bitlogin/docs/TODO.md

BitLogin — open items

Updated: 2026-08-04

Login-surface expansion (2026-08-04) — shipped, with owner follow-ups

One login surface, four methods (login-methods.md, passkey-login.md): password (primary), NIP-07 extension, NIP-46 remote signer (memory-only), and passkey via WebAuthn PRF. OAuth on-ramps were built, then removed the same day for requiring per-site provider registration (centralized-onramps.md, superseded, kept on the record). Also shipped: the deployment-CSP 'wasm-unsafe-eval' fix (live password flows were broken since 2026-07-31), the service-worker cache: "reload" precache fix, window.bitlogin.activeMethod()/activeSession(), and welcome/sign-in UI polish.

Security audit response (2026-08-04, same day)

All confirmed findings fixed and regression-tested: BL-16 (auth_url now https-only via sanitizeAuthUrl, hostname shown on the link, hostile-scheme tests), BL-17 (post-creation PRF fallback pinned via allowCredentials to the created credential), BL-18 (dead-socket CLOSE can no longer strand a query promise), BL-19 (local filter.limit enforcement + duplicate-id drop

• 1000-event ceiling per buffered query), BL-20 (.semgrep.yml try/catch pattern was unparseable — fixed and verified firing on hostile code under the pinned Semgrep 1.171.0). Lows: NIP-07 and NIP-46 now verify returned signed events against the request (signature, identity, field equality); Nip46Client.close() wipes the client and conversation keys; passkey labels are distinguishable; postcss ≥8.5.25; Actions pinned to commit SHAs.

Deferred from the audit, non-security interop items: NIP-46 protocol-level logout on teardown (no stable method name across deployed signers) and the recommended switch_relays request.

Owner action items:

1. Live-fire the NIP-46 QR with Amber on bitlogin.network (flow was verified against a fake bunker in tests, not yet against a real phone signer end-to-end).
2. Live-fire passkey sign-in on a real device (Chrome + Google Password Manager, and once on iOS Safari). PRF cannot be exercised in CI; the ceremony paths are untested against real authenticators.
3. Passkey derivation is a new compatibility contract — packages/widget/src/passkey.test.ts known-answer vectors carry the same never-update-the-expected-value rule as knownAnswer.test.ts.
4. NIP-46 credential persistence (vault record) stays gated on the external security review, as before.

Entropy audit (2026-07-31)

entropy-audit-2026-07-31.md — RNG and randomness-integration audit. No predictable-fallback defect: random.ts is the single chokepoint, throws rather than degrading, and rejection-samples to avoid modulo bias. Three hardening items, in order:

• M2 — done. Nine tests in packages/core/src/crypto/crypto.test.ts pin fail-closed behaviour and randomUniformInt's uniformity. Mutation-verified: a zero-filling stub in place of the throw turns five of them red, and swapping rejection sampling for bare modulo gives chi-square 5614 against a threshold of 147.
• M1 — done. nip44Encrypt / nip04Encrypt no longer take a nonce or IV; the capability lives in the non-exported crypto/testing.ts, and crypto/index.ts re-exports explicitly instead of export *. Only one test ever used an override and ivOverride had no callers, so nothing was lost. Verified from a real consumer against the built package: all three deep-import routes fail with ERR_PACKAGE_PATH_NOT_EXPORTED. knownAnswer.test.ts green throughout — the derivation chain is untouched.
• L1 — done. Both Math.random calls (backup-quiz picker, relay subscription id) now use the CSPRNG, so the ban has no standing exception. .semgrep.yml enforces it in CI alongside two more rules: no fallback around getRandomValues, and no timestamp-seeded secrets. Verified the rules fire — reintroducing the old call gives 1 blocking finding and exit 1.

The entropy audit is closed for this repo. The only gate left is an independent review of the RNG path by someone other than the author, which is not something a coding agent can sign off.

Owner action items

1. Close the Dependabot PR on dependabot/npm_and_yarn/npm-security-and-maintenance-83024bc549. It bundles seven major bumps into one change (@noble/hashes 1.8→2.2, @noble/curves 1.9→2.2, @scure/base 1.2→2.2, @scure/bip39 1.6→2.2, TypeScript 5→7, Vite 6→8, Vitest 3→4) and fails the build: noble v2 dropped the extensionless subpath exports this code imports. It should be closed, not merged or fixed — .github/dependabot.yml now groups only minor/patch and ignores majors of the derivation chain, so this PR will not recur.

   The four dependabot/github_actions/* PRs are unaffected and fine to merge.

2. Decide whether the manual-password removal is final. User-chosen passwords were removed entirely (not merely discouraged) in the 2026-07-31 hardening, and packages/widget/src/securityPolicy.test.ts pins that. The security argument is sound — a user-chosen password against a downloadable capsule is offline-guessable forever — but it is a product decision that changes what users can do, and it is now enforced by a test rather than by preference.

Standing rule: the derivation chain is a compatibility contract

Account capsules live on public relays. The login name plus password derive the locator, signing scalar and capsule key deterministically, so those outputs are a contract with every account that already exists — change them and users are locked out permanently, with no server-side record to migrate from.

packages/core/src/crypto/knownAnswer.test.ts pins HKDF-Extract, HKDF-Expand, ScalarExpand (scalar, counter, and resulting public key), BIP-39 phrase and seed, base64url framing, and JCS ordering.

A failure there is never "update the expected value". It means the change being attempted is account-breaking and needs a migration plan or rejection. The rest of the crypto suite only checks self-consistency — same input, same output within one run — which stays green through exactly the kind of upgrade that would lock everyone out.

Deferred hardening

Carried from the 2026-07-30 audit; none are live defects.

• Tier 2 — packages/widget/src/element.ts is ~1,600 lines with no direct test coverage. securityPolicy.test.ts now asserts a few properties of its source text, which is a start, not coverage.
• Tier 3 — compare-and-swap on capsule writes (relays offer no atomic primitive, so this needs a protocol-level answer), and an encrypted high-water-mark store.
• Tier 4 — moving high-value authorization into a cross-origin or extension boundary. An embedded widget is same-origin with its host page, so a compromised host can reach the worker directly. Documented honestly in llms.txt and the README rather than papered over.

Gates still in force

• External security review before the vault holds anything beyond a budget-capped NWC connection. The S3 and password profiles stay designs until then.
• Personal-tier UI was gated on the sudo key leaving the credential capsule. That gate is now met — the sudo key lives only in the phrase-gated recovery capsule — but the UI still needs a separately reviewed key ceremony before it ships.