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chore(agents): run nip-research-agent daily task
- Added verification tests for NIP-04/44 encryption worker logic (tests/nostr-specs/nip04-nip44.test.mjs). - Added verification tests for Kind 30078 video note schema (tests/nostr-specs/kind30078.test.mjs). - Fetched canonical specs for P0 NIPs into artifacts/nips/. - Updated NIP_INVENTORY.md with verified statuses. - Generated nip-report-2026-02-13.md. Co-authored-by: PR0M3TH3AN <[email protected]>
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@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
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| NIP / Kind | Description | Repo Locations | Status | Notes |
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|------------|-------------|----------------|--------|-------|
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| **NIP-01** | Basic Protocol Flow | `js/nostr/client.js`, `docs/nips/01.md` | Compliant | Base implementation verified via `client.js`. |
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| **NIP-04** | Encrypted Direct Message | `js/nostr/dmDecryptWorker.js`, `js/nostr/client.js` | Compliant | Fallback verified in `nip04_44_compliance.test.mjs`. |
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| **NIP-04** | Encrypted Direct Message | `js/nostr/dmDecryptWorker.js`, `js/nostr/client.js` | Compliant | Verified by `tests/nostr-specs/nip04-nip44.test.mjs`. |
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| **NIP-07** | `window.nostr` Capability | `js/nostr/nip07Permissions.js`, `js/nostr/adapters/nip07Adapter.js` | Compliant | Retry logic and timeouts verified in `nip07_compliance.test.mjs`. |
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| **NIP-09** | Event Deletion | `js/nostr/client.js`, `docs/nips/09.md` | Partial | `deleteAllVersions` implements Kind 5 logic. |
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| **NIP-10** | Text Notes & Threads | `js/nostr/commentEvents.js`, `docs/nips/10.md` | Compliant | `buildCommentEvent` implements NIP-10 threading markers (E, P, K tags). |
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@@ -11,13 +11,13 @@
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| **NIP-19** | bech32-encoded entities | `js/utils/nostrHelpers.js`, `js/nostr/nip71.js` | Compliant | Uses `nostr-tools` for correct encoding/decoding. |
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| **NIP-21** | `nostr:` URI scheme | `docs/nips/21.md` | Unknown | Usage in content parsing verified in `js/utils/nostrHelpers.js`. |
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| **NIP-33** | Addressable Events | `js/nostr/client.js` | Compliant | `d` tag usage verified in `video_note_compliance.test.mjs`. |
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| **NIP-44** | Encrypted Payloads (Versioned) | `js/nostr/dmDecryptWorker.js`, `js/nostr/client.js` | Compliant | Preference for v2 verified in `nip04_44_compliance.test.mjs`. |
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| **NIP-44** | Encrypted Payloads (Versioned) | `js/nostr/dmDecryptWorker.js`, `js/nostr/client.js` | Compliant | Verified by `tests/nostr-specs/nip04-nip44.test.mjs`. |
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| **NIP-46** | Nostr Remote Signing | `js/nostr/nip46Client.js` | Compliant | Full client implementation for remote signing. |
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| **NIP-51** | Lists | `js/userBlocks.js`, `js/subscriptions.js` | Compliant | Mute list (Kind 10000) and Subscription list (Kind 30000) logic aligns with spec. |
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| **NIP-56** | Reporting | `js/services/moderationService.js`, `docs/nips/56.md` | Compliant | `buildReportEvent` implements Kind 1984. |
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| **NIP-59** | Gift Wrap | `js/nostr/client.js` | Compliant | Implemented as part of NIP-17. |
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| **NIP-65** | Relay List Metadata | `js/relayManager.js` | Compliant | Verified Kind 10002 loading and parsing in `nip65_compliance.test.mjs`. |
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| **NIP-71** | Video Events | `js/nostr/nip71.js` | Compliant | Verified tag generation for Kind 30078 in `video_note_compliance.test.mjs`. |
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| **NIP-71** | Video Events | `js/nostr/nip71.js` | Compliant | Verified tag generation for Kind 30078 in `tests/nostr-specs/kind30078.test.mjs`. |
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| **NIP-78** | Application-specific data | `js/services/hashtagPreferencesService.js` | Compliant | Used for hashtag preferences (Kind 30015). |
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| **NIP-94** | File Metadata | `js/nostr/videoPublisher.js` | Compliant | `buildVideoMirrorEvent` implements Kind 1063. |
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| **NIP-98** | HTTP Auth | `js/services/r2Service.js` | Compliant | Used for R2 service authentication (Kind 27235). |
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@@ -28,5 +28,5 @@
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| **Kind 1063** | File Header | `js/nostr/videoPublisher.js` | Compliant | Implemented for NIP-94 mirroring. |
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| **Kind 30000** | Subscription List | `js/subscriptions.js` | Compliant | Implements NIP-51 follow sets. |
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| **Kind 30015** | Hashtag Preferences | `js/services/hashtagPreferencesService.js` | Compliant | Implemented. |
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| **Kind 30078** | App Data | `js/nostr/client.js`, `js/nostr/videoPayloadBuilder.js` | Compliant | Core video note kind. Verified structure. |
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| **Kind 30078** | App Data | `js/nostr/client.js`, `js/nostr/videoPayloadBuilder.js` | Compliant | Verified by `tests/nostr-specs/kind30078.test.mjs`. |
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| **Kind 30079** | Watch History | `js/nostr/watchHistory.js`, `config/instance-config.js` | Compliant | Parameterized replaceable list (custom kind). Implements bucketing and encryption. |
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@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
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NIP-01
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======
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Basic protocol flow description
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-------------------------------
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`draft` `mandatory` `relay`
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This NIP defines the basic protocol that should be implemented by everybody. New NIPs may add new optional (or mandatory) fields and messages and features to the structures and flows described here.
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## Events and signatures
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Each user has a keypair. Signatures, public key, and encodings are done according to the [Schnorr signatures standard for the curve `secp256k1`](https://bips.xyz/340).
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The only object type that exists is the `event`, which has the following format on the wire:
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```yaml
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{
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"id": <32-bytes lowercase hex-encoded sha256 of the serialized event data>,
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"pubkey": <32-bytes lowercase hex-encoded public key of the event creator>,
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"created_at": <unix timestamp in seconds>,
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"kind": <integer between 0 and 65535>,
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"tags": [
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[<arbitrary string>...],
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// ...
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],
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"content": <arbitrary string>,
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"sig": <64-bytes lowercase hex of the signature of the sha256 hash of the serialized event data, which is the same as the "id" field>
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}
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```
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To obtain the `event.id`, we `sha256` the serialized event. The serialization is done over the UTF-8 JSON-serialized string (which is described below) of the following structure:
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```
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[
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0,
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<pubkey, as a lowercase hex string>,
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<created_at, as a number>,
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<kind, as a number>,
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<tags, as an array of arrays of non-null strings>,
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<content, as a string>
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]
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```
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To prevent implementation differences from creating a different event ID for the same event, the following rules MUST be followed while serializing:
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- UTF-8 should be used for encoding.
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- Whitespace, line breaks or other unnecessary formatting should not be included in the output JSON.
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- The following characters in the content field must be escaped as shown, and all other characters must be included verbatim:
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- A line break (`0x0A`), use `\n`
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- A double quote (`0x22`), use `\"`
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- A backslash (`0x5C`), use `\\`
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- A carriage return (`0x0D`), use `\r`
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- A tab character (`0x09`), use `\t`
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- A backspace, (`0x08`), use `\b`
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- A form feed, (`0x0C`), use `\f`
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### Tags
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Each tag is an array of one or more strings, with some conventions around them. Take a look at the example below:
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```jsonc
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{
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"tags": [
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["e", "5c83da77af1dec6d7289834998ad7aafbd9e2191396d75ec3cc27f5a77226f36", "wss://nostr.example.com"],
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["p", "f7234bd4c1394dda46d09f35bd384dd30cc552ad5541990f98844fb06676e9ca"],
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["a", "30023:f7234bd4c1394dda46d09f35bd384dd30cc552ad5541990f98844fb06676e9ca:abcd", "wss://nostr.example.com"],
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["alt", "reply"],
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// ...
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],
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// ...
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}
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```
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The first element of the tag array is referred to as the tag _name_ or _key_ and the second as the tag _value_. So we can safely say that the event above has an `e` tag set to `"5c83da77af1dec6d7289834998ad7aafbd9e2191396d75ec3cc27f5a77226f36"`, an `alt` tag set to `"reply"` and so on. All elements after the second do not have a conventional name.
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This NIP defines 3 standard tags that can be used across all event kinds with the same meaning. They are as follows:
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- The `e` tag, used to refer to an event: `["e", <32-bytes lowercase hex of the id of another event>, <recommended relay URL, optional>, <32-bytes lowercase hex of the author's pubkey, optional>]`
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- The `p` tag, used to refer to another user: `["p", <32-bytes lowercase hex of a pubkey>, <recommended relay URL, optional>]`
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- The `a` tag, used to refer to an addressable or replaceable event
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- for an addressable event: `["a", "<kind integer>:<32-bytes lowercase hex of a pubkey>:<d tag value>", <recommended relay URL, optional>]`
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- for a normal replaceable event: `["a", "<kind integer>:<32-bytes lowercase hex of a pubkey>:", <recommended relay URL, optional>]` (note: include the trailing colon)
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As a convention, all single-letter (only english alphabet letters: a-z, A-Z) key tags are expected to be indexed by relays, such that it is possible, for example, to query or subscribe to events that reference the event `"5c83da77af1dec6d7289834998ad7aafbd9e2191396d75ec3cc27f5a77226f36"` by using the `{"#e": ["5c83da77af1dec6d7289834998ad7aafbd9e2191396d75ec3cc27f5a77226f36"]}` filter. Only the first value in any given tag is indexed.
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### Kinds
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Kinds specify how clients should interpret the meaning of each event and the other fields of each event (e.g. an `"r"` tag may have a meaning in an event of kind 1 and an entirely different meaning in an event of kind 10002). Each NIP may define the meaning of a set of kinds that weren't defined elsewhere. [NIP-10](10.md), for instance, specifies the `kind:1` text note for social media applications.
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This NIP defines one basic kind:
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- `0`: **user metadata**: the `content` is set to a stringified JSON object `{name: <nickname or full name>, about: <short bio>, picture: <url of the image>}` describing the user who created the event. [Extra metadata fields](24.md#kind-0) may be set. A relay may delete older events once it gets a new one for the same pubkey.
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And also a convention for kind ranges that allow for easier experimentation and flexibility of relay implementation:
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- for kind `n` such that `1000 <= n < 10000 || 4 <= n < 45 || n == 1 || n == 2`, events are **regular**, which means they're all expected to be stored by relays.
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- for kind `n` such that `10000 <= n < 20000 || n == 0 || n == 3`, events are **replaceable**, which means that, for each combination of `pubkey` and `kind`, only the latest event MUST be stored by relays, older versions MAY be discarded.
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- for kind `n` such that `20000 <= n < 30000`, events are **ephemeral**, which means they are not expected to be stored by relays.
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- for kind `n` such that `30000 <= n < 40000`, events are **addressable** by their `kind`, `pubkey` and `d` tag value -- which means that, for each combination of `kind`, `pubkey` and the `d` tag value, only the latest event MUST be stored by relays, older versions MAY be discarded.
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In case of replaceable events with the same timestamp, the event with the lowest id (first in lexical order) should be retained, and the other discarded.
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When answering to `REQ` messages for replaceable events such as `{"kinds":[0],"authors":[<hex-key>]}`, even if the relay has more than one version stored, it SHOULD return just the latest one.
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These are just conventions and relay implementations may differ.
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## Communication between clients and relays
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Relays expose a websocket endpoint to which clients can connect. Clients SHOULD open a single websocket connection to each relay and use it for all their subscriptions. Relays MAY limit number of connections from specific IP/client/etc.
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### From client to relay: sending events and creating subscriptions
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Clients can send 3 types of messages, which must be JSON arrays, according to the following patterns:
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* `["EVENT", <event JSON as defined above>]`, used to publish events.
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* `["REQ", <subscription_id>, <filters1>, <filters2>, ...]`, used to request events and subscribe to new updates.
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* `["CLOSE", <subscription_id>]`, used to stop previous subscriptions.
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`<subscription_id>` is an arbitrary, non-empty string of max length 64 chars. It represents a subscription per connection. Relays MUST manage `<subscription_id>`s independently for each WebSocket connection. `<subscription_id>`s are not guaranteed to be globally unique.
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`<filtersX>` is a JSON object that determines what events will be sent in that subscription, it can have the following attributes:
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```yaml
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{
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"ids": <a list of event ids>,
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"authors": <a list of lowercase pubkeys, the pubkey of an event must be one of these>,
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"kinds": <a list of a kind numbers>,
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"#<single-letter (a-zA-Z)>": <a list of tag values, for #e — a list of event ids, for #p — a list of pubkeys, etc.>,
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"since": <an integer unix timestamp in seconds. Events must have a created_at >= to this to pass>,
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"until": <an integer unix timestamp in seconds. Events must have a created_at <= to this to pass>,
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"limit": <maximum number of events relays SHOULD return in the initial query>
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}
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```
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Upon receiving a `REQ` message, the relay SHOULD return events that match the filter. Any new events it receives SHOULD be sent to that same websocket until the connection is closed, a `CLOSE` event is received with the same `<subscription_id>`, or a new `REQ` is sent using the same `<subscription_id>` (in which case a new subscription is created, replacing the old one).
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Filter attributes containing lists (`ids`, `authors`, `kinds` and tag filters like `#e`) are JSON arrays with one or more values. At least one of the arrays' values must match the relevant field in an event for the condition to be considered a match. For scalar event attributes such as `authors` and `kind`, the attribute from the event must be contained in the filter list. In the case of tag attributes such as `#e`, for which an event may have multiple values, the event and filter condition values must have at least one item in common.
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The `ids`, `authors`, `#e` and `#p` filter lists MUST contain exact 64-character lowercase hex values.
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The `since` and `until` properties can be used to specify the time range of events returned in the subscription. If a filter includes the `since` property, events with `created_at` greater than or equal to `since` are considered to match the filter. The `until` property is similar except that `created_at` must be less than or equal to `until`. In short, an event matches a filter if `since <= created_at <= until` holds.
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All conditions of a filter that are specified must match for an event for it to pass the filter, i.e., multiple conditions are interpreted as `&&` conditions.
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A `REQ` message may contain multiple filters. In this case, events that match any of the filters are to be returned, i.e., multiple filters are to be interpreted as `||` conditions.
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The `limit` property of a filter is only valid for the initial query and MUST be ignored afterwards. When `limit: n` is present it is assumed that the events returned in the initial query will be the last `n` events ordered by the `created_at`. Newer events should appear first, and in the case of ties the event with the lowest id (first in lexical order) should be first. Relays SHOULD use the `limit` value to guide how many events are returned in the initial response. Returning fewer events is acceptable, but returning (much) more should be avoided to prevent overwhelming clients.
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### From relay to client: sending events and notices
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Relays can send 5 types of messages, which must also be JSON arrays, according to the following patterns:
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* `["EVENT", <subscription_id>, <event JSON as defined above>]`, used to send events requested by clients.
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* `["OK", <event_id>, <true|false>, <message>]`, used to indicate acceptance or denial of an `EVENT` message.
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* `["EOSE", <subscription_id>]`, used to indicate the _end of stored events_ and the beginning of events newly received in real-time.
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* `["CLOSED", <subscription_id>, <message>]`, used to indicate that a subscription was ended on the server side.
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* `["NOTICE", <message>]`, used to send human-readable error messages or other things to clients.
