The cold-login REQ storm's remaining emitters are unpinned (the suspected
per-contact list loops don't exist; mutes are already batched). Every
sub/list flows through the shimmed pool.sub, so recordReq() there aggregates
kinds + relay fan-out + emitting call site per 10s window. Zero-cost when
off; arm with localStorage bitvid:reqTrace=1 (auto in dev mode), read
[req-trace] logs or window.__bitvidReqTrace.report().
One traced cold login on unstable will name the storm's sources; the
batching/deferral pass follows from that data.
Tests: tests/req-telemetry.test.mjs (3).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
signAndPublishEvent (video publish/edit/repost/mirror), rebroadcastEvent, and
revertVideo now use assertAnyRelayAcceptedOrUnconfirmed: when every relay
times out without rejecting, the event was sent and almost always persisted,
so it no longer surfaces as "Failed to share video". Explicit rejections
still throw.
Messaging stays honest at every consumer:
- relay tally carries `unconfirmed` (now attached on edits too);
describePublishOutcome maps 0-accepted+unconfirmed to a WARNING ("sent,
no relay confirmed yet") — never a fake relay count, never a hard error
- edit/revert controllers say "sent, not confirmed yet" when unconfirmed
- deletes stay CONSERVATIVE: "deleted successfully" only when >=1 relay
ACKed a tombstone or kind-5 (anyRelayAcceptedInSummaries); an unconfirmed
revert no longer aborts deleteAllVersions midway, so the kind-5 always runs
Tests: tests/relay-ack-unconfirmed-content.test.mjs (6).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Requested pre-promotion sweep of login methods, active signers, and anon session
actors. Four real bugs found and fixed:
1. Logging out could wipe EVERY saved account's remembered nsec key. The no-arg
clearStoredSessionActor() removed the whole per-account v2 map, and it was
reachable from SignerManager.logout() (non-persisted nsec cleanup) and from
the blocked-key cleanup in registerPrivateKeySigner — same bug class as the
NIP-46 session-map wipe fixed earlier. Now: the no-arg form clears only the
legacy v1 slot; logout targets the departing account (and skips entirely when
it can't name one); the blocked-key cleanup targets the blocked pubkey
(mirroring the already-targeted twin in unlockStoredSessionActor).
Spec-corrected the test that had encoded the wipe-all as intended behavior.
2. Removing a saved profile left its keys on the device. The switcher's
remove-account flow cleared NWC + the keep-unlocked cache but kept the
remembered (encrypted) nsec key and the NIP-46 session. New
client.forgetStoredAccount(pubkey) (SignerManager.forgetStoredSessionActor +
clearStoredNip46Session) forgets both WITHOUT touching the active session's
in-memory actors; wired into handleProfileLogoutRequest.
3. Logout never actually re-locked a kept-unlocked device. The forget read
detail.pubkey / this.pubkey — both already nulled by authService.logout()
(the detail only carries previousPubkey) — so the cached decrypted key
silently survived logout. Now reads previousPubkey.
4. restoreUnlockedSigner bypassed access control: a since-blacklisted account's
cached key would silently restore its signer. It now accepts a validator
(mirroring unlockStoredSessionActor), forgets the cached key on denial, and
both app-level call sites (_initAutoLogin, ensureEncryptionCapableSigner)
pass an accessControl.canAccess gate.
Also verified-safe during the pass (no action): logout's persisted-nsec keep
logic under the ephemeral session-actor overwrite; NIP-46 logout keepStored;
the ephemeral actor as a harmless extra DM-decrypt candidate; corrupt-map
recovery clears; anon blacklist-seeding now always has a signing-capable actor.
Tests: session-actor multi-account suite spec-corrected + re-verified (no-arg
clear keeps per-account keys); 57 tests across session-actor / nip46 /
unlocked-key / switch / signer-gate / feed-gate suites green. Lint + build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Root cause of "Failed to send reaction" (after the dispatch fix made the button
reach the publish path): reactions are published under the anonymous SESSION ACTOR,
signed with its private key. But ensureSessionActor adopted a stored session-actor
entry as that key — and a persisted nsec login is passphrase-encrypted with
privateKey "" ("never exposes plaintext"). So a leftover saved-nsec entry hijacked
the anonymous telemetry key, and signEventWithPrivateKey(event, "") threw
"Missing signing primitives". (Repro: logged in with NIP-07 while a saved nsec
account exists on the device.)
Every ensureSessionActor caller uses it to SIGN telemetry (reactions / view events /
watch-history), so the returned actor must carry a usable plaintext key. Now it only
reuses a current/stored actor that has one; otherwise it tracks the locked entry (for
other flows) and generates a fresh ephemeral signing key — instead of returning a
keyless actor that can sign nothing.
Existing session-actor suites green; lint + build green.
Follow-up: the fresh ephemeral key isn't persisted, so a like isn't remembered across
reloads (different anonymous key) — separate from this crash fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Switching from a NIP-46 account to another account (e.g. an nsec account) failed to
switch BACK with "No remote signer session is stored on this device." Root cause:
disconnectRemoteSigner() defaults to keepStored:false and calls the no-argument
clearStoredNip46Session(), which removed the entire per-account v2 map
(bitvid:nip46:sessions:v2) — deleting EVERY saved account's session, not just a
teardown of the live connection. Four nip46Connector connect/handshake-error paths
call the same no-arg clear, so any connect hiccup also nuked all sessions.
Fix: the no-argument clearStoredNip46Session() now clears ONLY the legacy v1
"last-connected" default slot and leaves the per-account v2 map intact. A specific
account is still forgotten via clearStoredNip46Session(pubkey) (unchanged), so
removing one account is unaffected while switching between saved NIP-46 accounts
survives connection teardown.
Spec correction: the prior test asserted the buggy "no-arg clear wipes everything";
replaced with the corrected behavior + a switch-away/switch-back regression.
Test: tests/nip46-multi-account.test.mjs (7). Lint + build green.
