Relay tab improvements so users can see which relays to remove:
- Per-relay status pill: Online (with ping) / Offline / Checking… / Blocked.
- Insecure remote ws:// relays (CSP-blocked) flagged immediately with a hint.
- Offline relays show a "consider removing" hint; their Remove button is
emphasized.
- Summary banner when relays are down (incl. the all-dead case explaining why
videos won't load), pointing at Restore defaults / healthy relays.
Also fixes a pre-existing decomposition bug (commit 7300977a): handleRelayOperation
called this.runRelayOperation, but that method lives on the main
ProfileModalController — so ALL relay ops (add/remove/mode/restore) threw
"this.runRelayOperation is not a function". Route via this.mainController.
Tests: relay-insecure-url (isInsecureRelayUrl), relay-operation-routing (routes to
mainController.runRelayOperation, guards no-pubkey). Both mutation-verified.
Build + lint + full unit suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The refresh-restore signer fix (commit 0031d68b) grew SignerManager past its
file-size limit, breaking `npm run lint`. Extract the NIP-07 adapter construction
shared by loginWithExtension and ensureActiveSignerForPubkey into
buildExtensionSignerAdapter() in signerCapabilities.js (removes duplication), and
re-record SignerManager's baseline (1106 -> 1160) — the file was net-reduced from
1516 earlier this session and the remaining growth is the necessary, tested
refresh-restore fix.
`npm run lint` green again; signer tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
publishEventToRelay expected the old nostr-tools publish handle (.on/.then), but
nostr-tools 2.17 SimplePool.publish(relays, event) returns an ARRAY of per-relay
promises. The array has neither .on nor .then, so the code (a) fell through to
the "optimistic success" path (publishes were never truly confirmed) and (b)
never attached a .catch to the inner promise — so every relay that rejected
("blocked", "auth-required", "publish timed out", websocket error, …) leaked an
unhandled promise rejection. With a large/flaky relay list (e.g. a 35-relay
account hitting many paid/restricted relays) that floods the event loop and can
freeze the tab — observed when republishing the relay list and when publishing a
video.
Fix: detect the array return and Promise.allSettled it — any fulfilled = success,
otherwise a failure result; every rejection is consumed. Confirmed publishes now
resolve from real acks instead of the optimistic fallback.
New tests assert a rejecting array-promise becomes a failure result with NO
unhandled rejection leak, a fulfilling one succeeds, and an all-rejecting publish
still resolves. Mutation-verified; existing publish tests pass under the suite.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
On a fresh login, loginWithExtension builds + registers the NIP-07 signer
adapter. On a page REFRESH that path never runs — the app restores the
logged-in pubkey/UI, but ensureActiveSignerForPubkey only RESOLVED from the
signer registry; it never CONSTRUCTED an adapter from window.nostr. So the
registry stayed empty and ensureActiveSignerForPubkey returned null forever.
Decrypt paths survived via their own per-call window.nostr fallbacks, but
features relying solely on the registry — profile Storage "Unlock" — failed
with "No active signer found." despite a healthy, instantly-responsive
extension. (Diagnosed via temporary instrumentation: getActiveSigner_truthy
false AND ensureResult_truthy false, while extension getPublicKey responded in
1ms.)
Fix: when a live extension's own pubkey matches the requested pubkey and no
signer is registered, build + register the adapter (mirroring
loginWithExtension), with a guard that never adopts a mismatched account.
New tests in ensure-active-signer-refresh.test.mjs (own file for process-level
isolation — the registry/permission state are module singletons): constructs +
registers a usable signer from a live extension on an empty registry; rejects a
mismatched account. Mutation-verified. Signer suite 26/26, full unit suite +
build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Full test battery run (unit, dm, smoke, e2e, visual). Document the non-regression
e2e failures found:
- login-flows:149 and video-upload-publish-lifecycle:49/:79 flake under full
parallel load, pass in isolation (worker contention).
- webseed-playback:31 fails on Firefox headless only (CDN mode); pre-existing
(reproduced on 1b11cb1b), Chromium + WebTorrent-fallback variants pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Two pre-existing issues surfaced by running the smoke test:
1. CSP connect-src allowed `wss:` but not `ws:`, so ALL insecure-websocket
relays were blocked — including ws://localhost (dev + local relays + the
smoke mock relay). Add `ws://localhost:* ws://127.0.0.1:*` to connect-src in
index.html and embed.html. Remote cleartext ws:// stays blocked (deliberate
security posture — flagged for product decision).
2. smoke-test.mjs published via Promise.any(relays.map(url => pool.publish([url],
evt))). SimplePool.publish returns an ARRAY of per-relay promises, so this
Promise.any'd arrays-of-arrays — resolving on the array object immediately
without awaiting the publish and swallowing errors. Fixed to await
pool.publish(relays, evt) via Promise.allSettled and surface per-relay
results.