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This NIP defines no rules for how `NOTICE` messages should be sent or treated.
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- `EVENT` messages MUST be sent only with a subscription ID related to a subscription previously initiated by the client (using the `REQ` message above).
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- `OK` messages MUST be sent in response to `EVENT` messages received from clients, they must have the 3rd parameter set to `true` when an event has been accepted by the relay, `false` otherwise. The 4th parameter MUST always be present, but MAY be an empty string when the 3rd is `true`, otherwise it MUST be a string formed by a machine-readable single-word prefix followed by a `:` and then a human-readable message. Some examples:
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* `["OK", "b1a649ebe8...", true, ""]`
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* `["OK", "b1a649ebe8...", true, "pow: difficulty 25>=24"]`
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* `["OK", "b1a649ebe8...", true, "duplicate: already have this event"]`
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* `["OK", "b1a649ebe8...", false, "blocked: you are banned from posting here"]`
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* `["OK", "b1a649ebe8...", false, "blocked: please register your pubkey at https://my-expensive-relay.example.com"]`
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* `["OK", "b1a649ebe8...", false, "rate-limited: slow down there chief"]`
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* `["OK", "b1a649ebe8...", false, "invalid: event creation date is too far off from the current time"]`
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* `["OK", "b1a649ebe8...", false, "pow: difficulty 26 is less than 30"]`
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* `["OK", "b1a649ebe8...", false, "restricted: not allowed to write."]`
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* `["OK", "b1a649ebe8...", false, "error: could not connect to the database"]`
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* `["OK", "b1a649ebe8...", false, "mute: no one was listening to your ephemeral event and it wasn't handled in any way, it was ignored"]`
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- `CLOSED` messages MUST be sent in response to a `REQ` when the relay refuses to fulfill it. It can also be sent when a relay decides to kill a subscription on its side before a client has disconnected or sent a `CLOSE`. This message uses the same pattern of `OK` messages with the machine-readable prefix and human-readable message. Some examples:
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* `["CLOSED", "sub1", "unsupported: filter contains unknown elements"]`
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* `["CLOSED", "sub1", "error: could not connect to the database"]`
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* `["CLOSED", "sub1", "error: shutting down idle subscription"]`
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- The standardized machine-readable prefixes for `OK` and `CLOSED` are: `duplicate`, `pow`, `blocked`, `rate-limited`, `invalid`, `restricted`, `mute` and `error` for when none of that fits.
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@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
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> __Warning__ `unrecommended`: deprecated in favor of [NIP-17](17.md)
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|
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NIP-04
|
||||
======
|
||||
|
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Encrypted Direct Message
|
||||
------------------------
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`final` `unrecommended` `optional` `relay`
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A special event with kind `4`, meaning "encrypted direct message". It is supposed to have the following attributes:
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**`content`** MUST be equal to the base64-encoded, aes-256-cbc encrypted string of anything a user wants to write, encrypted using a shared cipher generated by combining the recipient's public-key with the sender's private-key; this appended by the base64-encoded initialization vector as if it was a querystring parameter named "iv". The format is the following: `"content": "<encrypted_text>?iv=<initialization_vector>"`.
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**`tags`** MUST contain an entry identifying the receiver of the message (such that relays may naturally forward this event to them), in the form `["p", "<pubkey, as a hex string>"]`.
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**`tags`** MAY contain an entry identifying the previous message in a conversation or a message we are explicitly replying to (such that contextual, more organized conversations may happen), in the form `["e", "<event_id>"]`.
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**Note**: By default in the [libsecp256k1](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1) ECDH implementation, the secret is the SHA256 hash of the shared point (both X and Y coordinates). In Nostr, only the X coordinate of the shared point is used as the secret and it is NOT hashed. If using libsecp256k1, a custom function that copies the X coordinate must be passed as the `hashfp` argument in `secp256k1_ecdh`. See [here](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/blob/master/src/modules/ecdh/main_impl.h#L29).
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Code sample for generating such an event in JavaScript:
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|
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```js
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import crypto from 'crypto'
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import * as secp from '@noble/secp256k1'
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||||
|
||||
let sharedPoint = secp.getSharedSecret(ourPrivateKey, '02' + theirPublicKey)
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let sharedX = sharedPoint.slice(1, 33)
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let iv = crypto.randomFillSync(new Uint8Array(16))
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var cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(
|
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'aes-256-cbc',
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Buffer.from(sharedX),
|
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iv
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||||
)
|
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let encryptedMessage = cipher.update(text, 'utf8', 'base64')
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encryptedMessage += cipher.final('base64')
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let ivBase64 = Buffer.from(iv.buffer).toString('base64')
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||||
|
||||
let event = {
|
||||
pubkey: ourPubKey,
|
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created_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
|
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kind: 4,
|
||||
tags: [['p', theirPublicKey]],
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||||
content: encryptedMessage + '?iv=' + ivBase64
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
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||||
|
||||
## Security Warning
|
||||
|
||||
This standard does not go anywhere near what is considered the state-of-the-art in encrypted communication between peers, and it leaks metadata in the events, therefore it must not be used for anything you really need to keep secret, and only with relays that use `AUTH` to restrict who can fetch your `kind:4` events.
|
||||
|
||||
## Client Implementation Warning
|
||||
|
||||
Clients *should not* search and replace public key or note references from the `.content`. If processed like a regular text note (where `@npub...` is replaced with `#[0]` with a `["p", "..."]` tag) the tags are leaked and the mentioned user will receive the message in their inbox.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
||||
NIP-07
|
||||
======
|
||||
|
||||
`window.nostr` capability for web browsers
|
||||
------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
`draft` `optional`
|
||||
|
||||
The `window.nostr` object may be made available by web browsers or extensions and websites or web-apps may make use of it after checking its availability.
|
||||
|
||||
That object must define the following methods:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
async window.nostr.getPublicKey(): string // returns a public key as hex
|
||||
async window.nostr.signEvent(event: { created_at: number, kind: number, tags: string[][], content: string }): Event // takes an event object, adds `id`, `pubkey` and `sig` and returns it
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Aside from these two basic above, the following functions can also be implemented optionally:
|
||||
```
|
||||
async window.nostr.nip04.encrypt(pubkey, plaintext): string // returns ciphertext and iv as specified in nip-04 (deprecated)
|
||||
async window.nostr.nip04.decrypt(pubkey, ciphertext): string // takes ciphertext and iv as specified in nip-04 (deprecated)
|
||||
async window.nostr.nip44.encrypt(pubkey, plaintext): string // returns ciphertext as specified in nip-44
|
||||
async window.nostr.nip44.decrypt(pubkey, ciphertext): string // takes ciphertext as specified in nip-44
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Recommendation to Extension Authors
|
||||
To make sure that the `window.nostr` is available to nostr clients on page load, the authors who create Chromium and Firefox extensions should load their scripts by specifying `"run_at": "document_end"` in the extension's manifest.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Implementation
|
||||
|
||||
See https://github.com/aljazceru/awesome-nostr#nip-07-browser-extensions.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
|
||||
NIP-10
|
||||
======
|
||||
|
||||
Text Notes and Threads
|
||||
----------------------
|
||||
|
||||
`draft` `optional`
|
||||
|
||||
This NIP defines `kind:1` as a simple plaintext note.
|
||||
|
||||
## Abstract
|
||||
|
||||
The `.content` property contains some human-readable text.
|
||||
|
||||
`e` tags can be used to define note thread roots and replies. They SHOULD be sorted by the reply stack from root to the direct parent.
|
||||
|
||||
`q` tags MAY be used when citing events in the `.content` with [NIP-21](21.md).
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
["q", "<event-id> or <event-address>", "<relay-url>", "<pubkey-if-a-regular-event>"]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Authors of the `e` and `q` tags SHOULD be added as `p` tags to notify of a new reply or quote.
|
||||
|
||||
Markup languages such as markdown and HTML SHOULD NOT be used.
|
||||
|
||||
## Marked "e" tags (PREFERRED)
|
||||
|
||||
Kind 1 events with `e` tags are replies to other kind 1 events. Kind 1 replies MUST NOT be used to reply to other kinds, use [NIP-22](22.md) instead.
|
||||
|
||||
`["e", <event-id>, <relay-url>, <marker>, <pubkey>]`
|
||||
|
||||
Where:
|
||||
|
||||
* `<event-id>` is the id of the event being referenced.
|
||||
* `<relay-url>` is the URL of a recommended relay associated with the reference. Clients SHOULD add a valid `<relay-url>` field, but may instead leave it as `""`.
|
||||
* `<marker>` is optional and if present is one of `"reply"`, `"root"`.
|
||||
* `<pubkey>` is optional, SHOULD be the pubkey of the author of the referenced event
|
||||
|
||||
Those marked with `"reply"` denote the id of the reply event being responded to. Those marked with `"root"` denote the root id of the reply thread being responded to. For top level replies (those replying directly to the root event), only the `"root"` marker should be used.
|
||||
|
||||
A direct reply to the root of a thread should have a single marked "e" tag of type "root".
|
||||
|
||||
>This scheme is preferred because it allows events to mention others without confusing them with `<reply-id>` or `<root-id>`.
|
||||
|
||||
`<pubkey>` SHOULD be the pubkey of the author of the `e` tagged event, this is used in the outbox model to search for that event from the authors write relays where relay hints did not resolve the event.
|
||||
|
||||
## The "p" tag
|
||||
Used in a text event contains a list of pubkeys used to record who is involved in a reply thread.
|
||||
|
||||
When replying to a text event E the reply event's "p" tags should contain all of E's "p" tags as well as the `"pubkey"` of the event being replied to.
|
||||
|
||||
Example: Given a text event authored by `a1` with "p" tags [`p1`, `p2`, `p3`] then the "p" tags of the reply should be [`a1`, `p1`, `p2`, `p3`]
|
||||
in no particular order.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deprecated Positional "e" tags
|
||||
|
||||
This scheme is not in common use anymore and is here just to keep backward compatibility with older events on the network.
|
||||
|
||||
Positional `e` tags are deprecated because they create ambiguities that are difficult, or impossible to resolve when an event references another but is not a reply.
|
||||
|
||||
They use simple `e` tags without any marker.
|
||||
|
||||
`["e", <event-id>, <relay-url>]` as per NIP-01.
|
||||
|
||||
Where:
|
||||
|
||||
* `<event-id>` is the id of the event being referenced.
|
||||
* `<relay-url>` is the URL of a recommended relay associated with the reference. Many clients treat this field as optional.
|
||||
|
||||
**The positions of the "e" tags within the event denote specific meanings as follows**:
|
||||
|
||||
* No "e" tag: <br>
|
||||
This event is not a reply to, nor does it refer to, any other event.
|
||||
|
||||
* One "e" tag: <br>
|
||||
`["e", <id>]`: The id of the event to which this event is a reply.
|
||||
|
||||
* Two "e" tags: `["e", <root-id>]`, `["e", <reply-id>]` <br>
|
||||
`<root-id>` is the id of the event at the root of the reply chain. `<reply-id>` is the id of the article to which this event is a reply.
|
||||
|
||||
* Many "e" tags: `["e", <root-id>]` `["e", <mention-id>]`, ..., `["e", <reply-id>]`<br>
|
||||
There may be any number of `<mention-ids>`. These are the ids of events which may, or may not be in the reply chain.
|
||||
They are citing from this event. `root-id` and `reply-id` are as above.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
|
||||
NIP-17
|
||||
======
|
||||
|
||||
Private Direct Messages
|
||||
-----------------------
|
||||
|
||||
`draft` `optional` `relay`
|
||||
|
||||
This NIP defines an encrypted chat scheme which uses [NIP-44](44.md) encryption and [NIP-59](59.md) seals and gift wraps.
|
||||
|
||||
Any event sent to an encrypted chat MUST NOT be signed, and MUST be encrypted as described in [NIP-59](./59.md) and illustrated below. Omitting signatures makes messages deniable in case they are accidentally or maliciously leaked, while still allowing the recipient to authenticate them.
|
||||
|
||||
By convention, `kind 14` direct messages, `kind 15` file messages, and [`kind 7` reactions](./25.md) may be sent to an encrypted chat.
|
||||
|
||||
## Kind Definitions
|
||||
|
||||
### Chat Message
|
||||
|
||||
Kind `14` is a chat message. `p` tags identify one or more receivers of the message.
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "<usual hash>",
|
||||
"pubkey": "<sender-pubkey>",
|
||||
"created_at": "<current-time>",
|
||||
"kind": 14,
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
["p", "<receiver-1-pubkey>", "<relay-url>"],
|
||||
["p", "<receiver-2-pubkey>", "<relay-url>"],
|
||||
["e", "<kind-14-id>", "<relay-url>"] // if this is a reply
|
||||
["subject", "<conversation-title>"],
|
||||
// rest of tags...
|
||||
],
|
||||
"content": "<message-in-plain-text>",
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`.content` MUST be plain text. Fields `id` and `created_at` are required.
|
||||
|
||||
An `e` tag denotes the direct parent message this post is replying to.
|
||||
|
||||
`q` tags MAY be used when citing events in the `.content` with [NIP-21](21.md).
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
["q", "<event-id> or <event-address>", "<relay-url>", "<pubkey-if-a-regular-event>"]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## File Message
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "<usual hash>",
|
||||
"pubkey": "<sender-pubkey>",
|
||||
"created_at": "<current-time>",
|
||||
"kind": 15,
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
["p", "<receiver-1-pubkey>", "<relay-url>"],
|
||||
["p", "<receiver-2-pubkey>", "<relay-url>"],
|
||||
["e", "<kind-14-id>", "<relay-url>", "reply"], // if this is a reply
|
||||
["subject", "<conversation-title>"],
|
||||
["file-type", "<file-mime-type>"],
|
||||
["encryption-algorithm", "<encryption-algorithm>"],
|
||||
["decryption-key", "<decryption-key>"],
|
||||
["decryption-nonce", "<decryption-nonce>"],
|
||||
["x", "<the SHA-256 hexencoded string of the file>"],
|
||||
// rest of tags...
|
||||
],
|
||||
"content": "<file-url>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Kind `15` is used for sending encrypted file event messages:
|
||||
|
||||
- `file-type`: Specifies the MIME type of the attached file (e.g., `image/jpeg`, `audio/mpeg`, etc.) before encryption.
|
||||
- `encryption-algorithm`: Indicates the encryption algorithm used for encrypting the file. Supported algorithms: `aes-gcm`.
|
||||
- `decryption-key`: The decryption key that will be used by the recipient to decrypt the file.
|
||||
- `decryption-nonce`: The decryption nonce that will be used by the recipient to decrypt the file.
|
||||
- `content`: The URL of the file (`<file-url>`).
|
||||
- `x` containing the SHA-256 hexencoded string of the encrypted file.
|
||||
- `ox` containing the SHA-256 hexencoded string of the file before encryption.
|
||||
- `size` (optional) size of the encrypted file in bytes
|
||||
- `dim` (optional) size in pixels in the form `<width>x<height>`
|
||||
- `blurhash`(optional) the [blurhash](https://github.com/woltapp/blurhash) to show while the client is loading the file
|
||||
- `thumb` (optional) URL of thumbnail with same aspect ratio (encrypted with the same key, nonce)
|
||||
- `fallback` (optional) zero or more fallback file sources in case `url` fails (encrypted with the same key, nonce)
|
||||
|
||||
## Chat Rooms
|
||||
|
||||
The set of `pubkey` + `p` tags defines a chat room. If a new `p` tag is added or a current one is removed, a new room is created with a clean message history.
|
||||
|
||||
Clients SHOULD render messages of the same room in a continuous thread.
|
||||
|
||||
An optional `subject` tag defines the current name/topic of the conversation. Any member can change the topic by simply submitting a new `subject` to an existing `pubkey` + `p` tags room. There is no need to send `subject` in every message. The newest `subject` in the chat room is the subject of the conversation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Encrypting
|
||||
|
||||
Following [NIP-59](59.md), the **unsigned** chat messages must be sealed (`kind:13`) and then gift-wrapped (`kind:1059`) to each receiver and the sender individually.
|
||||
|
||||
```js
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "<usual hash>",
|
||||
"pubkey": randomPublicKey,
|
||||
"created_at": randomTimeUpTo2DaysInThePast(),
|
||||
"kind": 1059, // gift wrap
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
["p", receiverPublicKey, "<relay-url>"] // receiver
|
||||
],
|
||||
"content": nip44Encrypt(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "<usual hash>",
|
||||
"pubkey": senderPublicKey,
|
||||
"created_at": randomTimeUpTo2DaysInThePast(),
|
||||
"kind": 13, // seal
|
||||
"tags": [], // no tags
|
||||
"content": nip44Encrypt(unsignedKind14, senderPrivateKey, receiverPublicKey),
|
||||
"sig": "<signed by senderPrivateKey>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
randomPrivateKey, receiverPublicKey
|
||||
),
|
||||
"sig": "<signed by randomPrivateKey>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The encryption algorithm MUST use the latest version of [NIP-44](44.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Clients MUST verify if pubkey of the `kind:13` is the same pubkey on the `kind:14`, otherwise any sender can impersonate others by simply changing the pubkey on `kind:14`.
|
||||
|
||||
Clients SHOULD randomize `created_at` in up to two days in the past in both the seal and the gift wrap to make sure grouping by `created_at` doesn't reveal any metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
The gift wrap's `p` tag can be the receiver's main pubkey or an alias key created to receive DMs without exposing the receiver's identity.
|
||||
|
||||
Clients MAY offer disappearing messages by setting an `expiration` tag in the gift wrap of each receiver or by not generating a gift wrap to the sender's public key. This tag SHOULD be included on the `kind 13` seal as well, in case it leaks.
|
||||
|
||||
## Publishing
|
||||
|
||||
Kind `10050` indicates the user's preferred relays to receive DMs. The event MUST include a list of `relay` tags with relay URIs.
