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Record the Google rail's scoping and blast radius in §CO3.3
Per-client-ID app-data silo makes the rail per-site; cross-site portability is the capsule account's job. A host's dead Google project locks out ungraduated users in practice while every account survives on relays -- the phrase card is load-bearing. Shared ecosystem client ID behind a bitlogin.network relay hub considered and rejected: a chokepoint plus federated credential readability is worse than the silo. Note the sensitive-scope verification review hosts should expect. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
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@@ -136,6 +136,24 @@ Password rotation while Google-managed is the graduation step (CO6 step 2):
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the Drive copy simply goes stale and dead, and the rotate screen says so
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before the user commits.
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**Scoping and blast radius (recorded 2026-08-04).** Drive app data is siloed
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per OAuth client ID, so the Google rail is a per-site (or per-site-family)
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convenience: a credential stored via Site A's client ID is invisible to
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Site B, whose "Continue with Google" would offer to create a NEW account.
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Cross-site portability is the underlying capsule account's job — password or
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phrase work on every BitLogin site. If a HOST'S Google project is banned or
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deleted, no Nostr account is lost (capsules live on public relays), but
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ungraduated users are locked out in practice: their credential file sits in
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their own Drive, readable only through an app bearing the dead client ID.
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Graduated users lose nothing but a button. This is why the Tier B2 phrase
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card is load-bearing, not decorative. A shared ecosystem-wide client ID
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behind a static relay hub on bitlogin.network was considered and rejected:
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it would make one domain and one Google project a chokepoint for every
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deployment, and a shared client ID lets any federated site read the user's
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credential file — worse centralization than the per-site silo it would fix.
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`drive.appdata` is a Google "sensitive" scope: hosts should expect Google's
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app-verification review before serving more than ~100 users.
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## CO3.2 Architecture B — OAuth as the password manager (recommended)
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The insight: a BitLogin account requires a high-entropy password, but the
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