Files
SeedPass/scripts/mutation_test.py
T
thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Opus 5 cf18ab8091 test: close the gaps mutation testing found in approvals, sinks, and a flaky test
Approvals scored 58%. Five survivors, all genuine:

  - `ttlSeconds` and `uses` validation was unguarded by any test. An approval
    issued with ttl 0 is expired the instant it exists; one with uses 0 can
    never be consumed. Either would look like a granted authorization to
    whoever asked for it and silently authorize nothing — the confusing
    failure rather than the safe one.
  - The expiry boundary (`<=` vs `<`) was unpinned. It now asserts that an
    approval expiring exactly now is refused, and that one millisecond earlier
    it still works, so the boundary is where it claims to be rather than
    approximately there. Python uses `<=`, so this is parity as well as the
    safer direction.

Approvals now 100%.

Sinks scored 67%. The survivor turned `&&` into `||` in the command-spec
parser, which makes a multi-element spec whose FIRST element contains
whitespace get tokenized — silently discarding every element after it. Losing
an argument changes which command runs, and dropping a `--dry-run` or a target
path is exactly the kind of silent change that matters for a sink being handed
a secret. Sinks now 100%.

Separately, the full suite caught a flaky test of my own: the recovery-split
tamper check rewrote the payload's tail and, depending on the payload's
padding, sometimes reproduced the original string exactly — asserting nothing.
It only failed when a randomized share happened to end the wrong way. Now it
flips a character and asserts the result actually differs before expecting the
throw, plus a second case that tampers at four positions rather than trusting
one. Five consecutive runs are clean.

The agent's mapping was also wrong: agent.ts holds the high-risk session, whose
tests live in highRisk.test.ts, so leaving that suite out scored the agent at
38% and blamed the code for a gap that was really a gap in the harness.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vtx94nXDmNgXEeThUZP4QN
2026-08-19 13:41:55 -04:00