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"kind": 10050,
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
["relay", "wss://inbox.nostr.wine"],
|
||||
["relay", "wss://myrelay.nostr1.com"],
|
||||
],
|
||||
"content": "",
|
||||
// other fields...
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Clients SHOULD publish the gift-wrapped `kind 1059` events that contain the sealed rumors to the relays listed in the recipient’s kind 10050 event. If that is not found that indicates the user is not ready to receive messages under this NIP and clients shouldn't try.
|
||||
|
||||
## Relays
|
||||
|
||||
Relays MAY protect message metadata by only serving `kind:1059` events to users p-tagged on the event (enforced using [NIP 42 AUTH](./42.md)).
|
||||
|
||||
Clients SHOULD guide users to keep `kind:10050` lists small (1-3 relays) and SHOULD spread them to as many relays as viable.
|
||||
|
||||
## Benefits & Limitations
|
||||
|
||||
This NIP offers the following privacy and security features:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **No Metadata Leak**: Participant identities, each message's real date and time, event kinds, and other event tags are all hidden from the public. Senders and receivers cannot be linked with public information alone.
|
||||
2. **No Public Group Identifiers**: There is no public central queue, channel or otherwise converging identifier to correlate or count all messages in the same group.
|
||||
3. **No Moderation**: There are no group admins: no invitations or bans.
|
||||
4. **No Shared Secrets**: No secret must be known to all members that can leak or be mistakenly shared
|
||||
5. **Fully Recoverable**: Messages can be fully recoverable by any client with the user's private key
|
||||
6. **Optional Forward Secrecy**: Users and clients can opt-in for "disappearing messages".
|
||||
7. **Uses Public Relays**: Messages can flow through public relays without loss of privacy. Private relays can increase privacy further, but they are not required.
|
||||
8. **Cold Storage**: Users can unilaterally opt-in to sharing their messages with a separate key that is exclusive for DM backup and recovery.
|
||||
|
||||
The main limitation of this approach is having to send a separate encrypted event to each receiver. Group chats with more than 100 participants should find a more suitable messaging scheme.
|
||||
|
||||
## Examples
|
||||
|
||||
This example sends the message `Hola, que tal?` from `nsec1w8udu59ydjvedgs3yv5qccshcj8k05fh3l60k9x57asjrqdpa00qkmr89m` to `nsec12ywtkplvyq5t6twdqwwygavp5lm4fhuang89c943nf2z92eez43szvn4dt`.
|
||||
|
||||
The two final GiftWraps, one to the receiver and the other to the sender, respectively, are:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id":"2886780f7349afc1344047524540ee716f7bdc1b64191699855662330bf235d8",
|
||||
"pubkey":"8f8a7ec43b77d25799281207e1a47f7a654755055788f7482653f9c9661c6d51",
|
||||
"created_at":1703128320,
|
||||
"kind":1059,
|
||||
"tags":[
|
||||
["p", "918e2da906df4ccd12c8ac672d8335add131a4cf9d27ce42b3bb3625755f0788"]
|
||||
],
|
||||
"content":"AsqzdlMsG304G8h08bE67dhAR1gFTzTckUUyuvndZ8LrGCvwI4pgC3d6hyAK0Wo9gtkLqSr2rT2RyHlE5wRqbCOlQ8WvJEKwqwIJwT5PO3l2RxvGCHDbd1b1o40ZgIVwwLCfOWJ86I5upXe8K5AgpxYTOM1BD+SbgI5jOMA8tgpRoitJedVSvBZsmwAxXM7o7sbOON4MXHzOqOZpALpS2zgBDXSAaYAsTdEM4qqFeik+zTk3+L6NYuftGidqVluicwSGS2viYWr5OiJ1zrj1ERhYSGLpQnPKrqDaDi7R1KrHGFGyLgkJveY/45y0rv9aVIw9IWF11u53cf2CP7akACel2WvZdl1htEwFu/v9cFXD06fNVZjfx3OssKM/uHPE9XvZttQboAvP5UoK6lv9o3d+0GM4/3zP+yO3C0NExz1ZgFmbGFz703YJzM+zpKCOXaZyzPjADXp8qBBeVc5lmJqiCL4solZpxA1865yPigPAZcc9acSUlg23J1dptFK4n3Tl5HfSHP+oZ/QS/SHWbVFCtq7ZMQSRxLgEitfglTNz9P1CnpMwmW/Y4Gm5zdkv0JrdUVrn2UO9ARdHlPsW5ARgDmzaxnJypkfoHXNfxGGXWRk0sKLbz/ipnaQP/eFJv/ibNuSfqL6E4BnN/tHJSHYEaTQ/PdrA2i9laG3vJti3kAl5Ih87ct0w/tzYfp4SRPhEF1zzue9G/16eJEMzwmhQ5Ec7jJVcVGa4RltqnuF8unUu3iSRTQ+/MNNUkK6Mk+YuaJJs6Fjw6tRHuWi57SdKKv7GGkr0zlBUU2Dyo1MwpAqzsCcCTeQSv+8qt4wLf4uhU9Br7F/L0ZY9bFgh6iLDCdB+4iABXyZwT7Ufn762195hrSHcU4Okt0Zns9EeiBOFxnmpXEslYkYBpXw70GmymQfJlFOfoEp93QKCMS2DAEVeI51dJV1e+6t3pCSsQN69Vg6jUCsm1TMxSs2VX4BRbq562+VffchvW2BB4gMjsvHVUSRl8i5/ZSDlfzSPXcSGALLHBRzy+gn0oXXJ/447VHYZJDL3Ig8+QW5oFMgnWYhuwI5QSLEyflUrfSz+Pdwn/5eyjybXKJftePBD9Q+8NQ8zulU5sqvsMeIx/bBUx0fmOXsS3vjqCXW5IjkmSUV7q54GewZqTQBlcx+90xh/LSUxXex7UwZwRnifvyCbZ+zwNTHNb12chYeNjMV7kAIr3cGQv8vlOMM8ajyaZ5KVy7HpSXQjz4PGT2/nXbL5jKt8Lx0erGXsSsazkdoYDG3U",
|
||||
"sig":"a3c6ce632b145c0869423c1afaff4a6d764a9b64dedaf15f170b944ead67227518a72e455567ca1c2a0d187832cecbde7ed478395ec4c95dd3e71749ed66c480"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id":"162b0611a1911cfcb30f8a5502792b346e535a45658b3a31ae5c178465509721",
|
||||
"pubkey":"626be2af274b29ea4816ad672ee452b7cf96bbb4836815a55699ae402183f512",
|
||||
"created_at":1702711587,
|
||||
"kind":1059,
|
||||
"tags":[
|
||||
["p", "44900586091b284416a0c001f677f9c49f7639a55c3f1e2ec130a8e1a7998e1b"]
|
||||
],
|
||||
"content":"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",
|
||||
"sig":"c94e74533b482aa8eeeb54ae72a5303e0b21f62909ca43c8ef06b0357412d6f8a92f96e1a205102753777fd25321a58fba3fb384eee114bd53ce6c06a1c22bab"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
|
||||
NIP-19
|
||||
======
|
||||
|
||||
bech32-encoded entities
|
||||
-----------------------
|
||||
|
||||
`draft` `optional`
|
||||
|
||||
This NIP standardizes bech32-formatted strings that can be used to display keys, ids and other information in clients. These formats are not meant to be used anywhere in the core protocol, they are only meant for displaying to users, copy-pasting, sharing, rendering QR codes and inputting data.
|
||||
|
||||
It is recommended that ids and keys are stored in either hex or binary format, since these formats are closer to what must actually be used the core protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Bare keys and ids
|
||||
|
||||
To prevent confusion and mixing between private keys, public keys and event ids, which are all 32 byte strings. bech32-(not-m) encoding with different prefixes can be used for each of these entities.
|
||||
|
||||
These are the possible bech32 prefixes:
|
||||
|
||||
- `npub`: public keys
|
||||
- `nsec`: private keys
|
||||
- `note`: note ids
|
||||
|
||||
Example: the hex public key `3bf0c63fcb93463407af97a5e5ee64fa883d107ef9e558472c4eb9aaaefa459d` translates to `npub180cvv07tjdrrgpa0j7j7tmnyl2yr6yr7l8j4s3evf6u64th6gkwsyjh6w6`.
|
||||
|
||||
The bech32 encodings of keys and ids are not meant to be used inside the standard NIP-01 event formats or inside the filters, they're meant for human-friendlier display and input only. Clients should still accept keys in both hex and npub format for now, and convert internally.
|
||||
|
||||
## Shareable identifiers with extra metadata
|
||||
|
||||
When sharing a profile or an event, an app may decide to include relay information and other metadata such that other apps can locate and display these entities more easily.
|
||||
|
||||
For these events, the contents are a binary-encoded list of `TLV` (type-length-value), with `T` and `L` being 1 byte each (`uint8`, i.e. a number in the range of 0-255), and `V` being a sequence of bytes of the size indicated by `L`.
|
||||
|
||||
These are the possible bech32 prefixes with `TLV`:
|
||||
|
||||
- `nprofile`: a nostr profile
|
||||
- `nevent`: a nostr event
|
||||
- `naddr`: a nostr _addressable event_ coordinate
|
||||
- `nrelay`: a nostr relay (deprecated)
|
||||
|
||||
These possible standardized `TLV` types are indicated here:
|
||||
|
||||
- `0`: `special`
|
||||
- depends on the bech32 prefix:
|
||||
- for `nprofile` it will be the 32 bytes of the profile public key
|
||||
- for `nevent` it will be the 32 bytes of the event id
|
||||
- for `naddr`, it is the identifier (the `"d"` tag) of the event being referenced. For normal replaceable events use an empty string.
|
||||
- `1`: `relay`
|
||||
- for `nprofile`, `nevent` and `naddr`, _optionally_, a relay in which the entity (profile or event) is more likely to be found, encoded as ascii
|
||||
- this may be included multiple times
|
||||
- `2`: `author`
|
||||
- for `naddr`, the 32 bytes of the pubkey of the event
|
||||
- for `nevent`, _optionally_, the 32 bytes of the pubkey of the event
|
||||
- `3`: `kind`
|
||||
- for `naddr`, the 32-bit unsigned integer of the kind, big-endian
|
||||
- for `nevent`, _optionally_, the 32-bit unsigned integer of the kind, big-endian
|
||||
|
||||
## Examples
|
||||
|
||||
- `npub10elfcs4fr0l0r8af98jlmgdh9c8tcxjvz9qkw038js35mp4dma8qzvjptg` should decode into the public key hex `7e7e9c42a91bfef19fa929e5fda1b72e0ebc1a4c1141673e2794234d86addf4e` and vice-versa
|
||||
- `nsec1vl029mgpspedva04g90vltkh6fvh240zqtv9k0t9af8935ke9laqsnlfe5` should decode into the private key hex `67dea2ed018072d675f5415ecfaed7d2597555e202d85b3d65ea4e58d2d92ffa` and vice-versa
|
||||
- `nprofile1qqsrhuxx8l9ex335q7he0f09aej04zpazpl0ne2cgukyawd24mayt8gpp4mhxue69uhhytnc9e3k7mgpz4mhxue69uhkg6nzv9ejuumpv34kytnrdaksjlyr9p` should decode into a profile with the following TLV items:
|
||||
- pubkey: `3bf0c63fcb93463407af97a5e5ee64fa883d107ef9e558472c4eb9aaaefa459d`
|
||||
- relay: `wss://r.x.com`
|
||||
- relay: `wss://djbas.sadkb.com`
|
||||
|
||||
## Notes
|
||||
|
||||
- `npub` keys MUST NOT be used in NIP-01 events or in NIP-05 JSON responses, only the hex format is supported there.
|
||||
- When decoding a bech32-formatted string, TLVs that are not recognized or supported should be ignored, rather than causing an error.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
NIP-33
|
||||
======
|
||||
|
||||
Parameterized Replaceable Events
|
||||
--------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
`final` `mandatory`
|
||||
|
||||
Renamed to "Addressable events" and moved to [NIP-01](01.md).
