPubkey, connectionId));
return raw ? (JSON.parse(raw) as RecordHighWaterMark) : null;
}
export async function raiseRecordHighWaterMark(
store: KeyValueStore,
vaultPubkey: string,
connectionId: string,
observed: RecordHighWaterMark
): Promise<void> {
const current = await getRecordHighWaterMark(store, vaultPubkey, connectionId);
if (current && current.createdAt > observed.createdAt) return;
// Equal timestamps are NOT a no-op: two devices editing the same record in
// the same second both compute nextCreatedAt(T) = T+1, so a benign edit can
// land at the exact timestamp of a REVOCATION. Ties break on event id (the
// addressable-event convention) so the mark advances deterministically
// rather than depending on which write arrived first.
if (current && current.createdAt === observed.createdAt && current.eventId <= observed.eventId) return;
await store.set(hwmKey(vaultPubkey, connectionId), JSON.stringify(observed));
}
/** Publishes one record event to the vault relays with the §15.6 quorum bar,
* raising the local high-water mark only on success. */
export async function publishConnectionRecord(params: {
vaultPrk: Uint8Array;
event: NostrEvent;
connectionId: string;
relayUrls: string[];
store: KeyValueStore;
minAcknowledgements?: number;
timeoutMs?: number;
}): Promise<PublishVerificationResult> {
const signingKey = deriveVaultSigningKey(params.vaultPrk);
const pool = new RelayPool(params.relayUrls, { authPrivateKey: signingKey });
let result: PublishVerificationResult;
try {
result = await publishAndVerify(pool, params.event, {
dTag: connectionDTag(params.connectionId),
minAcks: params.minAcknowledgements,
// The readback bar follows the ack bar: a caller publishing to fewer
// relays (a targeted repair, a test) has already lowered its quorum.
minReadbacks: params.minAcknowledgements,
timeoutMs: params.timeoutMs
});
} finally {
pool.closeAll();
}
if (result.success) {
await raiseRecordHighWaterMark(params.store, params.event.pubkey, params.connectionId, {
createdAt: params.event.created_at,
eventId: params.event.id
});
}
return result;
}
export interface FetchedConnectionEvents {
/** Newest valid event per connection id, high-water marks already applied. */
events: Map<string, NostrEvent>;
/** Connection ids where every visible event is OLDER than this device has
* already accepted — stale replicas or replay, never auto-accepted (§CV9). */
rollbackWarnings: string[];
quorumMet: boolean;
respondedCount: number;
/** True when a relay returned the full page, so records may be missing. */
truncated: boolean;
}
/** Ceiling on records fetched in one query. Hit means the relay, not the
* user, decided which connections exist -- so it is REPORTED, not silent. */
const FETCH_LIMIT = 500;
/** Fetches every connection record visible for this vault identity (§CV10). */
export async function fetchConnectionRecordEvents(params: {
vaultPrk: Uint8Array;
relayUrls: string[];
store: KeyValueStore;
timeoutMs?: number;
}): Promise<FetchedConnectionEvents> {
const signingKey = deriveVaultSigningKey(params.vaultPrk);
const vaultPubkey = getPublicKeyHex(signingKey);
const pool = new RelayPool(params.relayUrls, { authPrivateKey: signingKey });
let quorum;
try {
quorum = await pool.queryQuorum(
{ kinds: [KIND_APP_DATA], authors: [vaultPubkey], limit: FETCH_LIMIT },
params.timeoutMs
);
} finally {
pool.closeAll();
}
const truncated = quorum.outcomes.some((outcome) => outcome.events.length >= FETCH_LIMIT);
const newestById = new Map<string, NostrEvent>();
for (const event of quorum.outcomes.flatMap((o) => o.events)) {
if (!verifyNostrEvent(event) || event.pubkey !== vaultPubkey) continue;
const connectionId = connectionIdFromDTag(findTagValue(event, "d") ?? "");
if (connectionId === null) continue;
const current = newestById.get(connectionId);
if (!current || event.created_at > current.created_at) newestById.set(connectionId, event);
}
const events = new Map<string, NostrEvent>();
const rollbackWarnings: string[] = [];
for (const [connectionId, event] of newestById) {
const hwm = await getRecordHighWaterMark(params.store, vaultPubkey, connectionId);
// Strict `<` alone let a same-second sibling of a revocation through
// forever (the relay may keep both events at one address). An equal
// timestamp is only acceptable from the SAME event, or a later-sorting
// id under the same tie-break the mark itself uses.
const stale =
hwm !== null &&
(event.created_at < hwm.createdAt ||
(event.created_at === hwm.createdAt && event.id < hwm.eventId));
if (stale) {
rollbackWarnings.push(connectionId);
continue;
}
events.set(connectionId, event);
await raiseRecordHighWaterMark(params.store, vaultPubkey, connectionId, {
createdAt: event.created_at,
eventId: event.id
});
}
return {
events,
rollbackWarnings,
quorumMet: quorum.quorumMet,
respondedCount: quorum.respondedCount,
truncated
};
}