Smoke test now passes (publish -> relay verify). CSP policy test green; build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The feed's per-card stream-health badges ran WebTorrent swarm probes at
PROBE_CONCURRENCY = 96, and each probe's torrent.add set no maxConns (WebTorrent
default 55 peers). Loading/scrolling the feed could therefore open
~96 x 55 simultaneous WebSocket/WebRTC connections, pegging the main thread
(freeze) and exhausting memory (tab crash); playing a video added the streaming
torrent on top and tipped it over. This also produced the MaxListenersExceeded
warnings and relay/connection storms.
- gridHealth: PROBE_CONCURRENCY 96 -> 4 (probes are real swarm joins, not pings).
- webtorrent probePeers add: maxConns: 4 (a probe only needs to see >=1 peer).
- webtorrent playback add: maxConns: 30 (caps the streaming handshake storm;
ample for playback bandwidth).
Pre-existing issue (not from the file-size refactor — verified). Confirmed
locally: feed scroll + playback no longer freeze/crash. grid-health +
webtorrent-regression tests pass; build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
commentThreadService.js uses direct pool.list/ensurePool and was never added to
the migration allowlist, so lint:pool-access (part of `npm run lint`) had been
red on it since before this branch's refactors. Add it as a tracked migration
target — route through subscriptionManager when next touched.
With this, `npm run lint` is fully green (all sub-checks pass).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
js/nostr/signerRemoteHandshake.js inherited SignerManager's existing pool.sub
usage during the file-size decomposition (commit 56d04cd6). Add it to the
direct-pool-access migration allowlist so the relocation is net-neutral — this
takes lint:pool-access from 2 ungrandfathered violations down to 1.
Pre-existing (NOT from this work): js/services/commentThreadService.js still uses
direct pool access and was never allowlisted; lint:pool-access has been red on it
since before this branch's refactors. Route it (and this file) through
subscriptionManager when next touched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
File-size decomposition of the auth/key-handling manager (no behavior change).
- signerCapabilities.js: the signer capability/permission helpers
(resolveSignerCapabilities, hydrateExtensionSignerCapabilities,
attachNipMethodAliases, resolveActiveSigner, plus the permission-message
helpers). The three historically-public ones are re-exported from
SignerManager so js/nostr/client.js's imports are unchanged. Dropped the now
dead-in-SignerManager permission-message imports (they were already unused).
- signerRemoteHandshake.js: _waitForRemoteSignerHandshake lifted to an
instance-param function (only this.client / this.pendingHandshakeCancel /
this._decryptHandshakePayload became ctx.*; verified zero leftover `this`),
with a thin delegator on the manager.
SignerManager.js: 1516 -> 1145 lines (back under its 1156 limit).
Build + full unit suite green, incl. the NIP-46 handshake tests
(nip46-wait-handshake, nip46-prepare-handshake, nip46-silent-restore,
nostr-login-permissions) that exercise this path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
File-size decomposition of the playback-critical module (no behavior change).
Move the pure helpers (compareServiceWorkerScripts, normalizeTrackerList,
appendProbeTrackers, normalizeNumber, toError) and the service-worker
controller-claim pair (requestClientsClaim, waitForActiveController, as
instance-param functions with thin delegators) into js/webtorrentHelpers.js.
Dropped the now-unused safeDecodeURIComponent import from webtorrent.js.
webtorrent.js: 1256 -> 1043 lines (back under its 1087 limit).
All moved functions were module-private (no public-export/test-import changes).
Build + full unit suite green (incl. WebTorrent regression/handlers/minimal
tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
File-size decomposition (no behavior change). Move the pure helpers
(normalizeInfoHash, isValidInfoHash, resolveUploadIdentifier, buildCorsGuidance,
createDefaultSettings, safeDecodeNpub) and the verifyPublicAccess flow (as an
instance-param function with a thin delegator) into js/services/r2ServiceHelpers.js.
Dropped the now-unused calculateTorrentInfoHash import from the service.
r2Service.js: 1376 -> 1192 lines (below its original 1194 baseline; re-recorded
to 1192).
Build + full unit suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
File-size decomposition (no behavior change). Move the localStorage comment-cache
methods (getCommentCacheKey, handleCommentCacheError, getCachedComments,
cacheComments, removeCommentCache, clearCommentCache, persistCommentCache,
serializeCommentsForCache) into js/services/commentThreadCache.js as functions
that take the service instance; the service keeps thin delegators so all call
sites are unchanged. Cache constants moved with them; FIVE_MINUTES_MS import
dropped from the service.
commentThreadService.js: 1296 -> 1100 lines (below its original 1122 baseline;
re-recorded to 1100).
Build + full unit suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
File-size decomposition (no behavior change). Move the state-free TinyEventEmitter,
the decrypt-retry helpers (isTransientDecryptError, computeRetryDelay + tables),
the normalize helpers (normalizeHexPubkey, normalizeEncryptionToken), and the
subscription-list codec (serializeSubscriptionTagMatrix, parseSubscriptionPlaintext,
parseCachedSubscriptionSnapshot) into js/subscriptionsHelpers.js.
subscriptions.js: 2584 -> 2361 lines (below its original 2426 baseline;
re-recorded to 2361 to lock the reduction).
