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Defense-in-depth against XSS for a client that holds storage credentials in memory. The critical directive is a strict script-src: 'self' + the hash of the inline theme-bootstrap + the nostr-tools CDN fallbacks, with no 'unsafe-inline' or 'unsafe-eval' (verified no bundle uses eval/Function/wasm). This blocks injected script/object elements, inline handlers, and base-tag hijack, so an injected payload cannot run and read the in-memory storage master key, the signer, or DM plaintext. connect/img/media stay broad because relays, R2/S3 endpoints, and video/thumbnail URLs are user/content defined; worker-src allows blob: for the WebTorrent module worker. Applied to index.html and embed.html. Test (tests/csp-policy.test.mjs) locks the inline-script hash to script-src and asserts script-src stays strict (no unsafe-inline/eval) with object-src 'none' and base-uri 'self'. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
104 lines
3.7 KiB
JavaScript
104 lines
3.7 KiB
JavaScript
// Regression test for the Content-Security-Policy on the HTML entry points.
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//
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// SCN-csp-script-src-locks-inline-hash:
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// Given index.html / embed.html ship a CSP whose security depends on a strict
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// script-src (no 'unsafe-inline'),
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// When the inline bootstrap <script> is hashed,
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// Then that exact sha256 must be listed in script-src — otherwise the browser
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// blocks our own bootstrap (app broken) or someone added 'unsafe-inline'
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// (XSS protection silently gutted).
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//
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// This catches the most likely future regression: editing the inline script
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// without updating the hash, or relaxing script-src to make it "work".
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import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
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import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
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import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { test } from "node:test";
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import assert from "node:assert/strict";
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const ROOT = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..");
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function extractCsp(html) {
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// The content value itself contains single quotes ('self', 'none', hashes),
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// so capture up to the same quote char that opens the attribute.
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const meta = html.match(
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/<meta\s+http-equiv=["']Content-Security-Policy["']\s+content=(["'])([\s\S]*?)\1/i,
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);
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return meta ? meta[2] : "";
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}
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function parseDirectives(csp) {
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const map = new Map();
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for (const part of csp.split(";")) {
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const trimmed = part.trim();
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if (!trimmed) continue;
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const [name, ...values] = trimmed.split(/\s+/);
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map.set(name.toLowerCase(), values);
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}
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return map;
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}
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function inlineScriptHashes(htmlRaw) {
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// Browsers ignore content inside HTML comments; strip them so prose mentioning
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// "script" in a comment is not mistaken for a real inline <script>.
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const html = htmlRaw.replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, "");
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const re = /<script(?![^>]*\bsrc=)[^>]*>([\s\S]*?)<\/script>/gi;
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const hashes = [];
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let m;
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while ((m = re.exec(html))) {
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hashes.push(
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"sha256-" + createHash("sha256").update(m[1], "utf8").digest("base64"),
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);
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}
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return hashes;
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}
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for (const file of ["index.html", "embed.html"]) {
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test(`${file}: CSP exists and script-src is strict`, () => {
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const html = readFileSync(path.join(ROOT, file), "utf8");
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const csp = extractCsp(html);
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assert.ok(csp, `${file} must declare a Content-Security-Policy meta`);
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const directives = parseDirectives(csp);
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const scriptSrc = directives.get("script-src");
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assert.ok(scriptSrc, "script-src must be set");
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// The whole point: script execution must NOT be wide open.
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assert.ok(
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!scriptSrc.includes("'unsafe-inline'"),
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"script-src must not allow 'unsafe-inline' (defeats XSS protection)",
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);
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assert.ok(
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!scriptSrc.includes("'unsafe-eval'"),
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"script-src must not allow 'unsafe-eval' (no bundle needs it)",
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);
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assert.ok(scriptSrc.includes("'self'"), "script-src must include 'self'");
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// object-src/base-uri are cheap, high-value XSS hardening.
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assert.deepEqual(
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directives.get("object-src"),
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["'none'"],
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"object-src must be 'none'",
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);
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assert.deepEqual(
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directives.get("base-uri"),
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["'self'"],
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"base-uri must be 'self'",
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);
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});
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test(`${file}: every inline <script> is hash-allowlisted in script-src`, () => {
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const html = readFileSync(path.join(ROOT, file), "utf8");
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const scriptSrc = parseDirectives(extractCsp(html)).get("script-src") || [];
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for (const hash of inlineScriptHashes(html)) {
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assert.ok(
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scriptSrc.includes(`'${hash}'`),
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`inline <script> in ${file} has hash ${hash} which is not listed in ` +
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`script-src — update the CSP meta after editing the inline script`,
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);
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}
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});
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}
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