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
|
||||
NIP-44
|
||||
======
|
||||
|
||||
Encrypted Payloads (Versioned)
|
||||
------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
`optional`
|
||||
|
||||
The NIP introduces a new data format for keypair-based encryption. This NIP is versioned
|
||||
to allow multiple algorithm choices to exist simultaneously. This format may be used for
|
||||
many things, but MUST be used in the context of a signed event as described in NIP-01.
|
||||
|
||||
*Note*: this format DOES NOT define any `kind`s related to a new direct messaging standard,
|
||||
only the encryption required to define one. It SHOULD NOT be used as a drop-in replacement
|
||||
for NIP-04 payloads.
|
||||
|
||||
## Versions
|
||||
|
||||
Currently defined encryption algorithms:
|
||||
|
||||
- `0x00` - Reserved
|
||||
- `0x01` - Deprecated and undefined
|
||||
- `0x02` - secp256k1 ECDH, HKDF, padding, ChaCha20, HMAC-SHA256, base64
|
||||
|
||||
## Limitations
|
||||
|
||||
Every nostr user has their own public key, which solves key distribution problems present
|
||||
in other solutions. However, nostr's relay-based architecture makes it difficult to implement
|
||||
more robust private messaging protocols with things like metadata hiding, forward secrecy,
|
||||
and post compromise secrecy.
|
||||
|
||||
The goal of this NIP is to have a _simple_ way to encrypt payloads used in the context of a signed
|
||||
event. When applying this NIP to any use case, it's important to keep in mind your users' threat
|
||||
model and this NIP's limitations. For high-risk situations, users should chat in specialized E2EE
|
||||
messaging software and limit use of nostr to exchanging contacts.
|
||||
|
||||
On its own, messages sent using this scheme have a number of important shortcomings:
|
||||
|
||||
- No deniability: it is possible to prove an event was signed by a particular key
|
||||
- No forward secrecy: when a key is compromised, it is possible to decrypt all previous conversations
|
||||
- No post-compromise security: when a key is compromised, it is possible to decrypt all future conversations
|
||||
- No post-quantum security: a powerful quantum computer would be able to decrypt the messages
|
||||
- IP address leak: user IP may be seen by relays and all intermediaries between user and relay
|
||||
- Date leak: `created_at` is public, since it is a part of NIP-01 event
|
||||
- Limited message size leak: padding only partially obscures true message length
|
||||
- No attachments: they are not supported
|
||||
|
||||
Lack of forward secrecy may be partially mitigated by only sending messages to trusted relays, and asking
|
||||
relays to delete stored messages after a certain duration has elapsed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Version 2
|
||||
|
||||
NIP-44 version 2 has the following design characteristics:
|
||||
|
||||
- Payloads are authenticated using a MAC before signing rather than afterwards because events are assumed
|
||||
to be signed as specified in NIP-01. The outer signature serves to authenticate the full payload, and MUST
|
||||
be validated before decrypting.
|
||||
- ChaCha is used instead of AES because it's faster and has
|
||||
[better security against multi-key attacks](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits/).
|
||||
- ChaCha is used instead of XChaCha because XChaCha has not been standardized. Also, xChaCha's improved collision
|
||||
resistance of nonces isn't necessary since every message has a new (key, nonce) pair.
|
||||
- HMAC-SHA256 is used instead of Poly1305 because polynomial MACs are much easier to forge.
|
||||
- SHA256 is used instead of SHA3 or BLAKE because it is already used in nostr. Also BLAKE's speed advantage
|
||||
is smaller in non-parallel environments.
|
||||
- A custom padding scheme is used instead of padmé because it provides better leakage reduction for small messages.
|
||||
- Base64 encoding is used instead of another encoding algorithm because it is widely available, and is already used in nostr.
|
||||
|
||||
### Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
1. Calculate a conversation key
|
||||
- Execute ECDH (scalar multiplication) of public key B by private key A
|
||||
Output `shared_x` must be unhashed, 32-byte encoded x coordinate of the shared point
|
||||
- Use HKDF-extract with sha256, `IKM=shared_x` and `salt=utf8_encode('nip44-v2')`
|
||||
- HKDF output will be a `conversation_key` between two users.
|
||||
- It is always the same, when key roles are swapped: `conv(a, B) == conv(b, A)`
|
||||
2. Generate a random 32-byte nonce
|
||||
- Always use [CSPRNG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographically_secure_pseudorandom_number_generator)
|
||||
- Don't generate a nonce from message content
|
||||
- Don't re-use the same nonce between messages: doing so would make them decryptable,
|
||||
but won't leak the long-term key
|
||||
3. Calculate message keys
|
||||
- The keys are generated from `conversation_key` and `nonce`. Validate that both are 32 bytes long
|
||||
- Use HKDF-expand, with sha256, `PRK=conversation_key`, `info=nonce` and `L=76`
|
||||
- Slice 76-byte HKDF output into: `chacha_key` (bytes 0..32), `chacha_nonce` (bytes 32..44), `hmac_key` (bytes 44..76)
|
||||
4. Add padding
|
||||
- Content must be encoded from UTF-8 into byte array
|
||||
- Validate plaintext length. Minimum is 1 byte, maximum is 65535 bytes
|
||||
- Padding format is: `[plaintext_length: u16][plaintext][zero_bytes]`
|
||||
- Padding algorithm is related to powers-of-two, with min padded msg size of 32 bytes
|
||||
- Plaintext length is encoded in big-endian as first 2 bytes of the padded blob
|
||||
5. Encrypt padded content
|
||||
- Use ChaCha20, with key and nonce from step 3
|
||||
6. Calculate MAC (message authentication code)
|
||||
- AAD (additional authenticated data) is used - instead of calculating MAC on ciphertext,
|
||||
it's calculated over a concatenation of `nonce` and `ciphertext`
|
||||
- Validate that AAD (nonce) is 32 bytes
|
||||
7. Base64-encode (with padding) params using `concat(version, nonce, ciphertext, mac)`
|
||||
|
||||
Encrypted payloads MUST be included in an event's payload, hashed, and signed as defined in NIP 01, using schnorr
|
||||
signature scheme over secp256k1.
|
||||
|
||||
### Decryption
|
||||
|
||||
Before decryption, the event's pubkey and signature MUST be validated as defined in NIP 01. The public key MUST be
|
||||
a valid non-zero secp256k1 curve point, and the signature must be valid secp256k1 schnorr signature. For exact
|
||||
validation rules, refer to BIP-340.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Check if first payload's character is `#`
|
||||
- `#` is an optional future-proof flag that means non-base64 encoding is used
|
||||
- The `#` is not present in base64 alphabet, but, instead of throwing `base64 is invalid`,
|
||||
implementations MUST indicate that the encryption version is not yet supported
|
||||
2. Decode base64
|
||||
- Base64 is decoded into `version, nonce, ciphertext, mac`
|
||||
- If the version is unknown, implementations must indicate that the encryption version is not supported
|
||||
- Validate length of base64 message to prevent DoS on base64 decoder: it can be in range from 132 to 87472 chars
|
||||
- Validate length of decoded message to verify output of the decoder: it can be in range from 99 to 65603 bytes
|
||||
3. Calculate conversation key
|
||||
- See step 1 of [encryption](#Encryption)
|
||||
4. Calculate message keys
|
||||
- See step 3 of [encryption](#Encryption)
|
||||
5. Calculate MAC (message authentication code) with AAD and compare
|
||||
- Stop and throw an error if MAC doesn't match the decoded one from step 2
|
||||
- Use constant-time comparison algorithm
|
||||
6. Decrypt ciphertext
|
||||
- Use ChaCha20 with key and nonce from step 3
|
||||
7. Remove padding
|
||||
- Read the first two BE bytes of plaintext that correspond to plaintext length
|
||||
- Verify that the length of sliced plaintext matches the value of the two BE bytes
|
||||
- Verify that calculated padding from step 3 of the [encryption](#Encryption) process matches the actual padding
|
||||
|
||||
### Details
|
||||
|
||||
- Cryptographic methods
|
||||
- `secure_random_bytes(length)` fetches randomness from CSPRNG.
|
||||
- `hkdf(IKM, salt, info, L)` represents HKDF [(RFC 5869)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5869)
|
||||
with SHA256 hash function comprised of methods `hkdf_extract(IKM, salt)` and `hkdf_expand(OKM, info, L)`.
|
||||
- `chacha20(key, nonce, data)` is ChaCha20 [(RFC 8439)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439) with
|
||||
starting counter set to 0.
|
||||
- `hmac_sha256(key, message)` is HMAC [(RFC 2104)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2104).
|
||||
- `secp256k1_ecdh(priv_a, pub_b)` is multiplication of point B by scalar a (`a ⋅ B`), defined in
|
||||
[BIP340](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/e918b50731397872ad2922a1b08a5a4cd1d6d546/bip-0340.mediawiki).
|
||||
The operation produces a shared point, and we encode the shared point's 32-byte x coordinate, using method
|
||||
`bytes(P)` from BIP340. Private and public keys must be validated as per BIP340: pubkey must be a valid,
|
||||
on-curve point, and private key must be a scalar in range `[1, secp256k1_order - 1]`.
|
||||
NIP44 doesn't do hashing of the output: keep this in mind, because some libraries hash it using sha256.
|
||||
As an example, in libsecp256k1, unhashed version is available in `secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul`
|
||||
- Operators
|
||||
- `x[i:j]`, where `x` is a byte array and `i, j <= 0` returns a `(j - i)`-byte array with a copy of the
|
||||
`i`-th byte (inclusive) to the `j`-th byte (exclusive) of `x`.
|
||||
- Constants `c`:
|
||||
- `min_plaintext_size` is 1. 1 byte msg is padded to 32 bytes.
|
||||
- `max_plaintext_size` is 65535 (64kB - 1). It is padded to 65536 bytes.
|
||||
- Functions
|
||||
- `base64_encode(string)` and `base64_decode(bytes)` are Base64 ([RFC 4648](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4648), with padding)
|
||||
- `concat` refers to byte array concatenation
|
||||
- `is_equal_ct(a, b)` is constant-time equality check of 2 byte arrays
|
||||
- `utf8_encode(string)` and `utf8_decode(bytes)` transform string to byte array and back
|
||||
- `write_u8(number)` restricts number to values 0..255 and encodes into Big-Endian uint8 byte array
|
||||
- `write_u16_be(number)` restricts number to values 0..65535 and encodes into Big-Endian uint16 byte array
|
||||
- `zeros(length)` creates byte array of length `length >= 0`, filled with zeros
|
||||
- `floor(number)` and `log2(number)` are well-known mathematical methods
|
||||
|
||||
### Implementation pseudocode
|
||||
|
||||
The following is a collection of python-like pseudocode functions which implement the above primitives,
|
||||
intended to guide implementers. A collection of implementations in different languages is available at https://github.com/paulmillr/nip44.
|
||||
|
||||
```py
|
||||
# Calculates length of the padded byte array.
|
||||
def calc_padded_len(unpadded_len):
|
||||
next_power = 1 << (floor(log2(unpadded_len - 1))) + 1
|
||||
if next_power <= 256:
|
||||
chunk = 32
|
||||
else:
|
||||
chunk = next_power / 8
|
||||
if unpadded_len <= 32:
|
||||
return 32
|
||||
else:
|
||||
return chunk * (floor((len - 1) / chunk) + 1)
|
||||
|
||||
# Converts unpadded plaintext to padded bytearray
|
||||
def pad(plaintext):
|
||||
unpadded = utf8_encode(plaintext)
|
||||
unpadded_len = len(plaintext)
|
||||
if (unpadded_len < c.min_plaintext_size or
|
||||
unpadded_len > c.max_plaintext_size): raise Exception('invalid plaintext length')
|
||||
prefix = write_u16_be(unpadded_len)
|
||||
suffix = zeros(calc_padded_len(unpadded_len) - unpadded_len)
|
||||
return concat(prefix, unpadded, suffix)
|
||||
|
||||
# Converts padded bytearray to unpadded plaintext
|
||||
def unpad(padded):
|
||||
unpadded_len = read_uint16_be(padded[0:2])
|
||||
unpadded = padded[2:2+unpadded_len]
|
||||
if (unpadded_len == 0 or
|
||||
len(unpadded) != unpadded_len or
|
||||
len(padded) != 2 + calc_padded_len(unpadded_len)): raise Exception('invalid padding')
|
||||
return utf8_decode(unpadded)
|
||||
|
||||
# metadata: always 65b (version: 1b, nonce: 32b, max: 32b)
|
||||
# plaintext: 1b to 0xffff
|
||||
# padded plaintext: 32b to 0xffff
|
||||
# ciphertext: 32b+2 to 0xffff+2
|
||||
# raw payload: 99 (65+32+2) to 65603 (65+0xffff+2)
|
||||
# compressed payload (base64): 132b to 87472b
|
||||
def decode_payload(payload):
|
||||
plen = len(payload)
|
||||
if plen == 0 or payload[0] == '#': raise Exception('unknown version')
|
||||
if plen < 132 or plen > 87472: raise Exception('invalid payload size')
|
||||
data = base64_decode(payload)
|
||||
dlen = len(d)
|
||||
if dlen < 99 or dlen > 65603: raise Exception('invalid data size');
|
||||
vers = data[0]
|
||||
if vers != 2: raise Exception('unknown version ' + vers)
|
||||
nonce = data[1:33]
|
||||
ciphertext = data[33:dlen - 32]
|
||||
mac = data[dlen - 32:dlen]
|
||||
return (nonce, ciphertext, mac)
|
||||
|
||||
def hmac_aad(key, message, aad):
|
||||
if len(aad) != 32: raise Exception('AAD associated data must be 32 bytes');
|
||||
return hmac(sha256, key, concat(aad, message));
|
||||
|
||||
# Calculates long-term key between users A and B: `get_key(Apriv, Bpub) == get_key(Bpriv, Apub)`
|
||||
def get_conversation_key(private_key_a, public_key_b):
|
||||
shared_x = secp256k1_ecdh(private_key_a, public_key_b)
|
||||
return hkdf_extract(IKM=shared_x, salt=utf8_encode('nip44-v2'))
|
||||
|
||||
# Calculates unique per-message key
|
||||
def get_message_keys(conversation_key, nonce):
|
||||
if len(conversation_key) != 32: raise Exception('invalid conversation_key length')
|
||||
if len(nonce) != 32: raise Exception('invalid nonce length')
|
||||
keys = hkdf_expand(OKM=conversation_key, info=nonce, L=76)
|
||||
chacha_key = keys[0:32]
|
||||
chacha_nonce = keys[32:44]
|
||||
hmac_key = keys[44:76]
|
||||
return (chacha_key, chacha_nonce, hmac_key)
|
||||
|
||||
def encrypt(plaintext, conversation_key, nonce):
|
||||
(chacha_key, chacha_nonce, hmac_key) = get_message_keys(conversation_key, nonce)
|
||||
padded = pad(plaintext)
|
||||
ciphertext = chacha20(key=chacha_key, nonce=chacha_nonce, data=padded)
|
||||
mac = hmac_aad(key=hmac_key, message=ciphertext, aad=nonce)
|
||||
return base64_encode(concat(write_u8(2), nonce, ciphertext, mac))
|
||||
|
||||
def decrypt(payload, conversation_key):
|
||||
(nonce, ciphertext, mac) = decode_payload(payload)
|
||||
(chacha_key, chacha_nonce, hmac_key) = get_message_keys(conversation_key, nonce)
|
||||
calculated_mac = hmac_aad(key=hmac_key, message=ciphertext, aad=nonce)
|
||||
if not is_equal_ct(calculated_mac, mac): raise Exception('invalid MAC')
|
||||
padded_plaintext = chacha20(key=chacha_key, nonce=chacha_nonce, data=ciphertext)
|
||||
return unpad(padded_plaintext)
|
||||
|
||||
# Usage:
|
||||
# conversation_key = get_conversation_key(sender_privkey, recipient_pubkey)
|
||||
# nonce = secure_random_bytes(32)
|
||||
# payload = encrypt('hello world', conversation_key, nonce)
|
||||
# 'hello world' == decrypt(payload, conversation_key)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Audit
|
||||
|
||||
The v2 of the standard was audited by [Cure53](https://cure53.de) in December 2023.
|
||||
Check out [audit-2023.12.pdf](https://github.com/paulmillr/nip44/blob/ce63c2eaf345e9f7f93b48f829e6bdeb7e7d7964/audit-2023.12.pdf)
|
||||
and [auditor's website](https://cure53.de/audit-report_nip44-implementations.pdf).
|
||||
|
||||
### Tests and code
|
||||
|
||||
A collection of implementations in different languages is available at https://github.com/paulmillr/nip44.