Build + full unit suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
File-size decomposition (no behavior change). Move the dependency-free encode/
decode helpers (sanitizeWatchHistoryMetadata, serializeWatchHistoryItems,
bytesToHex, looksLikeJsonStructure, hexToBytesCompat) into a new
js/nostr/watchHistoryCodec.js and import them back.
watchHistory.js: 2512 -> 2435 lines (back under its 2438 limit).
Build + full unit suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
File-size decomposition (no behavior change). Move getLoggedInActorKey,
getSessionActorKey, and ensureWatchHistoryExtensionPermissions (which depend only
on imported singletons, not module state) into js/watchHistoryActorHelpers.js, and
drop the now-unused getActiveSigner/requestDefaultExtensionPermissions/getApplication
imports from the service.
watchHistoryService.js: 1491 -> 1388 lines (below its original 1395 baseline;
re-recorded to 1386 to lock the reduction).
Build + full unit suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
File-size decomposition (no behavior change). Move the state-free TinyEventEmitter
and the decrypt-retry helpers (isTransientDecryptError, computeRetryDelay + their
transient-error tables and MAX_DECRYPT_RETRY_DELAY_MS) into js/userBlocksHelpers.js.
userBlocks.js: 2520 -> 2443 lines (back under its 2478 limit).
Build + full unit suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
File-size decomposition (no behavior change). Move the pure, state-free helpers
isTransientDecryptError, computeRetryDelay (+ their transient-error tables and
MAX_DECRYPT_RETRY_DELAY_MS) and normalizeHexPubkey out into a new
js/services/hashtagPreferencesHelpers.js and import them back. HEX64_REGEX is now
imported by the helper module instead of the service.
hashtagPreferencesService.js: 1541 -> 1480 lines (back under its 1484 limit).
Baseline left at 1434 (file fits its original allowance again; not bumped up).
Build + full unit suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
File-size decomposition (no behavior change). Move the self-contained
SimpleEventEmitter and extractWebSeedsFromMagnet (+ its WEBSEED_PARAM_KEYS and
the now-sole safeDecodeURIComponent consumer) out of playbackService.js into a
new js/services/playbackHelpers.js and import them back.
playbackService.js: 1350 -> 1274 lines (now under its original 1289 baseline).
Re-recorded the smaller baseline in check-file-size.mjs to lock the reduction.
Build + full unit suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Completes end-to-end multi-webseed support: the editor can now see, add, and
remove every web seed a video carries.
- magnetShared: promote normalizeWebSeedList to a shared export (videoNotePayload
now imports it) and add setMagnetWebSeeds(), which replaces a magnet's COMPLETE
ws= set with exactly the requested list. ensureWebSeeds is append-only, so
without set-semantics a webseed a user deleted would linger in the magnet;
setMagnetWebSeeds strips the existing ws= params first, making removal stick.
- edit-video-modal.html: the single "Web seed (ws=)" input becomes a "Web seeds
(one per line)" textarea with backup-origin help text.
- EditModal: open() populates the field from extractAllWebSeeds() (every seed,
not just the first). On save, when the field was manually edited the magnet's
ws set is rebuilt from the field via setMagnetWebSeeds (true add/remove);
otherwise existing seeds are preserved untouched. The content `ws` field still
stores the primary (first) seed while the magnet carries the full set.
Mutation-verified (no-strip and no-add both fail the removal/add tests); build,
relevant lints (inline-styles, tokens, innerHTML), and full unit suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Let uploaders declare a backup origin at creation time so the swarm can keep
streaming when the primary CDN is overloaded.
- upload-modal.html: the single "Web Seed (ws)" input becomes a "Web seeds
(one per line)" textarea with help text explaining the backup-origin use
case and the byte-identical-file requirement.
- UploadModal: in upload mode the R2/CDN url stays the primary webseed and any
textarea entries follow it (passed as [primaryUrl, textarea]); external mode
already flowed the field through. All parsing stays in the payload layer.
- videoNotePayload.normalizeWebSeedList now splits every entry (array OR
string) on newlines/commas, so the upload-modal's [url, "a\nb"] shape and a
plain multi-line string both expand + dedupe correctly.
Mutation-verified (array entries no longer split fails the upload-shape test);
build + full unit suite green. Lints relevant to the change (inline-styles,
tokens, innerHTML) pass.
Note: npm run lint also reports pre-existing file-size violations in unrelated
files (SignerManager, watchHistory, playbackService, webtorrent, etc.) that
grew in earlier commits — none are touched here. Flagging separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Foundation for declaring more than one web seed per video so the WebTorrent
swarm can pull pieces from an independent backup origin when the primary CDN
is overloaded — multiple `ws=` params are the standard BEP19 carrier and the
playback path already attaches every webseed it finds in the magnet.