229 lines
8.6 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Mutation testing for the TypeScript surfaces that have no second implementation.
WHY THIS EXISTS
---------------
Differential fuzzing (scripts/differential_fuzz.py) uses Python as an oracle,
so it can only reach code both implementations have. The session agent, the
API's HTTP layer, high-risk session handling and the secret sinks exist only
in TypeScript — and they are where the security properties live. For those,
the question "would the suite notice if this broke?" has no oracle at all, so
it has to be answered by breaking things on purpose.
A passing suite proves the code works on the cases someone wrote down. It says
nothing about whether a REGRESSION would be caught. This deliberately breaks
one security predicate at a time and checks that some test goes red. A mutant
that survives is a place where the code could silently stop enforcing
something and every test would still pass.
WHAT IT MUTATES
---------------
Security predicates specifically, not arbitrary syntax: comparison and
equality operators, boolean connectives, and guard conditions forced to always
allow. Mutating a log message would produce a survivor that means nothing;
mutating `if (!tokenValid)` means something exact.
Three outcomes per mutant:
killed the suite failed. Good: a regression here would be caught.
SURVIVED the suite passed. A gap, or an equivalent mutant. Needs triage.
invalid the mutant does not typecheck. Not a real mutant; skipped.
Usage:
.venv/bin/python scripts/mutation_test.py --target agent
.venv/bin/python scripts/mutation_test.py --target all --limit 40
Survivors are reported with file, line, and the exact edit, so each can be
judged by hand. The script never leaves a mutation behind: the original file
is restored after every run, including on interrupt.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import re
import signal
import subprocess
import sys
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
CLI = REPO / "js" / "packages" / "cli"
# Each target names the source file and the tests that should defend it.
# Running only the relevant suites keeps a full pass tractable; a mutant that
# survives its own suite but would be caught by another is still a finding,
# because the defending test is not where anyone would look for it.
TARGETS: dict[str, tuple[str, list[str]]] = {
# agent.ts also holds the high-risk session, whose tests live in
# highRisk.test.ts. Leaving it out scored the agent at 38% and blamed the
# code for gaps that were really a gap in this mapping.
"agent": (
"src/agent.ts",
["test/agentSecurity.test.ts", "test/tokens.test.ts", "test/highRisk.test.ts"],
),
"server": ("src/api/server.ts", ["test/api.test.ts"]),
"routes": ("src/api/routes.ts", ["test/api.test.ts"]),
"highrisk": ("src/highRisk.ts", ["test/highRisk.test.ts"]),
"sinks": ("src/sinks.ts", ["test/sinks.test.ts", "test/tokens.test.ts"]),
"approvals": ("src/approvals.ts", ["test/highRisk.test.ts"]),
}
# Operator swaps that change a decision rather than a value's shape.
OPERATORS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [
("!==", "==="),
("===", "!=="),
(" >= ", " > "),
(" <= ", " < "),
(" > ", " >= "),
(" < ", " <= "),
(" && ", " || "),
(" || ", " && "),
]
# Lines worth mutating: they decide whether something is permitted, expired,
# within a limit, or authentic. A mutation anywhere else mostly produces noise.
SECURITY_HINTS = re.compile(
r"\b("
r"auth|token|cap|capab|scope|permit|allow|deny|refus|valid|verif|"
r"expire|expires|ttl|limit|rate|uses|remaining|owner|secret|password|"
r"factor|unlock|lock|held|fingerprint|hash|equal|match|forbidden"
r")",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
SKIP_LINE = re.compile(r"^\s*(//|\*|/\*)")
@dataclass
class Mutant:
line_no: int
original: str
mutated: str
description: str
def generate(source: str) -> list[Mutant]:
mutants: list[Mutant] = []
for i, line in enumerate(source.splitlines(), start=1):
if SKIP_LINE.match(line) or not SECURITY_HINTS.search(line):
continue
for old, new in OPERATORS:
if old not in line:
continue
mutated = line.replace(old, new, 1)
if mutated == line:
continue
mutants.append(
Mutant(i, line, mutated, f"{old.strip()} -> {new.strip()}")
)
# Force a guard to always allow. This is the single most informative
# mutation for security code: if no test notices a check being removed
# entirely, that check is unverified.
guard = re.match(r"^(\s*)if \((.+)\) \{\s*$", line)
if guard and SECURITY_HINTS.search(guard.group(2)):
mutants.append(
Mutant(
i,
line,
f"{guard.group(1)}if (false) {{",
"guard disabled (always allow)",
)
)
return mutants
def run(cmd: list[str], cwd: Path, timeout: int) -> tuple[int, str]:
try:
proc = subprocess.run(
cmd, cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout
)
return proc.returncode, proc.stdout + proc.stderr
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
# A hang counts as killed: the suite noticed, however unhappily.
return 1, "TIMEOUT"
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument(
"--target", default="all", choices=[*sorted(TARGETS), "all"]
)
parser.add_argument(
"--limit", type=int, default=0, help="cap mutants per target (0 = all)"
)
parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=420)
args = parser.parse_args()
targets = sorted(TARGETS) if args.target == "all" else [args.target]
overall_survivors: list[tuple[str, Mutant]] = []
overall_counts = {"killed": 0, "survived": 0, "invalid": 0}
for name in targets:
rel, tests = TARGETS[name]
path = CLI / rel
original = path.read_text()
mutants = generate(original)
if args.limit:
mutants = mutants[: args.limit]
print(f"\n=== {name} ({rel}): {len(mutants)} mutants ===")
# Restore the file whatever happens, including Ctrl-C. Leaving a
# deliberate security hole in the tree would be a spectacular own goal.
def restore(*_: object) -> None:
path.write_text(original)
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, lambda *a: (restore(), sys.exit(130)))
try:
for idx, mutant in enumerate(mutants, start=1):
lines = original.splitlines(keepends=True)
ending = "\n" if lines[mutant.line_no - 1].endswith("\n") else ""
lines[mutant.line_no - 1] = mutant.mutated + ending
path.write_text("".join(lines))
code, _ = run(
["npx", "tsc", "--noEmit"], CLI, timeout=args.timeout
)
if code != 0:
overall_counts["invalid"] += 1
print(f" [{idx}/{len(mutants)}] line {mutant.line_no}: invalid (does not typecheck)")
continue
code, _ = run(
["npx", "vitest", "run", *tests], CLI, timeout=args.timeout
)
if code != 0:
overall_counts["killed"] += 1
print(f" [{idx}/{len(mutants)}] line {mutant.line_no}: killed ({mutant.description})")
else:
overall_counts["survived"] += 1
overall_survivors.append((f"{rel}:{mutant.line_no}", mutant))
print(f" [{idx}/{len(mutants)}] line {mutant.line_no}: SURVIVED ({mutant.description})")
finally:
restore()
total = sum(overall_counts.values())
viable = overall_counts["killed"] + overall_counts["survived"]
print(f"\n{'=' * 70}")
print(
f"{overall_counts['killed']} killed, {overall_counts['survived']} survived, "
f"{overall_counts['invalid']} invalid (of {total})"
)
if viable:
print(f"mutation score: {overall_counts['killed'] / viable:.0%} of viable mutants caught")
if overall_survivors:
print(f"\nSURVIVORS — each is either a gap or an equivalent mutant, and needs judging:\n")
for where, mutant in overall_survivors:
print(f" {where} [{mutant.description}]")
print(f" was: {mutant.original.strip()[:110]}")
print(f" now: {mutant.mutated.strip()[:110]}")
print()
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())