Files
bitgate/packages/core/test/presets.test.js
T
thePR0M3TH3AN adeba151b8 feat: rename to BitGate and close the drop-in gap
Renames the project and makes it as easy to adopt as BitLogin, which was the
stated bar and which it did not previously meet.

Rename (ADR 0005): @nostr-governance/* -> @bitgate/*, governance-* elements ->
bitgate-*, createGovernanceRuntime -> createBitGate. "Governance" reads as DAO
voting to this audience and named a category rather than a product; BitGate
names the benefit and joins the bit- family that BitVid and BitRoad compose
with. Domain types keep their names — the product is BitGate, the subject
matter is still governance. The migration plan is left as written; this ADR
records the change rather than rewriting history.

Drop-in distribution (ADR 0006): adopting BitGate meant supplying a transport,
authoring a policy, and wiring every element in JavaScript. Now:

- createRelayTransport(urls) — WebSocket transport with reconnection, backoff,
  subscription replay, and cross-relay dedupe
- policy presets (social, commerce, admin-only) addressable by name; the engine
  still carries no thresholds of its own
- <bitgate-provider> — configuration in markup, with descendants finding the
  runtime through a bubbling context event rather than DOM walking, which
  breaks across shadow boundaries
- npm run build:widget — a self-contained dist/bitgate.js

That last one came from running it in a browser rather than from a test. Bare
specifiers resolve in Node and vitest but not in a browser, so the widget
source worked everywhere except a plain static page — the one place it exists
to serve. The bundle is not committed: consumers build from reviewed source.

Also found by running it: the provider's ready event fires during element
upgrade, before a page that defines elements after parsing can attach a
listener, so it now exposes `ready` as a promise too.

Four bugs fixed along the way, three found by new tests and one by the browser:
admin state stayed silent when a roster change altered capabilities but no
denials; the relay transport sent every subscription twice on connect; the
commerce preset computed a meaningless visibility verdict at checkout and could
hide a listing from its own seller; <bitgate-status> threw on an unusable
decision.