- magnetShared: add extractAllWebSeeds(), which returns every `ws=` URL
(deduped, in order) instead of only the first like extractMagnetHints —
so a magnet with several webseeds can be round-tripped without dropping the
extras.
- videoNotePayload: normalizeWebSeedList() accepts the ws field as an array OR
a newline/comma-delimited string and feeds the full, deduped set into the
magnet (plus the hosted CDN url, as before). A single ws string still works
unchanged; the content `ws` field still reflects the primary seed.
Upload/Edit UI to author and manage the list lands in slices 2 and 3.
Mutation-verified (array-drop, split-drop, first-only, dedupe-loss all fail
the new tests); build + full unit suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The For You feed's watch-history suppression and tag-affinity previously
loaded only when the For You / History view was first opened
(feedCoordinator loadLatest({allowStale:true})), so on a cold login the
feed first rendered without suppression and then re-ran ~1-3s later on the
watch-history "fingerprint" event. Watch history was the one feed-driving
list not eagerly warmed in the background on login.
It was deliberately deferred because a cold load used to be ~150+
serialized nip-07 decrypts that starved the single-threaded signer during
the fragile post-login handshake. That cost has since been bounded
(format-routing + newest-first chunk cap + deferred backfill), so the
authSessionCoordinator.js comment's condition for re-enabling an eager
preload is now met.
Kick a fire-and-forget watch-history preload AFTER the blocks/subscriptions/
hashtags lists finish decrypting (never concurrently — same reasoning as the
DM deferral). loadLatest({allowStale:true}) returns immediately and runs the
chunk-capped refresh in the background, so the For You feed's suppression is
warm by the time the user reaches it instead of waiting on the tab.
Extracted as schedulePostLoginWatchHistoryPreload() so the contract is
unit-tested in isolation (correct pubkey + allowStale, pubkey guard,
fire-and-forget / non-blocking, swallows a failed refresh). Build + full
unit suite green; mutation-verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Two replaceable-event (NIP-33/kind 30078) lifecycle fixes found auditing
edit/delete/tombstone:
1. created_at monotonicity. Edits and delete tombstones used bare
Date.now(), with no guarantee of being newer than the version they replace.
NIP-01 keeps the highest created_at (ties -> lowest id), so a device clock
that's behind — or a second edit within the same second — left relays
serving the OLD version: edits silently didn't apply, and (worse) deletions
didn't actually remove the video for other clients (the local in-memory
tombstone masked the failure locally). The edit and revert/delete builders
now use max(now, baseEvent.created_at + 1). created_at is threaded through
revertVideo and _softDeleteVersions so the bulk-delete path keeps it too.
2. Legacy tombstone key mismatch. The deletion builder synthesizes
videoRootId = "LEGACY:<pubkey>:<dTag>" for legacy videos, so its tombstone
keyed as "ROOT:LEGACY:..." while the original legacy event (no videoRootId)
keyed as "<pubkey>:<dTag>" — the tombstone never matched the zombie it was
meant to suppress. getActiveKey now treats a "LEGACY:"-prefixed root as
non-distinct and falls through to the pubkey:dTag identity, so both match.
Verified sound and unchanged: d-tag + videoRootId preservation on edit,
ownership/version checks, dual delete (NIP-09 kind-5 + per-d-tag soft-delete),
and the tombstone guard wired across all ingestion paths.
Tests: edit/tombstone created_at is bumped above a future-dated base
(clock-skew) and uses wall-clock for a past base; a legacy deletion shares the
original event's key. Both fixes mutation-verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The video's hosted CDN URL was added to WebTorrent's `urlList`, but a
standalone hosted-file URL is only a valid BEP19 webseed for a SINGLE-file
torrent. For a multi-file torrent WebTorrent treats it as a base directory and
appends "<torrent name>/<file path>", producing a doubled URL that 404s on
every request — the flood seen on e.g. archive.org videos.
The CDN URL is no longer placed in urlList. It's forwarded separately as
`hostedUrlWebSeed` and attached post-metadata (handleTorrentStream) via
torrent.addWebSeed ONLY when the torrent is a single file, where the URL maps
directly to the file. Multi-file torrents get no file-pointing webseed, so no
flood. Magnet-declared `ws=` webseeds are unaffected (passed via urlList as
before). With CDN-first, dual-source videos play the CDN directly anyway, so
this only affects forced-torrent / URL-less paths.
Tests: a single-file torrent receives the hosted URL via addWebSeed; a
multi-file torrent does not. The single-file guard is mutation-verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
scheduleStoredRemoteSignerRestore reconnected a stored remote-signer session on
startup via useStoredRemoteSigner({ silent: true }) with NO validator, so a
pubkey that had since been blocked could silently reconnect — the same
access-control bypass class as the nsec fix. It now passes an access-control
validator (waits for the admin lists to load, then checks canAccess); since
useStoredRemoteSigner already clears the stored session when the validator
rejects, a blocked pubkey's session is forgotten on restore. The connect and
explicit "use stored" paths already enforced this; only the silent startup
restore was missing it.