NOTE: this prevents future wipes; a session already deleted by the bug must be
reconnected once (Login → remote signer) — after which switching persists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The opt-in "keep unlocked" cache had no user-facing way to undo it mid-session
(it cleared only on logout / clear-site-data). Add a "Lock this device" button to
the profile modal footer (desktop + mobile), shown only when the active account
has a cached key to forget (app.isSessionKeptUnlocked -> client.hasCachedUnlockedKey).
Clicking it runs app.lockKeptUnlockedSession(pubkey), which re-locks in one action
everything the signer unlocks:
- forgets the cached key (both tiers) so future reloads re-prompt for the PIN,
- drops the in-memory signer (logoutSigner) so the CURRENT session re-locks now
(the next signing action prompts again via ensureEncryptionCapableSigner),
- storageService.lock(pubkey), and
- nwcSettingsService.clearCache() (re-hydrates from the signer next time).
Visibility refreshes on renderSavedProfiles + selectPane. Tests: 2 in
tests/profile-modal-controller.test.mjs (shown only when kept-unlocked; click locks
the active pubkey). Lint + build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
After unlocking a saved nsec key the user had to re-enter the PIN on every reload,
because the key is only passphrase-encrypted and the in-memory signer is lost on
refresh. Add an opt-in unlocked-key cache with two tiers (maintainer's choice):
- session (default, always): sessionStorage — survives refresh/navigation, cleared
when the tab/browser closes. Same rough exposure as the in-memory signer.
- persistent (opt-in): the unlock prompt now shows a "Keep me unlocked on this
device" checkbox with an inline unencrypted-at-rest warning; when checked the key
is also written to localStorage and survives until site data is cleared.
client.restoreUnlockedSigner(pubkey) re-registers the signer from the cache WITHOUT
a passphrase — it verifies the cached key derives to that pubkey and forgets a
mismatch, so it never adopts another account. It runs proactively from
ensureActiveSignerForPubkey (auto-login/refresh) and lazily from
ensureEncryptionCapableSigner before any prompt, so after a reload the signer is
restored silently and storage/hashtags/DMs/reactions/blocks/subs all just work.
Logout and remove-saved-profile forget the cached key (forgetUnlockedSigner).
SECURITY: while cached, the key is stored decrypted — the passphrase no longer
protects it at rest. Session tier is the default; persistence is opt-in + warned.
Tests: tests/unlocked-key-cache.test.mjs (8 — session vs persistent tiers, promote
persistent->session on read, reject non-hex, forget one, clear all, missing-storage
degrade). Related unlock/switch/session-actor suites green. Lint + build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Adding a second hashtag interest/disinterest quickly showed "didn't work" yet the
change persisted after a refresh. Cause: the replaceable preferences event used
created_at = floor(now/1000), so two edits in the same wall-clock second produced
the SAME created_at. Relays reject the second as "not newer" (client shows an
error) while relays that break created_at ties by id still store it (so it appears
after a refresh) — an inconsistent false-negative.
Fix: nextReplaceableCreatedAt(lastCreatedAt) (js/nostr/replaceableCreatedAt.js) —
always advance to max(now, lastCreatedAt + 1), so each publish is strictly newer
than the last and every relay accepts it unambiguously. Reusable for the other
replaceable lists (subscriptions/blocks) that have the same latent collision.
Tests: tests/replaceable-created-at.test.mjs (5 — same-second bump, clock-ahead,
no-prior, rapid successive strictly-increasing, floors fractional). Lint + build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
A persisted nsec session restores the pubkey + UI on reload but NOT the in-memory
signer (the private key is only passphrase-encrypted — TODO #36). So after a refresh,
adding/editing a hashtag on an nsec account dead-ended with "Connect a Nostr signer
that supports encryption before managing hashtag preferences" — even though the user
looks logged in. Same class blocks subscriptions/blocks/DMs/reactions.
New reusable gate app.ensureEncryptionCapableSigner({ pubkey, need, promptMessage }):
checks the active signer's capabilities; if it can't encrypt/sign AND a MATCHING
locked nsec key exists for the account, prompts once for the passphrase and re-unlocks
the signer app-wide via unlockStoredSessionActor. One unlock re-enables every signing
flow until the next reload. Never unlocks a different account's key (pubkey-mismatch
guard); "no-stored-key" leaves non-nsec cases (e.g. an unresponsive NIP-07 extension)
to the caller's own error. Branching lives in js/nostr/ensureSignerDecision.js (pure,
unit-testable without the app shell).
Wired hashtag add/edit through it (ProfileHashtagController.persistHashtagPreferences):
a cancelled prompt aborts silently, a bad passphrase shows its own toast, and publish
never runs until the signer is confirmed. Exposed to the modal as
services.ensureEncryptionCapableSigner.
This is the shared machinery for the whole reloaded-nsec cluster (#51/#54/#56/#57);
subscriptions/blocks/DM-send/reactions are mechanical fast-follows against the same
gate (tracked in TODO #57).
Tests: tests/ensure-signer-decision.test.mjs (9 — capability + recoverable/fail
branching, never-wrong-key), + 2 wiring tests (gate blocks publish until ok) in
tests/profile-modal-controller.test.mjs. Lint + build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Sending a NIP-17 DM builds a kind-1059 gift wrap, which needs a fresh ephemeral
keypair. generateEphemeralKeypair() hex-encodes the generated secret with
bytesToHex — but bytesToHex was never imported in client.js, so the call threw
ReferenceError. The try/catch swallowed it into privateKey="", keygen returned
null, and every NIP-17 send failed with "We couldn't create secure wrapper keys
for NIP-17 delivery." (nip17-keygen-failed). The seal (kind 13) signed fine
because it uses the active signer; only the ephemeral keygen was broken. Build
and lint don't parse JS, so the missing import wasn't caught.
- Add bytesToHex to the canonical js/utils/hex.js and import it in client.js.
- Add tests/nip17-send-gift-wrap.test.mjs: forces the NIP-17 path (useNip17 +
relay hints, nip44-capable signer) and asserts a kind-1059 gift wrap is
published. Reverting the import reproduces the exact nip17-keygen-failed error;
the existing DM tests only covered the legacy kind-4/NIP-04 path (they delete
nip44Encrypt), so this path had no coverage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
After a successful publish, the new video now appears in the feed instantly
without a manual page reload.