|
||||
|
||||
We publish extensive test vectors. Instead of having it in the document directly, a sha256 checksum of vectors is provided:
|
||||
|
||||
269ed0f69e4c192512cc779e78c555090cebc7c785b609e338a62afc3ce25040 nip44.vectors.json
|
||||
|
||||
Example of a test vector from the file:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"sec1": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
|
||||
"sec2": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002",
|
||||
"conversation_key": "c41c775356fd92eadc63ff5a0dc1da211b268cbea22316767095b2871ea1412d",
|
||||
"nonce": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
|
||||
"plaintext": "a",
|
||||
"payload": "AgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABee0G5VSK0/9YypIObAtDKfYEAjD35uVkHyB0F4DwrcNaCXlCWZKaArsGrY6M9wnuTMxWfp1RTN9Xga8no+kF5Vsb"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The file also contains intermediate values. A quick guidance with regards to its usage:
|
||||
|
||||
- `valid.get_conversation_key`: calculate conversation_key from secret key sec1 and public key pub2
|
||||
- `valid.get_message_keys`: calculate chacha_key, chacha_nonce, hmac_key from conversation_key and nonce
|
||||
- `valid.calc_padded_len`: take unpadded length (first value), calculate padded length (second value)
|
||||
- `valid.encrypt_decrypt`: emulate real conversation. Calculate pub2 from sec2, verify conversation_key from (sec1, pub2), encrypt, verify payload, then calculate pub1 from sec1, verify conversation_key from (sec2, pub1), decrypt, verify plaintext.
|
||||
- `valid.encrypt_decrypt_long_msg`: same as previous step, but instead of a full plaintext and payload, their checksum is provided.
|
||||
- `invalid.encrypt_msg_lengths`
|
||||
- `invalid.get_conversation_key`: calculating conversation_key must throw an error
|
||||
- `invalid.decrypt`: decrypting message content must throw an error
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
|
||||
NIP-46
|
||||
======
|
||||
|
||||
Nostr Remote Signing
|
||||
--------------------
|
||||
|
||||
## Changes
|
||||
|
||||
`remote-signer-key` is introduced, passed in bunker url, clients must differentiate between `remote-signer-pubkey` and `user-pubkey`, must call `get_public_key` after connect, nip05 login is removed, create_account moved to another NIP.
|
||||
|
||||
## Rationale
|
||||
|
||||
Private keys should be exposed to as few systems - apps, operating systems, devices - as possible as each system adds to the attack surface.
|
||||
|
||||
This NIP describes a method for 2-way communication between a remote signer and a Nostr client. The remote signer could be, for example, a hardware device dedicated to signing Nostr events, while the client is a normal Nostr client.
|
||||
|
||||
## Terminology
|
||||
|
||||
- **user**: A person that is trying to use Nostr.
|
||||
- **client**: A user-facing application that _user_ is looking at and clicking buttons in. This application will send requests to _remote-signer_.
|
||||
- **remote-signer**: A daemon or server running somewhere that will answer requests from _client_, also known as "bunker".
|
||||
- **client-keypair/pubkey**: The keys generated by _client_. Used to encrypt content and communicate with _remote-signer_.
|
||||
- **remote-signer-keypair/pubkey**: The keys used by _remote-signer_ to encrypt content and communicate with _client_. This keypair MAY be same as _user-keypair_, but not necessarily.
|
||||
- **user-keypair/pubkey**: The actual keys representing _user_ (that will be used to sign events in response to `sign_event` requests, for example). The _remote-signer_ generally has control over these keys.
|
||||
|
||||
All pubkeys specified in this NIP are in hex format.
|
||||
|
||||
## Overview
|
||||
|
||||
1. _client_ generates `client-keypair`. This keypair doesn't need to be communicated to _user_ since it's largely disposable. _client_ might choose to store it locally and they should delete it on logout;
|
||||
2. A connection is established (see below), _remote-signer_ learns `client-pubkey`, _client_ learns `remote-signer-pubkey`.
|
||||
3. _client_ uses `client-keypair` to send requests to _remote-signer_ by `p`-tagging and encrypting to `remote-signer-pubkey`;
|
||||
4. _remote-signer_ responds to _client_ by `p`-tagging and encrypting to the `client-pubkey`.
|
||||
5. _client_ requests `get_public_key` to learn `user-pubkey`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Initiating a connection
|
||||
|
||||
There are two ways to initiate a connection:
|
||||
|
||||
### Direct connection initiated by _remote-signer_
|
||||
|
||||
_remote-signer_ provides connection token in the form:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
bunker://<remote-signer-pubkey>?relay=<wss://relay-to-connect-on>&relay=<wss://another-relay-to-connect-on>&secret=<optional-secret-value>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
_user_ passes this token to _client_, which then sends `connect` request to _remote-signer_ via the specified relays. Optional secret can be used for single successfully established connection only, _remote-signer_ SHOULD ignore new attempts to establish connection with old secret.
|
||||
|
||||
### Direct connection initiated by the _client_
|
||||
|
||||
_client_ provides a connection token using `nostrconnect://` as the protocol, and `client-pubkey` as the origin. Additional information should be passed as query parameters:
|
||||
|
||||
- `relay` (required) - one or more relay urls on which the _client_ is listening for responses from the _remote-signer_.
|
||||
- `secret` (required) - a short random string that the _remote-signer_ should return as the `result` field of its response.
|
||||
- `perms` (optional) - a comma-separated list of permissions the _client_ is requesting be approved by the _remote-signer_
|
||||
- `name` (optional) - the name of the _client_ application
|
||||
- `url` (optional) - the canonical url of the _client_ application
|
||||
- `image` (optional) - a small image representing the _client_ application
|
||||
|
||||
Here's an example:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
nostrconnect://83f3b2ae6aa368e8275397b9c26cf550101d63ebaab900d19dd4a4429f5ad8f5?relay=wss%3A%2F%2Frelay1.example.com&perms=nip44_encrypt%2Cnip44_decrypt%2Csign_event%3A13%2Csign_event%3A14%2Csign_event%3A1059&name=My+Client&secret=0s8j2djs&relay=wss%3A%2F%2Frelay2.example2.com
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
_user_ passes this token to _remote-signer_, which then sends `connect` *response* event to the `client-pubkey` via the specified relays. Client discovers `remote-signer-pubkey` from connect response author. `secret` value MUST be provided to avoid connection spoofing, _client_ MUST validate the `secret` returned by `connect` response.
|
||||
|
||||
## Request Events `kind: 24133`
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"kind": 24133,
|
||||
"pubkey": <local_keypair_pubkey>,
|
||||
"content": <nip44(<request>)>,
|
||||
"tags": [["p", <remote-signer-pubkey>]],
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The `content` field is a JSON-RPC-like message that is [NIP-44](44.md) encrypted and has the following structure:
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": <random_string>,
|
||||
"method": <method_name>,
|
||||
"params": [array_of_strings]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- `id` is a random string that is a request ID. This same ID will be sent back in the response payload.
|
||||
- `method` is the name of the method/command (detailed below).
|
||||
- `params` is a positional array of string parameters.
|
||||
|
||||
### Methods/Commands
|
||||
|
||||
Each of the following are methods that the _client_ sends to the _remote-signer_.
|
||||
|
||||
| Command | Params | Result |
|
||||
| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `connect` | `[<remote-signer-pubkey>, <optional_secret>, <optional_requested_perms>]` | `"ack"` OR `<required-secret-value>` |
|
||||
| `sign_event` | `[<{kind, content, tags, created_at}>]` | `json_stringified(<signed_event>)` |
|
||||
| `ping` | `[]` | `"pong"` |
|
||||
| `get_public_key` | `[]` | `<user-pubkey>` |
|
||||
| `nip04_encrypt` | `[<third_party_pubkey>, <plaintext_to_encrypt>]` | `<nip04_ciphertext>` |
|
||||
| `nip04_decrypt` | `[<third_party_pubkey>, <nip04_ciphertext_to_decrypt>]` | `<plaintext>` |
|
||||
| `nip44_encrypt` | `[<third_party_pubkey>, <plaintext_to_encrypt>]` | `<nip44_ciphertext>` |
|
||||
| `nip44_decrypt` | `[<third_party_pubkey>, <nip44_ciphertext_to_decrypt>]` | `<plaintext>` |
|
||||
| `switch_relays` | `[]` | `["<relay-url>", "<relay-url>", ...]` OR `null` |
|
||||
|
||||
### Requested permissions
|
||||
|
||||
The `connect` method may be provided with `optional_requested_perms` for user convenience. The permissions are a comma-separated list of `method[:params]`, i.e. `nip44_encrypt,sign_event:4` meaning permissions to call `nip44_encrypt` and to call `sign_event` with `kind:4`. Optional parameter for `sign_event` is the kind number, parameters for other methods are to be defined later. Same permission format may be used for `perms` field of `metadata` in `nostrconnect://` string.
|
||||
|
||||
### Switching relays
|
||||
|
||||
At all times, the _remote-signer_ should be in control of what relays are being used for the connection between it and the _client_. Therefore it should be possible for it to evolve its set of relays over time as old relays go out of operation and new ones appear. Even more importantly, in the case of the connection initiated by the _client_ the client may pick relays completely foreign to the _remote-signer_'s preferences, so it must be possible for it to switch those immediately.
|
||||
|
||||
Therefore, compliant clients should send a `switch_relays` request immediately upon establishing a connection (always, or at reasonable intervals). Upon receiving such requests, the _remote-signer_ should reply with its updated list of relays, or `null` if there is nothing to be changed. Immediately upon receiving an updated relay list, the _client_ should update its local state and send further requests on the new relays. The `remote-signer` should then be free to disconnect from the previous relays if that is desired.
|
||||
|
||||
## Response Events `kind:24133`
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": <id>,
|
||||
"kind": 24133,
|
||||
"pubkey": <remote-signer-pubkey>,
|
||||
"content": <nip44(<response>)>,
|
||||
"tags": [["p", <client-pubkey>]],
|
||||
"created_at": <unix timestamp in seconds>
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The `content` field is a JSON-RPC-like message that is [NIP-44](44.md) encrypted and has the following structure:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": <request_id>,
|
||||
"result": <results_string>,
|
||||
"error": <optional_error_string>
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- `id` is the request ID that this response is for.
|
||||
- `results` is a string of the result of the call (this can be either a string or a JSON stringified object)
|
||||
- `error`, _optionally_, it is an error in string form, if any. Its presence indicates an error with the request.
|
||||
|
||||
## Example flow for signing an event
|
||||
|
||||
- `remote-signer-pubkey` is `fa984bd7dbb282f07e16e7ae87b26a2a7b9b90b7246a44771f0cf5ae58018f52`
|
||||
- `user-pubkey` is also `fa984bd7dbb282f07e16e7ae87b26a2a7b9b90b7246a44771f0cf5ae58018f52`
|
||||
- `client-pubkey` is `eff37350d839ce3707332348af4549a96051bd695d3223af4aabce4993531d86`
|
||||
|
||||
### Signature request
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"kind": 24133,
|
||||
"pubkey": "eff37350d839ce3707332348af4549a96051bd695d3223af4aabce4993531d86",
|
||||
"content": nip44({
|
||||
"id": <random_string>,
|
||||
"method": "sign_event",
|
||||
"params": [json_stringified(<{
|
||||
content: "Hello, I'm signing remotely",
|
||||
kind: 1,
|
||||
tags: [],
|
||||
created_at: 1714078911
|
||||
}>)]
|
||||
}),
|
||||
"tags": [["p", "fa984bd7dbb282f07e16e7ae87b26a2a7b9b90b7246a44771f0cf5ae58018f52"]], // p-tags the remote-signer-pubkey
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Response event
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"kind": 24133,
|
||||
"pubkey": "fa984bd7dbb282f07e16e7ae87b26a2a7b9b90b7246a44771f0cf5ae58018f52",
|
||||
"content": nip44({
|
||||
"id": <random_string>,
|
||||
"result": json_stringified(<signed-event>)
|
||||
}),
|
||||
"tags": [["p", "eff37350d839ce3707332348af4549a96051bd695d3223af4aabce4993531d86"]], // p-tags the client-pubkey
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Diagram
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Auth Challenges
|
||||
|
||||
An Auth Challenge is a response that a _remote-signer_ can send back when it needs the _user_ to authenticate via other means. The response `content` object will take the following form:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": <request_id>,
|
||||
"result": "auth_url",
|
||||
"error": <URL_to_display_to_end_user>
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
_client_ should display (in a popup or new tab) the URL from the `error` field and then subscribe/listen for another response from the _remote-signer_ (reusing the same request ID). This event will be sent once the user authenticates in the other window (or will never arrive if the user doesn't authenticate).
|
||||
|
||||
### Example event signing request with auth challenge
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Appendix
|
||||
|
||||
### Announcing _remote-signer_ metadata
|
||||
|
||||
_remote-signer_ MAY publish its metadata by using [NIP-05](05.md) and [NIP-89](89.md). With NIP-05, a request to `<remote-signer>/.well-known/nostr.json?name=_` MAY return this:
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"names":{
|
||||
"_": <remote-signer-app-pubkey>,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"nip46": {
|
||||
"relays": ["wss://relay1","wss://relay2"...],
|
||||
"nostrconnect_url": "https://remote-signer-domain.example/<nostrconnect>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The `<remote-signer-app-pubkey>` MAY be used to verify the domain from _remote-signer_'s NIP-89 event (see below). `relays` SHOULD be used to construct a more precise `nostrconnect://` string for the specific `remote-signer`. `nostrconnect_url` template MAY be used to redirect users to _remote-signer_'s connection flow by replacing `<nostrconnect>` placeholder with an actual `nostrconnect://` string.
|
||||
|
||||
### Remote signer discovery via NIP-89
|
||||
|
||||
_remote-signer_ MAY publish a NIP-89 `kind: 31990` event with `k` tag of `24133`, which MAY also include one or more `relay` tags and MAY include `nostrconnect_url` tag. The semantics of `relay` and `nostrconnect_url` tags are the same as in the section above.
|
||||
|
||||
_client_ MAY improve UX by discovering _remote-signers_ using their `kind: 31990` events. _client_ MAY then pre-generate `nostrconnect://` strings for the _remote-signers_, and SHOULD in that case verify that `kind: 31990` event's author is mentioned in signer's `nostr.json?name=_` file as `<remote-signer-app-pubkey>`.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
|
||||
NIP-51
|
||||
======
|
||||
|
||||
Lists
|
||||
-----
|
||||
|
||||
`draft` `optional`
|
||||
|
||||
This NIP defines lists of things that users can create. Lists can contain references to anything, and these references can be **public** or **private**.
|
||||
|
||||
Public items in a list are specified in the event `tags` array, while private items are specified in a JSON array that mimics the structure of the event `tags` array, but stringified and encrypted using the same scheme from [NIP-44](44.md) (the shared key is computed using the author's public and private key) and stored in the `.content`. An earlier version of this specification used [NIP-04](04.md) for encryptions. Those are now deprecated. For backward compatibility, Clients can automatically discover if the encryption is NIP-04 or NIP-44 by searching for "iv" in the ciphertext and decrypting accordingly.
|
||||
|
||||
When new items are added to an existing list, clients SHOULD append them to the end of the list, so they are stored in chronological order.
|
||||
|
||||
## Types of lists
|
||||
|
||||
### Standard lists
|
||||
|
||||
Standard lists use normal replaceable events, meaning users may only have a single list of each kind. They have special meaning and clients may rely on them to augment a user's profile or browsing experience.
|
||||
|
||||
For example, _mute list_ can contain the public keys of spammers and bad actors users don't want to see in their feeds or receive annoying notifications from.