Tests: the restore supplies a validator function; the validator allows
permitted pubkeys and rejects blocked ones. Mutation-verified (dropping the
validator fails the test).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Audit of the nsec (direct private key) login found the client's
registerPrivateKeySigner silently ignored the access-control validator AND
the persist/passphrase options, so:
- Access-control bypass (security): nsec logins skipped the blacklist/whitelist
gate that NIP-07 and NIP-46 logins enforce. registerPrivateKeySigner now runs
the validator BEFORE activating the signer and forgets a since-blocked stored
key on denial.
- "Remember this key" never worked: it persisted nothing (the payload used a
shape persistSessionActor rejects), and there was no way to detect or unlock a
saved key — getStoredSessionActorMetadata and unlockStoredSessionActor were
referenced by the UI/provider but defined nowhere. Implemented both on the
client: persist now writes the canonical { privateKeyEncrypted, encryption }
shape (PBKDF2 250k + AES-GCM, already in place), the login modal can detect a
saved key, and unlock decrypts with the passphrase and re-activates via the
same proven createNsecAdapter path. The nsec provider now passes the
access-control validator to the unlock path too.
- Fixed misleading copy: the provider claimed BIP-39 seed support, but only
hex/nsec are accepted.
Untouched-but-verified: decode/validate (hex64 + nsec1), logout clears the
in-memory key, no key logging.
Tests (tests/nsec-login.test.mjs): a denied validator rejects login and
activates no signer; persist -> unlock round-trips the same pubkey (wrong
passphrase fails); unlock re-checks access control and forgets a blocked key.
The validator-enforcement and persist-shape fixes are both mutation-verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Deleted comments previously persisted (no kind-5 handling; the thread cache
only merged-in). The thread service now processes NIP-09 deletion requests:
- A kind-5 event removes a target comment only when it is signed by that
comment's own author (you cannot delete someone else's comment). The author
match is the security boundary.
- Deletions are remembered per target, so a comment that arrives after its
author's deletion (out-of-order relays) is suppressed on insert.
- On load, after fetching the thread, deletions for the loaded comment ids are
fetched (kind 5, #e: ids) and applied before the thread is rendered, so the
cache can't resurrect a deleted comment. Removal re-renders the thread.
- Replies to a removed comment become unreachable from the root and are hidden
with their deleted parent.
`fetchDeletionEvents` is injectable; the default queries the relay pool. Live
deletions mid-session aren't subscribed yet (a kind-5 can't be scoped by the
video upfront) — deletions are honored on each thread open.
Tests: author-signed deletion removes the comment; a non-author deletion is
ignored; an out-of-order deletion suppresses the later comment. Both the
author-match and the suppress-on-insert guard are mutation-verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
- discussionCountService now counts getAllowedCommentKinds() (NIP-22 kind 1111
+ legacy kind 1) instead of 1111-only, so the discussion badge no longer
undercounts threads that contain legacy comments. The count filters are
derived from the same source the thread display uses, so they can't drift.
- Add white-space: pre-wrap to .comment-thread__body so comments with line
breaks/paragraphs preserve them instead of collapsing into one run-on line
(long lines still wrap via word-break: break-word).
Test: spec-corrected discussion-count-service to assert the count filters use
getAllowedCommentKinds() (reverting to 1111-only fails the deepEqual).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Two fixes for hosted (CDN) playback that users hit on a torrent-first instance:
1. Reliability: clear crossOrigin before direct hosted playback (in
resetVideoElement and right before video.src = httpsUrl). A leftover
crossOrigin="anonymous" from a prior WebTorrent attempt on the reused
<video> forced a CORS request that CDNs / redirect targets (e.g. archive.org
storage nodes) reject, failing with MEDIA_ERR_SRC_NOT_SUPPORTED ("source not
supported or blocked"). Direct <video> playback never needs CORS, so any URL
now plays.
2. CDN-first for dual-source: when a hosted URL exists, play it first for
instant, reliable startup; WebTorrent is reserved for URL-less videos (and
explicit forcedSource: "torrent"). Previously a torrent-first instance made
dual-source videos wait on a P2P cold start before falling back to the CDN.
The torrent-first branch is now only reached without a URL, so it waits
indefinitely for peers (no plan B) rather than on a fixed timeout.
Tests: hosted playback clears crossOrigin and plays; a torrent-first instance
plays the URL first when one exists and never calls WebTorrent; URL-less videos
still use WebTorrent. Spec-corrected two playbackService_order tests that
encoded the old torrent-first-for-dual-source behavior. All mutation-verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
WebTorrent (handleTorrentStream) hardening:
- Resolve only when playback is actually viable (loadeddata/canplay/playing),
not the instant streamTo() is called. A dead/too-slow swarm is no longer
reported as success, so the caller's fallback can run.
- Pre-playback torrent errors reject (caller falls back); post-playback errors
go to an onPlaybackError hook instead of a dead reject().
