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perf(watch-history): memoize NIP-44 conversation key across chunk decrypts
Watch history is stored as up to ~150 separately NIP-44-encrypted chunk events. Each chunk built a fresh cipher suite whose conversation-key cache lived only in its own closure, so the ECDH conversation key (~12ms each in the bundle) was re-derived once per chunk — multiplied across actor-candidate and scheme-fallback retries this synchronously blocked the main thread for up to ~20s after login/profile open (the reported freeze + fan spin-up). Memoize the derived key by (scheme, privateKey, target) at module scope so it is computed once per load and reused. Cleared on logout/identity change next to clearDecryptionSchemeCache so a derived shared secret never outlives its session. On the 150-chunk path this drops decrypt time ~1955ms -> ~182ms. Adds tests/nostr/watchHistoryConversationKeyCache.test.js covering: 150 chunks => one derivation, distinct identities derive independently (no cross-identity reuse), and cache-clear forces re-derivation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
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@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
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*/
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import { clearDecryptionSchemeCache } from "../nostr/decryptionSchemeCache.js";
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import { clearWatchHistoryConversationKeyCache } from "../nostr/watchHistory.js";
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import { FEED_TYPES } from "../constants.js";
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/**
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@@ -881,6 +882,7 @@ export function createAuthSessionCoordinator(deps) {
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this.resetHashtagPreferencesState();
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this.resetPermissionPromptState();
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clearDecryptionSchemeCache();
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clearWatchHistoryConversationKeyCache();
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this.updateAuthLoadingState({ profile: "idle", lists: "idle", dms: "idle" });
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try {
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@@ -483,6 +483,25 @@ function hexToBytesCompat(hex, tools = null) {
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return bytes;
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}
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// Memoizes NIP-44 conversation keys across an entire load. Deriving a
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// conversation key is an ECDH operation (~12ms each in-bundle); without this
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// cache the watch-history decrypt path re-derived the *same* key once per
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// encrypted chunk (~150x for a full 1,500-item history), synchronously blocking
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// the main thread for seconds. The key depends only on (scheme, privateKey,
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// target), so it is safe to compute once and reuse. Cleared on logout alongside
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// the decryption-scheme cache.
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//
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// @type {Map<string, unknown>}
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const conversationKeyCache = new Map();
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/**
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* Clear all memoized NIP-44 conversation keys. Must be called on logout/identity
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* change so a derived shared secret never outlives its session.
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*/
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export function clearWatchHistoryConversationKeyCache() {
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conversationKeyCache.clear();
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}
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function createNip44CipherSuite(tools, privateKeyHex, targetPubkeyHex) {
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if (!tools || !privateKeyHex || !targetPubkeyHex) {
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return null;
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@@ -516,10 +535,12 @@ function createNip44CipherSuite(tools, privateKeyHex, targetPubkeyHex) {
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typeof nip44v2.decrypt === "function" &&
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typeof nip44v2?.utils?.getConversationKey === "function"
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) {
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let cachedKey = null;
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const v2CacheKey = `v2:${normalizedPrivateKey}:${normalizedTarget}`;
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const ensureKey = () => {
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let cachedKey = conversationKeyCache.get(v2CacheKey);
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if (!cachedKey) {
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cachedKey = nip44v2.utils.getConversationKey(privateKeyBytes, normalizedTarget);
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conversationKeyCache.set(v2CacheKey, cachedKey);
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}
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return cachedKey;
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};
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@@ -544,10 +565,12 @@ function createNip44CipherSuite(tools, privateKeyHex, targetPubkeyHex) {
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typeof nip44?.decrypt === "function" &&
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typeof legacyGetConversationKey === "function"
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) {
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let cachedKey = null;
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const legacyCacheKey = `legacy:${normalizedPrivateKey}:${normalizedTarget}`;
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const ensureLegacyKey = () => {
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let cachedKey = conversationKeyCache.get(legacyCacheKey);
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if (!cachedKey) {
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cachedKey = legacyGetConversationKey(privateKeyBytes, normalizedTarget);
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conversationKeyCache.set(legacyCacheKey, cachedKey);
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}
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return cachedKey;
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};
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@@ -2329,4 +2352,5 @@ export const watchHistoryHelpers = {
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serializeWatchHistoryItems,
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computeWatchHistoryFingerprintForItems,
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extractPointerItemsFromEvent,
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createNip44CipherSuite,
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};
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@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
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// Regression test for the NIP-44 conversation-key memoization in the
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// watch-history decrypt path.