759 tests; lint, typecheck, and both builds clean.
2026-08-09 19:58:45 -04:00

218 lines
7.6 KiB
JavaScript

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { createAuthorityState } from "../src/authority.js";
import { reduceAdminState } from "../src/adminState.js";
import { createSnapshot, evaluateTarget } from "../src/evaluator.js";
import {
ADMIN_ONLY_POLICY,
COMMERCE_POLICY,
POLICY_PRESETS,
SOCIAL_POLICY,
getPolicyPreset,
} from "../src/presets.js";
const ROOT = "a1".repeat(32);
const MODERATOR = "b2".repeat(32);
const CREATOR = "d4".repeat(32);
const NOW = 1_750_000_000;
const trusted = (index) => index.toString(16).padStart(2, "0").repeat(32);
const TRUSTED = Array.from({ length: 16 }, (_, index) => trusted(index + 1));
const authority = () =>
createAuthorityState({
root: ROOT,
actors: { [ROOT]: ["super_admin"], [MODERATOR]: ["moderator"] },
});
/** Evaluate a user target with `count` trusted reports in `category`. */
function evaluateWithReports(policy, profile, category, count, contributions = []) {
const auth = authority();
const snapshot = createSnapshot({
authority: auth,
admin: reduceAdminState(contributions, auth),
trust: { contacts: new Set(TRUSTED) },
reports: new Map([
[
`user:${CREATOR}`,
TRUSTED.slice(0, count).map((reporter) => ({ reporter, category, createdAt: NOW - 100 })),
],
]),
});
return evaluateTarget({ type: "user", pubkey: CREATOR }, snapshot, {
surface: profile,
policyProfile: profile,
policy,
now: NOW,
});
}
describe("preset registry", () => {
it("resolves each preset by name", () => {
expect(getPolicyPreset("social")).toBe(SOCIAL_POLICY);
expect(getPolicyPreset("commerce")).toBe(COMMERCE_POLICY);
expect(getPolicyPreset("admin-only")).toBe(ADMIN_ONLY_POLICY);
});
it("is case- and whitespace-insensitive", () => {
expect(getPolicyPreset(" SOCIAL ")).toBe(SOCIAL_POLICY);
});
it("returns null for anything else", () => {
expect(getPolicyPreset("nonsense")).toBeNull();
expect(getPolicyPreset(/** @type {any} */ (null))).toBeNull();
});
it("exposes every preset in the registry", () => {
expect(Object.keys(POLICY_PRESETS).sort()).toEqual(["admin-only", "commerce", "social"]);
});
});
describe("social preset", () => {
it("escalates malware fastest", () => {
const decision = evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "playback", "malware", 1);
expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("restrict");
expect(decision.interaction.effect).toBe("deny");
});
it("requires more agreement before acting on spam", () => {
// One report of spam must not restrict anything: it is the category most
// easily weaponized against an unpopular account.
expect(evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "playback", "spam", 1).visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
expect(evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "playback", "spam", 4).visibility.effect).toBe("restrict");
});
it("declines to hard-hide on the feed", () => {
const decision = evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "feed", "spam", 8);
expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("restrict");
expect(decision.reasons.map((reason) => reason.id)).toContain("surface-policy-bypass");
});
it("does hide on playback, where the viewer chose the item", () => {
expect(evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "playback", "spam", 8).visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
});
it("exposes evidence only on playback", () => {
const playback = evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "playback", "spam", 4);
const feed = evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "feed", "spam", 4);
expect(playback.evidence?.trustedReporterPubkeys.length).toBe(4);
expect(feed.evidence?.trustedReporterPubkeys).toEqual([]);
});
it("leaves a clean target entirely alone", () => {
const decision = evaluateWithReports(SOCIAL_POLICY, "feed", "spam", 0);
expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
expect(decision.ranking.effect).toBe("normal");
});
});
describe("commerce preset", () => {
it("blocks checkout on a single malware report", () => {
expect(evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "checkout", "malware", 1).transaction?.effect).toBe(
"deny",
);
});
it("escalates scam through review before denial", () => {
expect(evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "checkout", "scam", 2).transaction?.effect).toBe(
"require-review",
);
expect(evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "checkout", "scam", 3).transaction?.effect).toBe(
"deny",
);
});
it("keeps a denied listing visible to its own seller", () => {
const denial = [
{ actor: MODERATOR, kind: "user-deny", targets: [{ type: "user", pubkey: CREATOR }] },
];
const dashboard = evaluateWithReports(
COMMERCE_POLICY,
"seller-dashboard",
"scam",
0,
/** @type {any} */ (denial),
);
const browse = evaluateWithReports(
COMMERCE_POLICY,
"browse",
"scam",
0,
/** @type {any} */ (denial),
);
expect(dashboard.visibility.effect).toBe("warn");
expect(browse.visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
expect(dashboard.transaction?.effect).toBe("deny");
});
it("keeps visibility more generous than transaction", () => {
const decision = evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "checkout", "scam", 3);
expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
expect(decision.transaction?.effect).toBe("deny");
});
it("never hides a listing from its own seller", () => {
// Strong evidence hides it everywhere else, but the seller still needs to
// see it to appeal.
expect(evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "browse", "scam", 5).visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
expect(
evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, "seller-dashboard", "scam", 5).visibility.effect,
).toBe("warn");
});
it("gives one product different answers per surface from one snapshot", () => {
const byProfile = Object.fromEntries(
["browse", "detail", "checkout", "seller-dashboard"].map((profile) => [
profile,
evaluateWithReports(COMMERCE_POLICY, profile, "scam", 5),
]),
);
expect(byProfile.browse.visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
expect(byProfile["seller-dashboard"].visibility.effect).toBe("warn");
expect(byProfile.checkout.visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
expect(byProfile.checkout.transaction?.effect).toBe("deny");
});
});
describe("admin-only preset", () => {
it("enforces administrative denial", () => {
const decision = evaluateWithReports(ADMIN_ONLY_POLICY, "default", "spam", 0, [
/** @type {any} */ ({
actor: MODERATOR,
kind: "user-deny",
targets: [{ type: "user", pubkey: CREATOR }],
}),
]);
expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("hide");
});
it("ignores trust signals entirely", () => {
// Even sixteen trusted reports do nothing: this preset is for operators who
// do not want crowd signals affecting what anyone sees.
const decision = evaluateWithReports(ADMIN_ONLY_POLICY, "default", "malware", 16);
expect(decision.visibility.effect).toBe("allow");
expect(decision.ranking.effect).toBe("normal");
});
});
describe("preset hygiene", () => {
it("gives every preset a version and a named default profile", () => {
for (const [name, policy] of Object.entries(POLICY_PRESETS)) {
expect(policy.version, name).toMatch(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/);
expect(policy.defaultProfile, name).toBeTruthy();
expect(policy.profiles[/** @type {string} */ (policy.defaultProfile)], name).toBeTruthy();
}
});
it("names every profile consistently with its key", () => {
for (const policy of Object.values(POLICY_PRESETS)) {
for (const [key, profile] of Object.entries(policy.profiles)) {
expect(profile.name).toBe(key);
}
}
});
});