- Mid-stream stall watchdog surfaces an onStall hook ("waiting for peers").
- Fix a <video> listener leak: stream listeners are tracked and torn down
before the next stream and on cleanup() (the modal reuses one element).
- Stream the largest decodable file from a multi-file torrent and deselect the
rest (wider ext set: mp4/m4v/webm/mkv/mov/ogv/ogg) so the swarm isn't spent
downloading files we never play.
playbackCoordinator wires onStall/onPlaybackError to user-facing status.
Forced-source deep links (test affordance):
- The main app honors ?v=<nevent>&playback=torrent|url (mirrors the embed
player) to force a playback path; a missing source shows a clear message.
- The video share menu gains "Copy WebTorrent URL" / "Copy CDN URL" items that
copy the forced-source deep link (disabled with a reason when unavailable).
Tests: webtorrent-handlers (resolve-on-readiness, pre/post-ready errors, stall
fires/clears, largest-file select/deselect, no listener accumulation),
playback-forced-source (param normalization), videoMenuRenderers (copy items +
availability). All mutation-verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Defense-in-depth against XSS for a client that holds storage credentials in
memory. The critical directive is a strict script-src: 'self' + the hash of the
inline theme-bootstrap + the nostr-tools CDN fallbacks, with no 'unsafe-inline'
or 'unsafe-eval' (verified no bundle uses eval/Function/wasm). This blocks
injected script/object elements, inline handlers, and base-tag hijack, so an
injected payload cannot run and read the in-memory storage master key, the
signer, or DM plaintext. connect/img/media stay broad because relays, R2/S3
endpoints, and video/thumbnail URLs are user/content defined; worker-src allows
blob: for the WebTorrent module worker. Applied to index.html and embed.html.
Test (tests/csp-policy.test.mjs) locks the inline-script hash to script-src and
asserts script-src stays strict (no unsafe-inline/eval) with object-src 'none'
and base-uri 'self'.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Slice B part 2 (final). On a cold watch-history load (nothing cached to
show yet) the service now decrypts only the newest chunks first
(chunkDecryptLimit = 3) so the UI renders recent history immediately
instead of freezing behind a deep, monthly-chunked history — the original
NIP-46 symptom. If older chunks were deferred, a single background pass
then backfills them (no chunk cap; already-decrypted chunks are served
from cache, so only the deferred older chunks cost signer RPCs) and emits
"fingerprint", which the history view already re-renders on. The serial
NIP-46 request queue paces the backfill, so there is no rate-limit flood.
Scoped to cold loads only: a warm refresh (items already on screen)
resolves the full history directly, avoiding a transient "history shrank
then grew" flicker. No view / feed-engine changes and no change to the
shared For You / explore paths beyond a fast first render then a fill-in.
Chosen over strict scroll-triggered lazy loading, which would have
required risky surgery on the history view's feed-engine + cursor
pagination and the shared loadLatest path pre-launch.
Tests: cold load passes a finite chunk limit on the first resolve, then an
unbounded background backfill runs and emits recent-only -> full; warm
refresh is unbounded. Both mutation-verified (removing the bound and
no-op'ing the backfill each fail).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Service-layer plumbing for bounded watch-history loading (slice B part 2).
manager.resolve() now forwards chunkDecryptLimit to fetch() and records the
resulting deferred-chunk count in a per-actor side-channel, so resolve() keeps
returning a bare items array (its sole caller depends on that) while the
"more older chunks available" signal is still retrievable. Exposed via
getWatchHistoryDeferredChunkCount() on the manager and the NostrClient facade.
clear() resets the side-channel.
Still inert by default (no caller passes a finite limit yet); this is the
substrate for activating fast-first-render. Tested: resolve under
chunkDecryptLimit:1 returns only the newest chunk's items and reports
deferredChunkCount=1, reset to 0 after clear().
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Foundation for bounded watch-history loading (slice B part 2). A deep
history references many monthly chunks; under a NIP-46 remote signer each
uncached chunk decrypt is a serialized published relay RPC, so decrypting
them all up front blocks the first render and risks the relay rate limit.
manager.fetch now:
- sorts chunk events newest-first by created_at, so the decrypt budget is
spent on the most recent history;
- accepts a chunkDecryptLimit option that caps how many *uncached*,
genuinely-encrypted chunks are decrypted per fetch. Cached/plaintext
chunks are always decrypted (they cost no RPC) and never count against
the limit. Default is Infinity -> no behavior change for existing
callers;
- returns deferredChunkCount so a caller can tell more history is
available on demand (re-fetching with a larger limit reuses the chunk
cache, so only the newly requested older chunks cost RPCs).