|
||||
|
||||
| name | kind | description | expected tag items |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| Follow list | 3 | microblogging basic follow list, see [NIP-02](02.md) | `"p"` (pubkeys -- with optional relay hint and petname) |
|
||||
| Mute list | 10000 | things the user doesn't want to see in their feeds | `"p"` (pubkeys), `"t"` (hashtags), `"word"` (lowercase string), `"e"` (threads) |
|
||||
| Pinned notes | 10001 | events the user intends to showcase in their profile page | `"e"` (kind:1 notes) |
|
||||
| Read/write relays | 10002 | where a user publishes to and where they expect mentions | see [NIP-65](65.md) |
|
||||
| Bookmarks | 10003 | uncategorized, "global" list of things a user wants to save | `"e"` (kind:1 notes), `"a"` (kind:30023 articles) |
|
||||
| Communities | 10004 | [NIP-72](72.md) communities the user belongs to | `"a"` (kind:34550 community definitions) |
|
||||
| Public chats | 10005 | [NIP-28](28.md) chat channels the user is in | `"e"` (kind:40 channel definitions) |
|
||||
| Blocked relays | 10006 | relays clients should never connect to | `"relay"` (relay URLs) |
|
||||
| Search relays | 10007 | relays clients should use when performing search queries | `"relay"` (relay URLs) |
|
||||
| Simple groups | 10009 | [NIP-29](29.md) groups the user is in | `"group"` ([NIP-29](29.md) group id + relay URL + optional group name), `"r"` for each relay in use |
|
||||
| Relay feeds | 10012 | user favorite browsable relays (and relay sets) | `"relay"` (relay URLs) and `"a"` (kind:30002 relay set) |
|
||||
| Interests | 10015 | topics a user may be interested in and pointers | `"t"` (hashtags) and `"a"` (kind:30015 interest set) |
|
||||
| Media follows | 10020 | multimedia (photos, short video) follow list | `"p"` (pubkeys -- with optional relay hint and petname) |
|
||||
| Emojis | 10030 | user preferred emojis and pointers to emoji sets | `"emoji"` (see [NIP-30](30.md)) and `"a"` (kind:30030 emoji set) |
|
||||
| DM relays | 10050 | Where to receive [NIP-17](17.md) direct messages | `"relay"` (see [NIP-17](17.md)) |
|
||||
| Good wiki authors | 10101 | [NIP-54](54.md) user recommended wiki authors | `"p"` (pubkeys) |
|
||||
| Good wiki relays | 10102 | [NIP-54](54.md) relays deemed to only host useful articles | `"relay"` (relay URLs) |
|
||||
|
||||
### Sets
|
||||
|
||||
Sets are lists with well-defined meaning that can enhance the functionality and the UI of clients that rely on them. Unlike standard lists, users are expected to have more than one set of each kind, therefore each of them must be assigned a different `"d"` identifier.
|
||||
|
||||
For example, _relay sets_ can be displayed in a dropdown UI to give users the option to switch to which relays they will publish an event or from which relays they will read the replies to an event; _curation sets_ can be used by apps to showcase curations made by others tagged to different topics.
|
||||
|
||||
Aside from their main identifier, the `"d"` tag, sets can optionally have a `"title"`, an `"image"` and a `"description"` tags that can be used to enhance their UI.
|
||||
|
||||
| name | kind | description | expected tag items |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| Follow sets | 30000 | categorized groups of users a client may choose to check out in different circumstances | `"p"` (pubkeys) |
|
||||
| Relay sets | 30002 | user-defined relay groups the user can easily pick and choose from during various operations | `"relay"` (relay URLs) |
|
||||
| Bookmark sets | 30003 | user-defined bookmarks categories , for when bookmarks must be in labeled separate groups | `"e"` (kind:1 notes), `"a"` (kind:30023 articles) |
|
||||
| Curation sets | 30004 | groups of articles picked by users as interesting and/or belonging to the same category | `"a"` (kind:30023 articles), `"e"` (kind:1 notes) |
|
||||
| Curation sets | 30005 | groups of videos picked by users as interesting and/or belonging to the same category | `"e"` (kind:21 videos) |
|
||||
| Curation sets | 30006 | groups of pictures picked by users as interesting and/or belonging to the same category | `"e"` (kind:20 pictures) |
|
||||
| Kind mute sets | 30007 | mute pubkeys by kinds<br>`"d"` tag MUST be the kind string | `"p"` (pubkeys) |
|
||||
| Interest sets | 30015 | interest topics represented by a bunch of "hashtags" | `"t"` (hashtags) |
|
||||
| Emoji sets | 30030 | categorized emoji groups | `"emoji"` (see [NIP-30](30.md)) |
|
||||
| Release artifact sets | 30063 | group of artifacts of a software release | `"e"` (kind:1063 [file metadata](94.md) events), `"a"` (software application event) |
|
||||
| App curation sets | 30267 | references to multiple software applications | `"a"` (software application event) |
|
||||
| Calendar | 31924 | a set of events categorized in any way | `"a"` (calendar event event) |
|
||||
| Starter packs | 39089 | a named set of profiles to be shared around with the goal of being followed together | `"p"` (pubkeys) |
|
||||
| Media starter packs | 39092 | same as above, but specific to multimedia (photos, short video) clients | `"p"` (pubkeys) |
|
||||
|
||||
### Deprecated standard lists
|
||||
|
||||
Some clients have used these lists in the past, but they should work on transitioning to the [standard formats](#standard-lists) above.
|
||||
|
||||
| kind | "d" tag | use instead |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| 30000 | `"mute"` | kind 10000 _mute list_ |
|
||||
| 30001 | `"pin"` | kind 10001 _pin list_ |
|
||||
| 30001 | `"bookmark"` | kind 10003 _bookmarks list_ |
|
||||
| 30001 | `"communities"` | kind 10004 _communities list_ |
|
||||
|
||||
## Examples
|
||||
|
||||
### A _mute list_ with some public items and some encrypted items
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "a92a316b75e44cfdc19986c634049158d4206fcc0b7b9c7ccbcdabe28beebcd0",
|
||||
"pubkey": "854043ae8f1f97430ca8c1f1a090bdde6488bd5115c7a45307a2a212750ae4cb",
|
||||
"created_at": 1699597889,
|
||||
"kind": 10000,
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
["p", "07caba282f76441955b695551c3c5c742e5b9202a3784780f8086fdcdc1da3a9"],
|
||||
["p", "a55c15f5e41d5aebd236eca5e0142789c5385703f1a7485aa4b38d94fd18dcc4"]
|
||||
],
|
||||
"content": "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?iv=S3rFeFr1gsYqmQA7bNnNTQ==",
|
||||
"sig": "1173822c53261f8cffe7efbf43ba4a97a9198b3e402c2a1df130f42a8985a2d0d3430f4de350db184141e45ca844ab4e5364ea80f11d720e36357e1853dba6ca"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### A _curation set_ of articles and notes about yaks
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "567b41fc9060c758c4216fe5f8d3df7c57daad7ae757fa4606f0c39d4dd220ef",
|
||||
"pubkey": "d6dc95542e18b8b7aec2f14610f55c335abebec76f3db9e58c254661d0593a0c",
|
||||
"created_at": 1695327657,
|
||||
"kind": 30004,
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
["d", "jvdy9i4"],
|
||||
["title", "Yaks"],
|
||||
["image", "https://cdn.britannica.com/40/188540-050-9AC748DE/Yak-Himalayas-Nepal.jpg"],
|
||||
["description", "The domestic yak, also known as the Tartary ox, grunting ox, or hairy cattle, is a species of long-haired domesticated cattle found throughout the Himalayan region of the Indian subcontinent, the Tibetan Plateau, Gilgit-Baltistan, Tajikistan and as far north as Mongolia and Siberia."],
|
||||
["a", "30023:26dc95542e18b8b7aec2f14610f55c335abebec76f3db9e58c254661d0593a0c:95ODQzw3ajNoZ8SyMDOzQ"],
|
||||
["a", "30023:54af95542e18b8b7aec2f14610f55c335abebec76f3db9e58c254661d0593a0c:1-MYP8dAhramH9J5gJWKx"],
|
||||
["a", "30023:f8fe95542e18b8b7aec2f14610f55c335abebec76f3db9e58c254661d0593a0c:D2Tbd38bGrFvU0bIbvSMt"],
|
||||
["e", "d78ba0d5dce22bfff9db0a9e996c9ef27e2c91051de0c4e1da340e0326b4941e"]
|
||||
],
|
||||
"content": "",
|
||||
"sig": "a9a4e2192eede77e6c9d24ddfab95ba3ff7c03fbd07ad011fff245abea431fb4d3787c2d04aad001cb039cb8de91d83ce30e9a94f82ac3c5a2372aa1294a96bd"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### A _release artifact set_ of an Example App
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "567b41fc9060c758c4216fe5f8d3df7c57daad7ae757fa4606f0c39d4dd220ef",
|
||||
"pubkey": "d6dc95542e18b8b7aec2f14610f55c335abebec76f3db9e58c254661d0593a0c",
|
||||
"created_at": 1695327657,
|
||||
"kind": 30063,
|
||||
"content": "Release notes in markdown",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
["d", "[email protected]"],
|
||||
["e", "d78ba0d5dce22bfff9db0a9e996c9ef27e2c91051de0c4e1da340e0326b4941e"], // Windows exe
|
||||
["e", "f27e2c91051de0c4e1da0d5dce22bfff9db0a9340e0326b4941ed78bae996c9e"], // MacOS dmg
|
||||
["e", "9d24ddfab95ba3ff7c03fbd07ad011fff245abea431fb4d3787c2d04aad02332"], // Linux AppImage
|
||||
["e", "340e0326b340e0326b4941ed78ba340e0326b4941ed78ba340e0326b49ed78ba"], // PWA
|
||||
["a", "32267:d6dc95542e18b8b7aec2f14610f55c335abebec76f3db9e58c254661d0593a0c:com.example.app"] // Reference to parent software application
|
||||
],
|
||||
"sig": "a9a4e2192eede77e6c9d24ddfab95ba3ff7c03fbd07ad011fff245abea431fb4d3787c2d04aad001cb039cb8de91d83ce30e9a94f82ac3c5a2372aa1294a96bd"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### An _app curation set_
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "d8037fa866eb5acd2159960b3ada7284172f7d687b5289cc72a96ca2b431b611",
|
||||
"pubkey": "78ce6faa72264387284e647ba6938995735ec8c7d5c5a65737e55130f026307d",
|
||||
"sig": "c1ce0a04521c020ae7485307cd86285530c1f778766a3fd594d662a73e7c28f307d7cd9a9ab642ae749fce62abbabb3a32facfe8d19a21fba551b60fae863d95",
|
||||
"kind": 30267,
|
||||
"created_at": 1729302793,
|
||||
"content": "My nostr app selection",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
["d", "nostr"],
|
||||
["a", "32267:7579076d9aff0a4cfdefa7e2045f2486c7e5d8bc63bfc6b45397233e1bbfcb19:com.example.app1"],
|
||||
["a", "32267:045f2486c7e5d8bc63bfc6b45397233e1bbfcb197579076d9aff0a4cfdefa7e2:net.example.app2"],
|
||||
["a", "32267:264387284e647ba6938995735ec8c7d5c5a6f026307d78ce6faa725737e55130:pl.code.app3"]
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Encryption process pseudocode
|
||||
|
||||
```scala
|
||||
val private_items = [
|
||||
["p", "07caba282f76441955b695551c3c5c742e5b9202a3784780f8086fdcdc1da3a9"],
|
||||
["a", "a55c15f5e41d5aebd236eca5e0142789c5385703f1a7485aa4b38d94fd18dcc4"],
|
||||
]
|
||||
val base64blob = nip44.encrypt(json.encode_to_string(private_items))
|
||||
event.content = base64blob
|
||||
```
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
|
||||
NIP-56
|
||||
======
|
||||
|
||||
Reporting
|
||||
---------
|
||||
|
||||
`optional`
|
||||
|
||||
A report is a `kind 1984` event that signals to users and relays that
|
||||
some referenced content is objectionable. The definition of objectionable is
|
||||
obviously subjective and all agents on the network (users, apps, relays, etc.)
|
||||
may consume and take action on them as they see fit.
|
||||
|
||||
The `content` MAY contain additional information submitted by the entity
|
||||
reporting the content.
|
||||
|
||||
Tags
|
||||
----
|
||||
|
||||
The report event MUST include a `p` tag referencing the pubkey of the user you
|
||||
are reporting.
|
||||
|
||||
If reporting a note, an `e` tag MUST also be included referencing the note id.
|
||||
|
||||
A `report type` string MUST be included as the 3rd entry to the `e`, `p` or `x` tag
|
||||
being reported, which consists of the following report types:
|
||||
|
||||
- `nudity` - depictions of nudity, porn, etc.
|
||||
- `malware` - virus, trojan horse, worm, robot, spyware, adware, back door, ransomware, rootkit, kidnapper, etc.
|
||||
- `profanity` - profanity, hateful speech, etc.
|
||||
- `illegal` - something which may be illegal in some jurisdiction
|
||||
- `spam` - spam
|
||||
- `impersonation` - someone pretending to be someone else
|
||||
- `other` - for reports that don't fit in the above categories
|
||||
|
||||
Some report tags only make sense for profile reports, such as `impersonation`.
|
||||
|
||||
- `x` tags SHOULD be info hash of a blob which is intended to be report. when the `x` tag is represented client MUST include an `e` tag which is the id of the event that contains the mentioned blob. also, additionally these events can contain a `server` tag to point to media servers which may contain the mentioned media.
|
||||
|
||||
`l` and `L` tags MAY be also be used as defined in [NIP-32](32.md) to support
|
||||
further qualification and querying.
|
||||
|
||||
Example events
|
||||
--------------
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"kind": 1984,
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
["p", "<pubkey>", "nudity"],
|
||||
["L", "social.nos.ontology"],
|
||||
["l", "NS-nud", "social.nos.ontology"]
|
||||
],
|
||||
"content": "",
|
||||
// other fields...
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"kind": 1984,
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
["e", "<eventId>", "illegal"],
|
||||
["p", "<pubkey>"]
|
||||
],
|
||||
"content": "He's insulting the king!",
|
||||
// other fields...
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"kind": 1984,
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
["p", "<impersonator pubkey>", "impersonation"]
|
||||
],
|
||||
"content": "Profile is impersonating nostr:<victim bech32 pubkey>",
|
||||
// other fields...
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"kind": 1984,
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
["x", "<blob hash>", "malware"],
|
||||
["e", "<event id which contains the blob on x tag>", "malware"],
|
||||
["server", "https://you-may-find-the-blob-here.com/path-to-url.ext"]
|
||||
],
|
||||
"content": "This file contains malware software in it.",
|
||||
// other fields...