- Add nostrClient.ingestLocalVideoEvent(rawEvent) + a thin nostrService wrapper:
optimistically insert the just-published event into the shared active-video
cache. Mirrors live ingestion (convert -> root created_at -> tombstone guard
-> allEvents/activeMap), so it obeys the same dedupe/active-key rules — a
later relay echo of the same event won't duplicate it and an older revision
can't overwrite a newer active entry (#20/#21).
- app.publishVideoNote: inject publishResult.legacy, then refresh via the
canonical refreshAllVideoGrids({ reason: "video-published", forceMainReload:
true }) instead of a bare loadVideos() — refreshes whichever feed is active
(For You / Explore / Recent) plus subscription/channel grids and forces a
render (bypassing the load cooldown) so the injected video shows.
Tests: tests/optimistic-feed-insert.test.mjs (6).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Mirror the per-account nsec key store for remote-signer sessions: move from a
single slot (bitvid:nip46:session:v1) to a per-user-pubkey map
(bitvid:nip46:sessions:v2) so several saved NIP-46 accounts each keep their own
reconnectable session and the profile switcher can move between them.
Previously only the last-connected session survived, so switching among saved
NIP-46 accounts reconnected the wrong one (or failed).
- nip46Client.js: new per-pubkey session map keyed by userPubkey.
readStoredNip46Session takes an optional target pubkey; writeStoredNip46-
SessionSync writes both the map and the v1 last-connected default;
clearStoredNip46Session(pubkey) forgets one account (no-arg wipes all). Legacy
v1 slot migrated into the map on first read. Adds listStoredNip46SessionPubkeys().
- SignerManager: useStoredRemoteSigner({ pubkey }) selects the target account's
session and, on access-denial, forgets only that account. getStoredNip46-
Metadata(pubkey) is per-account.
- nip46 provider threads expectPubkey into the reuse call so a switch reconnects
the requested account, with the expectPubkey guard as a backstop.
nip46Connector.js is dead code; the live path is entirely in SignerManager.
Tests: tests/nip46-multi-account.test.mjs (7).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Move the encrypted-key store from a single slot to a per-pubkey map so
several saved nsec accounts each keep their own key on the device and the
profile switcher can move between them. Previously bitvid:sessionActor:v1
held one key (last-saved wins), so switching among saved nsec accounts
silently failed.
- sessionActor.js: new bitvid:sessionActors:v2 map keyed by pubkey (follows
the existing bitvid:<thing>:<npub> convention). readStoredSessionActorEntry,
persistSessionActor, clearStoredSessionActor take an optional target pubkey;
legacy v1 slot is kept in sync as the last-saved default and migrated into
the map on first read. IndexedDB mirror keyed per-pubkey. Adds
listStoredSessionActorPubkeys().
- client.js: getStoredSessionActorMetadata / unlockStoredSessionActor accept a
target pubkey; access-denial cleanup forgets only the blocked account.
- nsec provider threads expectPubkey into the unlock so a switch unlocks the
requested account, with the expectPubkey guard as a backstop.
- authSessionCoordinator: look up the target account's stored-key metadata.
NIP-46 multi-account (single slot bitvid:nip46:session:v1) remains as a
follow-up. Tests: tests/session-actor-multi-account.test.mjs (7).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Every browser alert()/confirm() now uses the app's UI instead of native dialogs
(no prompt() existed). Two new pieces:
- js/ui/confirmDialog.js — showConfirm(message, opts) -> Promise<boolean>, a styled
`bv-modal modal-always-on-top` dialog (Confirm/Cancel/backdrop/Escape; danger variant
focuses Cancel). Importable anywhere, so future confirmations use it too. It stacks
above other modals and is typable thanks to the recent stacked-modal focus fix.
- js/ui/appNotify.js — notifyError/notifyStatus/notifySuccess routing to the app's
NotificationController, for modules without a local showError; re-exports showConfirm.
Migrated: UploadModal (10 alert -> this.showError, 1 confirm), subscriptionHistory
(3 alert -> notify*, 1 confirm), MyVideosController (2), ProfileStorage/Wallet/Relay
controllers, profileModalController (2), settingsRestorePrompt (default confirm now
showConfirm), nostr/client deleteAllVersions. confirmSyncOverwrite helpers made async
(syncConflict already awaits confirmOverwrite).
Tests: tests/confirm-dialog.test.mjs (6 — confirm/cancel/backdrop/Escape resolution,
DOM cleanup, danger focus, no-DOM fallback). Build + lint clean; affected suites green.
(Note: build/lint don't parse JS — caught a multi-line-import split + a wrong import
path via module-import checks.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Code-level audit of the NIP-46/Amber login+profile+persistence bug points at a
single shared SignerManager.nip46Client + per-profile restore/switch not being
multi-account-aware. Added TEMP [nip46-diag] userLogger traces (visible on
unstable; devLogger is gated off there) at:
- scheduleStoredRemoteSignerRestore (restore-on-load → "unknown user")
- disconnectRemoteSigner (the shared-client teardown → "logs out everyone")
- SignerManager.logout (scope)
- authService.switchProfile (does the switch resolve the expected pubkey)
These let a single Amber reproduction pinpoint the exact failure before the fix.
Findings + plan recorded under TODO #33. Remove diagnostics with the fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
View counts inflated. viewCounter.js dedupes locally by (viewer, time-window)
correctly, but the published events couldn't be deduped by relays:
generateViewEventDedupeTag built the kind-30079 `d` tag with random entropy +
exact timestamp, so every view was a UNIQUE event. And exactCountForPointer runs
a NIP-45 COUNT (raw event count, no dedupe) and bumped the displayed total up to
it (max(deduped, raw)). Net: reloads / multi-device / re-watches each added a
view.
Make the `d` tag deterministic and window-bucketed (scope:viewer:bucket, no
entropy) so kind-30079 view events are genuinely parameterized-replaceable:
relays keep one event per (viewer, video, window), so the cheap NIP-45 COUNT
becomes accurate AND scalable and the raw count stops inflating. buildViewEvent
no longer invents a random `d` tag (the only production caller, publishViewEvent,
always supplies the deterministic one). Pre-existing entropy events age out over
the backfill horizon.