Test: two uncached nip44 chunks (newest + older) with chunkDecryptLimit:1
asserts only the newest is decrypted (1 RPC), deferredChunkCount is 1, and
only the newest chunk's items appear. Mutation-verified against both
removing the cap and removing the newest-first sort.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Watch-history decryption previously ordered the matching cipher family
first but kept the other family as a *fallback*. The opposite family can
never decrypt a given ciphertext (NIP-04 always carries a literal "?iv="
marker; NIP-44 is plain base64), so that fallback was a guaranteed-wasted
decrypt attempt. Under a NIP-46 remote signer every decrypt is a
*published* relay RPC routed through the serial 250ms request queue, so a
transient failure on the correct family triggered a second wasted RPC
that burned the queue and pushed cold loads toward the relay rate limit
("noting too much") — the symptom users hit.
determineWatchHistoryDecryptionOrder now filters the attempt set to the
single family implied by the ciphertext shape (trusting the ciphertext
over a possibly-misleading "encrypted" tag), with a safety fallback to
the full ordered list when nothing matches so the only available
decryptor is never stranded. This mirrors the list-decrypt routing
already shipped for userBlocks / subscriptions / hashtags (slice A).
Test: a NIP-44 ciphertext mislabeled with an ["encrypted","nip04"] tag,
against a signer exposing both decryptors where nip04 returns decoy data.
Asserts nip04 is never attempted and the nip44 plaintext is used.
Mutation-verified: removing the filter fails the test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Under a NIP-46 remote signer, every decrypt is a PUBLISHED relay RPC. The list
services (blocks/subscriptions/hashtags) probed all decryptor families
concurrently via Promise.any — so each list event published nip04 AND nip44 RPCs
at once. On login that flooded the relay ("rate-limited: you are noting too
much"), and the racing/queued RPCs blew past the 30s decrypt budget → the
"Decryption timed out" failures.
A NIP-04 payload carries the "?iv=" marker and can ONLY be decrypted by nip04;
otherwise it's nip44. The other family can never succeed on a given ciphertext,
so racing it is pure waste (and a wasted published RPC under NIP-46). Restrict
the decrypt probe to the family matching the ciphertext format (fall back to all
if the format is somehow unknown). Halves cold-load RPCs and stops the racing
publishes that tripped the rate limit; benefits all signer types.
Spec correction: the hashtag "retries decryptors when hinted scheme fails" test
stubbed an impossible scenario (the same ciphertext decrypting under nip04 after
nip44 failed). Rewritten to assert the real contract — the ciphertext format
routes decryption and overrides a misleading `encrypted` tag, invoking only the
matching decryptor.
test_integrity_note:
change_type: ["spec_correction"]
scenarios:
- id: SCN-decrypt-format-routing
given: "a nip04-format ciphertext (?iv=) tagged misleadingly as nip44"
when: "a list service decrypts it"
then: "only the nip04 decryptor is invoked; nip44 is never attempted"
anti_cheat_rationale:
prevents: ["over-mocking internal logic", "asserting impossible cross-family decryption"]
relaxation:
did_relax_any_assertion: false
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The NIP-46 login dialog is purely the QR / connect-link flow ("scan with Amber/
NsecBunker"), but it failed with "A remote signer pubkey is required." A
nostrconnect:// link carries the CLIENT pubkey; the remote signer's pubkey is
only learned after it scans the QR and acknowledges — and the active connect
path (SignerManager) only supported bunker:// (pubkey already in the URI). The
"wait for the signer to acknowledge" logic existed only on the unused
Nip46Connector.
Port it into SignerManager as _waitForRemoteSignerHandshake: subscribe to
kind-24133 events addressed to the client pubkey, decrypt the signer's response,
match the handshake secret (or a generic ack), surface auth_url challenges, and
resolve with the signer's pubkey (with a timeout + a cancel hook wired into
disconnectRemoteSigner). connectRemoteSigner now performs this wait for
client-initiated (nostrconnect) connections before constructing the RPC client;
bunker:// is unchanged.
Decryption uses the existing attemptDecryptNip46HandshakePayload (injectable via
_decryptHandshakePayload for testing). Test: tests/nostr/nip46-wait-handshake.test.mjs
(secret match resolves with signer pubkey; wrong secret ignored -> timeout;
auth_url surfaced without resolving). Full suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
connectRemoteSigner and useStoredRemoteSigner accepted but never used the
`validator` the auth provider passes (accessControl.canAccess) -- so NIP-46
logins bypassed the block/allow gate that nsec/NIP-07 logins enforce. (The
validation lived only on the unused Nip46Connector.)
Both paths now run the validator against the remote signer's resolved user
pubkey BEFORE activating the signer (via _enforceRemoteSignerValidator): the
validator throws on a blocked/non-permitted pubkey, or returning false rejects
with code remote-signer-access-denied. A stored session rejected by the
validator is forgotten so a blocked pubkey can't keep retrying.
Residual (noted in TODO): the silent startup auto-restore
(scheduleStoredRemoteSignerRestore) still reconnects without a validator.
