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Proves the engine did not stay video-specific during extraction. - application adapter contract in core (createApplicationAdapter, evaluateObject, collectTargets): an object names the targets that govern it and the strictest verdict reaching any of them wins, so denying a seller takes their whole catalogue down with no cascade logic in the application - examples/commerce: a marketplace on the public API covering all ten proof-of-fit behaviors the plan requires, including that no core change was needed. One product, one snapshot, four surfaces, four different verdicts. - README, integration guide, per-example README, CHANGELOG, four ADRs, and GPL-3.0-or-later LICENSE (the license was listed in Phase 1 but missing) - checkpoints rewritten to reflect actual state and to say plainly which migration-plan phases belong to the consumer repos rather than here Fixes a real gap found by the proof-of-fit: composeDecisions kept only the first decision's evidence, so an object governed by several targets lost the evidence that drove its verdict. Evidence now merges — counts summed, contributor lists unioned, flags or-ed. 556 tests; lint, typecheck, and per-package type build clean.
69 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
69 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
# Commerce proof-of-fit
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A marketplace built on `nostr-governance`, using only the published API.
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The point is not to ship marketplace moderation. It is to prove the engine did
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not accidentally stay video-specific during extraction: if a commerce consumer
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needs a change to `@nostr-governance/core`, the abstraction is wrong.
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## What it demonstrates
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The migration plan lists ten behaviors a commerce consumer should show before
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`1.0.0`. Each is a numbered block in
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[`test/proof-of-fit.test.js`](test/proof-of-fit.test.js):
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1. **Seller allowlist mode** — unlisted sellers are hidden from discovery, but
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the allowlist is not enforced at checkout
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2. **Administrative seller denial** — takes the seller's whole catalogue down
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while leaving them their own dashboard view
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3. **Product-address denial** — survives the seller republishing under a new
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event id, and does not touch their other listings
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4. **Exact-event denial** — affects only the named revision
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5. **Trusted scam-report downranking** — one report reorders, three block
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checkout; nothing is hidden on a single signal
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6. **Malware checkout denial** — one trusted malware report blocks the sale,
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while three "misleading" reports do not
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7. **Moderator capability checks** — a listing moderator cannot deny a seller;
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a seller moderator cannot deny a listing address
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8. **Community curator ingestion** — curated denials are honored, curator
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contributions beyond their capability are dropped, and the root cannot be
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denied through a curated list
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9. **Seller-dashboard explanation** — the seller sees who reported and why;
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public surfaces see only counts
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10. **No core changes required** — four different verdicts for one product from
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one snapshot, using only exported functions
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## Files
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| File | Contents |
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| --- | --- |
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| `src/policy.js` | Marketplace thresholds and roles. None of these numbers exist in the core. |
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| `src/adapters.js` | Products, storefronts, reviews, and sellers as governance targets. |
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| `src/marketplace.js` | Feed pipeline, grid ordering, checkout, seller explanation. |
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## The shape worth copying
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A product answers to three targets — its seller, its exact event, and its
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address coordinate — and the composed decision is the strictest verdict reaching
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it. That is what makes "deny the seller" remove every listing without a line of
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cascade logic in the application.
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One product, one snapshot, four surfaces:
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| Surface | Visibility | Transaction |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `public-marketplace` | `restrict` | `deny` |
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| `product-detail` | `restrict`, overridable | `deny` |
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| `checkout` | `allow` | `deny` |
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| `seller-dashboard` | `restrict`, with evidence | `deny` |
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Reviews deliberately answer to their reviewer and their own event — never to the
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product they review. Otherwise denying a bad product would silence the reviews
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warning people about it.
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## Run it
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```bash
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npm test -- examples/commerce
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```
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