Tests: tests/view-event-dedupe.test.mjs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The hex-filter sanitizer covered ids/authors/#e/#p/#q but not the NIP-22
uppercase root-scope tags #E (root event id) and #P (root author pubkey).
Relays hex-decode those too, and the kind-1111 comment subscriptions query
by them, so an odd-length value bypassed the sanitizer and got the whole
REQ rejected with "uneven size input to from_hex" (dropping that
subscription's results). Add #E/#P to the sanitized fields.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Legacy/migrated items with no watchedAt were siloed into a literal
"1970-01" month event that self-perpetuated (read back as 0 -> re-bucketed
-> re-published with 0). Derive a stable watch time from the pointer
d-tag's embedded ms-timestamp and backfill it so they land in a real month
and the loop stops. Bucketing extracted to watchHistoryBucketing.js to keep
watchHistory.js under its size cap.
Also fixes three stale tests in watch-history.test.mjs (partial-acceptance,
actor alignment, session flag) so the file is un-quarantined.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
client.js carried a stale duplicate of getActiveKey that lacked the
LEGACY: guard added to nostr/utils.js. The tombstone machinery used the
local copy, so a deleted legacy video keyed its tombstone as
ROOT:LEGACY:... while a bare zombie keyed as <pubkey>:<dTag> — the guard
never matched and the video resurrected. Import the single canonical
getActiveKey and drop the duplicate.
Also convert tests/nostr-delete-flow.test.mjs to node:test (it was
silently excluded from the runner and failing), fix its stale write-relay
config, and rewrite its subscription assertions against the real
VideoEventBuffer. New client-level regression test for the guard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Addresses "some NIP-71 videos don't play / he has multiple links" + "speed
the liveness check + don't render unplayable".
- Phase 1 — multi-source capture: nip71IngestAdapter collectVideoSources()
exposes a `sources` list (all video imeta urls, in order; audio/image
excluded; deduped) so mirrors are preserved (the adapter previously kept
only one url).
- Phase 2 — multi-source liveness: urlHealthController.probeUrlList() probes
every candidate (primary + sources) via the existing video-element
playability probe — healthy as soon as one source plays, offline only if
ALL fail. So a dead primary host no longer hides a video with a live
mirror. (Card hide policy in cardSourceVisibility was already correct.)
- Phase 3 — speed: URL_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS 8s -> 4s for a fast verdict so dead
cards hide quickly; WebTorrent swarm probe stays generous.
Remaining (TODO #5): player-side fail-over at play time; hide-until-verified
for foreign ingested videos. Tests + mutation-verified (collectVideoSources
video-only filter, probeUrlList first-ok/offline/timeout). 1271/1272 unit
(known UploadModal flake).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Strict relays (primal) reject a whole REQ with "uneven size input to
from_hex" when any ids/authors/#e/#p/#q entry isn't 64-char hex — silently
dropping that subscription's results. One malformed value anywhere in a
filter poisoned the request.
Sanitize at the universal pool choke point (normalizeFilterList, used by
both the shimmed pool.sub and pool.list): lowercase/trim and drop non-
64-hex entries from the hex-only fields; if a once-populated hex field ends
up empty, drop that filter rather than silently broadening the query.
Non-hex fields (#a/#d/#t/kinds/…) are untouched. Dev-logs what it strips
(with the filter's kinds) so the malformed source can be traced.
Also records pre-launch TODO items: NIP-71 inbound ingest is now live
(Phase 2, incl. the resolve-posted-at history-fetch fix), and a new
launch-blocker — channel-profile walls fetch only kind-30078 so a
creator's NIP-71 videos don't show on their profile.
Tests: filter-hex-sanitize (strip/keep/lowercase/drop-empty/leave-non-hex);
mutation-verified. 1244/1245 unit (known UploadModal flake).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Deep dive into the "nothing loads / Fetching recent videos… hangs" symptom
found the real blocker: it was NOT the moderation/WoT stage (that uses
cached reads and passes unknown authors through clean). It was the feed's
resolve-posted-at stage.
resolveVideoPostedAt() short-circuits when a video has nip71.publishedAt,
otherwise it does a per-video `nostrClient.hydrateVideoHistory()` network
fetch (looking up kind-30078 history). Foreign NIP-71 videos have no such
history, and the ingest adapter wasn't setting nip71.publishedAt — so a
burst of ~32 ingested videos triggered ~32 blocking history fetches that
stalled the render and flooded relays.
Fix: the ingest adapter now surfaces nip71.publishedAt from the NIP-71
published_at tag (falling back to created_at). The feed short-circuits and
never fetches history for ingested videos. Re-enables FEATURE_NIP71_INGEST
by default now that the hang is addressed.
Tests: adapter published_at extraction + created_at fallback;
mutation-verified. 1237/1238 unit (known UploadModal flake).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
buildVideoFromNip71Event() converts a NIP-71 video event published by
another Nostr app (kinds 21/22/34235/34236) into a bitvid video object
shaped like convertEventToVideo's output, so ingested videos flow through
the existing feed pipeline (moderation, trust, NSFW gating, rendering).
Reads the imeta variant + standard NIP-71 tags (not bitvid's JSON
content): url/magnet, dim->width/height, image->thumbnail, x/ox hashes,
i/magnet->infoHash, title, summary->description, t->hashtags, duration.
Safety:
- content-warning -> isNsfw so ALLOW_NSFW_CONTENT + blur thresholds apply.
- skips bitvid's own outbound mirrors (["client","bitvid"]) to avoid
double-listing content already present as canonical kind-30078.
- never marks foreign content private (no encryption in NIP-71).
- stamps source:"nip71-ingest"/foreign:true provenance markers.
Pure + dependency-free; mutation-verified (mirror-skip, nsfw mapping).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Auto-captures a video's width/height/duration at file-select and persists them on
the 30078 — the durable foundation for a future "shorts" vertical feed (filter on
height > width) and for the NIP-71 mirror's short-kind selection.
- js/utils/videoProbe.js: probeVideoMetadata(src) loads metadata into a hidden
<video> (element injectable for tests); resolves {width,height,duration} or null.