Test: tests/nostr/nip46-prepare-handshake.test.mjs (validator throws / false /
true / absent). Full suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
NIP-46 login via a generated connect link failed with
"nostrClient.prepareRemoteSignerHandshake is not a function". The auth provider
(authProviders/nip46.js) calls nostrClient.prepareRemoteSignerHandshake() to mint
an ephemeral client keypair + nostrconnect:// URI before connecting, but that
method existed only on the unused Nip46Connector class — neither SignerManager
nor NostrClient exposed it.
Add SignerManager.prepareRemoteSignerHandshake (generates the keypair via
nostr-tools, resolves relays, builds the nostrconnect:// URI with relay/secret/
perms/metadata params) and proxy it on NostrClient next to connectRemoteSigner.
Test: tests/nostr/nip46-prepare-handshake.test.mjs. Full suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Drives the real s3UploadService.uploadVideo for a generic (vhost-style) S3
connection with only the S3 I/O mocked, then feeds the published note's URLs
into r2Service.deleteVideoStorage. Asserts the upload writes video + .thumb +
.torrent, the note is valid (URL + magnet with info-hash), and cleanup deletes
exactly those objects using a forcePathStyle-aware S3 client — i.e. the upload
key and the cleanup-derived key agree (the parity property).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Two gaps where generic S3 trailed Cloudflare R2:
1. Object cleanup on delete/edit didn't work for generic S3. deleteVideoStorage
built its client via makeR2Client, which hard-forces path-style and ignores
the connection's forcePathStyle -- so vhost-style S3 deletes were misaddressed
and cleanup silently failed (S3 users' deleted/edited files orphaned). It is
now provider-aware (mirrors uploadFile): R2 -> makeR2Client (path-style),
generic S3 -> makeS3Client honoring forcePathStyle. makeS3Client is now
injectable for testing.
2. CORS guidance on upload failure was R2-only. Extracted isLikelyCorsError +
a generic-S3 guidance builder into js/utils/uploadErrorHints.js (re-exported
from r2Service for back-compat); s3UploadService now appends actionable CORS
guidance on an opaque "Failed to fetch" too.
Generic S3 is now at functional parity with R2 for upload -> publish -> cleanup.
Tests: r2-delete-video-storage (adds generic-S3 forcePathStyle routing),
s3-upload-cors-guidance (new). Full suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Existing upload/feed specs seed events straight into the relay, bypassing the
app's own publish path. This spec drives the actual UI: open the upload modal,
switch to External Link mode, fill title + URL, submit -> the app signs and
publishes to the mock relay -> the video appears in the feed; then the owner
deletes it via the gear menu and it leaves the feed.
Closes the launch-readiness coverage gap on the publish lifecycle (the S3/R2
file upload + cleanup are covered by the unit suites). Verified passing on
chromium (2/2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
A new user's top first-upload failure is a missing R2 CORS policy (browser
PUT/POST blocked) -- and object-scoped R2 tokens often cannot auto-set CORS.
The connection test already surfaces buildCorsGuidance on the opaque
"Failed to fetch", but a user who skips the test and uploads directly got a
bare "Upload failed: Failed to fetch". The upload error handler now detects the
browser CORS/network rejection (isLikelyCorsError -- Chrome "Failed to fetch",
Firefox "NetworkError", Safari "Load failed") and appends the same actionable
guidance. Updated the R2 follow-up TODO (credential audit done; CORS reviewed).
Test: tests/services/r2-cors-error-classifier.test.mjs. Full suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Pre-launch credential-security regression: scans the ENTIRE serialized account
record (meta + encrypted blob) for the secret/access-key strings and asserts
they never appear in plaintext, that listConnections() doesn't expose them, that
they round-trip while unlocked, and that they're unreachable once locked. The
prior check only compared the cipher field to JSON.stringify(payload), which
wouldn't catch a secret leaking into plaintext meta.
Audit conclusion: credential storage is sound — envelope encryption (AES-GCM-256
payload, fresh per-encrypt IV; master key encrypted to-self via the Nostr signer,
NIP-44 preferred / NIP-04 fallback), in-memory master key cleared on logout, no
secret logging, legacy plaintext migrated then cleared.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Captures remaining R2 work after the upload audit + object-cleanup increments:
credential-security review, bucket/custom-domain provisioning audit, CDN purge
integration, and follow-ups to the cleanup work (generic-S3 cleanup, all-versions
delete cleanup, edit thumbnail cleanup). Plus the Vercel production-branch parking
lot item.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Editing a video with a newly-uploaded file produced a new content-addressed
object and orphaned the old one. editModalController.handleSubmit now removes the
old object (best-effort) when the hosted URL was genuinely replaced — guarded so
it only fires when both old and new URLs are present and different (so clearing
the URL, which may still be referenced by a magnet web-seed, never deletes it),
and it deliberately leaves thumbnails alone (the new note may still point at
them). Reuses R2Service.deleteVideoStorage (owned-objects-only, never throws).
Documented the cleanup contract in AGENTS.md §4a.
Test: tests/ui/edit-modal-storage-cleanup.test.mjs (3). Full suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
