Files
bitlogin/docs/TODO.md
T
thePR0M3TH3ANandClaude Fable 5 30d4ac4b83 Open items, and the standing rule about the derivation chain
Records the Dependabot PR to close and the manual-password decision to
confirm, plus the deferred hardening tiers and the gates still in force.

The part worth keeping visible: knownAnswer.test.ts failing is never "update
the expected value" -- it means the change is account-breaking. The rest of
the crypto suite only checks self-consistency, which stays green through
exactly the upgrade that would lock every user out.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CMr9Yt8SYmZcfgrg3CV2G1
2026-07-31 14:52:30 -04:00

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Markdown

# BitLogin — open items
Updated: 2026-07-31
## Owner action items
1. **Close the Dependabot PR on
`dependabot/npm_and_yarn/npm-security-and-maintenance-83024bc549`.** It
bundles seven major bumps into one change (`@noble/hashes` 1.8→2.2,
`@noble/curves` 1.9→2.2, `@scure/base` 1.2→2.2, `@scure/bip39` 1.6→2.2,
TypeScript 5→7, Vite 6→8, Vitest 3→4) and fails the build: noble v2 dropped
the extensionless subpath exports this code imports. It should be closed,
not merged or fixed — `.github/dependabot.yml` now groups only minor/patch
and ignores majors of the derivation chain, so this PR will not recur.
The four `dependabot/github_actions/*` PRs are unaffected and fine to merge.
2. **Decide whether the manual-password removal is final.** User-chosen
passwords were removed entirely (not merely discouraged) in the 2026-07-31
hardening, and `packages/widget/src/securityPolicy.test.ts` pins that. The
security argument is sound — a user-chosen password against a downloadable
capsule is offline-guessable forever — but it is a product decision that
changes what users can do, and it is now enforced by a test rather than by
preference.
## Standing rule: the derivation chain is a compatibility contract
Account capsules live on public relays. The login name plus password derive the
locator, signing scalar and capsule key deterministically, so those outputs are
a contract with every account that already exists — change them and users are
locked out permanently, with no server-side record to migrate from.
`packages/core/src/crypto/knownAnswer.test.ts` pins HKDF-Extract, HKDF-Expand,
ScalarExpand (scalar, counter, and resulting public key), BIP-39 phrase and
seed, base64url framing, and JCS ordering.
**A failure there is never "update the expected value".** It means the change
being attempted is account-breaking and needs a migration plan or rejection.
The rest of the crypto suite only checks self-consistency — same input, same
output within one run — which stays green through exactly the kind of upgrade
that would lock everyone out.
## Deferred hardening
Carried from the 2026-07-30 audit; none are live defects.
- **Tier 2** — `packages/widget/src/element.ts` is ~1,600 lines with no direct
test coverage. `securityPolicy.test.ts` now asserts a few properties of its
source text, which is a start, not coverage.
- **Tier 3** — compare-and-swap on capsule writes (relays offer no atomic
primitive, so this needs a protocol-level answer), and an encrypted
high-water-mark store.
- **Tier 4** — moving high-value authorization into a cross-origin or extension
boundary. An embedded widget is same-origin with its host page, so a
compromised host can reach the worker directly. Documented honestly in
`llms.txt` and the README rather than papered over.
## Gates still in force
- **External security review before the vault holds anything beyond a
budget-capped NWC connection.** The S3 and password profiles stay designs
until then.
- Personal-tier UI was gated on the sudo key leaving the credential capsule.
That gate is now **met** — the sudo key lives only in the phrase-gated
recovery capsule — but the UI still needs a separately reviewed key
ceremony before it ships.