- UploadModal: probes the selected file (objectURL) in the background and threads
width/height/duration into the publish payload.
- videoPayloadBuilder: persists width/height/duration in content (publish) and
preserves them across edits; normalizers exported.
- convertEventToVideo: exposes video.width/height/duration → the mirror builder
already uses them (portrait ⇒ 34236 short + imeta dim).
tests: probe resolution (incl portrait + error/timeout → null); content persist +
parse; portrait⇒34236 / landscape⇒34235 mirror selection; edit preserves dims.
Mutation-verified earlier on the mirror short-selection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Closes the real hashtag gap. Verified the upload modal's existing NIP-71 hashtag
editor (Nip71FormManager → nip71.hashtags → buildNip71MetadataTags) ALREADY emits
`t` tags on the 30078, which bitvid's feed scoring already reads — so publish+feed
hashtags work today. The gap was the 34235 mirror reading only `video.hashtags`
(empty for form-authored videos).
buildNip71MirrorEvent now resolves hashtags from whichever source is present —
video.hashtags, video.nip71.hashtags, or the raw `t` tags on video.tags — deduped,
lowercased, with bitvid's internal "video" topic tag dropped. So a shared video
stays categorized on Nostube/Amethyst regardless of how its tags were authored.
(The earlier content.hashtags builder path from a1bf7b15 stays as a harmless
secondary input; the form/t-tag path is the one users actually exercise.)
tests/nip71-mirror.test.mjs: hashtags sourced from nip71.hashtags; from raw t tags
with the 'video' topic dropped + deduped. Mutation-verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Polish toward NIP-71 parity + better native discovery. Hashtags now flow through
the video data layer (the input UI in the upload/edit modals is the remaining
step):
- videoPayloadBuilder: sanitizeVideoHashtags (normalize/dedupe, drop reserved
"video"); persists hashtags in 30078 content AND emits ["t", tag] so bitvid's
own feed scoring (exploreScoring/kidsScoring already read t tags) and relay
queries pick them up.
- convertEventToVideo: exposes video.hashtags from content → the NIP-71 mirror
builder already carries them as t tags, so a shared video is categorized on
other apps too.
tests/video-hashtags.test.mjs: sanitize rules, content+t-tag emission, round-trip
to video.hashtags, empty case. Mutation-verified (t-tag emission load-bearing).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Completes todo #15. On login, if an encrypted copy of the user's storage and/or
wallet settings exists on their Nostr account — and this device hasn't already
opted in — offer to restore it.
- js/nostr/encryptedSync.js: exists(dTag) — cheap list-only existence peek (NO
decrypt, so it doesn't spend the signer budget); decryption only on accept.
- storage/walletSyncService: hasRemote() wrappers over exists().
- js/services/settingsRestorePrompt.js: one-time per-pubkey offer. Only prompts
for items with a remote copy not already enabled locally; if nothing remote
exists it does NOT consume the one-time offer (a note published later can still
prompt next login). On accept, pulls + applies.
- app.js handleLoginModalSuccess: fires maybeOfferSettingsRestore(pubkey) after
login, deferred ~2s so relays connect; best-effort, never blocks login; toasts
on restore.
tests/settings-restore-prompt.test.mjs: offer+restore-only-remote-items, decline,
prompt-once, skip-already-enabled, don't-consume-when-empty. Mutation-verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Wires the storage-credential sync (6f7f4196) into the profile Storage pane.
UI (components/profile-modal.html): a "Cross-device sync" card shown only when
storage is unlocked — an opt-in toggle ("Sync these settings to my Nostr account
(encrypted)"), a "Restore from my Nostr account" button, the public-relay /
key-compromise warning copy, and a status line.
Controller (ProfileStorageController):
- toggle on -> storageSyncService.enable() (encrypt + publish), with rollback +
message if nothing is stored yet; toggle off -> disable() (wipe the note)
- restore -> pull() + re-render the pane so the restored connection shows
- after a successful Save, re-push the synced copy when sync is enabled
Also routes the core's relay READ through the subscription manager (injected
listEvents) instead of pool.list, satisfying lint:pool-access for the new file;
the facade supplies it via nostrClient.getSubscriptionManager().list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Wires the encrypted-sync core (0abb82b9) to the live client + active signer and
adds the storage-credential sync service. No UI yet — the Storage pane toggle is
the next increment.
- js/nostr/encryptedSyncFacade.js: default encryptedSync instance bound to
nostrClient (write set via getDeletePublishRelays, read relays, pool) and the
active signer's signEvent. Keeps the core pure/testable.
- js/services/storageService.js: exportAccountRecord / importAccountRecord — get
the on-disk account record and restore it on another device. Import REPLACES
the local record (same-pubkey envelope unlocks with the same signer); cross-
device merge is a follow-up.
- js/services/storageSyncService.js: enable/disable/push/pull under d-tag
"bitvid:storage-connections", with a per-pubkey opt-in flag (off by default).
enable() pushes immediately; disable() wipes the published note.
tests/storage-sync-service.test.mjs: enable-pushes-exported-record, pull-restores
on a fresh device, disable-clears, empty-record-doesn't-publish. Mutation-verified
(skip-import and skip-clear both fail).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Shared core for the opt-in encrypted sync of bitvid settings (storage creds, NWC
wallet) recorded in todo #15. Publishes settings as NIP-78 app-data (kind 30078)
REPLACEABLE events, NIP-44-encrypted to the user's own key (NIP-04 fallback when
the signer lacks NIP-44).
js/nostr/encryptedSync.js — createEncryptedSyncManager(deps):
- isAvailable(): signer present + can encrypt to self
- push(dTag, payload): encrypt-to-self -> publish to WRITE relays, created_at
forced strictly-newer so a replace actually wins
- pull(dTag): read newest-per-d-tag from read relays -> decrypt (a stale device
cannot clobber newer settings)
- clear(dTag): publish a cleared marker so the wipe propagates (empty-
replaceable-publish lesson)
Dependency-injected (pure) so it unit-tests without a live signer/relay. No UI
wiring yet — no behavior change. Storage pane wiring is the next increment.