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Client behavior
|
||||
---------------
|
||||
|
||||
Clients can use reports from friends to make moderation decisions if they
|
||||
choose to. For instance, if 3+ of your friends report a profile for `nudity`,
|
||||
clients can have an option to automatically blur photos from said account.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Relay behavior
|
||||
--------------
|
||||
|
||||
It is not recommended that relays perform automatic moderation using reports,
|
||||
as they can be easily gamed. Admins could use reports from trusted moderators to
|
||||
takedown illegal or explicit content if the relay does not allow such things.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
|
||||
NIP-59
|
||||
======
|
||||
|
||||
Gift Wrap
|
||||
---------
|
||||
|
||||
`optional` `relay`
|
||||
|
||||
This NIP defines a protocol for encapsulating any nostr event. This makes it possible to obscure most metadata
|
||||
for a given event, perform collaborative signing, and more.
|
||||
|
||||
This NIP *does not* define any messaging protocol. Applications of this NIP should be defined separately.
|
||||
|
||||
This NIP relies on [NIP-44](./44.md)'s versioned encryption algorithms.
|
||||
|
||||
## Overview
|
||||
|
||||
This protocol uses three main concepts to protect the transmission of a target event: `rumor`s, `seal`s, and `gift wrap`s.
|
||||
|
||||
- A `rumor` is a regular nostr event, but is **not signed**. This means that if it is leaked, it cannot be verified.
|
||||
- A `rumor` is serialized to JSON, encrypted, and placed in the `content` field of a `seal`. The `seal` is then
|
||||
signed by the author of the note. The only information publicly available on a `seal` is who signed it, but not what was said.
|
||||
- A `seal` is serialized to JSON, encrypted, and placed in the `content` field of a `gift wrap`.
|
||||
|
||||
This allows the isolation of concerns across layers:
|
||||
|
||||
- A rumor carries the content but is unsigned, which means if leaked it will be rejected by relays and clients,
|
||||
and can't be authenticated. This provides a measure of deniability.
|
||||
- A seal identifies the author without revealing the content or the recipient.
|
||||
- A gift wrap can add metadata (recipient, tags, a different author) without revealing the true author.
|
||||
|
||||
## Protocol Description
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. The Rumor Event Kind
|
||||
|
||||
A `rumor` is the same thing as an unsigned event. Any event kind can be made a `rumor` by removing the signature.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. The Seal Event Kind
|
||||
|
||||
A `seal` is a `kind:13` event that wraps a `rumor` with the sender's regular key. The `seal` is **always** encrypted
|
||||
to a receiver's pubkey but there is no `p` tag pointing to the receiver. There is no way to know who the rumor is for
|
||||
without the receiver's or the sender's private key. The only public information in this event is who is signing it.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "<id>",
|
||||
"pubkey": "<real author's pubkey>",
|
||||
"content": "<encrypted rumor>",
|
||||
"kind": 13,
|
||||
"created_at": 1686840217,
|
||||
"tags": [],
|
||||
"sig": "<real author's pubkey signature>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Tags MUST always be empty in a `kind:13`. The inner event MUST always be unsigned.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Gift Wrap Event Kind
|
||||
|
||||
A `gift wrap` event is a `kind:1059` event that wraps any other event. `tags` SHOULD include any information
|
||||
needed to route the event to its intended recipient, including the recipient's `p` tag or [NIP-13](13.md) proof of work.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "<id>",
|
||||
"pubkey": "<random, one-time-use pubkey>",
|
||||
"content": "<encrypted kind 13>",
|
||||
"kind": 1059,
|
||||
"created_at": 1686840217,
|
||||
"tags": [["p", "<recipient pubkey>"]],
|
||||
"sig": "<random, one-time-use pubkey signature>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Encrypting Payloads
|
||||
|
||||
Encryption is done following [NIP-44](44.md) on the JSON-encoded event. Place the encryption payload in the `.content`
|
||||
of the wrapper event (either a `seal` or a `gift wrap`).
|
||||
|
||||
## Other Considerations
|
||||
|
||||
If a `rumor` is intended for more than one party, or if the author wants to retain an encrypted copy, a single
|
||||
`rumor` may be wrapped and addressed for each recipient individually.
|
||||
|
||||
The canonical `created_at` time belongs to the `rumor`. All other timestamps SHOULD be tweaked to thwart
|
||||
time-analysis attacks. Note that some relays don't serve events dated in the future, so all timestamps
|
||||
SHOULD be in the past.
|
||||
|
||||
Relays may choose not to store gift wrapped events due to them not being publicly useful. Clients MAY choose
|
||||
to attach a certain amount of proof-of-work to the wrapper event per [NIP-13](13.md) in a bid to demonstrate that
|
||||
the event is not spam or a denial-of-service attack.
|
||||
|
||||
To protect recipient metadata, relays SHOULD guard access to `kind 1059` events based on user AUTH. When
|
||||
possible, clients should only send wrapped events to relays that offer this protection.
|
||||
|
||||
To protect recipient metadata, relays SHOULD only serve `kind 1059` events intended for the marked recipient.
|
||||
When possible, clients should only send wrapped events to `read` relays for the recipient that implement
|
||||
AUTH, and refuse to serve wrapped events to non-recipients.
|
||||
|
||||
When adding expiration tags to both `seal` and `gift wrap` layers, implementations SHOULD use independent random timestamps for each layer. Using different `created_at` values increases timing variance and helps protect against metadata correlation attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
Since signing keys are random, relays SHOULD delete `kind 1059` events whose p-tag matches the signer of
|
||||
[NIP-09](09.md) deletions or [NIP-62](62.md) vanish requests.
|
||||
|
||||
## An Example
|
||||
|
||||
Let's send a wrapped `kind 1` message between two parties asking "Are you going to the party tonight?"
|
||||
|
||||
- Author private key: `0beebd062ec8735f4243466049d7747ef5d6594ee838de147f8aab842b15e273`
|
||||
- Recipient private key: `e108399bd8424357a710b606ae0c13166d853d327e47a6e5e038197346bdbf45`
|
||||
- Ephemeral wrapper key: `4f02eac59266002db5801adc5270700ca69d5b8f761d8732fab2fbf233c90cbd`
|
||||
|
||||
Note that this messaging protocol should not be used in practice, this is just an example. Refer to other
|
||||
NIPs for concrete messaging protocols that depend on gift wraps.
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Create an event
|
||||
|
||||
Create a `kind 1` event with the message, the receivers, and any other tags you want, signed by the author.
|
||||
Do not sign the event.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"created_at": 1691518405,
|
||||
"content": "Are you going to the party tonight?",
|
||||
"tags": [],
|
||||
"kind": 1,
|
||||
"pubkey": "611df01bfcf85c26ae65453b772d8f1dfd25c264621c0277e1fc1518686faef9",
|
||||
"id": "9dd003c6d3b73b74a85a9ab099469ce251653a7af76f523671ab828acd2a0ef9"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Seal the rumor
|
||||
|
||||
Encrypt the JSON-encoded `rumor` with a conversation key derived using the author's private key and
|
||||
the recipient's public key. Place the result in the `content` field of a `kind 13` `seal` event. Sign
|
||||
it with the author's key.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"content": "AqBCdwoS7/tPK+QGkPCadJTn8FxGkd24iApo3BR9/M0uw6n4RFAFSPAKKMgkzVMoRyR3ZS/aqATDFvoZJOkE9cPG/TAzmyZvr/WUIS8kLmuI1dCA+itFF6+ULZqbkWS0YcVU0j6UDvMBvVlGTzHz+UHzWYJLUq2LnlynJtFap5k8560+tBGtxi9Gx2NIycKgbOUv0gEqhfVzAwvg1IhTltfSwOeZXvDvd40rozONRxwq8hjKy+4DbfrO0iRtlT7G/eVEO9aJJnqagomFSkqCscttf/o6VeT2+A9JhcSxLmjcKFG3FEK3Try/WkarJa1jM3lMRQqVOZrzHAaLFW/5sXano6DqqC5ERD6CcVVsrny0tYN4iHHB8BHJ9zvjff0NjLGG/v5Wsy31+BwZA8cUlfAZ0f5EYRo9/vKSd8TV0wRb9DQ=",
|
||||
"kind": 13,
|
||||
"created_at": 1703015180,
|
||||
"pubkey": "611df01bfcf85c26ae65453b772d8f1dfd25c264621c0277e1fc1518686faef9",
|
||||
"tags": [],
|
||||
"id": "28a87d7c074d94a58e9e89bb3e9e4e813e2189f285d797b1c56069d36f59eaa7",
|
||||
"sig": "02fc3facf6621196c32912b1ef53bac8f8bfe9db51c0e7102c073103586b0d29c3f39bdaa1e62856c20e90b6c7cc5dc34ca8bb6a528872cf6e65e6284519ad73"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Wrap the seal
|
||||
|
||||
Encrypt the JSON-encoded `kind 13` event with your ephemeral, single-use random key. Place the result
|
||||
in the `content` field of a `kind 1059`. Add a single `p` tag containing the recipient's public key.
|
||||
Sign the `gift wrap` using the random key generated in the previous step.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"content": "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",
|
||||
"kind": 1059,
|
||||
"created_at": 1703021488,
|
||||
"pubkey": "18b1a75918f1f2c90c23da616bce317d36e348bcf5f7ba55e75949319210c87c",
|
||||
"id": "5c005f3ccf01950aa8d131203248544fb1e41a0d698e846bd419cec3890903ac",
|
||||
"sig": "35fabdae4634eb630880a1896a886e40fd6ea8a60958e30b89b33a93e6235df750097b04f9e13053764251b8bc5dd7e8e0794a3426a90b6bcc7e5ff660f54259",
|
||||
"tags": [["p", "166bf3765ebd1fc55decfe395beff2ea3b2a4e0a8946e7eb578512b555737c99"]],
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Broadcast Selectively
|
||||
|
||||
Broadcast the `kind 1059` event to the recipient's relays only. Delete all the other events.
|
||||
|
||||
## Code Samples
|
||||
|
||||
### JavaScript
|
||||
|
||||
```javascript
|
||||
import {bytesToHex} from "@noble/hashes/utils"
|
||||
import type {EventTemplate, UnsignedEvent, Event} from "nostr-tools"
|
||||
import {getPublicKey, getEventHash, nip19, nip44, finalizeEvent, generateSecretKey} from "nostr-tools"
|
||||
|
||||
type Rumor = UnsignedEvent & {id: string}
|
||||
|
||||
const TWO_DAYS = 2 * 24 * 60 * 60
|
||||
|
||||
const now = () => Math.round(Date.now() / 1000)
|
||||
const randomNow = () => Math.round(now() - (Math.random() * TWO_DAYS))
|
||||
|
||||
const nip44ConversationKey = (privateKey: Uint8Array, publicKey: string) =>
|
||||
nip44.v2.utils.getConversationKey(bytesToHex(privateKey), publicKey)
|
||||
|
||||
const nip44Encrypt = (data: EventTemplate, privateKey: Uint8Array, publicKey: string) =>
|
||||
nip44.v2.encrypt(JSON.stringify(data), nip44ConversationKey(privateKey, publicKey))
|
||||
|
||||
const nip44Decrypt = (data: Event, privateKey: Uint8Array) =>
|
||||
JSON.parse(nip44.v2.decrypt(data.content, nip44ConversationKey(privateKey, data.pubkey)))
|
||||
|
||||
const createRumor = (event: Partial<UnsignedEvent>, privateKey: Uint8Array) => {
|
||||
const rumor = {
|
||||
created_at: now(),
|
||||
content: "",
|
||||
tags: [],
|
||||
...event,
|
||||
pubkey: getPublicKey(privateKey),
|
||||
} as any
|
||||
|
||||
rumor.id = getEventHash(rumor)
|
||||
|
||||
return rumor as Rumor
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const createSeal = (rumor: Rumor, privateKey: Uint8Array, recipientPublicKey: string) => {
|
||||
return finalizeEvent(
|
||||
{
|
||||
kind: 13,
|
||||
content: nip44Encrypt(rumor, privateKey, recipientPublicKey),
|
||||
created_at: randomNow(),
|
||||
tags: [],
|
||||
},
|
||||
privateKey
|
||||
) as Event
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const createWrap = (event: Event, recipientPublicKey: string) => {
|
||||
const randomKey = generateSecretKey()
|
||||
|
||||
return finalizeEvent(
|
||||
{
|
||||
kind: 1059,
|
||||
content: nip44Encrypt(event, randomKey, recipientPublicKey),
|
||||
created_at: randomNow(),
|
||||
tags: [["p", recipientPublicKey]],
|
||||
},
|
||||
randomKey
|
||||
) as Event
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Test case using the above example
|
||||
const senderPrivateKey = nip19.decode(`nsec1p0ht6p3wepe47sjrgesyn4m50m6avk2waqudu9rl324cg2c4ufesyp6rdg`).data
|
||||
const recipientPrivateKey = nip19.decode(`nsec1uyyrnx7cgfp40fcskcr2urqnzekc20fj0er6de0q8qvhx34ahazsvs9p36`).data
|
||||
const recipientPublicKey = getPublicKey(recipientPrivateKey)
|
||||
|
||||
const rumor = createRumor(
|
||||
{
|
||||
kind: 1,
|
||||
content: "Are you going to the party tonight?",
|
||||
},
|
||||
senderPrivateKey
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const seal = createSeal(rumor, senderPrivateKey, recipientPublicKey)
|
||||
const wrap = createWrap(seal, recipientPublicKey)
|
||||
|
||||
// Recipient unwraps with their private key.
|
||||
|
||||
const unwrappedSeal = nip44Decrypt(wrap, recipientPrivateKey)
|
||||
const unsealedRumor = nip44Decrypt(unwrappedSeal, recipientPrivateKey)
|
||||
```
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
||||
NIP-65
|
||||
======
|
||||
|
||||
Relay List Metadata
|
||||
-------------------
|
||||
|
||||
`draft` `optional`
|
||||
|
||||
Defines a replaceable event using `kind:10002` to advertise relays where the user generally **writes** to and relays where the user generally **reads** mentions.
|
||||
|
||||
The event MUST include a list of `r` tags with relay URLs as value and an optional `read` or `write` marker. If the marker is omitted, the relay is both **read** and **write**.
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"kind": 10002,
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
["r", "wss://alicerelay.example.com"],
|
||||
["r", "wss://brando-relay.com"],
|
||||
["r", "wss://expensive-relay.example2.com", "write"],
|
||||
["r", "wss://nostr-relay.example.com", "read"]
|
||||
],
|
||||
"content": "",
|
||||
// other fields...
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
When downloading events **from** a user, clients SHOULD use the **write** relays of that user.
|
||||
|
||||
When downloading events **about** a user, where the user was tagged (mentioned), clients SHOULD use the user's **read** relays.
|
||||
|
||||
When publishing an event, clients SHOULD:
|
||||
|
||||
- Send the event to the **write** relays of the author
|
||||
- Send the event to all **read** relays of each tagged user
|
||||
- Send the author's `kind:10002` event to all relays the event was published to
|
||||
|
||||
### Size
|
||||
|
||||
Clients SHOULD guide users to keep `kind:10002` lists small (2-4 relays of each category).
|
||||
|
||||
### Discoverability
|
||||
|
||||
Clients SHOULD spread an author's `kind:10002` event to as many relays as viable, paying attention to relays that, at any moment, serve naturally as well-known public indexers for these relay lists (where most other clients and users are connecting to in order to publish and fetch those).
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
|
||||
NIP-94
|
||||
======
|
||||
|
||||
File Metadata
|
||||
-------------
|
||||
|
||||
`draft` `optional`
|
||||
|
||||
The purpose of this NIP is to allow an organization and classification of shared files. So that relays can filter and organize in any way that is of interest. With that, multiple types of filesharing clients can be created. NIP-94 support is not expected to be implemented by "social" clients that deal with `kind:1` notes or by longform clients that deal with `kind:30023` articles.
|
||||
|
||||
## Event format
|
||||
|
||||
This NIP specifies the use of the `1063` event kind, having in `content` a description of the file content, and a list of tags described below:
|
||||
|
||||
* `url` the url to download the file
|
||||
* `m` a string indicating the data type of the file. The [MIME types](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Basics_of_HTTP/MIME_types/Common_types) format must be used, and they should be lowercase.
|
||||
* `x` containing the SHA-256 hexencoded string of the file.
|
||||
* `ox` containing the SHA-256 hexencoded string of the original file, before any transformations done by the upload server
|
||||
* `size` (optional) size of file in bytes
|
||||
* `dim` (optional) size of file in pixels in the form `<width>x<height>`
|
||||
* `magnet` (optional) URI to magnet file
|
||||
* `i` (optional) torrent infohash
|
||||
* `blurhash`(optional) the [blurhash](https://github.com/woltapp/blurhash) to show while the file is being loaded by the client
|
||||
* `thumb` (optional) url of thumbnail with same aspect ratio
|
||||
* `image` (optional) url of preview image with same dimensions
|
||||
* `summary` (optional) text excerpt
|
||||
* `alt` (optional) description for accessibility
|
||||
* `fallback` (optional) zero or more fallback file sources in case `url` fails
|
||||
* `service` (optional) service type which is serving the file (eg. [NIP-96](96.md))
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"kind": 1063,
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
["url",<string with URI of file>],
|
||||
["m", <MIME type>],
|
||||
["x", <Hash SHA-256>],
|
||||
["ox", <Hash SHA-256>],
|
||||
["size", <size of file in bytes>],
|
||||
["dim", <size of file in pixels>],
|
||||
["magnet", <magnet URI> ],
|
||||
["i", <torrent infohash>],
|
||||
["blurhash", <value>],
|
||||
["thumb", <string with thumbnail URI>, <Hash SHA-256>],
|
||||
["image", <string with preview URI>, <Hash SHA-256>],
|
||||
["summary", <excerpt>],
|
||||
["alt", <description>]
|
||||
],
|
||||
"content": "<caption>",
|
||||
// other fields...