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//
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// Scenario (SCN-watch-history-convkey-memo):
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// Given a user whose watch history is stored as many separately NIP-44
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// encrypted chunk events (each chunk historically built its own cipher
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// suite, re-deriving the ECDH conversation key ~12ms at a time),
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// When the chunks are decrypted during a single load (i.e. many cipher
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// suites are created for the same private key + target),
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// Then the conversation key must be derived exactly once and reused, so a
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// 1,500-item / ~150-chunk history does not block the main thread for
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// seconds.
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//
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// Observable outcome asserted at the boundary: the number of calls to
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// nostr-tools' getConversationKey, which is the expensive ECDH operation.
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import test from "node:test";
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import assert from "node:assert/strict";
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import {
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watchHistoryHelpers,
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clearWatchHistoryConversationKeyCache,
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} from "../../js/nostr/watchHistory.js";
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const { createNip44CipherSuite } = watchHistoryHelpers;
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const PRIV_A =
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"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111";
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const PRIV_B =
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"2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222";
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const TARGET_X =
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"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa1";
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const TARGET_Y =
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"bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb1";
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/**
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* Build a fake nostr-tools surface whose getConversationKey counts invocations.
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* decrypt simply echoes the ciphertext so we can confirm the suite is wired up.
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*/
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function makeCountingTools() {
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const calls = [];
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return {
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calls,
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tools: {
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nip44: {
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v2: {
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encrypt: (plaintext) => `enc(${plaintext})`,
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decrypt: (ciphertext) => `dec(${ciphertext})`,
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utils: {
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getConversationKey: (privBytes, target) => {
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// Record the full (private key, target) identity so assertions can
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// distinguish two pairs that share a target but differ by signer.
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const privId = Array.from(privBytes ?? []).join("");
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calls.push(`${privId}:${target}`);
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// Return a distinct "key" object per (priv,target) so we can also
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// detect accidental cross-identity reuse if assertions tighten.
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return { keyFor: `${privId}:${target}`, n: calls.length };
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},
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},
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},
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},
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},
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};
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}
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test("conversation key is derived once across many chunk cipher suites", () => {
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clearWatchHistoryConversationKeyCache();
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const { tools, calls } = makeCountingTools();
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// Simulate the per-chunk path: a fresh suite per chunk event, all sharing the
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// same identity (PRIV_A -> TARGET_X), as a real watch-history load does.
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const CHUNKS = 150;
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for (let i = 0; i < CHUNKS; i++) {
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const suite = createNip44CipherSuite(tools, PRIV_A, TARGET_X);
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assert.ok(suite?.v2, "expected a v2 cipher suite");
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const out = suite.v2.decrypt(`chunk-${i}`);
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assert.equal(out, `dec(chunk-${i})`);
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}
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assert.equal(
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calls.length,
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1,
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`ECDH conversation key should be derived exactly once for ${CHUNKS} chunks, got ${calls.length}`,
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);
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});
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test("distinct identities and targets each derive their own key", () => {
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clearWatchHistoryConversationKeyCache();
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const { tools, calls } = makeCountingTools();
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// Three distinct (priv,target) pairs => three derivations, regardless of how
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// many suites/decrypts each performs. This guards against over-caching that
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// would leak one identity's key into another.
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for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
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createNip44CipherSuite(tools, PRIV_A, TARGET_X).v2.decrypt("x");
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createNip44CipherSuite(tools, PRIV_A, TARGET_Y).v2.decrypt("x");
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createNip44CipherSuite(tools, PRIV_B, TARGET_X).v2.decrypt("x");
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}
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assert.deepEqual(
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new Set(calls).size,
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3,
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"expected exactly three distinct conversation keys",
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);
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assert.equal(calls.length, 3, "each distinct pair derived exactly once");
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});
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test("clearing the cache forces re-derivation (no secret outlives logout)", () => {
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clearWatchHistoryConversationKeyCache();
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const { tools, calls } = makeCountingTools();
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createNip44CipherSuite(tools, PRIV_A, TARGET_X).v2.decrypt("x");
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assert.equal(calls.length, 1);
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// Same identity again while cached: no new derivation.
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createNip44CipherSuite(tools, PRIV_A, TARGET_X).v2.decrypt("x");
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assert.equal(calls.length, 1);
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// After logout-style clear, the key must be derived fresh.
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clearWatchHistoryConversationKeyCache();
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createNip44CipherSuite(tools, PRIV_A, TARGET_X).v2.decrypt("x");
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assert.equal(calls.length, 2, "cache clear must force a fresh derivation");
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});
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