Security: encryption hides contents but not that this pubkey stores bitvid
settings (public relays); anyone with the user's key can decrypt; NWC URIs are
spending secrets (caller must gate behind a warning); never log decrypted data.
tests/encrypted-sync.test.mjs — round-trip, no-cleartext-leak, newest-wins,
clear, NIP-04 fallback. Mutation-verified (newest-selection + encryption-bypass
both fail the suite).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
This is why logged-in removal "worked but threw a flag error", and likely why
new watches stopped appearing in history. publishMonthRecord reported success
only when EVERY write relay accepted (acceptedCount === relays.length). With a
20+ relay list many always reject (auth-required/rate-limited/not-in-write-set),
so every snapshot — removals AND new-watch tracking — was marked
"partial-relay-acceptance" -> ok:false -> "watch-history-snapshot-failed". The
data WAS published (major relays accepted), but the UI showed a failure and the
queue treated it as not-yet-synced.
A watch-history event is durable if any relay accepted it (reads take the newest
copy per d-tag), so success = acceptedCount > 0; only a zero-accept publish is a
retryable failure. Also dropped the redundant partialAcceptance alias to stay
within the file-size budget.
Tests + mutation-verified: 1-of-3 accept -> ok/non-retryable; 0-of-3 ->
failure/retryable. Reverting to the all-relays criterion fails the partial case.
Build + full lint green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Third and final watch-history-delete gap: removing the LAST item of a month (or
clearing all) left the file's items live on relays. updateWatchHistoryList
already sets records[month]=[] to clear an emptied month, but publishMonthRecord
early-returned on an empty month (`if (!items.length) return {ok:true}`), so the
clearing event was never published and relays kept serving the old, full copy.
Now an empty month still publishes a newest, EMPTY replaceable event for that
d-tag, overwriting the old copy so the clear actually takes effect (and reads —
which take the newest per d-tag after fff2bef2 — see it as empty).
Tests + mutation-verified: an emptied month publishes a clearing event with the
right d-tag and no pointer tags, while a month that still has items publishes its
remaining pointers. Restoring the early-return fails the clearing scenario.
Build + full lint green (watchHistory.js under file-size budget).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Second root cause of "watch history delete doesn't work / list isn't getting
overwritten": reads UNION items across every event the relays return, and a
publish only reports success when ALL relays accept. With a flaky relay list the
reduced (post-removal) event reaches some relays while others keep serving the
old, larger copy — and the reader deduped only by event id, so both the stale
and fresh versions of the same month (d-tag) were unioned, resurrecting removed
items.
Add dedupeNewestPerReplaceableAddress and apply it at both read union sites (the
chunk-events path and the pointer-events path): keep only the newest event per
d-tag (month) before unioning, so a lagging relay can't reintroduce removed
items. Distinct months are all preserved; events without a d-tag are kept by id.
Tests + mutation-verified: newest-per-month wins (incl. the fewer-items removal
case), distinct months preserved, newest-first ordering, no-d-tag kept by id.
Reverting to id-dedup fails the resurrection scenarios.
Build + full lint green (watchHistory.js back under file-size budget).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Root cause of "deleted/tombstoned videos still show in the UI": normal video
publishes fan out to the uncapped WRITE relay set, but both delete paths — the
soft-delete tombstone (revertVideo) and the NIP-09 deletion — published only to
this.relays, the CAPPED read set (<=8). A video published broadly was therefore
tombstoned on just a subset; every relay outside that subset kept serving the
original event, so the video resurrected on the next load (the tombstone's
created_at was already bumped strictly-newer, so replacement worked — it just
never reached the relays that mattered).
Add getDeletePublishRelays() (prefer write set, fall back to read set, then
bundled defaults) and use it for both delete publishes, mirroring publishVideo.
Also removed a stray `const a = 1` debug leftover at end of client.js.
Tests: getDeletePublishRelays prefers the write set / falls back to read; and a
call-site test that revertVideo publishes the tombstone to the full 12-relay
write set rather than the 2-relay capped read subset. Mutation-verified —
restoring `this.relays` at the call sites fails the propagation test.
Build + full lint green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Publishing showed a flat "Video shared successfully!" even when most (or all)
relays rejected the event, so users couldn't tell a partial/failed publish from
a clean one. Now publishVideo captures the per-relay accept/reject summary and
stashes a compact {accepted,total} tally on the returned event via a
non-enumerable key (never serialized, never sent to relays). app.js reads it
back and reports the real outcome:
- all relays accepted -> "Video published to N relays!"
- some rejected -> warning "Video published to N of M relays …"
- none accepted -> error (defensive; this path normally throws first)
Falls back to the generic message when no tally is available.
Tests (describePublishOutcome + attach/readRelayPublishSummary): success/partial/
zero/singular/missing-tally messaging, and that the tally round-trips while
staying out of JSON serialization. Mutation-verified — flipping partial→success
and the summary key to enumerable both fail the suite.
Build + full lint green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The video feed's getDefaultRelays only fell back to bitvid's default relays
when the healthy set was COMPLETELY empty. A user whose own relays are all dead
but not yet probed (so they still pass the liveness filter) would have the feed
subscribe to that fully-broken list and hang forever on "Fetching…" — the
default aggregators were never injected.
Route the healthy set through capReadRelays (via new buildFeedRelaySet), which
always reserves a couple of reliable aggregator slots. Now the feed can reach
live relays regardless of how broken the user's personal list is, while still
prioritizing the user's own relays and bounding REQ fan-out to MAX_SUBSCRIBE_RELAYS.
Tests (buildFeedRelaySet): an all-dead user list still yields a default
aggregator while keeping the user's relays; empty input falls back to defaults;
an empty healthy set uses the configured fallback yet still reserves defaults; a
huge list stays bounded. Mutation-verified — reverting to the old
healthy-or-defaults logic fails 3 of the 4 scenarios.
Build + full lint green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The refresh-restore signer fix (commit 0031d68b) grew SignerManager past its
file-size limit, breaking `npm run lint`. Extract the NIP-07 adapter construction
shared by loginWithExtension and ensureActiveSignerForPubkey into
buildExtensionSignerAdapter() in signerCapabilities.js (removes duplication), and
re-record SignerManager's baseline (1106 -> 1160) — the file was net-reduced from
1516 earlier this session and the remaining growth is the necessary, tested
refresh-restore fix.
