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Closes the gap the audit left open: administrative state fails closed without a verifier, and BitGate shipped none. @bitgate/verify is a separate package so core, nostr, and runtime keep no crypto dependency and can be audited without one. The widget bundles it, so the drop-in path is verified with no extra step; verify="off" disables it, sets data-unverified on the element, and emits bitgate:unverified — meant for local development, and meant to be visible. Verification recomputes the event id before checking the signature. Checking only the signature would let a forged event pass by reusing a genuine signature over an unrelated id, which is the failure mode that matters here. createVerifier also rejects events dated far in the future. A far-future created_at wins replaceable-event selection indefinitely and pins stale state in place; the signature is perfectly valid, so only a clock check catches it. Found while testing: #adminIngestAllowed checked that a verifier *exists*, not that this event was verified — so the public ingestEvent path, which "bring your own relays" integrations use, bypassed verification entirely. Verification now runs inside ingestEvent, with an already-verified flag for the loaders. An async verifier cannot be awaited there and is treated as unverified; ingestVerified() awaits properly. Conformance validated against 120 live events from a public relay across kinds 0, 1, 3 and 10002 — 59 with non-ASCII content and 71 containing quotes, newlines or tabs, which is where a serialization mismatch would surface. All 120 verified, zero id mismatches. Bundle grows 72K -> 120K. 855 tests; audit clean.
66 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
66 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
# @bitgate/verify
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NIP-01 event signature verification for BitGate. Optional package, so the rest
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of BitGate carries no crypto dependency and can be audited without one.
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```bash
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npm install @bitgate/verify
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```
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```js
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import { createBitGate } from "@bitgate/runtime";
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import { createVerifier } from "@bitgate/verify";
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const runtime = createBitGate({
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root: ROOT_PUBKEY,
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verifySignature: createVerifier(),
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…
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});
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```
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`<bitgate-provider>` uses this automatically — the widget bundle includes it, so
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the drop-in path is verified without any extra step.
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## What verification means here
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Two checks, and both matter:
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1. **The event id is the hash of the event's own contents.** Without this, an
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attacker could take a genuine signature over one id and attach it to
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different content.
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2. **The signature is valid for that id under the claimed pubkey.**
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Checking only the signature would let a forged event pass by reusing a real
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signature over an unrelated id. `verifyEvent` recomputes the id and refuses on
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mismatch before touching the curve.
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## Clock skew
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`createVerifier({ maxFutureSeconds })` (default 900) rejects events dated
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further ahead than the allowance. A far-future `created_at` wins
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replaceable-event selection indefinitely and pins stale state in place — the
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signature is perfectly valid, so only a clock check catches it. Pass `0` to
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disable.
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## It never throws
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Malformed input, bad hex, and curve errors are all "not verified". A verifier
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that threw would be a denial-of-service vector: one hostile event would break
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the whole ingestion batch.
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## Conformance
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Validated against **120 live events** from a public relay across kinds 0, 1, 3,
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and 10002 — including 59 with non-ASCII content and 71 containing quotes,
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newlines, or tabs, which is where serialization mismatches would surface. All
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120 verified with zero id mismatches.
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## API
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| Export | Purpose |
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| --- | --- |
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| `createVerifier(options)` | Build a verifier for `verifySignature` |
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| `verifyEvent(event)` | Verify one event; never throws |
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| `computeEventId(event)` | NIP-01 event id |
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| `isVerifiable(event)` | Structural check, before any crypto |
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