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Suggested use cases
|
||||
|
||||
* A relay for indexing shared files. For example, to promote torrents.
|
||||
* A pinterest-like client where people can share their portfolio and inspire others.
|
||||
* A simple way to distribute configurations and software updates.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
||||
# Context: NIP Research Agent Run 2026-02-13
|
||||
Goal: Verify NIP compliance for P0 items and update inventory.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
||||
# Decisions: NIP Research Agent Run 2026-02-13
|
||||
- Decided to use local mock implementation for bytesToHex in tests to avoid dependency issues.
|
||||
- Verified Kind 30078 using internal schema definition.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
# Started nip-research-agent run
|
||||
|
||||
Agent: nip-research-agent
|
||||
Date: 2026-02-13
|
||||
Branch: agents/daily/nip-research-agent/run-2026-02-13-1771011102
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
# Completed nip-research-agent run
|
||||
|
||||
Agent: nip-research-agent
|
||||
Date: 2026-02-13
|
||||
Status: Success
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Performed NIP compliance verification for NIP-04, NIP-44, and Kind 30078.
|
||||
Updated NIP_INVENTORY.md and generated nip-report-2026-02-13.md.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
|
||||
# NIP Compliance Report - 2026-02-13
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
The `nip-research-agent` performed an initial inventory and compliance check on high-priority NIPs.
|
||||
|
||||
## P0 Compliance Status
|
||||
|
||||
| NIP / Kind | Status | Verification |
|
||||
|------------|--------|--------------|
|
||||
| **NIP-04** | Compliant | Verified via `tests/nostr-specs/nip04-nip44.test.mjs` |
|
||||
| **NIP-44** | Compliant | Verified via `tests/nostr-specs/nip04-nip44.test.mjs` |
|
||||
| **Kind 30078** | Compliant | Verified via `tests/nostr-specs/kind30078.test.mjs` |
|
||||
| **NIP-07** | Compliant (Legacy) | Marked compliant in inventory, but verification tests (`nip07_compliance.test.mjs`) are missing from codebase. |
|
||||
| **NIP-65** | Compliant (Legacy) | Marked compliant in inventory, but verification tests (`nip65_compliance.test.mjs`) are missing from codebase. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Actions Taken
|
||||
- Created `tests/nostr-specs/` directory.
|
||||
- Fetched canonical specs for P0 NIPs into `artifacts/nips/`.
|
||||
- Created and executed validation tests for NIP-04/44 encryption worker logic.
|
||||
- Created and executed validation tests for Kind 30078 schema construction.
|
||||
- Updated `NIP_INVENTORY.md` to reference new tests.
|
||||
|
||||
## Next Steps
|
||||
- Implement verification tests for NIP-07, NIP-65, NIP-51, and NIP-56.
|
||||
- Resolve "Partial" status for NIP-09.
|
||||
- Investigate "Unknown" status for NIP-21.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
||||
# Test Log: NIP Research Agent Run 2026-02-13
|
||||
Ran validation tests successfully.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
|
||||
|
||||
import { test, describe, it, before } from 'node:test';
|
||||
import assert from 'node:assert';
|
||||
|
||||
// Mock window/localstorage/etc
|
||||
if (typeof globalThis.window === 'undefined') {
|
||||
globalThis.window = globalThis;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (typeof globalThis.localStorage === 'undefined') {
|
||||
globalThis.localStorage = { getItem: () => null, setItem: () => {} };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We need to import the schema builder.
|
||||
// Since it's an ES module, we can import it directly.
|
||||
import {
|
||||
buildVideoPostEvent,
|
||||
NOTE_TYPES,
|
||||
getNostrEventSchema,
|
||||
validateEventStructure
|
||||
} from '../../js/nostrEventSchemas.js';
|
||||
|
||||
describe('Kind 30078 (Video Note) Compliance', () => {
|
||||
it('should have correct kind 30078', () => {
|
||||
const schema = getNostrEventSchema(NOTE_TYPES.VIDEO_POST);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(schema.kind, 30078);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('should require version 3', () => {
|
||||
const schema = getNostrEventSchema(NOTE_TYPES.VIDEO_POST);
|
||||
const versionField = schema.content.fields.find(f => f.key === 'version');
|
||||
assert.ok(versionField, 'Version field missing in schema');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(versionField.required, true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('should build a valid event with required fields', () => {
|
||||
const params = {
|
||||
pubkey: '00'.repeat(32),
|
||||
created_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
|
||||
dTagValue: 'my-video-slug',
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
version: 3,
|
||||
title: 'Test Video',
|
||||
videoRootId: 'my-video-slug',
|
||||
url: 'https://example.com/video.mp4'
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const event = buildVideoPostEvent(params);
|
||||
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(event.kind, 30078);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(event.pubkey, params.pubkey);
|
||||
|
||||
const parsedContent = JSON.parse(event.content);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(parsedContent.version, 3);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(parsedContent.title, 'Test Video');
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate structure
|
||||
const validation = validateEventStructure(NOTE_TYPES.VIDEO_POST, event);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(validation.valid, true, `Validation failed: ${validation.errors.join(', ')}`);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('should allow magnet links', () => {
|
||||
const params = {
|
||||
pubkey: '00'.repeat(32),
|
||||
created_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
|
||||
dTagValue: 'magnet-video',
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
version: 3,
|
||||
title: 'Magnet Video',
|
||||
videoRootId: 'magnet-video',
|
||||
magnet: 'magnet:?xt=urn:btih:1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678&dn=video.mp4'
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const event = buildVideoPostEvent(params);
|
||||
const parsedContent = JSON.parse(event.content);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(parsedContent.magnet, params.content.magnet);
|
||||
|
||||
const validation = validateEventStructure(NOTE_TYPES.VIDEO_POST, event);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(validation.valid, true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('should include "s" tag for storage pointer', () => {
|
||||
const params = {
|
||||
pubkey: '00'.repeat(32),
|
||||
created_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
|
||||
dTagValue: 'pointer-test',
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
version: 3,
|
||||
title: 'Pointer Test',
|
||||
videoRootId: 'pointer-test',
|
||||
url: 'https://example.com/video.mp4'
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const event = buildVideoPostEvent(params);
|
||||
const sTag = event.tags.find(t => t[0] === 's');
|
||||
assert.ok(sTag, 'Missing s tag');
|
||||
// "url" pointer format from storagePointer.js: "url:https://example.com/video.mp4" (roughly)
|
||||
// Actually deriveStoragePointerFromUrl -> buildStoragePointerValue -> "url:<url>"
|
||||
assert.match(sTag[1], /^url:/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('should include "d" tag', () => {
|
||||
const params = {
|
||||
pubkey: '00'.repeat(32),
|
||||
created_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
|
||||
dTagValue: 'd-tag-test',
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
version: 3,
|
||||
title: 'D Tag Test',
|
||||
videoRootId: 'd-tag-test'
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const event = buildVideoPostEvent(params);
|
||||
const dTag = event.tags.find(t => t[0] === 'd');
|
||||
assert.ok(dTag, 'Missing d tag');
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(dTag[1], 'd-tag-test');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
|
||||
|
||||
import { test, describe, it, before, after } from 'node:test';
|
||||
import assert from 'node:assert';
|
||||
import * as NostrTools from 'nostr-tools';
|
||||
import { generateSecretKey, getPublicKey, finalizeEvent } from 'nostr-tools';
|
||||
import * as nip04 from 'nostr-tools/nip04';
|
||||
import * as nip44 from 'nostr-tools/nip44';
|
||||
|
||||
const hexToBytes = (hex) => {
|
||||
if (typeof hex !== 'string') {
|
||||
throw new TypeError('hexToBytes: expected string, got ' + typeof hex);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (hex.length % 2) throw new Error('hexToBytes: received invalid unpadded hex' + hex.length);
|
||||
const array = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < array.length; i++) {
|
||||
const j = i * 2;
|
||||
const hexByte = hex.slice(j, j + 2);
|
||||
const byte = parseInt(hexByte, 16);
|
||||
if (Number.isNaN(byte) || byte < 0) throw new Error('Invalid byte sequence');
|
||||
array[i] = byte;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return array;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const bytesToHex = (bytes) => {
|
||||
if (!bytes) return '';
|
||||
let hex = '';
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) {
|
||||
const b = bytes[i];
|
||||
if (b < 16) hex += '0';
|
||||
hex += b.toString(16);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hex;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Polyfill for dmDecryptWorker environment
|
||||
globalThis.self = {
|
||||
addEventListener: (type, listener) => {
|
||||
if (type === 'message') {
|
||||
globalThis.messageListener = listener;
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
postMessage: (msg) => {
|
||||
if (globalThis.messageCallback) {
|
||||
globalThis.messageCallback(msg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Mock window for toolkit.js/logger.js if needed
|
||||
if (typeof globalThis.window === 'undefined') {
|
||||
globalThis.window = globalThis;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Pre-inject NostrTools to avoid bootstrap issues or timeouts
|
||||
globalThis.NostrTools = {
|
||||
...NostrTools,
|
||||
nip04,
|
||||
nip44,
|
||||
generateSecretKey,
|
||||
getPublicKey,
|
||||
finalizeEvent,
|
||||
verifyEvent: NostrTools.verifyEvent
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Import the worker module
|
||||
// We use a dynamic import to ensure the environment is set up first
|
||||
const loadWorker = async () => {
|
||||
await import('../../js/nostr/dmDecryptWorker.js');
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
describe('NIP-04 / NIP-44 Compliance (dmDecryptWorker)', () => {
|
||||
let workerListener;
|
||||
let aliceSk, alicePk;
|
||||
let bobSk, bobPk;
|
||||
|
||||
before(async () => {
|
||||
await loadWorker();
|
||||
workerListener = globalThis.messageListener;
|
||||
assert.ok(workerListener, 'Worker should have registered a message listener');
|
||||
|
||||
// Generate keys
|
||||
aliceSk = generateSecretKey();
|
||||
alicePk = getPublicKey(aliceSk);
|
||||
bobSk = generateSecretKey();
|
||||
bobPk = getPublicKey(bobSk);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const sendMessage = (payload) => {
|
||||
return new Promise((resolve) => {
|
||||
globalThis.messageCallback = resolve;
|
||||
workerListener({ data: payload });
|
||||
});
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
it('should decrypt NIP-04 messages', async () => {
|
||||
const plaintext = 'Hello NIP-04';
|
||||
const ciphertext = await nip04.encrypt(aliceSk, bobPk, plaintext);
|
||||
|
||||
const payload = {
|
||||
id: 'test-nip04',
|
||||
scheme: 'nip04',
|
||||
privateKey: bytesToHex(aliceSk), // decrypting as Alice (sender? no, nip04 is symmetric but usually recipient decrypts)
|
||||
// nip04.encrypt(privA, pubB, text) -> can be decrypted by A (with pubB) or B (with pubA).
|
||||
// Here we simulate Bob decrypting what Alice sent.
|
||||
// So privateKey should be Bob's, targetPubkey should be Alice's.
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Let's re-encrypt correctly for the test case: Alice sends to Bob.
|
||||
// Worker is asked to decrypt using Bob's SK and Alice's PK.
|
||||
const payloadForBob = {
|
||||
id: 'nip04-1',
|
||||
scheme: 'nip04',
|
||||
privateKey: bytesToHex(bobSk),
|
||||
targetPubkey: alicePk,
|
||||
ciphertext: ciphertext
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await sendMessage(payloadForBob);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(response.ok, true, `NIP-04 decryption failed: ${response.error?.message}`);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(response.plaintext, plaintext);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('should decrypt NIP-44 v2 messages', async () => {
|
||||
const plaintext = 'Hello NIP-44';
|
||||
const conversationKey = nip44.v2.utils.getConversationKey(aliceSk, bobPk);
|
||||
const ciphertext = nip44.v2.encrypt(plaintext, conversationKey);
|
||||
|
||||
// NIP-44 requires a signed event for verification in the worker?
|
||||
// Let's check dmDecryptWorker.js:
|
||||
// if (payload.scheme === "nip44" || payload.scheme === "nip44_v2") {
|
||||
// await verifyEventSignature(payload.event);
|
||||
|
||||
const unsignedEvent = {
|
||||
kind: 4, // or 14?
|
||||
created_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
|
||||
tags: [['p', bobPk]],
|
||||
content: ciphertext,
|
||||
pubkey: alicePk,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const signedEvent = finalizeEvent(unsignedEvent, aliceSk);
|
||||
|
||||
const payload = {
|
||||
id: 'nip44-1',
|
||||
scheme: 'nip44_v2',
|
||||
privateKey: bytesToHex(bobSk),
|
||||
targetPubkey: alicePk,
|
||||
ciphertext: ciphertext,
|
||||
event: signedEvent // Worker verifies this signature!
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await sendMessage(payload);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(response.ok, true, `NIP-44 decryption failed: ${response.error?.message}`);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(response.plaintext, plaintext);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('should fail NIP-44 decryption with invalid signature', async () => {
|
||||
const plaintext = 'Attack';
|
||||
const conversationKey = nip44.v2.utils.getConversationKey(aliceSk, bobPk);
|
||||
const ciphertext = nip44.v2.encrypt(plaintext, conversationKey);
|
||||
|
||||
const fakeEvent = {
|
||||
kind: 4,
|
||||
created_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
|
||||
tags: [['p', bobPk]],
|
||||
content: ciphertext,
|
||||
pubkey: alicePk,
|
||||
id: 'fakeid',
|
||||
sig: 'f'.repeat(128) // Invalid signature
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const payload = {
|
||||
id: 'nip44-fail',
|
||||
scheme: 'nip44_v2',
|
||||
privateKey: bytesToHex(bobSk),
|
||||
targetPubkey: alicePk,
|
||||
ciphertext: ciphertext,
|
||||
event: fakeEvent
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await sendMessage(payload);
|
||||
assert.strictEqual(response.ok, false);
|
||||
assert.match(response.error.message, /signature/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('should prioritize NIP-44 v2', async () => {
|
||||
// This test implicitly verifies v2 usage because we generated v2 ciphertext
|
||||
// and passed 'nip44_v2' scheme.
|
||||
// If we pass 'nip44' (v1?), nostr-tools might default to v2 if v1 is not available?
|
||||
// nostr-tools v2 only has v2.
|
||||
assert.ok(nip44.v2, 'NIP-44 v2 should be available in nostr-tools');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# TODO: NIP Research Agent Run 2026-02-13
|
||||
- [x] Fetch P0 specs
|
||||
- [x] Create validation tests for NIP-04/44
|
||||
- [x] Create validation tests for Kind 30078
|
||||
- [x] Update NIP_INVENTORY.md
|
||||
- [x] Generate report
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user