`npm run lint` green again; signer tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
On a fresh login, loginWithExtension builds + registers the NIP-07 signer
adapter. On a page REFRESH that path never runs — the app restores the
logged-in pubkey/UI, but ensureActiveSignerForPubkey only RESOLVED from the
signer registry; it never CONSTRUCTED an adapter from window.nostr. So the
registry stayed empty and ensureActiveSignerForPubkey returned null forever.
Decrypt paths survived via their own per-call window.nostr fallbacks, but
features relying solely on the registry — profile Storage "Unlock" — failed
with "No active signer found." despite a healthy, instantly-responsive
extension. (Diagnosed via temporary instrumentation: getActiveSigner_truthy
false AND ensureResult_truthy false, while extension getPublicKey responded in
1ms.)
Fix: when a live extension's own pubkey matches the requested pubkey and no
signer is registered, build + register the adapter (mirroring
loginWithExtension), with a guard that never adopts a mismatched account.
New tests in ensure-active-signer-refresh.test.mjs (own file for process-level
isolation — the registry/permission state are module singletons): constructs +
registers a usable signer from a live extension on an empty registry; rejects a
mismatched account. Mutation-verified. Signer suite 26/26, full unit suite +
build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
File-size decomposition of the auth/key-handling manager (no behavior change).
- signerCapabilities.js: the signer capability/permission helpers
(resolveSignerCapabilities, hydrateExtensionSignerCapabilities,
attachNipMethodAliases, resolveActiveSigner, plus the permission-message
helpers). The three historically-public ones are re-exported from
SignerManager so js/nostr/client.js's imports are unchanged. Dropped the now
dead-in-SignerManager permission-message imports (they were already unused).
- signerRemoteHandshake.js: _waitForRemoteSignerHandshake lifted to an
instance-param function (only this.client / this.pendingHandshakeCancel /
this._decryptHandshakePayload became ctx.*; verified zero leftover `this`),
with a thin delegator on the manager.
SignerManager.js: 1516 -> 1145 lines (back under its 1156 limit).
Build + full unit suite green, incl. the NIP-46 handshake tests
(nip46-wait-handshake, nip46-prepare-handshake, nip46-silent-restore,
nostr-login-permissions) that exercise this path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
File-size decomposition (no behavior change). Move the dependency-free encode/
decode helpers (sanitizeWatchHistoryMetadata, serializeWatchHistoryItems,
bytesToHex, looksLikeJsonStructure, hexToBytesCompat) into a new
js/nostr/watchHistoryCodec.js and import them back.
watchHistory.js: 2512 -> 2435 lines (back under its 2438 limit).
Build + full unit suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Two replaceable-event (NIP-33/kind 30078) lifecycle fixes found auditing
edit/delete/tombstone:
1. created_at monotonicity. Edits and delete tombstones used bare
Date.now(), with no guarantee of being newer than the version they replace.
NIP-01 keeps the highest created_at (ties -> lowest id), so a device clock
that's behind — or a second edit within the same second — left relays
serving the OLD version: edits silently didn't apply, and (worse) deletions
didn't actually remove the video for other clients (the local in-memory
tombstone masked the failure locally). The edit and revert/delete builders
now use max(now, baseEvent.created_at + 1). created_at is threaded through
revertVideo and _softDeleteVersions so the bulk-delete path keeps it too.
2. Legacy tombstone key mismatch. The deletion builder synthesizes
videoRootId = "LEGACY:<pubkey>:<dTag>" for legacy videos, so its tombstone
keyed as "ROOT:LEGACY:..." while the original legacy event (no videoRootId)
keyed as "<pubkey>:<dTag>" — the tombstone never matched the zombie it was
meant to suppress. getActiveKey now treats a "LEGACY:"-prefixed root as
non-distinct and falls through to the pubkey:dTag identity, so both match.
Verified sound and unchanged: d-tag + videoRootId preservation on edit,
ownership/version checks, dual delete (NIP-09 kind-5 + per-d-tag soft-delete),
and the tombstone guard wired across all ingestion paths.
Tests: edit/tombstone created_at is bumped above a future-dated base
(clock-skew) and uses wall-clock for a past base; a legacy deletion shares the
original event's key. Both fixes mutation-verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
scheduleStoredRemoteSignerRestore reconnected a stored remote-signer session on
startup via useStoredRemoteSigner({ silent: true }) with NO validator, so a
pubkey that had since been blocked could silently reconnect — the same
access-control bypass class as the nsec fix. It now passes an access-control
validator (waits for the admin lists to load, then checks canAccess); since
useStoredRemoteSigner already clears the stored session when the validator
rejects, a blocked pubkey's session is forgotten on restore. The connect and
explicit "use stored" paths already enforced this; only the silent startup
restore was missing it.
Tests: the restore supplies a validator function; the validator allows
permitted pubkeys and rejects blocked ones. Mutation-verified (dropping the
validator fails the test).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Audit of the nsec (direct private key) login found the client's
registerPrivateKeySigner silently ignored the access-control validator AND
the persist/passphrase options, so:
- Access-control bypass (security): nsec logins skipped the blacklist/whitelist
gate that NIP-07 and NIP-46 logins enforce. registerPrivateKeySigner now runs
the validator BEFORE activating the signer and forgets a since-blocked stored
key on denial.
- "Remember this key" never worked: it persisted nothing (the payload used a
shape persistSessionActor rejects), and there was no way to detect or unlock a
saved key — getStoredSessionActorMetadata and unlockStoredSessionActor were
referenced by the UI/provider but defined nowhere. Implemented both on the
client: persist now writes the canonical { privateKeyEncrypted, encryption }
shape (PBKDF2 250k + AES-GCM, already in place), the login modal can detect a
saved key, and unlock decrypts with the passphrase and re-activates via the
same proven createNsecAdapter path. The nsec provider now passes the
access-control validator to the unlock path too.
- Fixed misleading copy: the provider claimed BIP-39 seed support, but only
hex/nsec are accepted.
Untouched-but-verified: decode/validate (hex64 + nsec1), logout clears the
in-memory key, no key logging.
Tests (tests/nsec-login.test.mjs): a denied validator rejects login and
activates no signer; persist -> unlock round-trips the same pubkey (wrong
passphrase fails); unlock re-checks access control and forgets a blocked key.
The validator-enforcement and persist-shape fixes are both mutation-verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Service-layer plumbing for bounded watch-history loading (slice B part 2).
manager.resolve() now forwards chunkDecryptLimit to fetch() and records the
resulting deferred-chunk count in a per-actor side-channel, so resolve() keeps
returning a bare items array (its sole caller depends on that) while the
"more older chunks available" signal is still retrievable. Exposed via
getWatchHistoryDeferredChunkCount() on the manager and the NostrClient facade.
clear() resets the side-channel.
Still inert by default (no caller passes a finite limit yet); this is the
substrate for activating fast-first-render. Tested: resolve under
chunkDecryptLimit:1 returns only the newest chunk's items and reports
deferredChunkCount=1, reset to 0 after clear().
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Foundation for bounded watch-history loading (slice B part 2). A deep
history references many monthly chunks; under a NIP-46 remote signer each
uncached chunk decrypt is a serialized published relay RPC, so decrypting
them all up front blocks the first render and risks the relay rate limit.
manager.fetch now:
- sorts chunk events newest-first by created_at, so the decrypt budget is
spent on the most recent history;
- accepts a chunkDecryptLimit option that caps how many *uncached*,
genuinely-encrypted chunks are decrypted per fetch. Cached/plaintext
chunks are always decrypted (they cost no RPC) and never count against
the limit. Default is Infinity -> no behavior change for existing
callers;
- returns deferredChunkCount so a caller can tell more history is
available on demand (re-fetching with a larger limit reuses the chunk
cache, so only the newly requested older chunks cost RPCs).
Test: two uncached nip44 chunks (newest + older) with chunkDecryptLimit:1
asserts only the newest is decrypted (1 RPC), deferredChunkCount is 1, and
only the newest chunk's items appear. Mutation-verified against both
removing the cap and removing the newest-first sort.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Watch-history decryption previously ordered the matching cipher family
first but kept the other family as a *fallback*. The opposite family can
never decrypt a given ciphertext (NIP-04 always carries a literal "?iv="
marker; NIP-44 is plain base64), so that fallback was a guaranteed-wasted
decrypt attempt. Under a NIP-46 remote signer every decrypt is a
*published* relay RPC routed through the serial 250ms request queue, so a
transient failure on the correct family triggered a second wasted RPC
that burned the queue and pushed cold loads toward the relay rate limit
("noting too much") — the symptom users hit.
determineWatchHistoryDecryptionOrder now filters the attempt set to the
single family implied by the ciphertext shape (trusting the ciphertext
over a possibly-misleading "encrypted" tag), with a safety fallback to
the full ordered list when nothing matches so the only available
decryptor is never stranded. This mirrors the list-decrypt routing
already shipped for userBlocks / subscriptions / hashtags (slice A).
Test: a NIP-44 ciphertext mislabeled with an ["encrypted","nip04"] tag,
against a signer exposing both decryptors where nip04 returns decoy data.
Asserts nip04 is never attempted and the nip44 plaintext is used.
Mutation-verified: removing the filter fails the test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
The NIP-46 login dialog is purely the QR / connect-link flow ("scan with Amber/
NsecBunker"), but it failed with "A remote signer pubkey is required." A
nostrconnect:// link carries the CLIENT pubkey; the remote signer's pubkey is
only learned after it scans the QR and acknowledges — and the active connect
path (SignerManager) only supported bunker:// (pubkey already in the URI). The
"wait for the signer to acknowledge" logic existed only on the unused
Nip46Connector.
Port it into SignerManager as _waitForRemoteSignerHandshake: subscribe to
kind-24133 events addressed to the client pubkey, decrypt the signer's response,
match the handshake secret (or a generic ack), surface auth_url challenges, and
resolve with the signer's pubkey (with a timeout + a cancel hook wired into
disconnectRemoteSigner). connectRemoteSigner now performs this wait for
client-initiated (nostrconnect) connections before constructing the RPC client;
bunker:// is unchanged.
Decryption uses the existing attemptDecryptNip46HandshakePayload (injectable via
_decryptHandshakePayload for testing). Test: tests/nostr/nip46-wait-handshake.test.mjs
(secret match resolves with signer pubkey; wrong secret ignored -> timeout;
auth_url surfaced without resolving). Full suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
connectRemoteSigner and useStoredRemoteSigner accepted but never used the
`validator` the auth provider passes (accessControl.canAccess) -- so NIP-46
logins bypassed the block/allow gate that nsec/NIP-07 logins enforce. (The
validation lived only on the unused Nip46Connector.)
Both paths now run the validator against the remote signer's resolved user
pubkey BEFORE activating the signer (via _enforceRemoteSignerValidator): the
validator throws on a blocked/non-permitted pubkey, or returning false rejects
with code remote-signer-access-denied. A stored session rejected by the
validator is forgotten so a blocked pubkey can't keep retrying.
Residual (noted in TODO): the silent startup auto-restore
(scheduleStoredRemoteSignerRestore) still reconnects without a validator.
Test: tests/nostr/nip46-prepare-handshake.test.mjs (validator throws / false /
true / absent). Full suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
NIP-46 login via a generated connect link failed with
"nostrClient.prepareRemoteSignerHandshake is not a function". The auth provider
(authProviders/nip46.js) calls nostrClient.prepareRemoteSignerHandshake() to mint
an ephemeral client keypair + nostrconnect:// URI before connecting, but that
method existed only on the unused Nip46Connector class — neither SignerManager
nor NostrClient exposed it.
Add SignerManager.prepareRemoteSignerHandshake (generates the keypair via
nostr-tools, resolves relays, builds the nostrconnect:// URI with relay/secret/
perms/metadata params) and proxy it on NostrClient next to connectRemoteSigner.
Test: tests/nostr/nip46-prepare-handshake.test.mjs. Full suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
